Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES RICARDO and G.R.
NO. 149508
LEONILA DE LOS
Petitioners,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and
REYES,
JJ.
MA.
SOCORRO V. VDA. DE
MANGUBAT,
SPS. PURIFICACION
V.
LINAO and DOMINGO LINAO,
BIENVENIDO
G. VILLARENTE,
SPS.
CESAR G. VILLARENTE and
MARIA
DE LUZ HALILI, and
SPS.
LILIA V. MONTENEGRO and
RUDY
individual
capacities and as Heirs of
JOSEFA
R. CABAGAT, represented
by
BIENVENIDO G. VILLARENTE, Promulgated:
Respondents.* October 10, 2007
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
In the present Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Spouses Ricardo and Leonila
de los Santos (petitioners) assail the Resolution[1]
dated October 27, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61394 which
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners before it;
and the CA Resolution[2]
dated July 3, 2001 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
October 27, 2000 Resolution.
The procedural antecedents and
factual background of the case are as follows:
Private respondents are the registered
owners of Lot No. 1033 located in Sta. Cruz, Sta. Maria, Bulacan
with an area of 793 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 61.279.[3] Located in the east of Lot No. 1033 is Lot
No. 1034 where the house of petitioners is erected, with an area of 530 square
meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18929 in the name of a certain Elena
San Jose.[4] In front of Lot No. 1034 is the provincial
road.[5]
On
In
their Answer dated 22 June 1998, petitioners denied liability on the grounds
that the persons who allegedly executed
the Deed of Assignment of Right of Way are neither the owners nor possessors of
Lot No. 1034 and thus, the Deed of Assignment of Right of Way is null and void;
that the Deed of Assignment was executed because of the anticipation that Lot
No. 1034 will be allotted to the assignors as their share in the estate of
their ascendant, Pedro San Jose; that instead, Lot No. 1034 was inherited by
petitioner Leonila de los
Santos; and that the private respondents cannot demand the right of way there
being no proof that they have indemnified the petitioners.
Trial ensued and on P28,350.00;
but which denied the private respondents’ prayer for damages.[7]
A copy of the RTC’s
Decision was received by petitioners on
Dissatisfied,
the petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on
Petitioners
then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 61394.[13] On October 27, 2000, the CA issued a
Resolution[14]
dismissing the petition on two grounds: first, the verification and the
non-forum shopping certification is signed by petitioners’ counsel which is
proscribed by law; and second, the petitioners failed to file a Motion
for Reconsideration before resorting to the petition for certiorari. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but to no avail.[15]
Hence,
the present petition based on the following grounds:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ISSUED THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS DATED OCTOBER 27, 2000 BASED SOLELY ON TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS x x x AS WELL AS EFFECTIVELY AFFIRMING PUBLIC RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT’S MANIFESTLY NULL AND VOID ORDER OF AUGUST 17, 2000 DENYING DUE COURSE TO PETITIONER’S NOTICE OF APPEAL EVEN AS THE SAME WAS FILED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED ORDER OF
On
In
2005, pending resolution of herein petition, the Court amended the Rules of
Court on the appeal period in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals,[17] to
wit:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
x x x x
To recapitulate, a party litigant
may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new
15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory
after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
This
“fresh period rule” served as the beacon of light that guided the Court in the
resolution of the present petition.
However, there are existing
procedural rules that would have blocked the outright application of Neypes to the present case.
First, the dismissal by the CA of the petition
for certiorari filed before it by the petitioners was based on the
grounds that the verification and non-forum shopping certification were
signed by petitioners’ counsel; and that petitioners failed to file a motion
for reconsideration of the order denying due course to the appeal before
resorting to a petition for certiorari.
Supreme
Court Circular No. 28-91,[18]
as amended by SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94,[19]
specifically provided that the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping must be signed by the plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal
party seeking relief and failure to do so shall be a cause for the dismissal of
the petition.[20] This rule is now embodied in Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.[21]
In the present case, it was Atty.
Eduardo G. Araullo, the counsel for the petitioners,
who signed both the verification and certification against forum shopping
instead of the petitioners.[22]
In
Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,[23] the
Court held that the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and
not a jurisdictional requisite. It is
intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading
are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation. A party’s representative,
lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the
pleading may sign the verification.
The
rule that the certification on non-forum shopping should be signed by the
petitioner has been relaxed by the Court in several instances where procedural
lapses are overlooked in the interest of substantial justice and for compelling
reasons.[24]
In the present case, the issue
whether the RTC committed an error in awarding a right of way in favor of
private respondents, together with the other issues mentioned in the petition
for certiorari filed with the CA, are proper subjects of appeal. The fact that litigants have been given a
“fresh period” of appeal, constrains the Court to give due course to the
petition.
Second, the general rule is that before certiorari
under Rule 65 can be availed of, a motion for reconsideration must first be
filed.[25] However, this rule admits of exceptions.[26]
In
a plethora of cases, the Court held that when the Rules of Procedure are rigid
and strict in application, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote justice, the Court is empowered to suspend them.[27] The Court finds that the present case is one
of the instances where the rigid application of the rule on filing a motion for
reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari may be suspended
to give way to the application of the new rule enunciated in Neypes.
Third, the present Petition for Certiorari
filed with this Court is an improper remedy in bringing the instant case before
this Court. The proper remedy to obtain
reversal of the CA’s
While the Court may treat a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 as having been filed under Rule 45 to serve
the higher interest of justice, such liberal application of the rules finds no
application if the petition is filed well beyond the reglementary
period for filing a petition for review without any reason therefor.[28]
Herein petition for certiorari was
filed on the 60th day from date of receipt of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration,[29]
well beyond the 15-day period within which to file the petition for review
under Rule 45.
However, considering that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it
is well-recognized that the Supreme Court is empowered to suspend its
operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than to
promote the ends of justice.[30]
Taking into account the fact that
private respondent is entitled to the “fresh period rule,” in the interest of
substantial justice, procedural rules of the most
mandatory character in terms of compliance may be relaxed.[31]
Thus, setting aside technicalities,
the Court will proceed to determine the merits of herein petition.
For
a better perspective in the resolution of the present case, it is necessary
that the Court examine the petition for certiorari[32]
filed by petitioners before the CA.
Petitioners
raised the following issues, viz:
I.
WHETHER or not the public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it issued the questioned Decision dated May 3, 2000 granting a right of way to private respondents which was clearly more prejudicial and burdensome to the servient estate there being an existing concrete residential building getting in the way of the subject right of way owned not by petitioners but by third parties who were never impleaded in this case.
II.
WHETHER or not the public respondent gravely abused his discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it issued the assailed order of July 19, 2000 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding the fact that it had meritorious grounds and was timely filed;
III.
WHETHER or not
the public respondent gravely abused his discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, when it issued the assailed order dated August 17, 2000 denying
due course to petitioners’ Notice of Appeal even as the same was filed within
the reglementary period.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
The
Court will limit itself only to the sub-issue mentioned in the second issue regarding
the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision and to the
third issue involving the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The first two issues involve matters which go
into the merits of the case which should be properly threshed out in an appeal
before the CA.
The petitioners argue that the notice
of appeal filed before the RTC on
Before Neypes,
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from; and the period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion
for new trial or reconsideration.
The RTC acknowledges that on
In Neypes,
the trial court issued an order dated
The Court elucidated in Neypes that in order to standardize
the appeal periods provided in the Rules of Court and to afford litigants a fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, it is practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration. Thus, the Court
held that petitioners Neypes seasonably filed
their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days counted from the date
of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration.[38]
Procedural law refers to the
adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that
courts may be able to administer justice.[39]
Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law,
or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues - they may be
given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.[40]
The
“fresh period rule” is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15
days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for
reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of
procedural laws, the “fresh period rule” should be applied to pending actions,
such as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the
benefit of the “fresh period rule” will amount to injustice, if not absurdity,
since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years
later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final
order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that
parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998
will enjoy the benefit of the “fresh period rule” while those later
rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.
Petitioners
filed their Notice of Appeal on
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. In the higher interest of substantial
justice, the assailed Court of Appeals Resolutions dated
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* The
Court of Appeals and Presiding Judge D. Roy A. Masadao,
Jr., of the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 9, having been included as a co-respondents,
are deleted from the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez (now Acting Presiding Justice) with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr. (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.,
rollo, pp.32-33.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Supra note 1.
[15] Supra note 2.
[16] Rollo, pp. 150 and 163.
[17] G.R. No. 141524,
[18] Effective
[19] Effective
[20] Rambuyon
v. Fiesta Brands, Inc., G.R. No. 157029,
[21] Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court provides: “[T]he petition shall be accompanied by x x x a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.”
[22] Rollo
at p. 149.
[23] G.R. No. 146364,
[24] Office of the
Ombudsman v.
[25] Building Care Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 94237, February 26, 1997, 268
SCRA 666; Philippine National Construction Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 112629, July 7, 1995, 245 SCRA 668; Gonpu Services Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 111897, January 27, 1997, 266 SCRA 657.
[26] See Acance
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699,
[27] Rivera v.
People, G.R. No. 163996,
[28] Caballes v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 163108,
[29] Rollo, p. 1.
[30] Metro Rail Transit Corporation v.
Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 166273, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 562.
[31] Department of Agrarian Reform v.
Republic, G.R. No. 160560,
[32] Rollo,
pp. 128-149.
[33]
[34] RTC Order dated
[35]
[36] Annex “M,” rollo, p. 123.
[37]
[38]
[39] Lopez v.
Gloria, 40 Phil 28 (1919).
[40] Jamero
v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140929,