Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
SECOND DIVISION
|
ESTATE OF THE LATE
ENCARNACION VDA. DE PANLILIO, represented by GEORGE LIZARES,
Petitioner, - versus - GONZALO DIZON, RICARDO
GUINTU, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ELISEO GUINTU, ROBERTO DIZON, EDILBERTO CATU,
HERMINIGILDO FLORES, CIPRIANO DIZON, JUANARIO MANIAGO, GORGONIO CANLAS,
ANTONIO LISING, CARLOS PINEDA, RENATO GOZUN, ALFREDO MERCADO, BIENVENIDO
MACHADA, and the REGIONAL DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
REGION III, Respondents. x-------------------------------------------x REYNALDO VILLANUEVA, CENON
GUINTO, CELESTINO DIZON, CARMELITA VDA. DE DAVID, FORTUNATO TIMBANG, OSCAR
Petitioners, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS and
GEORGE LIZARES, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 148777 Present: QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. G.R. No. 157598 Promulgated: October 18, 2007 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Did
the owner of two (2) lots by a subsequent affidavit validly and legally revoke
the first affidavit voluntarily surrendering said lots for land acquisition
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law?
The answer will determine the rights of the parties in the instant
petitions––the heirs of the lot owner vis-à-vis the tenants declared to be
beneficiaries of the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.[1]
The Case
Before
us are two petitions. The first
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2]
under Rule 45 docketed as G.R. No. 148777, which seeks to set aside the November
29, 2000 Amended Decision[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502, which affirmed the August 7,
1997 Decision[4] of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case Nos.
4558-4561; and the June 26, 2001 Resolution[5] disregarding
the Motion for Reconsideration[6] of
said Amended Decision. The other is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[7]
under Rule 65 docketed as G.R. No. 157598, which seeks to set aside the November
14, 2002 CA Resolution[8]
which denied petitioners’ Motion for Entry of Judgment,[9]
and the January 24, 2003 CA Resolution[10] likewise
denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.[11]
Through our
The Facts
Encarnacion
Vda. De Panlilio is the owner of the disputed landholdings over a vast tract of
land, with an aggregate area of 115.41 hectares called Hacienda Masamat located
in Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 3510, 3513, 3514, 3515, 3522, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3526, 3528, 3530, 3531,
3532, 3533, RT-499 (9191), and RT-500 (11670),[13]
all of the Pampanga Registry of Deeds.
On
Sometime
in 1973, pursuant to the OLT under PD 27, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) issued thirty eight (38) Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) to Panlilio’s
tenants. The tenant-awardees were made
defendants in the instant consolidated complaints filed by petitioner Lizares.
On
Paulina
Mercado likewise filed a similar complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations
(CAR) at San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as CAR Case No. 1649-P’74.
On
Thus, on
1. That I am the owner of an agricultural
landholding situated [in]
2. That I have been informed that 50.22
hectares comprising the portion dedicated to palay crop have been placed under
the provisions and coverage of P.D. No. 27 and that Certificates of Land
Transfer have been issued to the tenant-farmers thereon;
3. That as owner of the abovementioned
property, I interpose no objection to the action taken by the Department of
Agrarian Reform in placing the aforesaid portion dedicated to palay crop within
the coverage of P.D. No. 27;
4. That lately, all the tenants of my said
property including those in the sugarcane portions, have filed a petition dated
December 4, 1976 with the Honorable Secretary Conrado F. Estrella, Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, requesting for the reversion of the sugarcane portion of my
property adverted to [the] palay land which is the original classification of my
entire subject property;
5. That the aforesaid petition dated
6. That
it is my desire that my entire subject property which is referred to as Hacienda
Masamat be placed under the coverage of P.D. 27 without exception and that
thereafter the same be sold to tenant-petitioners.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)
On
On the
basis of the action of the DAR Secretary, the CAR, on March 17, 1978, issued an
Order dismissing the complaint of Paulina Mercado (lessee) in CAR Case No.
1649-P’74, thus:
With this
development, the resolution of the principal issue in the instant case has
become moot and academic, it being already settled in the DAR proceedings the
placement of the land in question under the land transfer program of the
government. Therefore, the instant case
should be dismissed. Necessarily, all
pending incidents should be deemed disposed of.
[17]
On
Thereafter,
sometime in 1993, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to the following
tenants of Panlilio:
EP Nos.
Hermenegildo Flores 690774
143627
Celestino Dizon 690960
683355
45390
Gonzalo Dizon 680524
Roberto Dizon 690758
Cipriano Dizon 45260
45256
Antonio Dizon 681072
Teodulo Dizon 45326
Juanario Maniago 143207
Celestino Esguerra 45265
45219
Florentino Lapuz 690759
45259
Gorgonio Canlas 143508
Carlos Pineda 197097
45254
Renato Gozun 143208
Romeo Pangilinan 475341
Jose Serrano 475340
Wenceslao
Pangilinan 476572
Guillermo del
Rosario 475339
Candido Timbang 143931
45262
45257
Arsenio Legaspi 45266[18]
Subsequently,
in June 1994, the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49 appointed
petitioner George Lizares as executor of the estate of Panlilio.[19] Records show that petitioner Lizares is the
son of the late Jesus Lizares, Panlilio’s administrator of Hacienda Masamat
during her lifetime.
On
On
April 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the PARAD three more complaints for
cancellation of EPs, docketed as DARAB Case Nos. 933-P’95,[22]
934-P’95,[23] and
935-P’95,[24] against
the rest of respondents who filed their motions to dismiss[25]
on grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. On
Upon
petitioner’s motion, all the cases were consolidated. The PARAD then directed the parties to submit
their respective position papers,[28]
and, thereafter, considered the cases submitted for decision.
The
three (3) complaints filed in 1995 for cancellation of EPs have the following defendants:
(1) in DARAB Case No. 933-P’95, Herminigildo Flores and the Regional Director,
DAR, Region III; (2) in DARAB Case No. 934-P’95, Celestino Dizon, Gonzalo
Dizon, Roberto Dizon, and the Regional Director, DAR, Region III; and (3) in
DARAB Case No. 935-P’95, Cipriano Dizon, Antonio Dizon, Teodulo Dizon, Juanario
Maniago, Celestino Esguerra, Florentino Lapuz, Gorgonio Canlas, Antonio Lising,
Carlos Pineda, Renato Gozun, Alfredo Mercado, Romeo Pangilinan, Jose Serrano,
Wenceslao Pangilinan, Guillermo del Rosario, Candido Timbang, Bienvenido
Mechada, and Arsenio Legaspi, and the Regional Director, DAR, Region III.
Thus,
aside from public respondent DAR Regional Director, Region III, DARAB Case No.
638-P’94 had 15 defendants, DARAB Case No. 933-P’95 had a sole defendant, DARAB
Case No. 934-P’95 had three defendants, and DARAB Case No. 935-P’95 had 18
defendants. All the four (4)
consolidated cases were against 37 defendants.
The Ruling of the PARAD in
DARAB Case
Nos. 638-P’94, 933-P’95,
934-P’95 and 935-P’95
On
November 14, 1995, the PARAD rendered a Joint Decision[29]
dismissing petitioner Lizares’ complaint on the ground that the subject
landholdings have been properly placed under the coverage of PD 27 through the
January 12, 1977 Affidavit[30]
of Panlilio, unequivocally placing her entire property within the coverage of the
OLT. In addition, the PARAD relied on
the report of the DAR and the Bureau of Lands personnel that the subject
landholding is devoted to palay. And, finally, the PARAD applied the equitable
remedy of laches, in that Panlilio failed during her lifetime to bring to the
attention of the DAR and CAR her
The Ruling of the DARAB
in DARAB Case Nos. 4558-4561
(DARAB Case Nos. 638-P’94,
933-P’95, 934-P’95 and 935-P’95)
Aggrieved,
petitioner Lizares appealed the PARAD decision before the DARAB, which, on
The
DARAB likewise disregarded petitioner Lizares’ Motion for Reconsideration[33]
of the
Prior
to the issuance of the August 7, 1997 DARAB Decision, petitioner Lizares and defendant-appellees
Wenceslao Pangilinan, Romeo Pangilinan, Jose Serrano, and Guillermo del Rosario
filed their February 10, 1997 Joint Partial Motion to Dismiss[34]
with the DARAB, seeking dismissal of their respective claims in DARAB Case No.
4561 (DARAB Case No. 935-P’95) based on an Affidavit of Cancellation of Lis
Pendens Annotation of TCT Nos. 14321, 14322, 14323, and 14324, all of the Pampanga
Register of Deeds,[35] which
was executed by petitioner Lizares. Apparently, petitioner Lizares received
from a certain Ms. Petronila Catap the amount of PhP 1,356,619 for the
settlement of DARAB Case No. 4561 (DARAB Case No. 935-P’95) against the
abovementioned defendant-appellees.[36]
Earlier
on, petitioner Lizares filed his April 19, 1996 Motion to Withdraw Appeal in
favor of defendant-appellees Reynaldo Villanueva, Cenon Guinto, Carmelita Vda.
de David, Oscar Santiago, Celestino Dizon, Fortunato Timbang, and Florentino
Lapuz in DARAB Case No. 4558 (DARAB Case No. 638-P’94); defendant-appellee
Celestino Dizon in DARAB Case No. 4559 (DARAB Case No. 933-P’95); and
defendant-appellees Antonio Dizon, Teodulo Dizon, Celestino Esguerra,
Florentino Lapuz, and Candido Timbang in DARAB Case No. 4561 (DARAB Case No. 935-P’95),
as said defendant-appellees agreed to settle and compromise with petitioner
Lizares. The motion was however resisted
by other defendant-appellees through a May 27, 1996 Counter-Motion to the
Plaintiff-Appellant Motion to Withdraw Appeal,[37] on
the ground that a piece-meal withdrawal is not proper as the matter in
controversy is common and the same to all.
Unfortunately, the Motion to Withdraw Appeal
was not resolved as petitioner Lizares did not attend the DARAB scheduled
hearings. Thus, the
Petitioner Lizares elevated the DARAB
consolidated cases to the CA for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The
At the outset, the CA saw it
differently.
On
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board affirming the decision of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region III, San Fernando,
Pampanga is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Certificates of Land Transfer issued to
private respondents insofar as they pertain to sugarlands are hereby declared NULL and VOID.[38]
The CA primarily anchored its ruling on
Panlilio’s
The
Unconvinced, Reynaldo Villanueva, et
al. interposed a Motion for Reconsideration or in the alternative, Motion to
Remand for New Trial[39]
of said Decision, where they contended that:
1.
Petitioner’s
complaints should have been dismissed for his failure to implead therein
indispensable parties, namely the Land Bank of the
2.
[The CA]
disturbed and reversed the findings of fact by the PARAD and the DARAB
supported by substantial evidence. x x x
3.
It is not
the job of the appellate court to sieve through the evidence considered by the
administrative agency in adjudicating the case before it, following the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. x x x
4.
[The CA]
violated the principle of res judicata in reversing the CAR resolution
dismissing the complaint in Case No. 1649-P’74 rendered twenty-two years
ago. Likewise, estoppel and laches bar
the instant actions. x x x
5.
Lastly,
the petition should be dismissed in favor of Romeo Pangilinan, Wenceslao
Pangilinan, Jose Serrano and Guillermo del Rosario in view of the compromise
agreement in DARAB Case No. 4561 between them and petitioner herein. They submitted, as proof, their joint motion
to dismiss the complaint executed on
After considering the above contentions
together with petitioner Lizares’ Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration
dated May 2, 2000 with Motion for Correction of the Dispositive Portion of the
Decision,[41]
respondents’ Reply[42]
to said comment, and petitioner’s Rejoinder,[43]
the appellate court rendered on November 29, 2000 the assailed Amended Decision
on a vote of 3-2, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents’ motion for reconsideration
of Our Decision is hereby GRANTED. The
petition is ordered DISMISSED and the challenged DARAB decision is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.[44]
In reversing its earlier April 11, 2000
Decision, the CA concluded that the February 3, 1977 Affidavit was not executed
by Panlilio, ratiocinating that if she indeed made the second affidavit which
purportedly repudiated her earlier January 12, 1977 Affidavit, the natural
course of action to take was for her to submit the second affidavit to the DAR
to exclude the majority of her landholdings planted with sugar cane from the
coverage of the OLT under PD 27. Her
failure to effectuate the removal of her land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) coverage for nine (9) years until her death on
The appellate court also found Panlilio
and her successors-in-interest guilty of laches, pointing out that aside from
the alleged second affidavit of revocation, there was no indication of
Panlilio’s intention to recover the disputed landholdings.
On the issue of fraud and collusion on
the part of the DAR personnel, the CA found that no preponderance of evidence
was evinced to prove the accusation.
In
fine, the CA recognized and applied the
principle of res judicata to the March 17, 1978 CAR Order rendered more
than 20 years ago, holding that the resolution of said court placing the entire
landholdings in question under the coverage of PD 27 had long become final and
executory.
Petitioner Lizares’ plea for recall of
the assailed Amended Decision was rejected through the assailed
Petition
for review on certiorari under G.R. No. 148777
Thus, we have this Petition for Review
on Certiorari against only 15 private respondents from the original defendants
below, namely: Gonzalo Dizon, Ricardo
Guintu, Rogelio Munoz, Eliseo Guintu, Roberto Dizon, Edilberto Catu,
Herminigildo Flores, Cipriano Dizon, Juanario Maniago, Gorgonio Canlas, Antonio
Lising, Carlos Pineda, Renato Gozun, Alfredo Mercado, and Bienvenido Machada.
Petition
for certiorari under G.R. No. 157598
Consequent to the filing of the Petition
for Review on Certiorari by petitioner Lizares, on
The November 14, 2002 CA Resolution[48]
denied their motions for entry of judgment. A Motion for Reconsideration[49]
having been turned down through the January 24, 2003 CA Resolution,[50]
petitioners now register the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus in
G.R. No. 157598, assailing the aforesaid Resolutions for grave abuse of
discretion.
The
Issues
In G.R.
No. 148777, petitioner Lizares presents the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether or not in its
2. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000
Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals erred gravely in setting aside the 11
April 2000 Decision’s ruling that the land in question being planted with
sugarcane is not covered by P.D. No. 27, by instead declaring that “the fact
that land is sugarland has become inconsequential to the coverage under P.D.
No. 27 in the light of the affidavit dated January 12, 1977”;
3. Whether or not in its
4. Whether or not res judicata applies in
the instant case;
5. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000
Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals erred gravely in failing to rule that
there was fraud and collusion on the part of the respondents in the coverage of
the subject parcels of land;
6. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted
with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the transfer made by the private
respondents to third persons valid;
7. Whether or not forum-shopping or a false
certification of non-forum shopping [is present] here; and
8. Whether or not the instant petition complies
with the nature and requisites of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.[51]
In G.R. No. 157598, petitioners raise the sole issue of “whether the petitioners are entitled to an
entry of judgment.”[52]
The
Court’s Ruling
G.R. No. 148777
Before
we go to the substantial issues, we tackle first the procedural issues raised
in the last two issues in G.R. No. 148777 on whether the instant petition
complies with the requirements of Rule 45 and whether forum shopping is present.
Petition complied with
requisites for review on certiorari
Private
respondents contend that the grounds relied upon by petitioner are factual in
nature and thus outside the purview of a review on certiorari by this
Court. Petitioner disagrees and posits
that the petition raises issues of both fact and law which are so intimately
intertwined and that issues of law permeate the controversy between the
parties.
We find
for petitioner. The rule is clear––questions of facts are proscribed by Rule
45. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence
to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted. A question of fact
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and
to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[53]
The rule
is subject to exceptions. One such exception
exists in this case. Mixed questions of law and facts are raised pertaining to
the applicability of PD 27 on a large
portion of subject landholdings that were planted with sugar cane, which would
have been otherwise exempt, but were voluntary waived through an affidavit by
the lot owner to be placed under the OLT pursuant to said law; the import and
significance of the purported affidavit of revocation; and, the interpretation
of Executive Order No. (EO) 228[54]
in relation to subsequent land transfer made by the farmer-beneficiaries.
At the
very least, the instant petition complies with the requisites of Rule 45,
particularly Section 6, as we have given the instant petition due course.[55]
No forum shopping
Private
respondents argue that petitioner Lizares is guilty of forum shopping for
having pursued other civil cases allegedly involving the same subject matter
and on the same grounds raised in this petition. Petitioner Lizares counters that there is no
forum shopping, first, as the instant petition is a mere continuation of a
pending action, that is, the consolidated cases filed with the PARAD; second,
the causes of action and issues raised in the other civil cases lodged with the
RTC were different.
Respondents’
postulation cannot be entertained.
Private
respondents failed to furnish us copies of portions of the relevant records of the
other civil cases instituted by petitioner Lizares needed to determine the
existence of forum shopping. Absent such
necessary pleadings, we are constrained to take petitioner’s assertion at face
value that the other cases, particularly Civil Case Nos. 11342, 11344, 11345,
11346 and 11347, filed before the RTC differ from the instant case as to the
issues raised, the reliefs prayed for, and the parties impleaded.
Time
and again, the court has reminded prospective petitioners and lawyers alike
that it is necessary that they attach to the petition under Rule 45 all the
material portions of the case records of the lower courts or quasi-judicial
bodies which at one time or another had adjudicated the case or complaint. These documents are required to support the
grounds presented in the petition under Rule 45.[56] Any decision, order, pleading, or document forming
parts of the records that is relevant or important to the petition should be
appended to it so that the court, in reviewing the petition, will have easy
access to these papers. More
importantly, the submission will obviate delay as the court can readily decide
the petition without need of the elevation of the records of the court or
quasi-judicial body a quo.
Now we
move on to the substantive issues.
Main Issue: Genuineness and authenticity
of the February 3, 1977 Affidavit
The pith of the dispute is whether or not the
We rule
in the negative.
In a
slew of cases, the principle is firmly entrenched in this jurisdiction that
this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not tasked to calibrate and assess
the probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial all over
again.[57] However, in rare occasions, exceptions are
allowed. One exception is when there are
competing factual findings by the different triers of fact, such as those made
by the quasi-agencies on the one hand and the CA on the other, this Court is
compelled to go over the records of the case, as well as the submissions of the
parties, and resolve the factual issues.[58] In this case, however, there is
coalescence in the findings of the appellate court with that of the two
quasi-judicial agencies below––the PARAD and DARAB––on the issue of the
authenticity of the second Panlilio Affidavit.
It
being a question of fact, we find no reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions of the court a quo in its questioned November 29, 2000
Amended Decision holding that the challenged February 3, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit
is not an authentic document. We quote
with approval the factual findings of the CA which completely gave full accord
and affirmed the findings of the PARAD and DARAB, viz:
After assessing
the grounds raised by respondents in their motion for reconsideration and a
meticulous review of the records, We are now in serious doubts as to the
correctness of Our Decision. Our reasons
are:
First,
according to petitioner Lizares, Panlilio’s second affidavit (revoking her
first affidavit) upon which this Court anchors its assailed Decision, was
executed as early as
Moreover, in
her second affidavit, Panlilio specifically stated:
“That another
reason for my desire not to place my entire property referred to as Hacienda
Masamat in Mexico, Pampanga, under P.D. 27 is the fact that the said Hacienda
Masamat is leased to my nephew’s wife, Mrs. Paulina Y. Mercado, and the lease
contract I executed in her favor covering my said Hacienda Masamat is still
subsisting and in force and will expire only after the agricultural crop year
1978-1979;”
If Panlilio
indeed signed her affidavit of revocation, why did she not inform her niece
Paulina about it in order to protect her right as a lessee? It must be remembered that at that time, the
latter’s complaints (for cancellation of CLTs) against the tenants of Panlilio
were still pending in the DAR and the CAR.
Had Panlilio given Paulina a copy of such second affidavit, she could
have brought it to the attention of the CAR and the DAR. Certainly, the subject landholdings could not
have been placed entirely under Operation Land Transfer. We need not emphasize here that being a
lessee, Paulina would not want to part with her Aunt’s landholdings.
Out of the
blue, the second affidavit surfaced only in 1994 and 1995 when petitioner
Lizares brought the instant actions against Panlilio’s tenants or after
eighteen (18) years from the date of its alleged execution. At this juncture, We can only conclude
without hesitation that Panlilio did not execute the second affidavit.
Petitioner
alleged in his position paper that the same affidavit of revocation was
submitted to the DAR and the CAR, but they were not acted upon because of the
dismissal of the cases for cancellation of CLTs filed by Paulina Mercado. Petitioner’s claim is a mere allegation. It has not been substantiated. Again, if it were true, why did Panlilio and
Paulina fail to pursue any further action?[59]
We
respect and accord finality to the aforequoted findings of facts of the CA,
being the tribunal tasked to undertake a final review of the facts of the case
subject of course to certain tolerated exceptional situations. Once again we
reiterate the prevailing rule that the findings of fact of the trial court,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court.[60]
Second Issue: There is valid waiver through
the January 12, 1977 Affidavit
The CA likewise did not err in reversing its April
11, 2000 Decision that the subject land was properly covered by PD 27 since
Panlilio surrendered said lot to the DAR for coverage under PD 27 pursuant to
her January 12, 1977 Affidavit. The
non-existence of the February 3, 1977 Affidavit supports the inclusion of the
entire lot in the CARP of the Government.
On the
other hand, petitioner Lizares argues that there was no valid waiver under PD 27.
We are
not convinced.
Considering
the non-revocation of the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit,, the CA
considered the land of Panlilio planted with sugar cane as falling under the coverage
of PD 27, thus:
[W]hile the
proceedings in the CAR tend to establish the land as principally sugarland,
hence outside the coverage of P.D. 27, still, Panlilio’s consent to have the
entire land covered by the said law as alleged in her first affidavit, cannot
be construed as a violation of its provisions.
In fact, in executing the said affidavit, she did not defeat, nor
contravene the express intent of the law to emancipate her tenants from the
bondage of the soil. In doing so, she
even supported its implementation.
In Our
challenged Decision We found that the subject land was principally planted [with]
sugar and therefore outside the pale of P.D. 27. But We overlooked the fact that Panlilio in
her first affidavit, which was not validly revoked, expressed her desire to
have her entire landholdings placed within the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer. To be sure, the fact
that Panlilio’s land is sugarland has become inconsequential in the light of
her first affidavit.[61]
We agree with the CA.
While
PD 27 clearly applies to private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice
and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as
landed estate or not, it does not preclude nor prohibit the disposition of
landholdings planted with other crops to the tenants by express will of the
landowner under PD 27.
In the
instant case, a large portion of Hacienda Masamat with an aggregate area of
115.41 hectares was planted with sugar cane.
It is undisputed, as was duly shown in the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit,
that only 50.22 hectares were planted with palay. Thus, approximately 65.19 hectares of the subject
landholdings were planted with sugar cane aside from the portions used for the
residences of the tenants and planted with crops for their daily
sustenance. Needless to say, with the
January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit, she expressed her intent to include the
65.19 hectares to be placed under the OLT pursuant to PD 27 in favor of her
tenants which otherwise would have been exempt.
Indeed, waiver or an intentional and voluntary surrender of a right can
give rise to a valid title or ownership of a property in favor of another under
Article 6 of the Civil Code. Thus, such
disposition through the OLT pursuant to PD 27 is indeed legal and proper and no
irregularity can be attributed to the DAR which merely relied on the January
12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit.
Third Issue:
Equitable
remedy of laches
The court a quo correctly ruled that
Panlilio and her successors-in-interest are bound by the coverage of the lot
under PD 27 by reason of laches.
Even
granting arguendo that the February 3, 1977 Affidavit of revocation is
genuine and was furnished both the DAR and the CAR, still, no relief can be
accorded petitioner Lizares on account of laches.
Laches and its elements
Delay for a prolonged period of time
can result in loss of rights and actions.
The equitable defense of laches does not even concern itself with the
character of the defendant’s title, but only with plaintiff’s long inaction or
inexcusable neglect to bar the latter’s action as it would be inequitable and
unjust to the defendant.
According
to settled jurisprudence, “laches” means “the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which—by the exercise
of due diligence—could or should have been done earlier.”[62] Verily, laches serves to deprive a party
guilty of it of any judicial remedies.
Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the
complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct as having
been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or
notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right
in which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is
not held barred.[63]
In Santiago v. Court of Appeals,
we explained that there is “no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances.”[64]
Laches has set in
The records demonstrate clear signs
of laches. The first element is
undisputed. Panlilio’s erstwhile tenants
were issued CLTs sometime in 1973 and subsequently EPs in 1993. CAR Case No. 1649-P’74 filed by Panlilio’s
lessee, Paulina Mercado, was dismissed with finality on
It cannot be disputed that Panlilio’s
tenants, the private respondents, occupied portions of the subject landholdings
in an open, continuous, and adverse manner in the concept of owners from 1978
until 1994 and 1995 when the subject cases were instituted by petitioner
Lizares or for more than sixteen (16) years.
Private respondents’ possession of said portions for a lengthy period of
time gave cause to petitioner to complain and take legal steps to protect
Panlilio’s rights of ownership and title over the disputed lot. No such action was taken.
Likewise, the second element of
laches is amply shown. Panlilio and her
successors-in-interest did not take any administrative or judicial action to
protect her rights for more than 16 years.
As it is, if Panlilio indeed executed
the affidavit of revocation in February 3, 1977, why did she not pursue any
action to implement her affidavit disregarding her January 12, 1977 Affidavit? Indeed, Panlilio, during her lifetime, did
not lift a finger to regain her land.
After she died on December 29, 1986, Jesus Lizares, her administrator
for Hacienda Masamat, likewise did not initiate any legal action to effectuate
her alleged wish. Unfortunately for
petitioner Lizares, the cases initiated by him in 1994 and 1995 were belatedly
filed and much delay had transpired which proved to be prejudicial to his
interests.
Anent the third element, private
respondents did not know nor anticipate that their possession, occupancy, and
ownership of the subject landholdings after 16 years would still be
questioned. In fact, private respondents
did not only continue tilling the land, but later on had conveyed their lots to
innocent third parties for value.
Moreover, we take judicial notice that numerous commercial buildings,
residential houses, and a large mall stand on major portions of former Hacienda
Masamat. In fact, the subject
landholdings are now much different from what they were more than two decades
ago. Thus, after
more than sixteen (16) years of unquestioned, peaceful, and uninterrupted
possession, private respondents did not expect that petitioner Lizares would
still assert any right over the landholdings after the lapse of such a long
period of occupation.
Finally, grave prejudice and serious
damage would befall private respondents, in general, who relied on their CLTs
and EPs, and subsequent purchasers for value of the lots forming parts of the
former hacienda who relied on private respondents’ titles if the complaints of
petitioner were not barred. As a matter of fact, some buyers not
impleaded in the instant case opted to settle out-of-court with petitioner
Lizares rather than be disturbed in their possession and their right of
ownership.
Considering the foregoing discussion,
we uphold the finding of laches. Verily,
it would be a grave injustice if private respondents and the subsequent
purchasers for value would now be made to suffer after petitioner Lizares and
his predecessors-in-interest had slept on their rights for more than 16
years.
Fourth Issue: Principle of res judicata inapplicable
Private
respondents contend that the dismissal in CAR Case No. 1649-P’74 constitutes res
judicata over the instant case. CAR
Case No. 1649-P’74 involved Panlilio’s lessee against private respondents with
the issue of the crops being planted on subject landholdings, while the instant
case involves Panlilio’s successor-in-interest petitioner Lizares against
private respondents involving the issue of the alleged affidavit of revocation.
The
reliance on res judicata is
misplaced.
Res judicata, either in the concept of bar by
former judgment or conclusiveness of judgment, cannot be applied to the present
case.
In Vda. de Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr.,
we discussed the doctrine of res judicata, as follows:
The doctrine of res judicata
thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: 1) The
judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes
the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new
action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any
other tribunal; and 2) Any right, fact,
or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or
decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claim or demand, purpose or subject matter of the two suits
is the same. These two main rules mark
the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which
a judgment may operate as evidence. In
speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds
to the aforequoted paragraph (b) of Section 49, is referred to as “bar by
former judgment” while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph
(c) of the same section, is known as “conclusiveness of judgment.”
Stated otherwise, when we
speak of res judicata in its concept as a “bar by former judgment,” the
judgment rendered in the first case is an absolute bar to the subsequent action
since said judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and
received to sustain that judgment but also as to any other matter which might
have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged
therein. This is the concept in which
the term res judicata is more commonly and generally used and in which
it is understood as the bar by prior judgment constituting a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases.
On the other hand, the less
familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule
on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the
prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined
therein or which were necessarily included therein. Consequently, since other admissible and
relevant matters which the parties in the second action could properly offer are
not concluded by the said judgment, the same is not a bar to or a ground for
dismissal of the second action.
At bottom, the other
elements being virtually the same, the fundamental difference between the rule
of res judicata as a bar by former judgment and as merely a rule on the
conclusiveness of judgment is that, in the first, there is an identity in the
cause of action in both cases involved whereas, in the second, the cause of
action in the first case is different from that in the second case.[65]
Premised on the foregoing
disquisition, the principle of res judicata requires the concurrence of
the following requisites:
a) The former judgment or order must be
final;
b) It
must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the
trial of the case;
c) It
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and
d) There
must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action. This
requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same
parties.[66]
For want of the fourth requisite that
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter, and cause of action, the instant case is thus removed from the
operation of the principle of res judicata. Stated differently, there is no identity of
parties and issues in CAR Case No. 1649-P’74 and the instant case.
Nevertheless,
while res judicata is not applicable in the instant case, still, it will
not accord legal relief to petitioner with respect to his claim of ownership
over the lots in dispute.
Fifth Issue:
Fraud and collusion not proven
Petitioner
Lizares accuses the DAR personnel and private respondents of fraud and
collusion. Absent any proof, such
allegation falls flat.
In the
recent case of Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, we elucidated on
this same issue of the required evidential proof, thus:
Basic is the
rule of actori incumbit onus probandi, or the burden of proof lies with
the plaintiff. Differently stated, upon
the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. In the case at bar, petitioners must therefore
establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it––which
petitioners utterly failed to do so.
Besides, it is an age-old rule in civil cases that one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. Fraud is never presumed, but must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.
Thus, by admitting that Victorino, Luis, and Jovito, all surnamed Reyes,
indeed executed the Deed of Quitclaim coupled with the absence of evidence
substantiating fraud and mistake in its execution, we are constrained to uphold
the appellate court’s conclusion that the execution of the Deed of Quitclaim
was valid.[67]
Hence,
we uphold the CA’s pronouncement that there was no collusion and fraud
especially considering that no clear and convincing evidence was presented to
overwhelm and rebut the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed[68] by the
DAR personnel.
Sixth Issue: Subsequent transfers
valid only
to qualified farmer-beneficiaries
Petitioner
Lizares asseverates that ownership of lands granted to tenant-farmers under PD 27
may not be transferred or conveyed to third parties except by hereditary
succession or to the Government. He
contends that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the sale
of the land by private respondents Gonzalo Dizon, et al. to third persons
valid. The CA ratiocinated that EO 228 was enacted after PD 27 and since EO 228
is a later law, it will prevail over PD 27. Thus, the ownership of the lot may
now be transferred to persons other than the heirs of the beneficiary or the Government.
Petitioner
is correct.
EO 228 not inconsistent
with PD 27 on prohibition of transfers
The
prohibition in PD 27, the Tenants Emancipation Decree, which took effect on October
21, 1972, states that “[t]itle to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the
Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by hereditary succession or to the
Government in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of
Agrarian Reforms and other existing laws and regulations (emphasis supplied).”
Hereditary succession means succession by
intestate succession or by will to the compulsory heirs under the Civil Code,
but does not pertain to testamentary succession to other persons. “Government”
means the DAR through the Land Bank of the
Thus, PD 27 is clear that after full payment and
title to the land is acquired, the land shall not be transferred except to the
heirs of the beneficiary or the Government.
If the amortizations for the land have not yet been paid, then there can
be no transfer to anybody since the lot is still owned by the Government. The
prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs of other
qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the Government to develop
generations of farmers to attain its avowed goal to have an adequate and
sustained agricultural production. With certitude, such objective will not see
the light of day if lands covered by agrarian reform can easily be converted
for non-agricultural purposes.
On the
other hand, Sec. 6 of EO 228 provides, thus:
Sec. 6 The total cost of the land including interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum with a two percent (2%) interest rebate for amortizations paid on times,
shall be paid by the farmer-beneficiary or his heirs to the Land Bank over a
period of up to twenty (20) years in twenty (20) equal annual amortizations.
Lands already valued and financed by Land Bank are likewise extended a 20-year
period of payment of twenty (20) equal annual amortizations. However, the
farmer-beneficiary if he so elects, may pay in full before the twentieth year
or may request the Land Bank to structure a repayment period of less than
twenty (20) years if the amount to amount to be financed and the corresponding
annual obligations are well within the farmer’s capacity to meet. Ownership
of lands acquired by farmer-beneficiary may be transferred after full payment
of amortizations. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The CA highlighted
and made much of the last sentence of Sec. 6 which authorizes the transfer of
the ownership of the lands acquired by the farmer-beneficiary after full
payment of amortizations. It construed
said provision to mean that the farmer-beneficiary can sell the land even to a
non-qualified person.
This is
incorrect.
First
of all, the provision in question is silent as to who can be the transferees of
the land acquired through the CARP. The rule in statutory construction is that
statutes in pari materia should be construed together and harmonized.[69] Since
there appears to be no irreconcilable conflict between PD 27 and Sec. 6 of EO
228, then the two (2) provisions can be made compatible by maintaining the rule
in PD 27 that lands acquired under said decree can only be transferred to the
heirs of the original beneficiary or to the Government. Second, PD 27 is the specific law on agrarian
reform while EO 228 was issued principally to implement PD 27. This can easily
be inferred from EO 228 which provided for the mode of valuation of lands
subject of PD 27 and the manner of payment by the farmer-beneficiary and mode
of compensation to the land owner. Third,
implied repeals are not favored. A perusal of the aforequoted Sec. 6 of EO 228
readily reveals that it confers upon the beneficiary the privilege of paying
the value of the land on a twenty (20)-year annual amortization plan at six
percent (6%) interest per annum. He may elect to pay in full the installments
or have the payment plan restructured. Said
provision concludes by saying that after full payment, ownership of the land
may already be transferred. Thus, it is plain to see that Sec. 6 principally
deals with payment of amortization and not on who qualify as legal transferees
of lands acquired under PD 27. Since there is no incompatibility between PD 27 and
EO 228 on the qualified transferees of land acquired under PD 27, ergo, the
lands acquired under said law can only be transferred to the heirs of the
beneficiary or to the Government for eventual transfer to qualified
beneficiaries by the DAR pursuant to the explicit proscription in PD 27.
Thus,
the alleged transfers made by private respondents in G.R. No. 148777 of lands acquired
under PD 27 to non-qualified persons are illegal and null and void.[70]
The
ruling in Victorino Torres v. Leon Ventura sheds light on the policy behind
the prohibition, thus:
The law is
clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of Presidential
Decree No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was DEEMED OWNER of the land in
question. As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of the
soil. As such, he gained the rights to possess, cultivate, and enjoy the landholding
for himself. Those rights over that
particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To
insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not,
under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by
hereditary succession, to his successors.[71]
In addition,
the prohibition was expanded not only to cover the title issued to the
tenant-farmer but also the rights and interests of the farmer in the land while
he is still paying the amortizations on it.
A contrary ruling would make the farmer an “easy prey to those who would
like to tempt [him/her] with cash in exchange for inchoate title over the same,”
and PD 27 could be easily circumvented and the title shall eventually be
acquired by non-tillers of the soil.[72]
Anent the contravention of the prohibition under PD 27, we
ruled in Siacor v. Gigantana[73]
and more recently in Caliwag-Carmona v. Court
of Appeals,[74] that
sales or transfers of lands made in violation of PD 27 and EO 228 in favor of
persons other than the Government by other legal means or to the farmer’s
successor by hereditary succession are null and void. The prohibition even
extends to the surrender of the land to the former landowner. The sales or transfers are void ab initio,
being contrary to law and public policy under Art. 5 of the Civil Code that
“acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibiting laws shall be
void x x x.” In this regard, the DAR is duty-bound to take appropriate measures
to annul the illegal transfers and recover the land unlawfully conveyed to
non-qualified persons for disposition to qualified beneficiaries. In the case at bar, the alleged transfers
made by some if not all of respondents Gonzalo Dizon, et al. (G.R. No. 148777)
of lands covered by PD 27 to non-qualified persons are illegal and null and
void.
G.R. No. 157598
Finally,
we resolve the sole issue raised in G.R. No. 157598 on whether petitioners
Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. are entitled to a partial entry of judgment of the
Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502.
Petitioners in G.R. No.
157598 are not entitled to a partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502
Petitioners
contend that they are entitled to a partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No.
47502 as respondent George Lizares in G.R. No. 148777 deliberately excluded
them on account of the amicable settlement concluded between them. Thus, they contend that any judgment rendered
by the Court in G.R. No. 148777 will not affect them. In gist, petitioners strongly assert that the
Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 is already final and executory with
respect to them.
Respondent
Lizares, on the other hand, has continually affirmed that he deliberately
excluded petitioners in his petition for review under G.R. No. 148777 as they
had amicably settled with him; and that he has released, discharged, and waived
any and all claims against petitioners on account of the petition. Thus, respondent Lizares interposes no
objection for the issuance of a partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No.
47502 insofar as petitioners are concerned, as the issues and reliefs he is
seeking in G.R. No. 148777 do not concern nor prejudice petitioners.
We disagree.
It is
clear that petitioners, though they settled with respondent Lizares out-of-court,
were not able to get a favorable ruling from the DARAB approving the motion to
withdraw appeal filed by respondent Lizares in DARAB Case Nos. 4558, 4559, and 4561. This motion for the recall of the appeal
remained unacted upon until the
Subsequently,
the DARAB cases were elevated for review to the CA and docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 47502.
In its
November 29, 2000 Amended Decision, the CA upheld the DARAB Decision.
On
The
reason for the denial by the CA of the aforementioned prayers for entry of
judgment is as follows:
Our Amended
Decision in this case had long been elevated to the Supreme Court by a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
As held by the Supreme Court in Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B. L.
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, by the mere fact of the filing of the petition,
the finality of the Court of Appeals’ decision was stayed, and there could
be no entry of judgment therein, and hence, no premature execution could be
had. In that case, the High Court
emphatically declared that when this Court adopted a resolution granting
execution pending appeal after the petition for review was already filed in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals encroached on the hallowed grounds of the
Supreme Court. Thus, We find no legal
basis or justification to allow [the] motions for partial entry of judgment
even on the ground that private [respondent]-movants were not impleaded in G.R.
No. 148777 and in the absence of opposition from herein petitioner who had
allegedly concluded an out-of-court settlement with private [respondent]-movants.[75]
We fully agree with the CA that there
should be no partial entry of judgment for petitioners Reynaldo Villanueva, et
al. since their motion to withdraw was not acted upon by the DARAB nor by the
CA. Thus, there is nothing to record in the Book of Entry of Judgments.
More importantly,
it appears that the transfers made by some or all of petitioners Reynaldo
Villanueva, et al. (G.R. No. 157598) to non-qualified persons are proscribed under
PD 27. Such finding necessarily preludes the entry of judgment in favor of said
petitioners. Consequently, the alleged transfers made by petitioners
Villanueva, et al., being in contravention of a prohibitory provision of PD 27,
are null and void, and the titles issued to non-qualified individuals have to
be cancelled and new ones issued to the Government.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 148777 is partly
granted. The November 29, 2000 Amended Decision of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 47502 is affirmed with the modification that the transfers made by
private respondents to non-qualified persons, if any, under PD 27 are illegal and
declared NULL and VOID, and the titles issued based on the
transfers are likewise NULL and VOID.
The DAR is ORDERED to investigate the transfers covering the
subject landholdings and, based on the findings of illegal transfers for
violations of PD 27 and EO 228, to coordinate with the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga for the cancellation of the titles registered in the names of the
transferees or to their subsequent transferees and to issue new titles to the
Government for disposition to qualified beneficiaries. The November 14, 1995 PARAD Joint Decision in
DARAB Cases Nos. 638-P’94, 933-P’95, 934-P’95, and 935-P’95, as affirmed by the
The
petition in G.R. No. 157598 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The transfers made by petitioners
Reynaldo, et al. to non-qualified persons, if any, under PD 27 are likewise
declared NULL and
VOID. Similarly, the DAR is ORDERED to investigate the transfers covering the subject landholdings and,
based on the findings of illegal transfers for violations of PD 27 and EO 228,
to coordinate with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga for the cancellation of
the titles concerned registered in the names of the transferees or to their
subsequent transferees and to issue new titles to the Government for
disposition to qualified beneficiaries.
SO
ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate
Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] “Decreeing
the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the
Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor”
(1972).
[2] Rollo
(G.R. No. 148777), pp. 3-22.
[3]
[4] CA
rollo, pp. 46-64.
[5] Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), p. 84.
[6]
[7] Rollo (G.R. No. 157598), pp. 9-24.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), p. 440.
[13]
CA rollo, pp. 283-285, 286, 287-289, 290-292, 256-258, 273, 293-294, 298-300,
259-261, 277-279, 274-276, 262-264, 295-297, 265-269, 270-272, & 280-282,
respectively.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[19] CA rollo, pp. 233-234.
[20] Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), pp. 265-277.
[21]
CA rollo, pp. 87-92.
[22]
[23] Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), pp. 279-285.
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] CA rollo, pp. 326-342.
[30] Supra note 16.
[31] CA rollo, pp. 321-322.
[32] Supra note 4.
[33]
CA rollo, pp. 65-74.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44] Supra note 3, at 51.
[45] Supra note 5.
[46]
Supra note 9.
[47]
CA rollo, pp. 778-782.
[48] Supra note 8.
[49] Rollo (G.R. No. 157598), pp. 110-117.
[50] Supra note 10.
[52] Rollo (G.R. No. 157598), p. 159.
[53] Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, G.R. No. 138463, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 56, 70; citations omitted.
[54]
“Declaring
[55] Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), pp. 307-308, April 10, 2002 Resolution of the Third Division.
[56] Sec. 4.
[57] See Union Motor Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 159738, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 683; citing Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. and Manolet Lavides v. ICC Leasing and Financing Corporation, G.R. No. 150673, February 28, 2003, 398 SCRA 508.
[58] See Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158232, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 737; citing Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, G.R. No. 150092, September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA 201.
[59] Supra note 3, at 42-45.
[60] Xentrex
Automotive, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121559, June 18, 1998, 291
SCRA 66, 71; citations omitted.
[61] Supra note 3, at 47-48.
[62] Soliva
v. The Intestate Estate of Marcelo M. Villalba, G.R. No. 154017, December
8, 2003, 417 SCRA 277, 286; citing Ramos v. Heirs of Ramos, Sr., G.R.
No. 140848, April 25, 2002, 381 SCRA 594, 605; Westmont Bank v. Ong,
G.R. No. 132560, January 30, 2002, 375 SCRA 212, 222.
[63] Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Baba, G.R. No. 138945, August 19, 2003, 409 SCRA 306, 315; citing Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 133895, 2 October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 395, 405-406.
[64] G.R. No. 103959, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 98, 112.
[65] G.R. Nos. 75109-10, June 28, 1989, 174 SCRA 330, 338-339.
[66] I Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 472-473 (6th rev. ed.).
[67] Supra note 53, at 71-72.
[68] Revised Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m).
[69] Rodriguez, Statutory Construction 250 (2nd ed., 1998); citing 82 C.J.S. Statutes, 367.
[70] On transfers of lots acquired under RA 6657 which took effect on June 10, 1998, Section 27 provides:
Section 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands.––Land acquired by beneficiaries under this
Act may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary
succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified
beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the
children or the spouse of the transferor, shall have a right to repurchase the
land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of the land
shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of
the barangay where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Reform
Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as herein provided, shall in turn, be given
due notice thereof by the BARC. (Emphasis supplied.)
If the land has not yet
been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the land may be transferred
or conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or
to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or conveyance,
shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be
transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the availability of the
land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.
In the event of such
transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump
sum for the amounts the latter has already paid, together with the value of
improvements he has made on the land.
Unlike in PD 27, RA 6657 now authorizes the
transfer of the rights to the land to any heir of the beneficiary or other
qualified beneficiary who shall personally cultivate the land even if the
amortizations have not yet been paid. It
is clear however that the land will continuously be devoted to agricultural
production.
If the amortizations have been fully paid, the
land can only be sold, transferred, or conveyed through hereditary succession
or to the government, the LBP, or other qualified beneficiaries within a period
of ten (10) years from date of acquisition. After the ten (10)-year period had
elapsed, then the land can be sold to anybody even if the transferee is not a
qualified beneficiary. If the land has been the subject of conversion under
Article 65 of RA 6657, it can be transferred to anybody after the lapse of five
(5) years from date of acquisition.
[71]
G.R. No. 86044,
[72]
[73] G.R.
No. 147877, April 5, 2002, 380 SCRA 306, 313.
[74] G.R.
No. 148157,
[75] Supra note 8, at 27.