FIRST DIVISION
RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, G.R. No. 140240
JULIAN Q. TAJOLOSA,
HERMILO S. BALUCAN and
AVELINO C. CASTILLO,
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e
r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN
and
CARLOS E. INFANTE,
Respondents. Promulgated:
October
18, 2007
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D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari
and/or prohibition[1]
assailing the resolution[2] dated
November 20, 1998 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-ADM-96-0460 and the
order[3] dated
August 20, 1999 denying reconsideration.
The resolution dated November 20,
1998 found petitioners Rodolfo S. de Jesus, Julian Q. Tajolosa, Hermilo S.
Balucan and Avelino C. Castillo, members of the interim board of directors of
the Kabankalan Water District (KWD), guilty of simple misconduct for enacting
and approving resolution no. 5, s. 1992 and resolution no. 8, s. 1993 granting
the interim manager of KWD a housing allowance, a representation and travel
allowance (RATA) and an extraordinary and miscellaneous expense (EME)
allowance. In holding petitioners liable, the Office of the Ombudsman cited
Civil Service Commission resolution no. 95-4073 dated July 11, 1995 and
resolution no. 96-2079[4] dated
March 21, 1996 declaring as illegal the receipt and collection of any
additional, double or indirect compensation (including RATA and EME) from a
water district, except per diems, by any officer or employee of the LWUA[5] who sits
as member of the board of directors of a water district, pursuant to Section 13
of PD 198.[6] Thus,
petitioners were suspended for one month.
Petitioners sought reconsideration but
it was denied in an order dated August 20, 1999. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the Office
of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding them guilty of
simple misconduct and suspending them for one month. They claimed that the
enactment and approval of resolution no. 5, s. 1992 and resolution no. 8, s.
1993 were authorized under paragraph 2.4 of LWUA resolution no. 21, s. 1991
(Policy Guidelines Regarding Defaulting Water Districts):
2.4 The Interim General Manager shall be
designated/appointed by the Administrator from within LWUA or within the [water
district] locality whose qualifications shall at least be the same as that of
Grade 20 LWUA employee. His compensation and other allowances shall be as
determined by the [water district] Board of Directors.
Ordinarily, this petition which was
filed on October 19, 1999 should have been dismissed outright. In Fabian v. Desierto,[7] we
ruled that appeals from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals by
way of a petition for review under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. Pursuant to this ruling, the Court promulgated its February 9,
1999 resolution in A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC:
In
light of the decision in Fabian v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 129742, 16
September 1998), any appeal by way of petition for review from a decision or
final resolution or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, or special
civil action relative to such decision, resolution or order filed with the
Court after 15 March 1999 shall no longer be referred to the Court of
Appeals, but must be forthwith DENIED or DISMISSED, respectively.
Moreover, Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 also known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman provides:[8]
Sec.
7. Finality of Decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the
charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable.
(emphasis supplied)
In
Coronel v. Desierto,[9] however,
this Court suspended the application of A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC on the following
grounds:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that
grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the [r]ules,
we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.
It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to
effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves
to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering
justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided
by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application
of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its
operation. (emphasis supplied)
In Herrera v. Bohol,[10] this
Court stated that decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, suspension
of not more than one month or a fine equivalent to one month salary shall
be final and unappealable. However, this rule is not without exception.
In Republic v. Canastillo,[11] the
Court declared that decisions of administrative agencies which are declared
final and unappealable by law are still subject to judicial review if they fail
the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or
error of law.
Moreover, in Baylon v. Fact-Finding
Intelligence Bureau,[12] while
the Court found that the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed Baylon’s petition for review of a decision of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, it
nonetheless considered the merits of the petition in the interest of
substantial justice. The following pronouncement in Baylon is
instructive:
The
correctness of the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of petitioner’s petition for
review notwithstanding, this Court cannot write finis to the case at bar
by the strict application of the rules of procedure governing appeals. For judicial
cases do not come and go through the portals of a court of law by the mere
mandate of technicalities.
After
going over all the pleadings, evidence, and all other documents bearing on this
case, this Court has resolved to spare the present petition from dismissal to
which it should have been consigned as a matter of procedure.
xxx xxx xxx
Suspension
from public office is a serious incident that definitely blemishes a person’s
record in government service. It is an injury to one’s reputation and honor
which produces irreversible effects on one’s career and private life. If only to assure the judicial mind that no injustice is
allowed to take place due to a blind adherence to rules of procedure, the
dismissal on technicality of petitioner’s action, which is aimed at
establishing not just her innocence but the truth, cannot stand. That the
Ombudsman’s Memorandum Reviews may have attained finality due to petitioner’s
belated appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals does not preclude a
modification or an alteration thereof, for if the execution of a decision
becomes impossible or unjust, it may be modified or altered to harmonize it
with justice and the facts.[13]
(emphasis supplied)
Here, there are circumstances which justify the suspension of A.M.
No. 99-2-02-SC. In view of the decisions of the Court in several cases
intimately related to this case, the suspension of petitioners for simple
misconduct constitutes an error of law. Thus, in the interest of substantial
justice, the Court is not precluded from exercising its power of judicial
review.
In de Jesus v. Commission on Audit,[14] petitioners therein (including herein petitioners de Jesus,
Balucan and Castillo) were deemed to have received the additional allowances
and bonuses between May to December 1997 and April to June 1998 as members of
the interim board of directors of the Catbalogan Water District in good
faith. Their receipt of such allowances happened before Baybay Water
District v. Commission on Audit[15]
was decided. This ruling was reiterated in two other de Jesus v.
Commission on Audit cases.[16]
Petitioners, as members of the
interim board of directors of the KWD, enacted and approved resolution no. 5,
s. 1992 and resolution no. 8, s. 1993 granting a housing allowance and RATA and
EME allowances to the water district’s interim general manager pursuant to paragraph
2.4 of LWUA resolution no. 21, s. 1991 and prior to the decision in Baybay Water District.
Thus, following the three earlier de Jesus v. Commission on Audit
cases, they acted in good faith.
Misconduct means
intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior.[17]
It is incompatible with good faith. Since petitioners were in good faith, they
could not be held liable for simple misconduct.
WHEREFORE, pro hac vice, the petition
is hereby GRANTED. The resolution dated November 20, 1998 and order
dated August 20, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-VIS-ADM-96-0460 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners
Rodolfo S. de Jesus, Julian Q. Tajolosa, Hermilo S. Balucan and Avelino C.
Castillo are hereby ABSOLVED from any administrative liability in
connection with the enactment and approval of resolution no. 5, s. 1992 and
resolution no. 8, s. 1993.
SO
ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 27-33.
[3] Id., pp. 34-36.
[4] The Court upheld the validity of Civil Service Commission resolution no. 95-4073 dated July 11, 1995 and resolution no. 96-2079 in Cabili v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. Nos. 156503/156481, 22 June 2006, 492 SCRA 252.
[5] Local Water Utilities Administration.
[6] Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.
[7] 356 Phil. 787 (1998).
[8] Section
7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 has been amended by Administrative
Order No. 17, thus:
Sec. 7. Finality and execution of decision.
- Where the respondent is absolved of
the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and
unappealabe. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions
set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins
such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension
and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive
by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
[9] 448 Phil. 894 (2003).
[10] 466 Phil. 905 (2004), citing Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 438 Phil. 351 (2002).
[11] G.R. No. 172729, 08 June 2007 citing Herrera v. Bohol supra.
[12] 442 Phil. 217 (2002).
[13] Id.
[14] 451 Phil. 812 (2003).
[15] 425 Phil. 326 (2002). The decision in this case was promulgated on January 23, 2002. We ruled that PD 198 expressly prohibits the grant of RATA, EME, other allowances and bonuses to members of the board of water districts.
[16] G.R. No. 156641 promulgated on February 5, 2004 (466 Phil. 912) and G.R. Nos. 127515 and 127544 promulgated on May 10, 2005 (458 SCRA 368).
[17] Salazar v. Barriga, A.M. No. P-05-2016, 19 April 2007.