ERNESTO
B. FRANCISCO, JR., G.R. Nos. 135688-89
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA
and
GARCIA, JJ.
UEM-MARA
PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION,
TOLL
REGULATORY
BOARD and
PUBLIC
ESTATES AUTHORITY,
Respondents. Promulgated:
October 18, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of a
decision[2] and
resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 28, 1998 and September 23, 1998, respectively,
in the consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP Nos. 48111 and 48145 which set aside
the order[4] and writ
of preliminary injunction[5] issued
by the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 147 (RTC) dated June 23, 1998
and June 24, 1998, respectively, in Civil Case No. 98-1159.
Petitioner
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. alleged that he is a taxpayer and resident of Cavite.
He claimed that he instituted this suit in the RTC in his behalf and in behalf
of the other users of the Coastal Road which is the principal road connecting
Metro Manila and Cavite.[6]
Private
respondent UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UMPC) is a corporation duly
organized and validly existing under Philippine laws. It was incorporated by two Malaysian
entities, namely, United Engineers (Malaysia) Berhad (UEM) and Majlis Amanah
Rakyat (MARA).[7]
Public
respondents are the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), created under PD 1112[8] and the
Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government owned and controlled corporation
organized pursuant to PD 1084.[9]
On
July 26, 1996,[10]
UMPC entered into a Toll Operation Agreement (TOA) with the Republic of the
Philippines, through the TRB and PEA, for the design, construction, operation
and maintenance of the R-1 Expressway (Airport Road Junction to Zapote), the
C-5 Link Expressway (link between the R-1 Expressway and the South Luzon
Expressway) and the R-1 Expressway Extension (Zapote to Noveleta, Cavite), all
three (3) expressways being components of the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway
Project (MCTEP). Pursuant to the TOA, UMPC was exclusively responsible for the
design, construction and financing aspect of the expressways, while the PEA was
exclusively responsible for the operation and maintenance thereof.[11]
Under
the MCTEP, PEA was to operate the R-1 Expressway (also known as the Coastal
Road)[12] as a toll
facility and collect toll fees from its users.
Part of these fees would be used to compensate UMPC for its investment
and participation in the project. Toll
collection commenced on May 24, 1998.[13]
On
May 22, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and
declaration of nullity of the TOA, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC praying
that respondents be ordered to cease and desist from collecting the announced
toll fees for the use of the MCTEP on the following grounds: (1)
that the toll fees as fixed in the TOA were grossly exorbitant,
unconscionable and violative of the allowable reasonable rate of return on
investment and (2) that there was absence of notice and public hearing in the
fixing of the rate of toll fees in contravention of public interest.[14]
On
May 25, 1998, Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan, Vice-Executive Judge of the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 133, issued an ex parte TRO effective for 72 hours
enjoining respondents from charging and collecting the toll fees. The case was raffled to Judge Zeus C. Abrogar
of Branch 150 who subsequently inhibited himself from hearing the case.[15] The case was re-raffled to Judge Teofilo L.
Guadiz, Jr. of Branch 147.[16]
On
May 27, 1998, Judge Guadiz, Jr. issued an order extending the TRO to 20
days. On June 9, 1998, he issued an
order setting aside his May 27, 1998 order and set the case for summary hearing
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.[17]
On June 23, 1998, Judge Guadiz, Jr.
issued an order granting petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, which writ was issued on June 24, 1998 after petitioner posted a
surety bond in the amount of P100,000.[18]
On June 26, 1998, UMPC filed a
petition for certiorari with application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction in the CA. This was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 48111. On July 1,
1998, PEA and TRB likewise filed a petition for certiorari and this was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48145. The
cases were consolidated.[19]
In a decision promulgated on July 28, 1998, the CA nullified and set
aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC. It ruled that the writ was issued in
contravention of PD 1818[20] and
petitioner failed to prove that it satisfied the requisites for its issuance.[21] It
denied reconsideration in a resolution dated September 23, 1998.[22]
Hence
this petition.
In a
“manifestation and motion (in compliance with the Honorable Court's resolution
dated August 2, 2000 requiring submission of memorandum) with motion to cite in
contempt of court” dated August 15, 2001, petitioner prayed that private respondent
UMPC and its counsel be cited in contempt for misrepresenting to the Court that
UEM and MARA were still the stockholders of
UMPC.
First,
we shall resolve the sole substantive issue raised: should the prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction be granted?
We need
to determine if PD 1818 is applicable to this case. This law, dated January 16,
1981, states:
WHEREAS,
Presidential Decree No. 605[23]
prohibits the issuance by the courts of restraining orders or injunctions in
cases involving concessions, licenses, and other permits issued by
administrative officials or bodies for the exploitation, development and
utilization of natural resources of the country;
WHEREAS, it is in
the public interest to adopt a similar prohibition against the issuance of such
restraining orders or injunctions in other areas of activity equally critical
to the economic development effort of the nation, in order not to disrupt or
hamper the pursuit of essential government projects;
NOW, THEREFORE,
I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order as follows:
Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction,
or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy
involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other
natural resource development project of the government, or any public
utility operated by the government, including among others[,] public utilities
for the transport of goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental official from proceeding
with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project,
or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity
necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis
supplied)
PD
1818 proscribes the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in any case
involving an infrastructure project of the government.[24] The aim
of the prohibition, as expressed in its second whereas clause, is to prevent
delay in the implementation or execution of government infrastructure projects (particularly
through the use of provisional remedies) to the detriment of the greater good
since it disrupts the pursuit of essential government projects and frustrates
the economic development effort of the nation.[25]
Petitioner
argues that the collection of toll fees is not an infrastructure project of the
government. He cites the definition of “infrastructure projects” we used in Republic
v. Silerio:[26]
The term “infrastructure
projects” means “construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads, and
bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation,
flood control and drainage, water supply and sewage systems, shore protection,
power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings, and
other related construction projects that form part of the government capital
investment.”[27]
He
contends that the MCTEP does not involve the construction of a road since the
Coastal Road already existed since the early 1980s and UMPC merely upgraded it.[28] He also asserts that since the project was
financed by a foreign group, it does not “form part of the government capital
investment” that makes it a government infrastructure project as contemplated by
PD 1818.
Respondents counter that the Coastal Road was repaired, rehabilitated and
upgraded by UMPC, and thus falls under infrastructure projects as defined. Furthermore, the collection of toll fees is
necessary to the execution and implementation of the MCTEP because part of the
fees collected, after meeting the operation and maintenance expenses of the
expressway, is used by UMPC to pay the commercial loans it incurred to finance
the project. Therefore, if collection is enjoined, not only will the operation
and maintenance of the Coastal Road be affected but the construction and
completion of the other components of the project will also be disrupted.[29]
According to UMPC, the obligations of public respondents under the TOA
undeniably show that the MCTEP is an infrastructure project that forms part of the
government’s capital investment. They are obliged to finance the acquisition of
lands needed for the project.[30] The TOA also provides that the government of
the Philippines owns the toll expressways comprising the project.[31]
The CA held that the MCTEP is a government project considering that the
government, through the TRB, is one of the contracting parties of the TOA. It is an infrastructure project because it
involves the construction, design, operation and maintenance of the
expressways. The collection of toll fees is an activity necessary for the
execution, implementation or operation of this infrastructure project of the
government.[32]
We agree.
The definition of infrastructure projects specifically includes the
improvement and rehabilitation of roads and not just its construction. Accordingly, even if the Coastal Road was
merely upgraded and not constructed from scratch, it is still covered by the
definition. Moreover, PD 1818 itself
states that any person, entity or governmental official cannot be prohibited
from continuing the execution or implementation of such project or pursuing any
lawful activity necessary for such execution or implementation. Undeniably, the
collection of toll fees is part of the execution or implementation of the MCTEP
as agreed upon in the TOA.[33] The TOA is valid since it has not been
nullified. Thus it is a legitimate source of rights and obligations. It has the
force and effect of law between the contracting parties[34] and is
entitled to recognition by this Court. The MCTEP is an infrastructure project
of the government forming part of the government capital investment considering
that under the TOA, the government owns the expressways comprising the project.[35]
Next,
petitioner argues that PD 1818 does not extend to injunctions or restraining
orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases.
In a spate of cases,
this Court declared that although [PD 1818] prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends
only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative
acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving
questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.[36]
It is founded on the
principle that to allow the courts to determine such matters would disturb the
smooth functioning of the administrative machinery.[37]
Considering
the co-equal status of the three branches of government, courts may not tread
into matters requiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in
the executive and legislative branches, unless it is clearly shown that the
government official or office concerned abused his or its discretion.[38] Grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, as not to act at all in contemplation of law or where power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[39]
Futhermore,
xxx courts, as a rule, refuse to
interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in
the exercise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are
generally better equipped technically to decide administrative questions and
that non-legal factors, such as government policy on the matter, are usually
involved in the decisions.[40]
The
imposition of toll fees, fixing the amount thereof and its proper collection
are technical matters public respondents are surely more knowledgeable about
than the courts. This is clear from the
powers and duties conferred on them by their charters.
Under
Section 5 (k), PD 1084, PEA is authorized to collect tolls:
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of [PEA]. ― [PEA]
shall, in carrying out the purposes for which it is created, have the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
k. To issue such regulations as
may be necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or all of the
highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to
impose or collect fees or tolls for their use provided that all receipts by
[PEA] from fees, tolls and other charges are automatically appropriated for its
use.
Under
Section 3 of PD 1112, the TRB was tasked to supervise the collection of toll
fees:
Sec. 3. Powers and Duties of the [TRB]. The [TRB] shall have in addition to
its general powers of administration the following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
d. Issue,
modify and promulgate from time to time the rates of toll that will be charged
the direct users of toll facilities and upon notice and hearing, to approve or
disapprove petitions for the increase thereof. xxxx
In Padua v. Hon. Ranada,[41] we
stated:
The TRB, as the
agency assigned to supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of
toll facilities, has the necessary expertise, training and skills to
judiciously decide matters of this kind.
As may be gleaned from the petition, the main thrust of petitioner
Zialcita's argument is that the provisional toll rate adjustments are
exorbitant, oppressive, onerous and unconscionable. This is obviously a
question of fact requiring knowledge of the formula used and the factors
considered in determining the assailed rates. Definitely, this task is within
the province of the TRB.[42]
The
arguments petitioner advances to show that public respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion already go into the validity of the TOA itself or its
terms, which was the subject of the main case in the court below.[43] The issue that we are tackling here — the
propriety of the issuance of an injunction — merely involves the collection of
toll fees in the Coastal Road. Petitioner also claims that there were
irregularities committed by the respondents. While it is true that PD 1818 was
not intended to shield irregularities committed by administrative agencies from
judicial scrutiny,[44]
petitioner has not proven the supposed anomalies and they remain as mere
unsubstantiated claims. These factual issues were not passed upon by the courts
below and we decline to resolve them now considering that we are not a trier of
facts. In any event, as a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently,
there is no showing that public respondents abused their discretion in imposing
and collecting the toll fees. These are provided for in the TOA which, as
mentioned earlier, remains valid since it has not been declared invalid by any
court. Also, the presumption that official duty was performed regularly has not
been overturned.
We
now rule on the motion to cite in contempt filed by petitioner against UMPC and
its counsel, Castillo and Poblador Law Offices, particularly Atty. Napoleon J.
Poblador and Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretaña III. Petitioner alleges that they
should be cited for contempt for misrepresenting to the Court in their
memorandum dated November 17, 2000 that UEM and MARA were still the
stockholders of UMPC when in fact the Coastal Road Corporation (CRC) had
already bought their shares.[45] UMPC stated:
87. Contrary to petitioner's malicious
assertions, the Republic of the Philippines and public respondent PEA selected
private respondent (then represented by its stockholders MARA and UEM)
based on established guidelines of the national government on joint venture
agreements between government agencies and the private sector. xxx Private
respondent, therefore, could only assume, as it reasonably assumed, that these
government agencies performed their functions in accordance with law and only after
scrutinizing the qualifications of private respondent's stockholders – UEM and
MARA.
88. Private respondent is more than qualified to
be the joint venture partner of public respondent PEA based on the track record
of its aforementioned stockholders.
88.1 MARA is an instrumentality or corporate agency
of the Malaysian government. The Malaysian government specifically designated
MARA to realize its agreement with the Philippine government “to pursue and
enter into joint and cooperative development undertakings.” (cf., Annex “D,”
supra).
88.2 On the
other hand, UEM is a Malaysian company
publicly listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
(“KLSE”) since 1975. It has an authorized capital stock of RM500,000,000 or
approximately P5,000,000,000.00. It is one of Malaysia's largest engineering,
design and construction groups with direct and indirect interests in five (5)
publicly listed companies on the KLSE. xxxx[46]
(Emphasis supplied)
In
their comment on the motion, Attys. Poblador and Bretaña stated that they had
nothing to do with the sale of UEM and MARA of their 283,744 shares in UMPC as
other law firms, namely, Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon & San Jose Law
Offices representing UEM and Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan Law
Offices representing CRC were involved.
The sale was approved by the TRB on November 18, 1999.[47]
We do
not think that UMPC and its counsels should be sanctioned for contempt.
Counsels
can be held in contempt of court[48] for
making false statements in the pleadings they file[49] tending
to mislead the Court and to degrade the administration of justice. We cannot
see any deliberate falsehood or misrepresentation in the aforequoted statements
of Attys. Poblador and Bretaña. On the contrary, they
truthfully indicated that UEM and MARA were the former stockholders of
UMPC. This is the clear import of the
phrase “then represented by its stockholders MARA and UEM.” This also implied
that they had been replaced as such.
Besides, the ownership structure of UMPC as a party in this case was
never material to the issue for resolution which is the issuance of a writ of
injunction for the collection of toll fees.
Hence, the Court was not deceived in any way.
Petitioner
also insists that they be cited in contempt for showing disrespect and
resorting to offensive language against RTC Judge Guadiz, Jr. when they stated:
Despite the obvious legality of the project, petitioner,
either by sheer arrogance or a malicious refusal to acknowledge the truth –
that the [MCTEP] and the imposition of toll fees for the use of the Coastal
Road are legal and above board – initiated what is no more than a nuisance suit
and secured from an insufficiently-informed judge an illegal writ of
preliminary injunction which public respondent, the Honorable [CA],
subsequently reversed.[50]
Attys.
Poblador and Bretaña, in their defense, countered that there was nothing
insulting or disparaging in describing someone as “insufficiently informed.”
This was not intemperate language amounting to vilification.[51]
They
are correct. In criticizing a judge's decision, the test is whether it is done
in good faith:
While the Court
recognizes a litigant's right to criticize judges and justices in the
performance of their functions, “it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges (or justices) thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty
of respect to courts.”[52]
We
cannot say that the use of the adjective “insufficiently-informed” is
disrespectful, abusive or slanderous.
Besides,
[it] is well
settled that the power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in
all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due
administration of justice. Judges however are enjoined to exercise such power
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court,
and not for retaliation or vindictiveness.[53]
Therefore,
we deny petitioner’s motion to cite in contempt for lack of merit.
In
sum, PD 1818 prohibits the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the collection of toll fees for the use of the Coastal Road. None of the
exceptions to this proscription is applicable here. The collection of toll fees for R-1
Expressway, one of the components of the MCTEP, is an activity necessary for
the execution of a government infrastructure project covered by the protective
mantle of PD 1818. It is noteworthy that
the MCTEP was identified by the government as an “urgent necessity to support
the rapid development of the Calabarzon[54] area,
particularly the province of Cavite.”[55] Accordingly, no preliminary injunction can be
issued enjoining or preventing its implementation. We need not go into a
discussion of whether petitioner was able to prove the requisites for its
issuance.[56]
To
emphasize, we have limited ourselves to the issue of propriety of the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. We are not resolving the substantive
issues presented such as the validity of the TOA. We leave this to the RTC for resolution after
trial on the merits.[57]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The July 28, 1998 decision and September 23, 1998 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 48111 and 48145 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner's motion
to cite Attys. Napoleon J. Poblador and Manuel Joseph R. Bretaña III in
contempt of court is likewise DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate
Justice
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
|
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices Conchita Carpio Morales (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) and Renato C. Dacudao (retired) of the Special Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 147-153.
[3] Id., pp. 155-156.
[4] Penned by Judge Teofilo L. Guadiz, Jr.; id., pp. 495-499.
[5] Id., p. 500.
[6] Id., p. 37.
[7] Id., p. 791.
[8] Entitled “Authorizing the Establishment of Toll Facilities on Public Improvements, Creating a Board for the Regulation thereof and for Other Purposes.” Section 3 (a) of PD 112 provides that TRB can “enter into contracts for the construction, operation and maintenance of toll facilities such as but not limited to national highways, roads, bridges and public thoroughfares.”
[9] PEA was granted authority to reclaim lands and to operate and manage lands owned by the Republic of the Philippines including the construction and operation of highways, roads, utilities and buildings thereon and to impose or collect tolls or fees for their use. [id., p. 216, sections 4 and 5 (k) of PD 1084]
[10] Rollo, p. 374.
[11] Sec. 2.02 (1), TOA; id., p. 385.
[12] Id., p. 1186.
[13] Id., p. 1126.
[14] Id., pp. 148-149.
[15] On the ground that he was a regular user of the Coastal Road and understood the apprehension of petitioner; id, pp. 75, 176 and 1172.
[16] Id., p. 149.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id., pp. 81-84.
[20] Entitled “Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by the Government.”
[21] Rollo, p. 152.
[22] Id., pp. 70-71.
[23] PD 605 (Banning the Issuance by
Courts of Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Concessions, Licenses, and
other Permits Issued by Public Administrative Officials or Bodies for the
Exploitation of Natural Resources) stated:
SECTION 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.
[24] It is noteworthy that according to GV Diversified International, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 159245, 31 August 2006, 500 SCRA 589, 596), RA 8975 (An Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and For Other Purposes) effectively superseded PD 1818, citing Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas (G.R. No. 131442, July 10, 2003, 405 SCRA 530, 537-538). RA 8975 was approved on November 7, 2000 and took effect on November 26, 2000. Thus, PD 1818 was the law in force at the time of the institution of this case.
[25] Hernandez v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 145328, 23 March 2006, 485 SCRA 166, 183.
[26] G.R. No. 108869, 6 May 1997, 272 SCRA 280.
[27] Id., pp. 286-287, citing Letter of Instruction No. 1186, promulgated January 13, 1982, 83 VLD 79.
[28] Rollo, pp. 94-97.
[29] Id., pp. 1141-1143.
[30] Sec. 5.04 (1), TOA; id., pp. 393 and 1189.
[31] Sec. 5.12, TOA; id., p. 396.
[32] Id., pp. 151-152.
[33] Sec. 7.02, TOA; id., p. 402.
[34] Civil Code, Art. 1159.
[35] Supra note 29.
[36] Supra note 24 at 176-177, citing Zamora v. Caballero, G.R. No. 147767, 14 January 2004, 419 SCRA 384, 392; Malaga v. Penachos, Jr., G.R. No. 86695, 3 September 1992, 213 SCRA 516, 523-524; G & S Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 7, 22 (2002).
[37] Philippine Ports Authority v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 260, 288 (1996), citing Malaga v. Penachos, id., in turn citing Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. 42380, 22 June 1990, 186 SCRA 704.
[38] See Malayan Integrated Industries, Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101469, 4 September 1992, 213 SCRA 640, 651.
[39] G & S Transport Corp v. CA, supra note 36, citations omitted.
[40] Id., p. 21, citing Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, 27 February 1971, 37 SCRA 745, 750.
[41] 439 Phil. 538 (2002).
[42] Id., p. 551.
[43] Petitioner argues:
1.
by failing to
conduct a public hearing before imposing the toll fees, they violated Section
1, Article III or the “due process clause” of the Constitution;
2.
by keeping the
TOA from the public, they violated Section 7, Article III of the Constitution
which guarantees the right of people to information;
3.
the award of
MCTEP to Renong Berhad (predecessor of UMPC) did not undergo the usual procedures under the RA 6975, as
amended by RA 7718 (the Build-Operate-Transfer Law);
4.
instead of the
TRB, the negotiations with Renong Berhad and evaluation of its proposal were
done by a small group in the Department of Public Works and Highways;
5.
the TOA violated
the terms of the toll operation certificate (TOC) granted by TRB to PEA;
6.
the TOA also
violated Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution on the 25 year-restriction
on agreements for the development and utilization of lands of the public
domain;
7.
there was a
violation of PD 1112 and the TOC because under the TOA, PEA effectively
transferred, granted the usufruct of, and/or assigned its rights and privileges
under its TOC;
8.
there's another
violation of the TOC and the Public Service Law which prescribes a limit of 12%
allowable maximum return on investment;
9.
they could not justify
the claimed P1.1 billion cost of the upgrading of the Coastal Road and
10. by making itself a party to the TOA, the TRB had abdicated its role as a regulatory body and denied relief to the users of the Coastal Road. (Rollo, pp. 99-123.)
[44] Malaga
v. Penachos, Jr., supra note 36, p. 526.
[45] Rollo, pp. 1447 and 1492.
[46] Id., pp. 61-63.
[47] Id., p. 1597.
[48] Indirect contempt under Section 3,
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court:
Section 3. Indirect contempts to be
punished after charge and hearing. ― After charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel,
a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt:
(a)
Misbehavior of an
officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b)
Disobedience of
or resistance to lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court,
or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a person who,
after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property,
for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner
disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c)
Any abuse of or
any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this rule;
(d)
Any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e)
Assuming to be an
attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f)
Failure to obey a
subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the accused party into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
[49] Perea
v. Almadro, A.C. No. 5246, 2 May
2006.
[50] Rollo, pp. 1170 and 1447.
[51] Id., p. 1599.
[52] United BF Homeowners v. Sandoval-Gutierrez, A.M. No. CA-99-30, 16 October 2000, 343 SCRA 162, 168-169, citing Maglasang v. People, 190 SCRA 306, 313 (1990) and In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970).
[53] Ruiz v. Judge How, 459 Phil. 728, 739 (2003).
[54] Includes
Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal and Quezon.
[55] Whereas clause, TOA, rollo, p. 375.
[56] See note 44 at 439.
[57] We note that none of the parties had informed the Court about the status of the main case in the RTC.