|
MARIA L.
HAROLD, Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 130864
Present: |
|
- versus - AGAPITO T. ALIBA, Respondent. |
Quisumbing,
J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio
Morales, Tinga, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
QUISUMBING,
J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Sometime in January 1993, Harold engaged the services of
respondent Agapito T. Aliba,
a geodetic engineer, to conduct a relocation survey and to execute a
consolidation-subdivision of their properties including that of Harold’s
sister, Alice Laruan, located in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet. After completing his work, Aliba was paid P4,050 for
his services, but he failed to return the certificates of title of the said
properties for more than one year, despite repeated demands to return them.
It also appears that sometime in January 1994, Aliba prevailed upon Harold and her husband to sign a
document which was supposedly needed to facilitate the
consolidation-subdivision and the issuance of separate transfer certificates of
title over the properties. Harold and
her husband signed the document without reading it.
Thereafter, on
On several occasions, Aliba tried
to convince Harold to accept the sum of P400,000
which was later on increased to P500,000, as purchase price of the said
lot. It was only after such offers were
made that Aliba told Harold that he had indeed sold the
lot.
On P500,000 from Aliba but only as
partial payment, considering that the lot has an aggregate value of P1,338,000[3]
or P6,000 per square meter. On
the same date, Harold was made to sign an acknowledgment receipt and other
papers which were made to appear that Harold accepted the sum of P480,000 as full and final payment for the lot.
Harold later discovered that Aliba made it appear that she had sold the lot to him for P80,000 and had her certificates of title cancelled and
transferred to him. Harold also found
out that the alleged deed of sale was the document that Aliba
caused Harold and her husband to sign in January 1994.
Thinking that she can no longer recover her property, Harold
asked for the payment of the fair market value of her property but to no
avail. The dispute between Harold and Aliba was referred to Punong Barangay Limson Ogas and the Lupong Tagapamayapa. During the P75,000 to the
initial P500,000 Aliba had already given to
Harold. In the same proceedings, Aliba tendered P70,000,
which Harold accepted.[4] The receipt of the amount given was evidenced
by an acknowledgment receipt signed by the parties herein, attested to by the Lupon
chairman, and witnessed by several barangay officials.[5]
On P5,000 to Harold to
complete their amicable settlement.
Unfortunately, Harold refused to accept the same, saying that P5,000 is not enough and insisted on the elevation of the case
to the court.[6] Thus, a certification to file action[7] was
issued by the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa on
In his Answer,[9] Aliba prayed for the dismissal of the complaint,
considering that he had already been absolutely released from any obligation to
Harold and that what remains to be done is merely the completion of the
amicable settlement of the parties.
On
x x x x
It is not disputed that on
The said minutes further states therein, “continued for the second day”, which logically means that the balance be given the following day.
In the afternoon of
The last paragraph [of the minutes] states “Mr.
Aliba requested then if the paid amount of P70,000.00 be returned.
Mrs. Harold refused and opted that this case be elevated to the higher
court.”
Based on
the minutes of the mediation proceedings, it is clear that Barangay Captain Ogas was able to successfully mediate the case between
plaintiff and defendant. As a matter of
fact, Aliba has already substantially complied. It is not disputed that he gave plaintiff, on
that occasion, P70,000.00, and to give the balance of
P5,000.00, the day after. Thus, there
was meeting of the minds between the parties on a lawful subject, and
there was substantial fulfillment of the obligation. Regret[t]ably, when the small balance is to
be paid, Mrs. Harold reneged on the agreement, saying P75,000.00[10]
is not enough, then insisted that the case be filed in court, but at the same
time refusing to return the P70,000.00, when defendant tried to collect it
back. Consequently, the issuance of the
Certificate to File Action, is improper because no
valid repudiation [of the amicable settlement] was made.
Obviously, Mrs. Harold wants her cake and eat it too, so to speak. It is in[i]quitous to allow Mrs. Harold to exact substantial fulfillment from Aliba then conveniently change her mind overnight and worse, to refuse to give back what she already received.
The Court agrees with defendant that there is no clear repudiation of the agreement. It would have been different if Mrs. Harold returned the P70,000.00 to the defendant, after changing her mind. There would have been a clear repudiation of the amicable settlement.[11]
The dispositive portion of the said MTC Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, the Motion to Dismiss, incorporated in the Answer is hereby granted. This case is hereby ordered dismissed.
However, defendant is hereby ordered to tender payment to plaintiff his balance in the amount of P5,000.00 when this order becomes final and executory.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Dissatisfied, Harold filed an appeal before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63, of La Trinidad, Benguet.
In an Order dated
Undaunted, Harold further appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
however denied the same. Hence this
petition, on the following grounds:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE THREE LOWER COURTS WERE CORRECT IN DISMISSING HER COMPLAINT ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT SHE AND RESPONDENT WERE ABLE TO ARRIVE [AT] A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AMICABLE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE BARANGAY COURT OF THEIR PLACE WHEN CLEARLY ALL CIRCUMSTANCES SHOW THERE WAS NO MEETING OF MINDS BETWEEN THEM.
II.
GRANTING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, THERE WAS A MEETING OF MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THEREFORE, THERE WAS A VALID AMICABLE SETTLEMENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIPT SIGNED BY PETITIONER AND THE MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 411 OF RA 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AS CONCLUDED BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND AFFIRMED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS.
III.
GRANTING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, SAID LAW WAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH, WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S ACT OF NOT ACCCEPTING THE REMAINING BALANCE BEING PROFFERED BY RESPONDENT AND HER INSISTENCE THAT THE CASE BE INSTEAD ELEVATED TO THE COURTS DURING THE SECOND DAY OF HEARING SHOULD NOT ALSO BE CONSIDERED A REPUDIATION OF SAID AMICABLE SETTLEMENT OR AT THE VERY LEAST A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE THEREOF.[13]
Essentially, we are asked to resolve whether the Court of
Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that the dispute between the parties had already been amicably
settled during the barangay conciliation proceedings.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, we hold
that no reason exists to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the dismissal of the subject complaint.
In this case, Harold’s main contention
was hinged on the alleged non-perfection of the questioned amicable settlement
between her and Aliba because there was allegedly no
meeting of the minds between them regarding the subject matter and the cause
thereof.[14] On the other hand, Aliba’s
principal defense is anchored on the alleged existence and validity of the said
amicable settlement.[15]
Harold’s submission that there was no
meeting of the minds between the parties herein pertaining to the subject
matter and cause of the questioned amicable settlement is a clear deviation
from the facts on record. Admittedly,
both parties agreed during the June 8, 1994 barangay conciliation
proceedings for Aliba to pay an additional amount of P75,000 (which was the
object or subject matter of the amicable settlement) to the initial P500,000
Aliba had given to Harold as purchase price for the
subject lot in order to put an end to their dispute (which was the cause or reason of the amicable settlement). Thus,
it is evident that the parties herein entered into an amicable settlement, or
more specifically, a compromise agreement, during the said barangay conciliation proceedings.
Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise agreement was defined as “a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” In Sanchez
v. Court of Appeals,[16]
we held that a “compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only
allowed but also encouraged in civil cases.”[17]
It must also be
highlighted that Harold expressly acknowledged that the offer made by Aliba to pay an additional P75,000
was made in order for her to desist from pursuing her case against him.[18] By reason of her unconditional acceptance of
the offer and the P70,000 tendered to her,
Harold had already effectively waived whatever claims she might have against Aliba regarding the subject lot. Moreover, she is likewise barred from
pursuing her case against Aliba under the principle
of estoppel now.
Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying on it. Expounding on the
principle of estoppel, we held in Springsun Management Systems Corporation v. Camerino[19]
that “where a party, by his deed or conduct, has induced another to act in a
particular manner, estoppel effectively bars the
former from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct
that causes loss or injury to the latter.”[20]
The doctrine of estoppel is based
upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and
its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or
commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably
relied thereon.[21]
The issue concerning the alleged non-compliance of the
amicable settlement pursuant to the mandate of Section 411[22]
of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) arose because there
was no formal document denominated as “Amicable Settlement” signed by the
parties. However, we agree with the
similar holdings of the Court of Appeals and the RTC that the requirements
under Section 411 of the LGC had been substantially complied with. The minutes of the barangay conciliation
proceedings readily disclose the terms agreed upon by the parties for the
settlement of their dispute, and that the acknowledgment receipt, which was
written in a language known to the parties, signed by them, attested to by the Lupon Chairman, and witnessed by several barangay officials, serves as an indubitable
proof of the amicable settlement and of the substantial compliance of its terms
by respondent Aliba.
Moreover, even without the minutes of
the meeting and the acknowledgment receipt, the amicable settlement, or more
specifically the compromise agreement, entered into by the parties is
undeniably valid, considering that “a compromise agreement is a consensual
contract, and as such, it is perfected upon the meeting of' the minds of the
parties to the contract.”[23]
Furthermore, to rule against the validity
of the cited amicable settlement herein would militate against the spirit and
purpose of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law,[24]
which is to encourage the amicable settlement of disputes at the barangay level as an alternative to court
litigation.
Harold’s refusal to accept the remaining P5,000 that Aliba had tendered
cannot constitute an effective repudiation of the questioned amicable
settlement, considering that the reason for her refusal to accept the said
amount or alleged repudiation of the assailed amicable settlement is not one of
the grounds for repudiation clearly specified under Section 418[25]
of the LGC. As borne out by the records,
her refusal to accept the same was based on the alleged insufficiency of the
remaining P5,000 as settlement for the lot,
without any reference to vitiation of her consent by any fraud, violence or
intimidation on Aliba’s part.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 42-49. Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz, with Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena and Ricardo P. Galvez concurring.
[2]
[3] Product of 223 sq. meters x P6,000.
[4] Rollo, p. 64.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] P5,000 as mentioned in the minutes.)
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] G.R. No. 108947,
[17]
[18] Rollo, p. 22.
[19] G.R. No. 161029,
[20]
[21] P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158758, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 784, 793-794.
[22] SECTION 411. Forms
of Settlement – All amicable settlements shall be in writing, in a
language or dialect known to the parties, signed by them, and attested to by
the lupon
chairman or the pangkat
chairman, as the case may be. When the
parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the settlement
shall be written in the language or dialect known to them.
[23] Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947,
[24] Covers Sections 399-422 of the Local Government Code.
[25]
Section 418. Repudiation. – Any party to the dispute may,
within ten (10) days from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same by
filing with the lupon
chairman a statement to that effect sworn to before him, where the consent is
vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation. Such repudiation shall be sufficient basis
for the issuance of the certification for filing a complaint as hereinabove
provided. (Emphasis supplied.)