THIRD DIVISION
Petitioner,
- versus -
COURT OF
APPEALS and
NATIONAL
HOUSING
AUTHORITY,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DOMINGO LIM, G.R. No. 116176
Petitioner,
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS and
NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
NATIONAL HOUSING G.R. Nos. 116491-503
AUTHORITY,
Petitioner, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
MAXIMO
LOBERANES, NACHURA, and
ELADIO
QUIMQUE, CESARIO REYES, JJ.
VEGA,
JUANITO SANTOS,
ALEJANDRO ORACION and Promulgated:
GONZALO
MERCADO,
Respondents. October
15, 2007
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
For the resolution of the Court are three
consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. G.R. No. 110478 assails the
The three-decade saga of the parties
herein has for its subject parcels of land forming part of what was originally
known as the Grace Park Subdivision in Caloocan City and formerly owned by the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) and/or the Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC).
The Facts
Sometime in the 1960’s, RCAM allowed a
number of individuals to occupy the Grace Park property on condition that they
would vacate the premises should the former push through with the plan to construct
a school in the area. The plan, however, did not materialize, thus, the occupants
offered to purchase the portions they occupied. Later, as they could not afford
RCAM’s proposed price, the occupants, organizing themselves as exclusive members
of the Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. Tenants Association, Inc., petitioned the Government
for the acquisition of the said property, its subdivision into home lots, and
the resale of the subdivided lots to them at a low price.[5]
Acting on the association’s petition,
the Government, in 1963, through the Land Tenure Administration (LTA), later
succeeded by the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), negotiated
for the acquisition of the property from RCAM/PRC. But because of the high asking
price of RCAM and the budgetary constraints of the Government, the latter’s effort
to purchase and/or to expropriate the property was discontinued. RCAM then
decided to effect, on its own, the subdivision of the property and the sale of
the individual subdivided lots to the public.[6] Petitioners
Manapat and Lim and respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega,
A significant turn of events however
happened in 1977 when the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1072,[8]
appropriating P1.2M out of the President’s Special Operations Funds to
cover the additional amount needed for the expropriation of Grace Park. The
National Housing Authority (NHA), PHHC’s successor, then filed several
expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the purpose of developing
Grace Park under the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into
small lots for distribution and resale at a low cost to the residents of the
area.[9]
The following cases were filed by the NHA with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of
After due proceedings, the trial
court rendered separate decisions dismissing the expropriation cases, with the
exceptions of Cases Nos. C-6233 and C-6236 in which it ordered the condemnation
of the involved lots.[11] On
motion for reconsideration by the NHA in Cases Nos. C-6227, C-6228, C-6230,
C-6234, C-6235, C-6238 and C-6255, the trial court later amended its decision, set
aside its dismissal of the said cases, ordered the condemnation of the involved
lots and fixed the amount of just compensation at P180.00 per square
meter. In Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C-6232, C-6237 and C-6435, the RTC
however denied NHA’s motion for reconsideration.[12]
NHA eventually appealed to the CA the
decisions in Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C-6232, C-6237 and C-6435 on
the issue of the necessity of the taking, and the amended ruling in Cases Nos.
C-6227, C-6228, C-6230, C-6234, C-6235, C-6238 and C-6255 on the issue of just
compensation.[13] The CA
consolidated the appeals and docketed them as CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212. NHA likewise filed with the CA an
appeal from the decision in C-6226, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 27159.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1) Reversing and setting aside the decisions
of dismissal in Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C-6232, C-6237 and C-6435;
and in lieu thereof an order of condemnation is entered declaring that
plaintiff-appellant NHA has a lawful right to take the lots involved for the
public use described in the complaints;
2) Affirming the decisions in Case Nos.
C-6227, C-6228, C-6234, C-6235, C-6238 and C-6255 insofar as said decision
granted the expropriation; declaring that plaintiff-appellant NHA has a lawful
right to take the lots involved for the public use stated in the complaint; but
annulling and setting aside the just compensation fixed by the trial court at P180.00
per square meter in the said cases;
3) Ordering the remand of all the appealed
cases, except for Case No. C-6230, to the trial court for determination of the
just compensation to which defendants are entitled in accordance with Rule 67
of the Revised Rules of Court;
4) Finding the compromise agreement in Case
No. C-6230, entitled, “NHA v. Aurora Dy dela Costa, et al.” in accordance with
law, and not contrary to morals or public policy, and rendering judgment in
accordance therewith;
5) Ordering Remedios Macato to be joined as
defendant with Julia C. Diaz in Case No. C-6227.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Rosemarie
and Dolores Guanzon, two of the owners of the lots in C-6225, filed before this
Court a petition for review on certiorari
of the aforesaid decision of the appellate court [Their petition was docketed
as G.R. Nos. 110462-74]. On
Likewise,
Julia Diez and Remedios Macato, the owners of the lots in C-6227, assailed before
us the afore-quoted CA decision through a petition under Rule 45. On
Circular No. 19-91.[18] After
denying their motion for reconsideration,[19]
we issued an Entry of Judgment on
Petitioner Manapat, the defendant-landowner
in C-6229, also elevated the case before us via a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 110478.[21]
We initially dismissed this petition for having been filed out of time,[22]
but we reinstated it on motion for reconsideration.[23]
In the meantime, the other
defendants-landowners in the expropriation cases—RCAM/PRC in C-6225, Maximo
Loberanes and Eladio Quimque in C-6231, Alejandro Oracion, Gonzalo Mercado,
Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos in C-6435, and Remedios Macato in C-6227—moved
for the reconsideration of the said May 27, 1993 Decision of the CA.[24] In
the March 2, 1994 Resolution,[25]
the appellate court resolved the motions in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion
for reconsideration of movants Roman Catholic Archbishop of
The motions for reconsideration of movants
Gonzalo Mercado, Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos (in Special Civil Action No.
6435) and movants Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque (in Special Civil Action
No. 6231) are GRANTED. The motion for reconsideration of movant Alejandro
Oracion (in Special Civil Action No. 6435) is partially granted to the extent
of Three Hundred (300) square meters of
SO ORDERED.[26]
Aggrieved by the said
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration of
defendant-appellant Vivencio S. de Guzman of the decision promulgated
SO ORDERED.[28]
With the denial of its motion for
reconsideration, NHA filed with this Court a Consolidated Petition for Review[29]
under Rule 45, as aforesaid, assailing the March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994
Resolutions of the appellate court. NHA’s petition was docketed as G.R. Nos. 116491-503 against respondents Loberanes and Quimque (in
C-6231), Vega,
In a separate development, the CA, on
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
appealed decision dated
IT
IS SO ORDERED.[31]
Discontented
with the appellate court’s ruling, petitioner Domingo Lim, one of the owners of
the lots subject of C-6226, elevated the case to us via a petition for review
on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 116176.[32]
The Issues
Thus,
for resolution by this Court are the following consolidated cases: (1) G.R. No. 110478 of Manapat; (2) G.R. Nos. 116491-503 of the NHA; and
(3) G.R. No. 116176 of Lim.
In
G.R. No. 110487, petitioner Manapat
argues in the main that, as he is also a member of the tenant association, the
beneficiary of the expropriation, it would be incongruous to take the land away
from him only to give it back to him as an intended beneficiary. Accordingly, the CA, in its May 27, 1993 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212, should not
have allowed the expropriation of his lot. To further support his stance,
Manapat raises the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ISSUANCE MADE IN THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, SPECIFYING THE LOTS TO
BE EXPROPRIATED AND THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY ARE INTENDED, REMOVES FROM THE
JUDICIARY THE DETERMINATION OF THE NECESSITY OF THE TAKING, THERE BEING NO
SHOWING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION.[33]
II
SUPERVENING EVENT RENDERS IMPROPER THE
DISPOSITION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR AN ORDER OF CONDEMNATION DECLARING THAT
NHA HAS A LAWFUL RIGHT TO TAKE THE
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED
THAT FERMIN MANAPAT IS NOT ONLY A BONA FIDE OCCUPANT IN THE GRACE PARK
SUBDIVISION FOR PURPOSES OF P.D. 1072 BUT LIKEWISE HAS A TRANSFER CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE NO. 42370 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT
THE EVENTUAL BENEFICIARIES OF ITS BENEVOLENT EXPROPRIATION ARE SQUATTERS.[36]
NHA,
in its petition in G.R. Nos. 116491-503,
primarily contends that the CA erred when it issued its March 2, 1994 Resolution and modified the May 27, 1993 Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 10200-10212 to the extent
that it applied retroactively Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7279, thus exempting from expropriation the 300-sq m lots of respondents
Loberanes, Quimque, Vega, Santos, Oracion and Mercado. NHA summarized its
arguments as follows:
I
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
applying retroactively Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7279 to the
subject expropriation cases instituted back in 1977 by petitioner-appellant
NHA.[37]
A. Republic Act 7279 passed in 1992 should
operate prospectively and, therefore, should not be given retroactive effect.[38]
Republic Act 7279 is a substantive and penal
law with a penalty clause which cannot apply retroactively especially to
pending actions.[39]
B. Republic Act No. 7279 and PD 1072 are not in
pari materia.[40]
The retroactive application of Article VI,
Section 10 of RA 7279 will affect vested rights of petitioner-appellant NHA
arising from its exercise of the power of eminent domain.[41]
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
ignoring the impractical consequences resulting from a selective expropriation
of lots.[42]
In G.R. No. 116176, petitioner Lim, a non-member of the tenant
association who bought from RCAM/PRC four lots of the subdivided Grace Park
Subdivision,[43] argues
as follows:
1
Respondent NHA may not, as it would herein,
legally re-group several smaller lots into which a much bigger lot had
previously been subdivided, and consider and treat them as one again for the
purpose of subdividing it once more into still smaller lots for distribution to
its supposed or intended beneficiaries.[44]
2
There really was no genuine necessity for the
expropriation of the lots in question to satisfy the purpose thereof as alleged
in the complaint therefor.[45]
3
Respondent Court did not sustain the clear
finding of the trial court that no evidence sufficient to prove its claim that
the expropriation of said lots and subdividing them again into much smaller
lots for resale to their present occupants would provide the latter with more
healthful, decent and peaceful surroundings and thus improve the quality of
their lives was ever presented by respondent NHA.[46]
Stripped of non-essentials, the petitions raise only one
fundamental issue, and that is, whether the NHA may validly expropriate the
parcels of land subject of these cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The
power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the
State. Also called the power of
expropriation, it is described as “the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government” that may be acquired for some public purpose
through a method “in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State.”[47] By virtue of its sovereign character, the
exercise of the power prevails over the non-impairment clause,[48]
and is clearly superior to the final and executory judgment rendered by a court
in an ejectment case.[49]
Being
inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on the government by the
Constitution. Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, which mandates that “private property shall not be taken for
a public use without just compensation,” merely imposes a limit on the government’s
exercise of the power and provides a measure of protection to the individual’s
right to property.[50]
Just
like its two companion fundamental powers of the State,[51]
the power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. However, it may be delegated by Congress to
the President, administrative bodies, local government units, and even to
private enterprises performing public services.[52]
Albeit
the power partakes of a sovereign character, it is by no means absolute. Its exercise is subject to limitations, one
of which is, precisely, Section 9, Article III of the Constitution.
Over
the years and in a plethora of cases, this Court has recognized the following
requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain: (1) the
property taken must be private property; (2) there must be genuine necessity to
take the private property; (3) the taking must be for public use; (4) there
must be payment of just compensation; and (5) the taking must comply with due
process of law.[53] Accordingly, the question that this Court must
resolve is whether these requisites have been adequately addressed.
It
is incontrovertible that the parcels of land subject of these consolidated
petitions are private property. Thus,
the first requisite is satisfied.
With
respect to the second, it is well to recall that in Lagcao v. Judge Labra,[54]
we declared that the foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is
genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. As a rule, the determination of whether there
is genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable question.[55] However, when the power is exercised by the
Legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a political question.[56] Thus, in City
of
The
legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may
directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a
particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of
the improvement. In such a case, it is
well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the
public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking
the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the
legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to
substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people.
In
the instant cases, the authority to expropriate came from Presidential Decree
No. 1072, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1977. At that time, and as explicitly recognized
under the 1973 Constitution, President Marcos had legislative powers. Perforce, the expropriation of the subject
properties – identified with specificity in the P.D. --- was directed by
legislation. The issue of necessity then
assumed the nature of a political question.
As
to the third requisite of “public use,” we examine the purpose for which the
expropriation was undertaken by NHA. As
set forth in its petition, NHA justifies the taking of the subject property for
the purpose of improving and upgrading the area by constructing roads and
installing facilities thereon under the Government’s zonal improvement program and
subdividing them into much smaller lots for distribution and sale at a low cost
to qualified beneficiaries, mostly underprivileged long-time occupants of Grace
Park. Around 510 families with approximately 5 members each will be benefited
by the project.[58] The only
remaining obstacle in the completion of this project is the lots subject of
these consolidated petitions as the other lots in Grace Park have already been
expropriated.[59]
The
Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP), being implemented for government by NHA, draws
breath from policy mandates found in the 1987 Constitution.[60] It is an integral part of the government’s
“socialized housing” program which, in Sumulong
v. Guerrero,[61] we
deemed compliant with the “public use” requirement, it being a program clearly
devoted to a “public purpose.” Justice
Irene R. Cortes, speaking eloquently for the Court, said:
“Socialized housing” is defined as, “the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities” (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1). This definition was later expanded to include among others:
a) The construction and/or improvement of
dwelling units for the middle and lower income groups of the society, including
the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities;
b) Slum clearance, relocation and
resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers as well as the provision of related
facilities and services;
c) Slum improvement which consists basically
of allocating homelots to the dwellers in the area or property involved,
rearrangement and re-alignment of existing houses and other dwelling structures
and the construction and provision of basic community facilities and services,
where there are none, such as roads, footpaths, drainage, sewerage, water and
power system, schools, barangay centers, community centers, clinics, open
spaces, parks, playgrounds and other recreational facilities;
d) The provision of economic opportunities,
including the development of commercial and industrial estates and such other
facilities to enhance the total community growth; and
e) Such other activities undertaken in
pursuance of the objective to provide and maintain housing for the greatest
number of people under Presidential Decree No. 757. (Pres. Decree No. 1259,
sec. 1)
x x x x
Specifically,
urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is
recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of
public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The
1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and
ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. The 1987
Constitution goes even further by providing that:
The State shall promote a just and dynamic
social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and
free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved
quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]
The
state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with
the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which
will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas.
It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In
the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small
property owners. (Art. XIII,
sec. 9, Emphasis supplied)
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at once.
Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of crowded makeshift dwellings is a worldwide development particularly in developing countries. So basic and urgent are housing problems that the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the “International Year of Shelter for the Homeless” “to focus the attention of the international community on those problems”. The General Assembly is “[s]eriously concerned that, despite the efforts of Governments at the national and local levels and of international organizations, the living conditions of the majority of the people in slums and squatter areas and rural settlements, especially in developing countries, continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute terms.” [G.A. Res. 37/221, Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, Vol. 36, p. 1043-4]
In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls within the confines of "public use". It is, particularly important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which should be construed in relation with the preceding three paragraphs. Provisions on economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project.[62]
It need only be added, at this
juncture, that the “public use” requisite for the valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing
conditions. At present, it may not be
amiss to state that whatever is beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use.[63]
Still, petitioner Manapat insists
that, being himself a beneficiary of the expropriation (because he has been a
long-time resident of Grace Park), it would be incongruous for government to
take his land away from him only to give it back to him. This contention sadly fails to comprehend the
public purpose for the taking under the “socialized housing” program. The parcels of land subject of the expropriation
are, precisely, being taken so that they can be subdivided into much smaller
lots --- at an average of 66.5 square meters per lot[64]
--- for distribution to deserving dwellers in the area. Upon the completion of the project, Manapat,
and those similarly situated as he, cannot assert any right to be awarded the
very same lots they currently occupy, nor be entitled to the same area of the
land they now have.
Then, we have petitioner Lim and
respondents Vega,
We are not persuaded.
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration[65] is instructive. In that case, this Court adopted the
dissenting opinion of Justice J. B. L. Reyes in Republic v. Baylosis,[66]
that the propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain cannot be
determined on a purely quantitative or area basis, given that the Constitution
speaks of lands, not of landed estates. Speaking through Justice (later Chief
Justice) Enrique M. Fernando, the Court said:
This is not to say of course that property rights are disregarded. This is merely to emphasize that the philosophy of our Constitution embodying as it does what Justice Laurel referred to as its “nationalistic and socialist traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of [its] provisions” although not extending as far as the “destruction or annihilation” of the rights to property, negates the postulate which at one time reigned supreme in American constitutional law as to their well-nigh inviolable character. This is not so under our Constitution, which rejects the doctrine of laissez faire with its abhorrence for the least interference with the autonomy supposed to be enjoyed by the property owner. Laissez faire, as Justice Malcolm pointed out as far back as 1919, did not take too firm a foothold in our jurisprudence. Our Constitution is much more explicit. There is no room for it for laissez faire. So Justice Laurel affirmed not only in the above opinion but in another concurring opinion quoted with approval in at least two of our subsequent decisions. We had occasion to reiterate such a view in the ACCFA case, decided barely two months ago.
This particular grant of authority to Congress authorizing the expropriation of land is a clear manifestation of such a policy that finds expression in our fundamental law. So is the social justice principle enshrined in the Constitution of which it is an expression, as so clearly pointed out in the respective dissenting opinions of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and Chief Justice Paras in the Baylosis case. Why it should be thus is so plausibly set forth in the ACCFA decision, the opinion being penned by Justice Makalintal. We quote: “The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only ‘because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,’ continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.”
In a more recent decision,[67]
we had occasion to declare that the fact that the property is less than
½-hectare and that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation
does not diminish its public use character, inasmuch as “public use” now
includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including
in particular, urban land reform and housing.
The Court’s departure from the land size
or area test finds further affirmation in its rulings in Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. v. Dimayuga[68] and
the aforecited Sumulong v. Guerrero.[69]
Given this discussion, it is clear
that “public use,” as a requisite for the exercise of eminent domain in the
instant cases, has been adequately fulfilled.
To satisfy the fourth requisite, we
affirm the appellate court’s disposition that the subject cases be remanded to
the trial court for the determination of the amount of just compensation. Under case law, the said determination is a
judicial prerogative.[70] As to the observance of the fifth requisite,
the due process clause, in the expropriation proceedings, all the parties have
been given their day in court. That they
are now before this Court is attestation enough that they were not denied due
process of law.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it
is unmistakable that all the requirements for the valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain have been complied with.
Thus, our answer to the singular and fundamental issue in these
consolidated cases is: YES, the NHA may validly expropriate the subject parcels
of land.
One final matter: the propriety of
the application by the CA of R.A. No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992.
The
Court is not unaware of the condition now imposed by R.A. No. 7279[71]
that, for purposes of urban development and housing under the Act, where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners
shall be exempted.[72] “Small
property owners” are owners of residential lands with an area not exceeding 300
sq m in highly urbanized cities and 800 sq m in other urban areas and who do
not own any other real property.[73]
Invoking this limitation under the said law, the appellate court in the
questioned rulings exempted from expropriation the lots owned by Loberanes,
Quimque, Mercado, Vega and
The CA’s ruling on this point is
incorrect. R.A. No. 7279 was enacted in 1992, almost two decades after the
expropriation cases against the property owners herein were instituted with the
RTC in 1977. Nova constitutio futuris
formam imponere debet, non praeteritis. A new statute should affect the
future, not the past. The law looks forward, not backward.[74] Article
4 of the Civil Code even explicitly declares, “(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided.”[75] In
these consolidated cases, the Court finds that the language of R.A. No. 7279 does
not suggest that the Legislature has intended its provisions to have any
retroactive application. On the contrary, Section 49 of the said law indicates
that it “shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.”[76] The
law’s prospective application being clearly stated, the Court cannot agree with
the disposition of the appellate court that the subject lots not exceeding 300
sq m are exempt from expropriation.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the May
27, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212 and the
June 28, 1994 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 27159 are AFFIRMED; and the March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994 Resolutions
in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 10200-10212 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Initially, this case was given
additional 11 docket numbers, 110482-93, due to the fact that the decision of
the CA indicated that it involved 12 consolidated expropriation cases. After
perusing the records, however, the Court in the September 20, 1993 Resolution
ordered the deletion of the additional docket numbers for it found that
petitioner Manapat filed his appeal only in his behalf and not of the other
parties in the CA consolidated cases (see
rollo, G.R. No. 110478, pp. 109-111).
[2] Penned by Associate Justice
Eduardo G. Montenegro, with Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena (who later
became Associate Justice of this Court) and Regina G. Ordoñez-Benitez, concurring;
rollo, G.R. No. 110478, pp. 48-69.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice
Eugenio S. Labitoria, with Associate Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Fermin A.
Martin, Jr., concurring; rollo, G.R.
No. 116176, pp. 20-31.
[4] Both penned by Associate Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro, with Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena (who later became Associate Justice of this Court) and Cezar D. Francisco, concurring; rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, pp. 66-74 and 76-81.
[5] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, pp. 27-28.
[6]
[7] Rollo, G.R. No. 110478, p. 14; rollo,
G.R. No. 116176, p. 11; rollo, G.R.
Nos. 116491-503, pp. 13-14.
[8] PD
No. 1072 substantially states as follows:
x x x x
APPROPRIATING THE AMOUNT OF ONE
MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS TO COVER THE ADDITIONAL AMOUNT NEEDED FOR
THE EXPROPRIATION OF 51 LOTS OF THE GRACE PARK SUBDIVISION IN CALOOCAN CITY
WHEREAS, upon petition of the occupants, the defunct
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation authorized on November 27, 1964, the
expropriation of 51 lots of Block 157, 158 and 159 of the Grace Park
Subdivision situated in Caloocan City, totaling 18,427.5 sq. m., and requested
the Office of the President the sum of Six Hundred Forty Five Thousand
(P645,000.00) Pesos needed to acquire that said lots at P35.00 per square meter.
WHEREAS, the Treasurer of the Philippines was able to
release the requested sum of P645,000.00 to the National Housing Authority only
on February 12, 1976, at which time the market value of the said lots had
increased from P35.00 per square meter to an average of P100 per square meter,
or a total of P1.85 million, thereby making the amount released to the National
Housing Authority inadequate by One Million Two Hundred Thousand
(P1,200,000.00) Pesos.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the
SECTION 1. The
sum of One Million Two Hundred Thousand (P1,200,000.00) Pesos is hereby
appropriated out of the President's Special Operations Funds, to cover the
additional amount needed to expropriate the 51 lots of Block 157, 158 and 159
of the Grace Park Subdivision in Caloocan City, for resale to the bona fide
occupants therein.
SECTION 2. This
Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of
[9] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, pp. 29-33.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, G.R. No. 110478, p. 54.
[14]
[15]
[16] Rollo,
G.R. Nos. 110462-74, pp. 99-100.
[17]
[18] Rollo,
G.R. No. 110770, p. 3.
[19]
[20]
[21] Rollo,
G.R. No. 110478, p. 10-46.
[22]
[23]
[24] Rollo,
G.R. No. 116491-503, p. 67.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] Supra note 4.
[31] Rollo,
G.R. No. 116176, p. 12.
[32]
[33] Rollo,
G.R. No. 110478, p. 28.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37] Rollo, G.R. No. 116491-503, p. 33.
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43] Rollo,
G.R. No. 116176, p. 88.
[44] Id at 13.
[45] Id at 14.
[46] Id at 14-15.
[47] Isagani A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1998 ed., p. 61,
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 616.
[48] Kabiling
v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-57424,
[49] Filstream
International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 125218 and 128077,
[50] Republic
v. Tagle, G.R. No. 129079,
[51] The two other fundamental powers of the State are the police power and the power of taxation.
[52] Under existing laws, quasi-public corporations such as the Philippine National Railways, the PLDT and Meralco have been granted the power of expropriation.
[53] Manotok
v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-55166-67,
[54] G.R. No. 155746,
[55] Bardillon v. Barangay Masili, Calamba,
Laguna, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 440; Republic v. La Orden de Po Benedictinos, G.R. No. L-12792,
[56]
[57] 40 Phil. 349.
[58] NHA,
in its Petition in G.R. Nos. 116491-503, explains that:
x x x x
39. Having been placed in possession of the
subject properties, plaintiff prepared the development plans and detailed
engineering for the area (T.S.N. of Engr. Ramon Ronquillo, pp. 14-15, March 9,
1981). The development plans as approved
by the petitioner and the City Government of Caloocan City called for the
construction of footpaths, roads, drainage system, water supply system and
electrical system (Id. P. 17-18).
39.1.
Such development plan was consistent with the 3rd Improvement
Program of the National Government to be implemented by its various agencies
and instrumentalities. In various
presidential issuances, the National Government had clearly espoused an
extensive national housing policy directed towards the improvement and
rehabilitation of congested urban areas.
39.
2. The whole area of Grace Park Subdivision was one of the projects to be
supervised by the plaintiff NHA under a zonal improvement program. As
distinguished from other housing programs of the government, the zonal
improvement project was into development or upgrading of the project area
(T.S.N. of Engr. Ramon Ronquillo, 9 March 1981, pp. 53-55). This entailed the
construction of footpaths, roads, drainage system, water supply system and
electrical system (Ibid., p. 17-18) which would require a considerable
aggregate need for open space in the congested area. Upon query of the trial court, Engr. Ramon
Ronquillo testified that in totality a reasonable estimate of thirty per cent (30%)
of the land area would be required for open spaces (Ibid., p. 130).
39.3.
To implement the project, it was necessary to effect the re-blocking of some
structures to conform to the physical development plan of the project. This meant the dismantling of some
structures, or portions thereof for the purpose of aligning the rest of the
structures (Ibid., p. 98).
39.4. The zonal improvement program was differentiated
from the resettlement projects ventured into by the government in other
areas. Whilst the resettlement involved
movement of people from one location to another effecting thereby a dislocation
of these families and their sources of livelihood (Ibid., p. 138-139), the
zonal improvement program sought to remedy the social malady by merely focusing
its scarce available financial and technical resources on the site to
accommodate the residents in the same area where they have lived, worked, and
been schooled (Ibid., p. 139-140). Moreover, concomitant to this objective was
the plan of establishing a livelihood component. It basically offers financial loans to be
used for construction materials to improve this lot (Ibid., p. 147).
40. There were approximately 510
families/households beneficiaries of the intended expropriation, some of whom
were renters, who took second priority in the award and for whom some vacant
lots are intended (Ibid., p. 106). Each
household or family had an average of five (5) members (Id., p. 134). Hence, the entire project would provide
shelter to approximately 2,550 individuals. The average site of individual
homelots to be awarded to each family is 60 square meters (Id., p. 137). The biggest area could be one hundred seventy
(170) square meters (Ibid., p. 138). In
very exceptional cases an area of forty (40) square meters could be sold. The variance was explained by the fact that
small structures occupied small lots (Ibid., p. 139).
41. Petitioner-appellant
advertised for public bidding the construction of infrastructure (
x x x x
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, pp. 30-33.
[59] See Appendix B of the Petition in
G.R. Nos. 116491-503; id. at 61-64.
[60] Section 9, Article II, and Section 9, Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution.
[61] No. L-48685,
[62] Sumulong
v. Guerrero, supra note 61, at 466-469; see Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103125, May
17, 1993, 222 SCRA 173.
[63] Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R.
No. 137285, January 16, 2001.
[64] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 116491-503, p. 79.
[65] No. L-21064,
[66] 96 Phil. 461 (1955).
[67] Filstream
International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 49.
[68] No. L-32049,
[69] Supra note 61.
[70] EPZA
v. Dulay, 146 SCRA 305.
[71] The law is entitled “An Act to
Provide for a Comprehensive and Continuing Urban Development and Housing
Program, Establishing Mechanism for its Implementation, and for Other
Purposes,” and approved on
[72] Section 10 of R.A. No. 7279 which
reads:
SEC. 10. Modes
of Land Acquisition.—The modes of acquiring land for purposes of this Act
shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly
or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture
agreement, negotiated purchase and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted only when
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further, That where expropriation is resorted to,
parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes
of this Act: Provided, finally,
That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to
the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of
the Rules of Court.
For the purpose of socialized housing,
government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be acquired by the local
government units, or by the National Housing Authority primarily through
negotiated purchase: Provided, That
qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the land shall be given the
right of first refusal. [Underscoring ours.]
[73] See
Section 3 of R.A. No. 7279; City of
[74] Coloso
v. Garilao, G.R. No. 129165,
[75] Gallardo
v. Borromeo, No. L-36007, May 25, 1988, 161 SCRA 500, 502; Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776,
October 28, 1993, 227 SCRA 444, 448.
[76] See Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Opeña, G.R. No. 129807, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 58, 83.