THE PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee, [Formerly
G.R. No. 147313]
Present:
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
- versus - CARPIO,**
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA, and
JOEMARIE CERILLA, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Appellant.
Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals[2] dated
26 October 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00032 which affirmed with modification the
Decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 23 dated 15 August 2000
in Criminal Case No. 496502 finding appellant Joemarie Cerilla guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On
That on or about April 24, 1998, in the Municipality of Leganes, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot Alexander Parreño with the firearm which the accused was then provided, hitting and inflicting pellet wound at the right back portion of his body which caused his death.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[4]
The
prosecution’s evidence shows that at around
from appellant’s house, Michelle
heard an explosion. Michelle immediately turned her back and saw appellant
pointing a gun at Alexander who, at that moment, was staggering towards her.[7] Sendin, who was also with Alexander and
Michelle, did not look back but instead ran away and proceeded to the house of Mrs.
Parreño.[8] Meanwhile,
Michelle was cuddling Alexander beside the road when the latter repeatedly told
her that it was appellant who shot him.[9] Twenty
minutes later, Alexander’s other daughter, Novie Mae, arrived; she was
also told by Alexander at that moment that it was appellant who shot him.[10]
SPO3
Frederick Dequito (SPO3 Dequito) and other police officers rushed to the crime
scene and helped carry Alexander to an ambulance. SPO3 Dequito was able to ask Alexander who
shot him to which he answered “Pato.”
“Pato” is an alias by which appellant
is known.[11]
Alexander’s
wife, Susan, who rushed to the hospital was also told by Alexander that it was
appellant who shot him.[12] Alexander died the following day.[13]
Dr.
Tito D. Doromal, Philippine National Police
medico-legal officer, performed an autopsy on the body of Alexander. The autopsy report stated the cause of death to
be hemorrhage secondary to pellet wounds.[14] Testifying
on his report, Dr. Doromal explained that Alexander died from a gunshot wound
which penetrated the ribs and lacerated the right lobe of the liver, colon,
stomach, duodenum, and right kidney. The
entrance wound was located at the middle-back portion of the body. Seven (7) pellets were recovered on the
muscle of the upper and middle abdominal wall.[15]
The
defense’s evidence consists of the testimonies of appellant himself and of his wife,
Madoline, his stepdaughter, Franlin, PO1 Manolito Javelora, PO3 Alberto
Sarmiento, and PO3 Wilson Allona.
Appellant interposed alibi as his main defense. He claimed that Alexander, together with his
daughter and Sendin, had gone to his house on
went to his house and told him that
he was a suspect in the shooting of Alexander and was then brought to the
police station.[17] The following day, he was subjected to
paraffin test the result of which turned out to be negative.[18]
Appellant’s testimony was
corroborated by Madoline and Franlin.
PO1 Javelora declared that when he asked Alexander who shot him, the
latter did not answer.[19] Likewise, PO3 Sarmiento and Allona stated
that when they went to the hospital to interrogate Alexander, the latter could
not give a definite answer as to who shot him.[20]
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, and in the light of the facts obtaining and the
jurisprudence aforecited, judgement is hereby rendered finding the accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, hereby sentencing the
said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 7659[,] amending Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. The said
accused is further condemned to indemnify the surviving heirs of the deceased,
Alexander Parreño, the sum of P257,774.75 by way of actual damages; the
amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages and the sum of P50,000.00
by way of death compensation. The
accused who is detained is entitled to be credited in full with the entire
period of his preventive detention. The
Jail Warden,
SO ORDERED.[21]
The
trial court regarded the victim’s dying declaration as the most telling
evidence pointing to appellant as the assailant.[22] It appreciated the presence of treachery in
qualifying the crime to murder because the victim
was unarmed and walking
on his way
home when he was suddenly and
unexpectedly shot from behind by appellant.[23] The trial court ruled that appellant’s alibi
and denial could not prevail over the positive testimonies of credible
witnesses.[24] Moreover, it observed that appellant was not
able to prove the impossibility of his presence at the crime scene which could
have proven his alibi.[25]
In view of the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant,
the case was initially elevated to this Court for review. However, pursuant to our
ruling in People v. Mateo,[26]
the case was referred to the Court of Appeals.
The
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling but modified the award of
moral damages from Thirty Thousand Pesos to Fifty Thousand Pesos.[27] Hence, the instant appeal.
In a Resolution dated
Appellant
argues that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of
the prosecution's eyewitness, Michelle, as well as the dying declaration of
Alexander considering that the circumstances under which the crime was
committed rendered the identification of the gunman impossible.
This
argument essentially challenges the credibility of the witnesses, including the
eyewitness, whose testimonies were relied upon by the trial court in convicting
appellant. Basic is the principle that the
findings of fact of a trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This
is because the
trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and is in the best position to
discern whether they are telling the truth. This rule holds true especially
when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court.[30]
Appellant’s
authorship of the crime was proven by the positive identification of an
eyewitness and the victim’s dying declaration.
The
prosecution presented Michelle, who categorically identified appellant as the
one who shot Alexander, viz:
Q: While you and your father were walking towards home, did you remember anything unusual that happened?
A:
Yes, Ma’am.
Q:
What was that?
A: I heard an explosion.
Q:
Where were you in relation to your
father when you heard that shot?
A: I was in front of my Daddy and he was
at my back.
Q:
You said you heard a shot, what did
you do when you heard a shot?
A: When I heard the shot, I turned back and I saw Joemarie pointing to my Dad.
COURT:
Q:
What did he point towards your Dad?
A:
Firearm.
PROSECUTOR PADILLA:
Q: You
said Joemarie was pointing a firearm to your father. Was it [a] long or short firearm?
A:
About 11 inches.
Q:
After you saw Joemarie pointing a
firearm to your father, what happened next?
A: I saw my father staggering towards me and I saw Joemarie Cerilla ran.
Q:
Where was he going?
A:
Maybe towards his house.[31]
x
x x x
Q:
If this Joemarie Cerilla is inside
the Courtroom, can you identify him?
A:
Yes, Ma’am.
Q:
Please point to him. (Witness
pointing to the accused Joemarie Cerilla).[32]
Michelle’s
account of how her father was shot by appellant was corroborated by the
post-mortem examination which reveals that the entrance wound is located at the
back of the victim.[33] In the same vein, the medico-legal expert concluded
that the gunshot was fired at a close range, as evidenced by the presence of a
power burn measuring four (4) centimeters in diameter surrounding the periphery
of the wound [34] and
penetrating his internal organs.[35]
Significantly, the eyewitness’s
positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime is fully
supported the victim’s dying declaration.
A dying declaration is a statement
made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts which concern
the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed
belief that death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a
very short time, without an opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all
hopes of recovery. In other words, it is
a statement made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a
belief that death is certain, stating the facts concerning the cause and
circumstances surrounding his/her death.[36]
As an exception to the rule against
hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence of
the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of
his impending death would make
a careless and false accusation.[37]
It is thus admissible to provide
the identity of the accused and the
deceased, to show the
cause of death
of the deceased,
and the circumstances under which
the assault was made
upon him.
The reasons for its admissibility
is necessity and
trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant’s death
renders it impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that
there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; allowing it, therefore,
prevents a failure of justice. And
trustworthiness, because the declaration is made in extremity, when the party
is at the point of death and when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the
mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. The law
considers the point of death as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an
obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.[38]
Of the doctrines that authorize the
admission of special classes of hearsay, the doctrine relating to dying
declarations is the most mystical in its theory and, traditionally, among the
most arbitrary in its limitations. In
the
Four requisites must concur in order
that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus: first, the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death. This refers not only to
the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the
assault having a direct causal connection with it. Statements involving the nature of the
declarant’s injury or the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and
willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for the killing;
justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of cause for the
act are admissible.[40] Second, at the time the declaration was
made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death. The
rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief
in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not
the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying
declaration admissible. It is not
necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of
the deceased. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly
impending.[41] Third, the declarant is competent as a
witness. The rule is that where the
declarant would not have been a competent witness had he survived, the
proffered declarations will not be admissible. Accordingly, declarations made
by a child too young to be a competent witness or by a person who was insane or
incapable of understanding his own statements by reason of partial
unconsciousness are not admissible in evidence.[42] Thus,
in the absence of evidence showing that the declarant could not have been competent
to be a witness had he survived, the presumption must be sustained that he
would have been competent.[43] Fourth, the declaration must be offered
in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant
is the victim.[44] Anent this
requisite, the same deserves no further elaboration as, in fact, the
prosecution had caused its witnesses to take the stand and testify in open
court on the substance of Alexander’s ante mortem statement in the present
criminal case for murder.
The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to three persons who testified
with unanimity that they had been told by the victim himself that it was appellant
who shot him. Michelle recounted:
Q:
You said your father moved towards
you, what happened next?
A: I approached my father and cuddled him.
Q:
What happened next?
A: While I was cuddling my father he said, “Day, it was Joemarie who shot me.”
Q: How many time he said he was shot?
A: Not once but about 10 times.[45]
Shortly thereafter, Novie Mae arrived
and was told by Alexander that it was appellant who opened fire at him:
Q:
When you reached
A:
I saw that my elder sister was
assisting my father.
COURT:
Q:
What’s the name of your sister?
A:
Michelle.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL:
Q:
When you saw your sister Michelle assisting
your father, what [sic] happened next?
A:
And I immediately went near my
father and asked him who shot him and he answered it was Joemarie Cerilla who
shot him.
Q:
Before you reached your father, did
you observe his physical appearance of what happened to him?
A:
Yes, Ma’am, he was supporting with
his arm and when I asked him he still made a response.
Q:
You said [that] before you
approached your father[,] you saw him supporting his body, what was his
position at that time?
A:
He was in a position of lying with
his hand on the road and my sister was assisting him.
x
x x
Q:
Were you able to observe why your
father was sitting on the ground and supporting himself not to fall.
A:
Yes, Ma’am.
Q:
Why, [sic] what did you observe?
A:
My father was supporting himself
in order that blood will not [ooze] from his body and his body will not fall
down.[46]
SPO3 Dequito, who responded
immediately to the crime scene, corroborated the testimonies of the Alexander’s
children, to wit:
Q:
So, what did you do when you
arrived at the crime scene?
A:
We advised the group to carry Mr.
Parreño to the ambulance because the ambulance was on the way and after our
mobile arrived, the ambulance arrived also [sic]
so we carried Mr. Parreño to be brought to the hospital.
COURT:
Q:
Meaning you loaded the victim into
the ambulance?
A:
Yes, Your Honor.
Q:
And after he was loaded, what did
you do?
A:
Before the ambulance left the
area, I questioned the victim who shot him and he answered Alias “Pato.”
I am referring to Joemarie Cerilla, the accused.
Q:
The accused Cerilla, Alias “Pato”?
A:
Yes, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR:
Q:
Can you remember the exact words
uttered by the victim when you asked him who shot him?
A:
He answered me that: I questioned
him, “Who shot you?” and he answered that it was Cerilla and I further asked
him “The husband of Madoline” and he answered “Yes, Alias “Pato”, the husband of Madoline.[47]
Likewise, Alexander’s wife, Sonia, testified:
Q:
You said from your house when you
were told by the girls that your husband was shot, what did you do?
A:
I looked for a taxi and proceeded
to the hospital.
x
x x
Q:
When you arrived at the hospital,
where did you go first?
A:
To my husband.
x
x x
Q:
When you reached that hospital and
your own mother led you to where Alexander was, in what part of the hospital
did you first see him.
A:
Outside the operating room.
Q:
What was the situation of your
husband when you first saw him?
A:
He was leaning on his side and
many nurses attending to him and saying “araguy.”
x
x x
Q:
Between you and your husband who
spoke first?
A:
My husband.
Q:
What were the exact words stated by
your husband?
A: He told me that it was Joemarie who shot
him.[48]
These statements comply with all the
requisites of a dying declaration. First,
Alexander’s declaration pertains to the identity of the person who shot him. Second, the fatal quality and extent of the
injuries[49] he suffered
underscore the imminence of his death as his condition was so serious that his
demise occurred the following morning after a thirteen (13)-hour operation. Third, he would have been competent to
testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying declaration is offered in a criminal
prosecution for murder where he was the victim.
Other police officers were presented
by the defense to refute the dying declaration.
PO1 Javelora alleged that he happened to pass by the crime scene and saw
a young girl crying. The girl led him to
her father who was sitting on the roadside.
He asked the victim who shot him but he did not get any reply.[50] PO3 Allona and Sarmiento arrived at the
hospital and questioned Alexander as to who shot him but the latter told them,
“I am not sure because it was dark.”[51] These statements cannot be construed as a
categorical statement of the victim denying knowledge as to the identity of his
assailant. It can be recalled that at
the time Alexander was being questioned, he was already being readied for
surgery. At that point, he was
understandably no longer fit to respond to questions. Between these two seemingly conflicting
testimonies, it is the positive identification made by Alexander in his dying
declaration which must be sustained.
Appellant insists that there was an
inherent impossibility in identifying the assailant with clarity since there
was a power blackout at the time of the commission of the crime and was then a
moonless night.
The fact that the crime was committed
during a blackout does not cast doubt on Alexander’s and Michelle’s positive
identification of appellant. While the place of occurrence was dark, this did
not prevent the Alexander or Michelle from identifying the assailant,
especially since the shot was delivered at close range.
In dismissing appellant’s contention,
the trial court rationalized:
x x x This argument deserves scant consideration. In the case of People v. Hillado, G.R. No. 122838[,] promulgated on May 24, 1999[,] citing the case of People v. Oliano, “visibility at nighttime is possible not only at the exact minute and date when the moon is full as indicated in the calendar. Thus, a person’s nocturnal eyesight, is not necessarily diminished just because there is no illumination from the moon, because it is a fact that our eyes can actually adjust to the darkness so that we can still see objects clearly even without sufficient lighting. In the case at bar, it would not be so hard for Michelle to identify a person’s fact especially if the latter – as in the present case – was barely two (2) arms length away from them which is confirmed by the presence of gunpowder nitrates on the body of the victim. We stress, that the normal reaction of the person is to direct his sight towards the source of a startling [shot] or occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar, the most natural reaction of the victims in criminal violence is to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and to observe the manner in which the crime is committed. Added to this is the fact that the accused Joemarie Cerilla and the victim Alexander Parreño have known each other quite well before the incident so that they became familiar with each other’s face and physical features. x x x [52]
Moreover, the prosecution witnesses
were not shown to be impelled by ill motive to testify falsely against
appellant. Besides, Susan, Michelle and
Novie Mae, being immediate relatives of the deceased, would naturally be
interested in having the real culprit punished.[53]
The positive identification of
appellant must necessarily prevail over his alibi.[54] It was not physically impossible for
appellant to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. The distance of his house, where
he supposedly was, from the locus
criminis is only 120-150 meters, more or less.[55]
Appellant counters that there was
absence of any motive on his part to kill the victim; that it was not clearly
proven that he fired a gun, based on the paraffin test; and that he appeared
calm and composed and showed no indication of guilt when he was invited by the
police officers shortly after the commission of the crime.
Time and again, we have ruled that a
negative finding on paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that one has not
fired a gun because it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no
traces of nitrates or gunpowder, as when the culprit washes his hands or wears
gloves.[56]
The trial court correctly rejected the result of the paraffin test in light of
the positive identification of appellant.
The trial court held that the killing
was qualified by treachery because Alexander, who was unarmed, was suddenly and
unexpectedly shot from behind by appellant without any risk to the latter from
any defense which the former might make.
There was no opportunity given to Alexander to repel the assault or
offer any defense of his person. There
was not the slightest provocation on his part.[57] We
agree with the findings of the trial court. The presence of treachery was
evident in the execution of the crime. Appellant suddenly, and without warning,
shot Alexander from his back.
Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, murder is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. Because the killing of Alexander, although
qualified by treachery, was not attended by any other aggravating circumstance,
the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua.
We deem it proper to further impose exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 which is recoverable in the presence
of an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary, in the
commission of the crime.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Acting
Chief Justice
*As replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave per Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
**Acting
Chairperson.
[1]Rollo, pp. 4-17. Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla.
[37]People v. Cortezano, 425 Phil. 696, 715 (2002).
[38]
[40]See People v. Ortiz and Zausa, 55 Phil. 993 (1931); People v. Araja, et al., 192 Phil. 412, 424 (1981).
[41]People v. Almeda, 209 Phil. 393, 398 (1983); See also People v. Devaras, 147 Phil. 664, 673 (1971).
[42]See People v. Sagario, et al., 121 Phil. 1257 (1965); People v. Araja, et al., 192 Phil. 412 (1981).
[49]Supra note 11. “6. Pellet wound 2.5 x 3.0 cm. in diameter 121 cm from the right heel, 7.0 cm. from the posterior median line, with powder burn 0.4 cm. in diameter surrounding its periphery, penetrating the abdominal cavity by fracturing the 10th and 11th ribs, lacerating the diaphragm, macerating the right lobe of the liver, perporating the ascending colon, stomach, duodenum, right kidney (nephrectomy) and 7 pellets were recovered on the muscle of the upper and middle abdominal wall.
“CAUSE OF DEATH:
“HEMORRHAGE, SECONDARY TO PELLET WOUNDS.” (Autopsy Report (Exh. “B”). Record, p. 150.