THIRD
DIVISION
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KLT
FRUITS, INC., JOSEPH LAO TIAK BEN, MICHAEL LAO TIAN BEN, ARLENE LAO and
ROGELIO BUAN, Petitioners, - versus - WSR FRUITS, INC. and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 20, Respondents. |
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G.R.
No. 174219 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the: (1)
Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82487, dated 28 April 2006 denying the
Petition of the herein petitioners, and affirming the Order[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 20, dated 7 November 2003 in
Civil Case No. 99-92683; and (2) Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals dated 18 August 2006 denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
As narrated by the Court of Appeals, the factual background which gave
rise to this petition started on 10
February 1999 when private respondent
WSR Fruits, Inc. (WSR) filed before the RTC a Complaint for Sum of Money with
Writ of Preliminary Attachment[4]
against petitioners KLT Fruits, Inc. (KLT), Joseph Lao Tiak
Ben, Michael Lao Tian Ben, Roger Buan,
Arlene Lao, Leopoldo J. Gonzales, and Leida A. Gonzales before the RTC of Manila (Branch 20).[5] In its Complaint, WSR alleged that it is
engaged in the business of fruit dealing wholesale or retail, fresh and
preserved - and in food processing; while KLT is engaged in the business of
purchasing and processing various fruits.
Since 1988, WSR had been supplying KLT with fresh mangoes and other
fruits, processed or preserved fruits and finished fruit products; and doing
business with KLT through its authorized employee, Leopoldo
Gonzales, the purchasing manager, and his spouse Leida
Gonzales, the cash manager.
In 1997, KLT incurred a cash flow problem, forcing it to enter into a
check rediscounting transaction with WSR, so that it could pay off its other
fruit suppliers. The check rediscounting
was carried out by the issuance of postdated checks by KLT in exchange for cash
from WSR in amounts less than those stated in the checks, with the difference
representing the profit earned by WSR from the arrangement. These transactions were all made and
facilitated by Leopoldo and Leida
Gonzales, as KLT purchasing officer and cash manager, respectively. WSR agreed to enter into the check
rediscounting transaction with KLT because the latter had been its customer
since 1988, and upon the guarantee and assurance of KLT officers (the other
petitioners herein) and Leopoldo and Leida Gonzales that all the checks issued were in order and
shall be funded when due. The check
rediscounting proceeded smoothly with KLT making good on all their checks to
WSR until 1998.
On various occasions in the latter part of 1998, KLT issued in favor of
WSR, several postdated checks[6] in
exchange for cash, under their check rediscounting arrangement, in the total
amount of P3,685,766.00.[7]
However, when the said checks were deposited at the bank as they fell
due, they were dishonored for the reason “Account Closed/Stop Payment.” Several of the checks were replaced by KLT
with other postdated checks but the latter were also dishonored upon
presentment for payment for the reason “Stop Payment/DAUD.” Despite several oral and written demands[8] by
WSR upon the KLT for the payment of the latter’s obligations for unpaid fruit
purchases and for the dishonored checks, KLT refused. This led to the filing by the WSR of the
Complaint before the RTC, where it prayed:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that pending the hearing of the case, a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment be issued against the properties of the defendants to
secure the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered therein.
It is further prayed that after
due hearing on the principal cause of action, judgment be rendered ordering all
the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:
1. FOR
THE REDISCOUNTING TRANSACTION:
The
amount of THREE MILLION NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR
PESOS AND SEVENTY CENTAVOS (P3,914,934.70), Philippine Currency,
representing the total obligation due and owing with interest, thereon at 5%
per month from the date of filing of the complaint until the whole obligation
is fully paid and satisfied;
2. FOR
THE PURCHASES:
The
amount of NINETY-FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS AND SIX CENTAVOS (P95,400.06),
Philippine Currency, representing the total obligation due and owing with
interest, thereon at 18% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint
until the whole obligation is fully paid and satisfied;
3. The sum representing twenty-five percent (25%) of the total
amount involved as attorney’s fees plus P3,500 per court appearance; and
4. Cost of suit.
Plaintiff
further prays for such relief deemed just and equitable under the premises.[9]
WSR likewise sought to collect on unpaid purchases of bananas by KLT
amounting to P90,830.00.
KLT proceeded to file an Answer with cross-claim and counterclaim.[10]
Issues having been joined, a full-blown trial on the merits ensued, with
the parties presenting rebuttal and sur-rebuttal
evidence. Consequently, on
Premised on the foregoing
consideration, the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby renders its
judgment ordering defendants KLT Corporation, Michael Lao Tian
Ben and Leopoldo Gonzales jointly and severally
1. To pay P3,685,766 to the plaintiff WSR Fruits, Inc.
with legal interest;
2. To pay plaintiff WSR Fruits, Inc. the amount of P90,830
for the bananas delivered on October 20 & 21, 1998 with legal interest;
3. To pay a sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and
payable as attorney’s fees;
4. To pay costs.
For
insufficient evidence, the case against defendants Arlene Lao, Joseph Lao Tiak Ben, Roger Buan and Leida Gonzales is ordered dismissed.
Defendants[´]
counter-claim is dismissed.[11]
On
On
On
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules mandates that within
the period to appeal, the appellant shall pay to the Clerk of the Court that
rendered the judgment x x x
the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
Section
13 of the same Rule provides that the trial court may motu propio dismiss the appeal for
non-payment of the docket fees and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period.
The
record of the case shows that defendants have not paid the docket fees and
other lawful fees, to date.
KLT subsequently paid the docket fees
only on
On
This
resolves the defendant’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
The
record of the case show (sic) that on November 17, 2003 defendants through
counsel filed the necessary docket fees with receipt numbers 18832287, 18827082
and 0101710 to the Office of the Clerk of Court Regional Trial Court, Manila.
It is
the rule and the jurisprudence that within the period of appeal, the appellant
shall pay the amount of the court docket and other fees.
The
right to appeal is a procedural remedy of statutory origin and, as such, may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing
its exercise. (Oro
vs. Diaz, 361 SCRA 108)
The
payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the
perfection of appeal. Without such
payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction of the action and
the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. (Manalili vs. de
Leon, 370 SCRA 625)
WHEREFORE,
defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for being unmeritorious.[20]
From the RTC, KLT filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure.[21] The Court of Appeals denied the Petition in
its Decision dated
In refusing to cater to KLT’s arguments regarding
the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure, the appellate court
underscored that KLT failed to show any justifiable, persuasive or weighty
reasons to rationalize a relaxation of the rule. The appellate court noted that in KLT’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated 20 November
2003, KLT’s counsel, Atty. Vicente Posadas, admitted that he committed an “honest, innocent
oversight or omission” when he was unable to cause the payment of the appeal
docket fees when he filed the notice of appeal.
The oversight was allegedly due to the recent chronic illness plaguing
counsel who was the only full-time lawyer in the law office which he shared
with his brother. KLT’s
counsel even attached a duly notarized medical certificate to support his
claim. He alleged that he failed to
notice the non-payment of the docket fees when he filed their “Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss Appeal,” as he was already sick, resting at home; and that
the said pleading was only filed through the assistance of an outside junior
lawyer, who occasionally assisted him in times of indisposition. The Court of Appeals determined that by
admitting his “oversight or omission,” KLT’s counsel
effectively admitted to being grossly negligent. Negligence, to be deemed “excusable,” must be
one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.[23] The omission herein could hardly be
characterized as excusable. Despite his
alleged illness or indisposition, the Court of Appeals explicitly declared that
Atty. Posadas should have exercised greater prudence
and diligence in ensuring that the appeal docket and other legal fees were paid
as soon as he filed the notice of appeal.[24]
KLT’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated
Rule 41, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
Rule
41. Appeal from the Regional Trial
Court:
SEC.
4. Appellate
court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from, the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the
record on appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x x
SEC.
9. Perfection
of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A
party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect
to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed
in due time.
In
appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time
to appeal of the other parties.
In
appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and
the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In
either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on
appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of
the appeal.
The failure of
the appellant to pay the docket fees is a ground for the dismissal of the
appeal under Rule 50, Section 1(c) of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
which explicitly states that:
Rule 50. Dismissal of Appeal.
Section
1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court
of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee,
on the following grounds:
x x x x
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the
docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of Rule 40 and section 4
of Rule 41.
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned
that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for
the perfection of an appeal. This is so
because a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees regardless of the
actual date of filing of the case in court.
Villena v. Rupisan[26] pronounced
the current jurisprudence on the matter, to wit:
In the case of Gegare v. Court of
Appeals [358 Phil. 228 (1998)], this
Court upheld the appellate court’s dismissal of an appeal for failure of
petitioner to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period despite a
notice from the Court of Appeals informing him that such fees had to be paid
within 15 days from receipt of such notice.
Denying petitioner’s plea for judicial leniency, we held that –
“Also without merit, in our view, is petitioner’s plea
for a liberal treatment by the said court, rather than a strict adherence to
the technical rules, in order to promote substantial justice. For it has consistently held that payment in
full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. As this Court has firmly declared in Rodillas v. Commission on Elections [245 SCRA
702 (1995)], such payment is an essential requirement before the court could
acquire jurisdiction over a case:
The
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the
perfection of an appeal (Dorego v. Perez, 22 SCRA 8
[1968]; Bello v. Fernandez, 4 SCRA 135 [1962]). In both original and appellate cases, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees as held in Acda v. Minister of
Labor, 119 SCRA 306 (1982). The
requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or
procedure. It is an essential
requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in
accordance with, the provision of the law.”
In Lazaro v. Court of Appeals
[386 Phil. 412 (2000)], decided
We must stress that the bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. “Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of this thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.”
Sure enough, the foregoing jurisprudence truly blazed
the trails for a liberal application of the strict interpretation of the law.
In Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, [371
Phil. 393 (1999)], the payment of the docket fees was delayed by six days, but
the late payment was accepted because the party showed willingness to abide by
the Rules by immediately paying those fees.
The Court also took note of the importance of the issues in this case
involving as it does the entitlement or not of the respondents to properties
involved.
Of
similar import is the ruling of the court in the case of Ginete v. Court of Appeals [357 Phil. 36 (1998)], where we held that aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or
property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory
character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower
court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the
following: (1) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances; (2) the merits of the case; (3) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Yambao v.
Court of Appeals [399 Phil. 712
(2000)], saw us again relaxing the Rules when we declared therein that “the
appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if
appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for the failure to
pay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud,
accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty,
without fault on the part of the appellant.
In Go v. Tong [G.R. No. 151942, 27 November
2003, 416 SCRA 557, 567], reiterated
in Heirs of Bertuldo
Hinog v. Melicor [G.R.
No. 140954, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 475], it was held that while the
payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness
to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation [G.R. No. 156278, 29 March 2004,
426 SCRA 414, 420], the Court stated that failure to pay the appellate docket
fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of an appeal, dismissal
being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. And in determining whether or not to dismiss
an appeal on such ground, courts have always been guided by the peculiar legal
and equitable circumstances attendant to each case.
In Camposagrado v. Camposagrado [G.R.
No. 143195, P5.00). This Court called for the liberal
interpretation of the rules and gave due course to the appeal. In brief, the Court said that the failure to
pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of
the appeal, dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate
court. A party’s failure to pay the appellate
docket fee within the reglementary period confers only a discretionary and not
a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal. Such discretionary power should be used in
the exercise of the court’s sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play with great deal of circumspection, considering all
attendant circumstances and must be exercised wisely and ever prudently, never
capriciously, with a view to substantial justice.
In
the subsequent case of Far Corporation v.
Magdaluyo [G.R. No. 148739, 19 November 2004, 443
SCRA 218], this Court, while reiterating that the payment of docket and other
legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional,
in the same vein, recognized that the existence of persuasive and weighty
reasons call for a relaxation of the rules.
In La Salette College
v. Pilotin [463 Phil. 785 (2003)],
notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate
docket fees, we also recognized that its strict application is qualified by the
following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period
allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with
its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of
all attendant circumstances.
In
all, what emerges from all of the above is that the rules of procedure in the
matter of paying the docket fees must be followed. However, there are exceptions to the
stringent requirement as to call for a relaxation of the application of the
rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of
the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the
time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and
equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial
justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13)
exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. Concomitant to a liberal
interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the
rules. Anyone seeking exemption from the
application of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally
meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure.
It bears stressing that while we have
laid down the rule on the discretionary interpretation of the rules on the perfection
of an appeal or the payment of docket fees, we have also in some cases refused
to give due course to an appeal for failure to pay docket fees. Thus, in Tamayo
v. Tamayo, Jr.,[27]
petitioners therein failed to pay the docket fees on the ground that they were
not advised by the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to when to pay the
same. In affirming the dismissal of
therein petitioners’ appeal, this Court reiterated the rule that anyone seeking
exemption from the application of the mandatory nature of the payment of docket
fees has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist
which warrant a departure from the requirement of the law. Of the same tenor is our ruling in Enriquez
v. Enriquez,[28] in
which we repeated that concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules
of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality
to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[29]
Guided by the foregoing
jurisprudential pronouncements, we shall now address the issue of whether the
petition may be granted, and whether the appeal of KLT may be allowed despite
the late payment of docket fees. The antecedents that led to the non-payment of
docket fees are not disputed.
As borne out by the “Corrected Notice
of Appeal” filed by KLT, it received a copy of the RTC Decision dated
KLT did file a Notice of Appeal on
KLT attempted to correct the defect in
its Notice of Appeal by filing an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss Appeal on
In seeking exemption from the mandatory
application of the rule, the reason advanced by KLT’s
counsel was that he was ill at the time the Notice of Appeal was filed, to wit.
1. Undersigned counsel admits the hones,
innocent oversight or omission he had committed when he was unable to cause the
payment of the appeal docket fees with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, when he caused the filing of the notice of appeal. The principal reason for the oversight was
that said counsel was already getting frequently sick and staying at home in
the month of October and in fact had to visit his physician in the
2. The abovementioned facts and
circumstances clearly show that the required appeal docket fee was
inadvertently not paid by reason of the recent chronic illness plaguing
undersigned counsel who is the only full-time lawyer in his and his brother’s
law firm. The Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss Appeal glossed over the said requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 41 of the
Rules as undersigned counsel was already sick and resting at home and said
pleading was rushed by an outside junior lawyer who occasionally assisted
undersigned counsel in times of illness or indisposition. After being informed by phone of the
Honorable Court’s Order of
From the foregoing, we are tasked to
determine whether the above justification constitutes adequate excuse to call
for a relaxation of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the mandatory
payment of docket fees. We answer this
in the negative. In exceptional
circumstances, we allowed a liberal application of the rule.[31] However,
in those exceptional circumstances, the payments of the required docket
fees were delayed for only a few days,[32]
so much unlike this case in which the delay was for more than thirty days; and,
at worse, counsel had several opportunities to rectify said faux pas, yet failed to do so. We are, thus, reminded of Guevarra
v. Court of Appeals,[33] in which the payment of docket fees
was made 41 days after notice of the questioned Decision; and the excuse of
“inadvertence, oversight, and pressure of work was disregarded as too flimsy,
an old hat, a hackneyed pretext. Such
has never been given the badge of excusability by the
Court.
As to the existence of a meritorious
defense which warrants a further hearing of the case, KLT insist that the
checks in question were forged[34]
or stolen from the vault of KLT by Leopoldo Gonzales,
and that Gonzales admitted that he was the author of the forgery and
theft. The forgery and theft of the
checks in question will prevent WSR from recovering from KLT the value of the
said checks. It bears stressing, though,
that the RTC did not give due credence to the claim of forgery by KLT that
would insulate it from liability for the amount of the checks. All told, the instant case underwent a
full-blown trial, in which both parties presented evidence including rebuttal
and sur-rebuttal evidence. Where a party was given the opportunity to
defend its interest in due course, it cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process.[35] It must be emphasized that KLT was adequately
heard, and that all issues were ventilated before the Decision was
promulgated. All the necessary pleadings
were filed by KLT’s counsel to protect its interests
when the case was still before the RTC.
KLT was not deprived of its day in court.[36] No denial of due process was shown. Verily, KLT was afforded adequate and full
opportunity to ventilate its case in the proceedings below.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
RUBEN T.
REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring; rollo, p. 46
[2] Penned by Presiding Judge Marivic Balisi Umali, rollo, p. 109.
[3] Rollo, p. 48.
[4]
[5] The petitioners occupy positions in KLT as follows:
|
a) Joseph Lao Tiak Ben |
- President |
|
b) Michael Lao Tian Ben |
- Executive Vice-President |
|
c) Roger Buan |
- Vice-President |
|
d) Arlene Lao |
- Assistant Vice-President |
|
e) Leopoldo J. Gonzales |
- Purchasing Manager |
|
f) Leida A. Gonzales |
- Cash Manager (CA rollo, p. 20) |
[6] PCIB Check No. Amount Date For payment to
(Name of Supplier)
|
Annex A |
0000263661 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex B |
0000263649 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex C |
0000263659 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex D |
0000263673 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex E |
0000263682 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex F |
0000263677 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex G |
0000263681 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex H |
0000263687 |
|
|
Norma Atlas |
|
Annex I |
0000263685 |
|
|
Norma Atlas |
|
Annex J |
0000263678 |
|
|
Nando Cosico |
|
Annex K |
0000263684 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex L |
0000263674 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex M |
0000263693 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex N |
0000263696 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex O |
0000263688 |
|
|
Norma Atlas |
|
Annex P |
0000263676 |
|
|
Nardo Cosico |
|
Annex Q |
0000263675 |
|
|
Norma Atlas |
UCPB CHECKS NUMBERS
|
Annex R |
00005439824 |
|
|
Norma Atlas |
|
Annex S |
00005439832 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex T |
00005439823 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex U |
00005439822 |
|
|
Moreno de Villa |
|
Annex V |
00005439885 |
|
|
|
|
Annex W |
00005439893 |
|
|
|
|
Annex X |
00005439886 |
|
|
|
TOTAL P3,685,766.00
(Rollo, p. 52)
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] KLT’s Notice of Appeal reads:
NOTICE OF APPEAL
COME
NOW DEFENDANTS, by undersigned counsel, hereby file their Notice of Appeal from
the judgment of this Honorable Court in the above-entitled case dated
(SGD)
VICENTE R. POSADAS (
[13] WSR’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal states:
2. Specifically, the Notice of Appeal is not sufficient in form and substance for the following reasons:
a. It does not specify the court to which the appeal is being taken.
b. It does not state the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal:
b.1 Date of receipt of the copy of the judgment or final order appealed from.
b.2 Date when the Motion for Reconsideration was filed and that it was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period to file Notice of Appeal.
b.3 Statement that the Notice of Appeal is filed within the remainder/balance of the original fifteen-day period of perfecting an appeal from the trial court.
c. It does not state and indicate the proof of
payment of docket and other lawful fees. (
[14] SEC. 5. Notice of Appeal. – The notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, specify the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from, specify the court to which the appeal is being taken, and state the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal.
[15] Rollo, p. 106.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
[22] Rollo, p. 32.
[23] Insular
Life Savings and Trust Company v. Runes, Jr., G.R. No. 152530,
[24] CA rollo, pp. 185-186.
[25] Rollo, p. 199.
[26] G.R. No. 167620,
[27] G.R. No. 148482,
[28] G.R. No. 139303,
[29]
[30] Rollo, p. 228.
[31] Villena v. Rupisan, supra note 26.
[32]
[33] G.R. No. L-43714,
[34] Rollo, p. 24.
[35] Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890, 905 (1997).
[36]