THIRD
DIVISION
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Petitioner, - versus- PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION GROUP (PNP-CIDG),
Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 169982 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the dismissal from service of
petitioner Salvador A. Pleyto after being found
guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty by the Office of the Ombudsman in its
Decision,[2]
dated 27 May 2004, in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I, affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
its Decision,[3] dated
20 July 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086.
The present Petition stems
from a Complaint,[4] dated 28
July 2003, filed by respondent Philippine National Police-Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), through its Director, Eduardo S. Matillano, with the Office of the Ombudsman, which charges
petitioner and the rest of his family as follows:
The undersigned Director of the PNP Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group is hereby filing complaints for Violation
of RA 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in favor of the State any property
found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer) in
relation to Section 8, RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended, Section 8(a) of RA 6713, (Code of Ethical Standard for Public official
and employee) and Section 7 of RA 3019 (Statement of Assets and
Liabilities) and for violation of Article 171 para
4, RPC (Perjury/Falsification of Public Official Documents) against the
following:
1.
USEC
2.
MIGUELA PLEYTO (Wife)- # 1 May Street, Congressional Village,
3.
4.
MARY GRACE
PLETYO- # 1 May Street, Congressional Village,
5.
RUSSEL
PLEYTO-
The said Complaint was based on the
investigation/inquiry on the alleged lavish lifestyle and nefarious activities
of certain personnel of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
conducted by a team, composed of Atty. Virgilio T. Pablico (Atty. Pablico) and Crime
Investigator II Dominador D. Ellazar,
Jr. (Investigator Ellazar, Jr.) of the PNP-CIDG,
together with investigating officers from other government agencies. Petitioner, then serving as a DPWH
Undersecretary, was one of the subjects of the investigating team since he
reportedly amassed unexplained wealth.
Investigating officers, Atty. Pablico and
Investigator Ellazar, Jr., executed a Joint
Affidavit,[6]
essentially stating that: (1) petitioner and the rest of his family accumulated
numerous real properties in Bulacan, other than their
newly renovated residence in Quezon City; (2)
petitioner did not honestly fill out his Statements of Assets and Liabilities
and Networth (SALNs) for
the years 2001 and 2002 for he failed to declare therein all of his and his
wife’s real and personal properties, the true value thereof, and their business
interests; (3) petitioner and his family also took frequent foreign trips from
1993 to 2002; and (4) the properties and foreign trips of petitioner and his
family are grossly disproportionate to petitioner’s income.
The
Investigating Panel from the Preliminary Investigation and Administrative
Adjudication Bureau A (PIAB-A) of the Office of the Ombudsman, tasked to
evaluate the Complaint against petitioner and his family, issued a Report on 9
September 2003, recommending that the said Complaint be docketed as separate
administrative and criminal cases.
Pursuant thereto, the administrative complaint was docketed as OMB-C-A-03-0347-1,
while the criminal complaint was docketed as OMB-C-C-03-05130-1. It is the administrative complaint, OMB-C-A-03-0347-1, for grave
misconduct and dishonesty, which presently concerns this Court.[7]
In
its initial evaluation of the “numerous pieces of evidence” which were attached
to the Complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman, in its Order, dated
In
the meantime, petitioner, his wife, and his children filed their respective
Counter-Affidavits and Supplemental Affidavits before the Office of the
Ombudsman, presenting the following defenses: (1) petitioner admits ownership
of the real properties identified in the Complaint but alleges that they were
acquired by way of foreclosure or dacion en
pago in the course of his wife’s lending business
in Sta. Maria, Bulacan; (2) petitioner is not solely dependent on his salary
since his wife has been operating several businesses in Bulacan,
including lending, piggery, and pawnshop, for the last 25 years; (3) his
children are not financially dependent on petitioner and his wife, but are
full-fledged entrepreneurs and professionals; and (4) the computation of their
travel expenses is exaggerated and inaccurate since most of petitioner’s trips
were sponsored by foreign and local organizations, his wife’s trips were
promotional travel packages to Asian destinations, and his children’s trips
were at their own expense.
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, respondent SALVADOR A. PLEYTO, is hereby found
guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and DISHONESTY and is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM THE SERVICE with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government
service.
The
Honorable Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways, Port Area,
Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in an Order[11]
dated
Petitioner
then assailed before the Court of Appeals the Decision, dated
1.
Upon filing of the petition, a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction be immediately issued directing
the Office of the Ombudsman, its officials and agents, or persons acting for
and on it [sic] behalf, including the Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways from implementing the assailed Decision of the
Ombudsman dated 28 June 2004 and its Order dated 12 October 2004.
2.
After hearing on the merits, that judgment be rendered
nullifying the assailed Decision of the Ombudsman dated
Other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.[12]
On
The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the PNP-CIDG, requested an
extension of 30 days, or until
However, even before the OSG
could file its Comment, the Office of the Ombudsman filed its own Comment (with
Motions to Intervene; Admit Comment; and Recall Temporary Restraining Order) on
Petitioner promptly filed a
Reply Ad Cautelam (To Ombudsman’s Comment)
with Supplemental Plea. In addition to
opposing the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No.
87086, petitioner also addressed the arguments presented by the Office of the
Ombudsman in its Comment on the propriety of his dismissal from service. He avers that he has adequately controverted by clear and convincing evidence the
unsubstantiated charges against him.
Petitioner thus pleads anew for the immediate and urgent grant of his
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the execution of the
order of dismissal of the Office of the Ombudsman.
On
Finding that the execution of the judgment of dismissal
from service of petitioner pending his appeal thereof would possibly work
injustice to petitioner, or tend to render the judgment on his appeal
ineffectual, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[13]
on 1 March 2005 granting the writ of preliminary injunction, thus, ordering the
Office of the Ombudsman and all persons action on its behalf from implementing
its assailed Decision, dated 28 June 2004, and Order, dated 12 October 2004,
pending final determination of CA-G.R. SP No. 87086. The appellate court further directed the
parties to submit their memoranda.
Petitioner and the Office of the Ombudsman filed their
respective Memoranda, while the OSG manifested that it was adopting its Comment
and the Comment of the Office of the Ombudsman on the Petition as its
Memorandum.
On
To repeat, the
administrative liabilities of the petitioner proven by substantial evidence is
his failure to file a truthful and accurate SALN and possession of assets
manifestly out of proportion of (sic) his legitimate income. Either one is legal basis for dismissal or
removal from office. As a final
recourse, the petitioner asks for the chance to correct his SALN before he should
be held administratively liable. The
Ombudsman ripostes that this would be a mockery of the law, saying that the
SALN is not a misdeclare-first-and
correct-if-caught instrument, but a full and solemn recording under oath of
al (sic) the items required to be reported. Ipse dixit.
IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, and the petition
DISMISSED. The writ of preliminary
injunction is LIFTED.[14]
The Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution,[15] dated 4
October 2005, found that the arguments raised in petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration had already been discussed and passed upon in its Decision,
dated 20 July 2005, and there was no cogent reason to warrant reconsideration,
much less, a reversal of the appellate court’s original findings. Hence, petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner now comes before this Court via a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision, dated
a) The Court of
Appeals committed grave error in law in allowing the active intervention of the
Ombudsman in the review proceedings and invoking its arguments raised on appeal
in the resolution of the case.[16]
b) The Court of
Appeals gravely erred in adopting in toto the
appealed judgment of the Ombudsman, the finding being inconsistent with the
evidence on record and the burden of proof required by law being higher than
mere substantial evidence as the penalty involves dismissal from service.[17]
c) The Court of
Appeals committed grave error in law in declaring that petitioner’s resort to
the Compliance and Review Procedure under Sec. 10 of R.A. 6713 is completely
unavailing.[18]
Pursuant
to a Resolution issued by this Court on
NOW, THEREFORE, you (the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways), your officers, agents, representatives, and/or persons acting upon your orders or, in your place or stead, are hereby ENJOINED, ORDERED, COMMANDED and DIRECTED to desist from implementing the assailed decision and order dated June 28, 2004 and October 12, 2004, respectively, of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I entitled “Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group vs. Salvador A. Pleyto” dismissing herein petitioner from the service, as affirmed in the decision and resolution dated July 20, 2005 and October 4, 2005, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086 entitled “Salvador A. Pleyto vs. Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group.”[19]
Having established the facts leading to the Petition at bar, this Court shall now proceed to review petitioner’s assigned errors one at a time.
Petitioner
raises before this Court his continued objection to the intervention of the
Office of the Ombudsman in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. It should be recalled that the Office of the
Ombudsman, although not named as a respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, filed
its Comment and Memorandum therein, which were admitted by the Court of
Appeals.
The Office of the Ombudsman moved
to intervene in the Court of Appeals proceedings in representation of the
State’s interests. As a competent
disciplining body, it asserts its rights to defend its own findings of fact and
law relative to the imposition of its decisions and ensure that its judgments
in administrative disciplinary cases be upheld by the appellate court,
consistent with the doctrine laid down by this Court in Civil Service
Commission v. Dacoycoy[20]
and Philippine National Bank v. Garcia.[21] As the agency which rendered the assailed
Decision, it is best equipped with the knowledge of the facts, laws and
circumstances that led to the finding of guilt against petitioner.
Petitioner opposed from the very
beginning the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in the appellate
court proceedings. He pointed out to the
Court of Appeals that only the PNP-CIDG was named as a respondent in his
Petition for Review, and the Office of the Ombudsman was not impleaded because Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
expressly mandates that the court or agency which rendered the assailed
decision should not be impleaded in the
petition. He argued that the
non-inclusion of the court or tribunal as respondent in cases elevated on
appeal is founded on the doctrine that the court is not a combatant in the
appeal proceedings. He called attention
to previous rulings of this Court admonishing judges to maintain a posture of
detachment in cases where their decisions are elevated on appeal or
review.
Petitioner,
in the instant Petition, presents the same arguments in support of his first
assignment of error. It is noted that
the OSG, representing the PNP-CIDG, in its Comment and Memorandum before this
Court, did not address the issue on the intervention of the Office of the
Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, focusing solely on the issue on the
propriety of the dismissal from service of petitioner.
After
a review of both positions on the matter of the intervention of the Office of
the Ombudsman in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, this Court rules
in favor of petitioner. The Court of
Appeals indeed committed an error in admitting the Comment and Memorandum of
the Office of the Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086.
Fabian v. Hon. Desierto[22] already settled that appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman should be
brought first to the Court of Appeals via a verified Petition for Review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, together with Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from
judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. In specifying the contents of such a Petition
for Review, both Rule 43 of the Rules of Court[23]
and Administrative Circular No. 1-95[24]
require the full names of the parties to the case without impleading the lower courts or agencies as petitioners or
respondents. The only parties in
an appeal are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee
as respondent. The court, or in this case, the administrative agency which
rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a party in said appeal.[25]
This is not
a case wherein the petitioner improperly impleaded
the Office of the Ombudsman in his Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No.
87086. In fact, the petitioner adhered
to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 1-95, by
naming as respondent only the PNP-CIDG, the original complainant against
him. It is the Office of the Ombudsman
who actively sought to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086.
It is a
well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from cases where his
decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre
for such doctrine is the fact that a judge is not an active combatant in such
proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual
positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without his active
participation. When a judge actively
participates in the appeal of his judgment, he, in a way, ceases to be judicial
and has become adversarial instead.[26]
The court
or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only when
hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought
on appeal before a higher court. The
judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind
that he is an adjudicator who must settle the controversies between parties in
accordance with the evidence and the applicable laws, regulations, and/or
jurisprudence. His judgment should
already clearly and completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no more need for him to justify
further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial
officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his
detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes personal
since his objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the
original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his judgment),
but more significantly, to refute the appellant’s assignment of errors, defend
his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal.
The
reliance of the Office of the Ombudsman on this Court’s pronouncements in Dacoycoy and Garcia cases are
misplaced.
The issue in the landmark case Dacoycoy, was the right of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) to file an appeal with this Court from the decision of the
Court of Appeals exonerating the civil service officer Dacoycoy
from the administrative charges against him.
According to Section 39 of the Civil Service Law, appeals, where
allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within
15 days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is
seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within 15 days. Previous decisions of this Court ruled that
the “party adversely affected” in Section 39 of the Civil Service Law, refers
solely to the public officer or employee who was administratively disciplined
and, hence, an appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is
found guilty. It is within the foregoing
context that this Court ruled in Dacoycoy in
the following manner:
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court
of Appeals to the Supreme Court?
Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government.
Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely
affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service
system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it
may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this
ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that “the
phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or
salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office” and not included are “cases
where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more then thirty (30) days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary” or “when the respondent is
exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal.” In other words, we
overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law “does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges” enunciated in Paredes
v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro
v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more
recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.[27]
The similar issue arose in Garcia. In said case, the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) imposed upon its employee Garcia the penalty of
forced resignation for gross neglect of duty.
On appeal, the CSC exonerated Garcia from the administrative charges
against him. In
accordance with its ruling in Dacoycoy, this
Court affirmed the standing of the PNB to
appeal to the Court of Appeals the CSC resolution exonerating Garcia. After all, PNB was the aggrieved party which
complained of Garcia’s acts of dishonesty. Should Garcia be finally
exonerated, it might then be incumbent upon PNB to take him back into its
fold. PNB should therefore be allowed to appeal a decision that, in its
view, hampered its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it
can protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in the
country.
Having established the
foregoing, the Office of the Ombudsman cannot use Dacoycoy and Garcia
to support its intervention in the appellate court proceedings for the following reasons:
First, petitioner was not exonerated from the administrative
charges against him, and was in fact dismissed for grave misconduct and
dishonesty by the Office of the Ombudsman in its decision in the administrative
case, OMB-C-A-03-0347-I. Thus, it was
petitioner who appealed to the Court of Appeals being, unquestionably, the
party aggrieved by the judgment on appeal.
Second, the issue herein is the right of the Office of the
Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal of its decision, not its right to
appeal. Its decision has not even been
reversed yet so no question has arisen as to the standing of the Office of the
Ombudsman to appeal from the reversal of its judgment. The Office of the Ombudsman
only wishes to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086 to make sure that its decision
dismissing petitioner from service is upheld by the appellate court.
And third, Dacoycoy
and Garcia should be read together with Mathay, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals[28] and National
Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag,[29] in which this Court qualified and clarified the exercise of
the right of a government agency to actively participate in the appeal of
decisions in administrative cases. In Mamauag, this Court ruled:
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a
private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority.
Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize “either party” to appeal in the
instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP
member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of
demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the
government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but
the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can
appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the
case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service.
The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the
administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous
situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the
case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in
prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy,
the Court declared:
To be sure, when the
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of
Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As
a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge
who should “detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a
higher court for review.”
In instituting G.R. No.
126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as
adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to “hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of
its offices and agencies,” not to litigate.[30]
Should the Office of the
Ombudsman insist on its right to intervene based on Dacoycoy and Garcia,
then its exercise of such right should likewise be qualified according to Mathay and Mamauag. As the disciplining authority or tribunal
which heard the case and imposed the penalty, it must remain partial and detached. It must be mindful of its role as an
adjudicator, not an advocate. It should
just have allowed the government agency prosecuting the administrative charges
against petitioner, namely, the PNP-CIDG, appropriately represented by the OSG,
to participate in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086.
Not
being an appropriate party to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, any
participation of the Office of the Ombudsman therein, more particularly,
through its Comment, Memorandum, and other pleadings, should not have been
considered by the Court of Appeals. Not
even the adoption by the OSG of the Comment of the Office of the Ombudsman as
its Memorandum can cure the defect of such Comment which was filed by a
non-party to the case. To rule otherwise
would be to condone the wrongful intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in
the appellate court proceedings and to allow a circumvention of a fundamental
rule of procedure, for it would still afford the Office of the Ombudsman the
opportunity to effectively present its position and arguments in the case
despite its absence of interest or personality therein, a dangerous precedent
indeed.
Intervention
of the Office of the Ombudsman cannot be allowed on liberality. Obedience to the requirements of procedural
rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results therefrom,
and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harping on
the policy of liberal construction.[31] Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide
strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, this was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.[32]
This Court now proceeds to
petitioner’s second assignment of error in which he alleges that the judgment
against him was grossly inconsistent with the evidence on record and the burden
of proof required by law. Undoubtedly,
petitioner is requesting that this Court consider and weigh again the evidence
presented before the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as the Court of Appeals,
and make its own findings of fact.
While it is an established rule in
administrative law that the courts of justice should respect the findings of
fact of said administrative agencies, the same is not absolute and there are
recognized exceptions thereto. Courts
may not be bound by the findings of fact of an administrative agency when there
is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly,
manifestly and patently insubstantial;[33] when
there is a clear showing that the administrative agency acted arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion or in a capricious and whimsical manner, such
that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction;[34]
or when the precise issue in the case on appeal is whether there is
substantial evidence supporting the findings of the administrative agency.[35] The last exception exists in this case and
compels this Court to review the findings of fact of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
There are two principal findings
against petitioner as a result of the proceedings below: (1) petitioner failed
to satisfactorily prove that his acquisition of properties, as well as his
foreign travels, were within his lawful income; and (2) petitioner willfully
concealed and misdeclared his assets in his 2001 and
2002 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN). It was on the basis thereof that petitioner
was found guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty by both the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals.
The Complaint of the PNP-CIDG and the attached Joint Affidavit of its investigating officers identified the following properties in the name of petitioner and his wife:
a)
One residential house and lot in
b)
Poblacion, Sta. Maria, Bulacan:
·
Three residential lots measuring 998, 998 and
359 sq. m.;
·
One residential house built on a lot measuring
356 sq. m.;
c)
Pulong Buhangin,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan:
·
Two commercial lots measuring 462 and 898 sq.
m.;
·
Two residential lots measuring 143 and 152 sq.
m.;
·
Four agricultural lots measuring 6,597; 1,000;
3,000; and 746 sq. m.
d)
Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan:
·
Eight residential lots each measuring 340 sq.
m.;
·
Four agricultural lots two of which measuring
140 sq. m. each and the other two measuring 450 sq. m. each.; and
e) Three residential lots measuring 50, 500, and 600 sq. m., in Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[36]
The same
Complaint and Joint Affidavit also attributed to petitioner ownership of the
following properties registered in the names of his children who were alleged
to have no substantial income to acquire the same:
a)
One residential house built on a lot measuring 632 sq.
m. in the name of Russel Pleyto;
b)
One residential lot measuring 113 sq. m. in the name of
Russel Pleyto, married to
Shirley Pleyto;
c) One commercial building on three commercial lots in the name of Mary Grace Pleyto;
d) One residential lot measuring 244 sq. m. in the name of Salvador Pleyto, Jr.; and
e) One residential lot measuring 138 sq. m. in the name of Mary Grace Pleyto.[37]
All these
properties are worth P16,686,643.20, based on their 2003 adjusted market
value as determined by the local assessor, way over the total value of real
properties declared by petitioner in his 2001 and 2002 SALNs,
i.e., P5,956,400.00 and P9,384,090.25, respectively.
In support of its foregoing
allegations, the PNP-CIDG submitted the transfer certificates of title (TCTs), tax declarations, and pictures of the real
properties in the names of the petitioner, his wife and children. It also presented copies of petitioner’s 2001
and 2002 SALNs so that the list of real properties
and their values declared therein may be compared with the actual list of real
properties and their values as uncovered by the PNP-CIDG in its
investigation.
Petitioner
does not deny ownership of the real properties in his and his wife’s
names. What he contests with regard to
the said real properties are the findings that these were beyond his and his
wife’s financial capacity to acquire and, thus, deemed to have been acquired
illegally. Petitioner and his wife
submitted their respective Counter-Affidavits, attaching thereto certificates
of business registration, income tax returns, audited balance sheets, deeds of
sale, and bank promissory notes, all meant to establish how petitioner and his
wife acquired the said real properties.
It is
worthy to note that in its Decision, dated 27 May 2004, in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I,
the Office of the Ombudsman determined the value of the real properties in the
names of petitioner and his wife to be P16,686,643.20, based on the 2003
adjusted market value of said real properties as assessed by the local
assessor. While it may be conceded that
the adjusted market value of the real properties is true and correct, such
valuation bears no significance to the issue in this case, namely, whether
petitioner and his wife had the financial capacity to acquire the real
properties. To answer this question, the
relevant
valuation would be the acquisition cost of the real properties vis-à-vis, the financial capacity of
the petitioner and his wife at the time of their acquisition. Any appreciation (or depreciation) in the
value of the real properties after their acquisition until present has no
bearing herein.
To address
this apparent faux pas, the Office of the Ombudsman, in its Order, dated
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SUMMARY OF SALNs AND ANNUAL SALARY OF UNDERSECRETARY PLEYTO |
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|
YEAR |
REAL PROPERTIES |
PERSONAL PROPERTIES |
LIABILITIES |
NETWORTH |
INC./(DEC) OF NETWORTH OVER PREVIOUS YEAR |
ANNUAL SALARY |
|
1992 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1993 |
1,314,400.00 |
1,210,900.00 |
1,045,000.00 |
1,480,300.00 |
|
166,980.00 |
|
1994 |
1,314,100.00 |
1,558,287.00 |
1,080,000.00 |
1,792,387.00 |
312,087.00 |
190,560.00 |
|
1995 |
2,064,100.00 |
1,714,677.30 |
1,780,000.00 |
1,998,777.30 |
206,390.30 |
202,560.00 |
|
1996 |
3,456,400.00 |
2,303,544.60 |
3,507,000.00 |
2,252,944.60 |
254,167.30 |
217,716.00 |
|
1997 |
3,526,400.00 |
2,884,066.00 |
3,800,000.00 |
2,610,466.00 |
357,521.40 |
239,472.00 |
|
1998 |
4,526,400.00 |
3,352,294.50 |
4,595,200.00 |
3,283,494.50 |
673,028.50 |
259,404.00 |
|
1999 |
4,526,400.00 |
4,105,107.50 |
4,340,142.80 |
4,291,364.70 |
1,007,870.20 |
265,896.00 |
|
2000 |
5,826,400.00 |
3,854,407.20 |
5,293,830.50 |
4,386,976.70 |
95,612.00 |
292,488.00 |
|
2001 |
5,956,400.00 |
4,029,641.40 |
5,401,488.80 |
4,584,552.60 |
197,575.90 |
314,784.00 |
|
2002 |
9,384,090.25 |
7,400,695.70 |
10,828,566.20 |
5,956,219.75 |
1,371,667.15 |
319,380.00 |
This
table was meant to illustrate that it was impossible for petitioner to have acquired
the real properties considering his annual salary. Based on the said table, the Court of Appeals
agreed with the Office of the Ombudsman that the progressive, albeit
unexplained rise in petitioner’s net worth, is prima facie evidence of ill-gotten
wealth.
This Court is not convinced.
The Court of Appeals applies against
the petitioner the prima facie presumption laid down in Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any
Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by any Public Officer or
Employee And Providing for the Proceedings Therefor),
which reads:
Sec. 2. Filing of petition. – Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
A prima facie presumption, also
referred to as disputable, rebuttable or juris tantum,[39]
is satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence.[40] The presumption in Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 1379 is merely prima facie and may still be overcome by evidence to
the contrary. In fact, Section 5 of the
same statute requires the court, before which the petition for forfeiture is
filed, to set public hearings during which the public officer or employee may
be given ample opportunity to explain to the satisfaction of the court how he
had acquired the property in question.
Similarly, the public officer or employee administratively charged
before the Office of the Ombudsman, such as petitioner herein, must be given
sufficient opportunity to present evidence to rebut the prima facie
presumption applied against him: that his properties were illegally acquired.
Indeed, after a cursory look at the
table, it would be easy to conclude that petitioner’s annual salary cannot support
his yearly increase in net worth, thus, giving rise to the prima facie
presumption that petitioner’s properties, specifically the real properties,
were acquired unlawfully.
Nonetheless,
this Court finds that the table prepared by the Office of the Ombudsman, using
what the petitioner referred to as the “net-worth-to-income-discrepancy analysis,”
may be effective only as an initial evaluation tool, meant to raise warning
bells as to possible unlawful accumulation of wealth by a public officer or
employee, but it is far from being conclusive proof of the same. While the variations in net worth from year
to year may be readily apparent by mere comparison, the reasons therefor may not be so easily discerned. An increase in net worth in the succeeding year
may not always be due to the acquisition of more properties by purchase. Many factors may account for the increase in
net worth, such as the reduction or payment of liabilities in the succeeding
year resulting in an increase in net worth even though the assets remain
constant; or a donation or inheritance which may significantly increase the
assets without any or with very minimal corresponding liability. Hence, “net-worth-to-income-discrepancy analysis”
may seem deceptively simple, but it is, in fact, more complex, and prudence
must be exercised in drawing conclusions therefrom.
To rebut
the supposed prima facie presumption against him, petitioner submitted
evidence to explain the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of each of
the real properties in his and his wife’s names, and to show that his and his
wife’s combined incomes were sufficient for them to acquire said real
properties.
In his Petition before this Court,
petitioner presented his own table[41]
summarizing the properties he and his wife acquired and the evidence they
submitted in support thereof. Said table
is reproduced below:
|
PROPERTY |
AREA (in square meters) |
YEAR OF ACQUI-SITION |
PURCHASE PRICE (In Pesos) |
MODE OF ACQUI- SITION |
PREVIOUS OWNER |
SUPPORTING EVIDENCE |
|
1. Residential |
385.4 |
1977 |
69,372.00 |
Purchase-through
installment |
Urban Estates, Incorporated |
Contract to Sell Attached as Annex “12” of Salvador Pleyto’s Counter-Affidavit (Annex “H” of the Petition) |
|
2. Residential Caypombo, Sta. Maria |
340 |
1979 |
1,500.00 |
Purchase |
Anacoreta Reyes |
STANDARD DEED OF SALE FORM used by Mrs. Pleyto in her lending business in cases where the
defaulting debtor opts to settle the unpaid account with property. Attached as Annexes “2” and “47” to “48” of Miguela Pleyto’s Supplemental
Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
3. Residential Caypombo, Sta. Maria |
340 |
1979 |
1,500.00 |
Purchase |
Anacoreta Reyes |
-do- Attached as Annexes “2” and “47” to “48” of Miguela Pleyto’s Supplemental
Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
4. Residential Caypombo, Sta. Maria |
340 |
1979 |
1,500.00 |
Purchase |
Anacoreta Reyes |
-do- Attached as Annexes “2” and “47” to “48” of Miguela Pleyto’s Supplemental
Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
5. Residential Caypombo, Sta. Maria |
340 |
1979 |
1,500.00 |
Purchase |
Anacoreta Reyes |
-do- Attached as Annexes “2” and “47” to “48” of Miguela Pleyto’s Supplemental
Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
6. Residential Caypombo, Sta. Maria |
340 |
1979 |
2,000.00 |
Purchase |
Anacoreta Reyes |
-do- Attached as Annexes “2” and “47” to “48” of Miguela Pleyto’s Supplemental
Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
7. Residential Caypombo, Sta. Maria |
340 |
1979 |
2,000.00 |
Purchase |
Anacoreta Reyes |
-do- Attached as Annexes “2” and “47” to “48” of Miguela Pleyto’s Supplemental
Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
8. Residential Caypombo, Sta. Maria |
340 |
1980 |
2,000.00 |
Purchase |
Anacoreta Reyes |
-do- Attached as Annexes “2” and “47” to “48” of Miguela Pleyto’s Supplemental
Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
9. Residential Caypombo, Sta. Maria |
340 |
1980 |
2,000.00 |
Purchase |
Magno and Azucena
Reyes |
-do- Attached as Annex “49” of Miguela
Pleyto’s Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I”
of the Petition) |
|
10. Residential Poblacion, Sta. Maria |
998 |
1987 (The TCT was issued in 1991 under TCT No. 141909) |
- |
Inheritance |
Candido Guballa
and Maria Diaz |
-do- Extra-Judicial Partition and Subdivision Plan Attached as Annexes “30-31” of Miguela
Pleyto’s Supplemental Counter Affidavit (Annex “I”
of the Petition) |
|
11. Residential Poblacion, Sta. Maria |
998 |
1987 (The TCT was issued in 1993 under TCT No. 182666) |
- |
Inheritance |
Candido Guballa
and Maria Diaz |
-do- Extra-Judicial Partition and Subdivision Plan Attached as Annexes “30-31” of Miguela
Pleyto’s Supplemental Counter Affidavit (Annex “I”
of the Petition) |
|
12. Residential Poblacion, Sta. Maria |
356 |
1988 |
40,000.00 |
Purchase |
Thelma Cruz Celestino |
STANDARD DEED OF SALE FORM used by Mrs. Pleyto in her lending business in cases where the
defaulting debtor opts to settle the unpaid account with property. Attached as Annex “34” of Miguela
Pleyot’s [sic] Supplemental
Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
13. Residential Poblacion, Sta. Maria |
359 |
1995 |
251,300.00 |
Purchase |
Dionisio Buenaventura |
-do- Attached as Annex “32” of Miguela
Pleyto’s
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
14. Agricultural Pulong Buhangin,
Sta. Maria |
1,000 |
1996 |
60,000.00 |
Purchase |
Anita Caidoy |
-do- Attached as Annex “44” of Miguela
Pleyto’s
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
15.
Residential Pulong Buhangin,
Sta. Maria |
152 |
1996 |
40,000.00 |
Purchase |
Ramon and Elizabeth Hambre |
-do- Attached as Annex “42” of Miguela
Pleyto’s
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
16. Commercial Pulong Buhangin,
Sta. Maria |
462 |
1997 |
138,600.00 |
Purchase |
Marie Concepcion
J. Nicolas |
-do- Attached as Annex “38” of Miguela
Pleyto’s
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
17. Commercial Pulong Buhangin,
Sta. Maria |
898 |
1997 |
120,000.00 |
Purchase |
Ma. Concepcion
Nicolas and Madonna Nicolas |
-do- Attached as Annex “40” of Miguela
Pleyto’s
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
18. Agricultural Pulong Buhangin,
Sta. Maria |
6,587 |
1998 |
500,000.00 |
Purchase |
Reynaldo Evangelista |
-do- Attached as Annex “43” of Miguela
Pleyto’s
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
19. Residential Catmon, Sta. Maria |
100 |
1998 |
100,000.00 |
Purchase |
Rosita Resurreccion |
-do- Annex “50” of Miguela Pleyto’s Supplemental Counter - Affidavit (attached as
Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
20. Residential Catmon, Sta. Maria |
500 |
1998 |
200,000.00 |
Purchase |
Macaria and Herminigildo
Ramos |
-do- Attached as Annex “51” of Miguela
Pleyto’s
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
21. Residential Catmon, Sta. Maria |
600 |
1998 |
300,000.00 |
Purchase |
Zosima and Teotimo
dela Cruz |
-do- Attached as Annex “52” of Miguela
Pleyto’s
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
22. Residential Pulong Buhangin,
Sta. Maria |
143 |
1999 |
42,900.00 |
Purchase |
Lorenzo Gonzales and Remedios Gonzales |
-do- Attached as Annex “41” of Miguela
Pleyto’s
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
23. Agricultural Pulong Buhangin,
Sta. Maria |
3,000 |
1999 |
153,909.30 |
Foreclosure/ Dacion |
Eliseo Hermogenes |
Real Estate Mortgage Attached as Annexes “45”
and “46” of Miguela Pleyto’s
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
|
24. Agricultural Pulong Buhangin,
Sta. Maria |
746 |
1999 |
38,272.00 |
Purchase |
Eliseo Hermogenes |
STANDARD DEED OF SALE FORM used by Mrs. Pleyto in her lending business in cases where the
defaulting debtor opts to settle the unpaid account with property. Attached as Annex “46” of Miguela
Pleyto’s
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex “I” of the Petition) |
In addition
to the foregoing 24 lots identified by the PNP-CIDG in its Complaint,
petitioner voluntarily disclosed two more lots in his and his wife’s names in Caysio, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
which they acquired through foreclosure in 2002.
Petitioner’s table comprehensively
presents his and his wife’s real properties, the names of the previous owners,
the cost, year and mode of their acquisitions, and the supporting
evidence. It reveals that the petitioner
and his wife acquired their real properties in a span of 22 years, from 1977 to
1999. A number of the real properties
were acquired before 1992, the year from which the Office of the Ombudsman
began his “net-worth-to-income-discrepancy analysis.” Petitioner and his wife
acquired the real properties by four modes: (1) purchase by installment; (2)
inheritance; (3) dacion en pago, by which the defaulting debtor settles his
outstanding account with petitioner’s wife with property; and (4) foreclosure
of mortgage. The last two modes of
acquisition, dacion en pago
and foreclosure of mortgage, are exercised in the regular conduct of the
lending business of petitioner’s wife.
Irrefragably, these are legitimate modes of acquiring properties. On their face, the supporting documents
for the transactions by which petitioner and his wife acquired their real
properties appear to be in order.
Notably, the PNP-CIDG, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Court of
Appeals did not challenge the validity or authenticity of any of these
documentary evidences. They, instead,
focused on questioning the financial capacity of petitioner and his wife to
acquire all these real properties.
Petitioner
asserts that, other than his salary as a government employee, he and his wife
had other sources of income which enabled them to acquire real properties. Petitioner’s wife, Miguela
Pleyto, has been a successful businesswoman since
1976, operating several businesses, particularly, a piggery and poultry farm, a
pawnshop, and a lending investor business.
To prove that these are legitimate businesses, petitioner submitted
registration papers and certifications from the Department of Trade and
Industry.[42] Also to establish the profits from these
businesses, petitioner presented the income tax returns and financial
statements of his wife’s businesses.[43] Moreover, petitioner annexed to his
Counter-Affidavit a schedule of loans availed of by petitioner and his wife
from different banks from 1979 to 2002, secured by real estate mortgages[44]
constituted on their existing real properties and annotated on the appropriate TCTs.
As
petitioner explained, the properties were accumulated over the last two
decades. Most of the properties are
integral to his wife’s piggery and lending business. Twelve of the properties he and his wife
acquired, including four structures, were devoted to the piggery, while the
others were used as collaterals for short-term loans, the proceeds of which
were used by his wife in her lending business and which, in turn, enabled her
to acquire more properties when defaulting borrowers settled their obligations
through dacion en pago
or foreclosure of mortgages.
The Court of Appeals, however, rejected petitioner’s allegations and evidence of other legitimate sources of income, for the following reasons:
Logic will dictate that the whole divide between assets and income may be closed by evidence that the wife was herself earning enough to account for the acquisition of properties. The spirited position taken by the petitioner on this point, however, did not wash with the Ombudsman. The reason seems to be that he was trying to tout his wife’s gross income as proof of her capacity when he should prove her disposable income after deducting her taxes and expenses. The Ombudsman insisted on this approach after realizing that the petitioner and his family had indulged in rather heavy spending. x x x The argument meets with the concurrence of the Solicitor General. He says in his comments, that the gross income of the wife from her business should not be made a barometer of her financial capacity, but to be believable, she should specify her available income after deducting all expenses and taxes, a procedure she did not follow.[45]
It is worthy to note that the
Office of the Ombudsman, in preparing the table in its
Furthermore, in his Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, petitioner directly addressed the afore-quoted observation of the appellate court by presenting the following table[46] in which taxes and expenses were already deducted from his wife’s business income:
|
DATE |
YEARLY INCREASE/ DECREASE IN NETWORTH |
SALARY INCOME |
BUSINESS INCOME (Income from Business + Depreciation Cost) |
TOTAL INCOME (Salary Income + Business Income |
|
1992 |
- |
136,620.00 |
180,438.50 |
317,058.50 |
|
1993 |
584,409.00 |
166,980.00 |
181,703.00 |
348,683.00 |
|
1994 |
312,087.00 |
190,560.00 |
242,817.60 |
433,377.60 |
|
1995 |
206,390.30 |
202,560.00 |
240,917.62 |
443,477.62 |
|
1996 |
254,167.30 |
217,716.00 |
333,908.96 |
551,624.96 |
|
1997 |
357,521.40 |
239,472.00 |
489,023.46 |
728,495.46 |
|
1998 |
673,028.50 |
259,404.00 |
485,105.79 |
744,509.79 |
|
1999 |
1,007,870.20 |
265,896.00 |
507,845.21 |
773,741.21 |
|
2000 |
95,612.00 |
292,488.00 |
570,280.67 |
862,768.67 |
|
2001 |
197,575.90 |
314,784.00 |
596,980.95 |
911,764.95 |
|
2002 |
1,371,667.15 |
319,380.00 |
969,565.05 |
1,288,945.05 |
|
TOTAL |
5,060,328.75 |
2,605,860.00 |
4,798,586.81 |
7,404,446.81 |
The figures
in the business income column were derived from the income statements of Miguela Pleyto, annexed to her
income tax returns, which were prepared by a certified public accountant and
submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The business income figures are already net of business expenses and
provisions for income taxes, but include the amounts of depreciation[47]
of buildings, equipment, and furniture/fixtures. Based on the foregoing table, the increase in
petitioner’s net worth from 1992 to 2002 (P5,060,328.75) no longer
appears to be grossly disproportionate to his and his wife’s combined income
for the same period (P7,404,446.81).
At this point, it is undeniable that petitioner had other sources of income apart from his salary. His wife was also earning substantial income from her businesses. According to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379, the prima facie presumption of unlawful acquisition would arise only when the amount of property is manifestly out of proportion to the salary of the public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property.
Other than the real properties,
both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals deemed the numerous
foreign travels of petitioner, his wife, and his children as proof of
petitioner’s unexplained wealth, relying on the following attestations[48]
of the investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG:
10. Our
verification with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on the travels
abroad made by Mr. Pleyto (and his son Salvador Juan Jr) for the duration of his stint as a DPWH official
revealed that since 1995, Mr. Pleyto had made seventeen
(17) travels abroad. Our
cross-checking with the declared official travels abroad of Mr. Pleyto, as appearing in his Personal Data Sheet, revealed
that he had made a total of nine (9) unofficial travels
abroad. BID records also show that in
his two (2) trips abroad, he brought along his son Salvador Juan Pleyto, Jr. that is, when he went on the REAAA council
meeting in Kuala Lumpur in October 1999 and when he went to the US also in
October 2000 on an unofficial trip (Annexes “81”
and “82”); His wife Miguela had
seventeen (17) travels abroad (Annex “83”) while his other son, Russel had six (6) travels abroad (Annex “84”)
11. We
have estimated that the sum total of the expenses incurred by Mr. Salvador A. Pleyto for the travels abroad by him, his wife and
children, at P100,000.00 per travel amounted to THREE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P3,700,000.00), broken
down as follows:
|
|
- |
|
|
Miguela G. Pleyto – 17 travels |
- |
1,700,000.00 |
|
Russel G. Pleyto – 6 travels |
- |
600,000.00 |
|
Salvador
G. Pleyto Jr., – 5 travels |
- |
500,000.00 |
|
TOTAL |
: |
|
While the investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG also referred to the
trips abroad taken by petitioner’s children, this Court shall discuss first
only the foreign travels of petitioner and his wife. The foreign travels, as well as the real
properties of their children, shall be the subject of a separate and later
discussion.
After going through the records, the only evidence presented by the
PNP-CIDG as regards the foreign travels of petitioner and his family are the
travel records[49]
provided by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), from which the
following information were derived:
|
TRAVEL INFORMATION
OF |
|
|||
|
Full Name DOB Nationality Passport No. Address |
: : : : : |
Filipino K862613/CC272892 No. 1 May Street, Congressional Village, |
||
|
Departure Date |
Destination |
Arrival Date |
|
|
|
- |
Tapei |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hongkong |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hongkong |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hongkong |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
- |
|
|
|
|
- |
|
|
|
|
|
- |
|
|
|
|
Total
No. of Travels Abroad: |
Seventeen
(17) |
|
||
|
TRAVEL INFORMATION
OF MIGUELA PLEYTO |
|
|||
|
Full Name DOB Nationality Passport No. Address |
: : : : : |
Miguela Pleyto
y Guballa Filipino K850031/CC264659/JJ329075 No. 1 May Street, Congressional Village, |
||
|
Departure Date |
Destination |
Arrival Date |
|
|
|
|
Seoul/Korea |
|
|
|
|
|
Hongkong |
|
|
|
|
|
- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hongkong |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hongkong |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total
No. of Travels Abroad: |
Seventeen
(17) |
|
||
From
1995 to 2003, petitioner traveled abroad 17 times; 8 trips were found by the
investigating officers to be official and only 9 were unofficial. Their summary, though, failed to indicate
which of petitioner’s trips were official and which were unofficial. It would appear that only the 9 unofficial
foreign trips are being charged against petitioner. For the same period, petitioner’s wife also
took 17 trips abroad.
Petitioner offered the following explanation for his and his wife’s
foreign travels:
·
As to petitioner Pleyto, his alleged travel
expense of Php 900 thousand is unfounded. His (9) “unofficial” travels (“official time
but with no cost to the government”) were all shouldered by sponsoring
organizations such as the Road Engineering Association of Asia and Australia
(REEAA) and the American Society of Civil Engineers, Philippine Chapter, where
he has served as President. The
sponsorship includes travel and accommodation and sometimes even one (1)
companion. These facts have not been
disputed on record. (In fact, for this year, petitioner Pleyto
was again a beneficiary of sponsorship travel extended by REEA (sic) where he continues to serve as
President.)
·
As to Mrs. Pleyto, her alleged travel expense of
Php 1.7 M (at Php 100,000
per travel) is bloated and unsubstantiated.
To begin with, the number of travels appears to be inaccurate as
previously explained. Besides, the
estimated expense of Php 100,000 per travel is
grossly exaggerated as most of the travels were to Asian destinations. As shown by evidence, the travel package
(fare and accommodation) only averages from Php
15,000 to Php 25,000 which contention has not been
disputed by contrary evidence. Besides,
Mrs. Pleyto, who is already in her senior years and
with no more children to support, is entitled to enjoy the comforts of travel.[50]
While
26 foreign trips[51]
may indeed seem excessive, it should be kept in mind that these were taken by
two individuals in a span of 9 years.
Frequency of foreign travel, by itself, is not proof of unexplained
wealth of a public officer or employee.
More importantly, it must be established that the trips abroad are
beyond his financial capacity, taking into account his salary and his other
lawful sources of income.
The
travel records from the BID could only establish the details on the trips taken
by petitioner and his wife, specifically, the dates of departure and arrival,
the destination, and the frequency thereof.
Even these details were at times incomplete or contradictory. Take for example the travel information of petitioner, with several
missing entries on the dates of departure and arrival and destination. As for the travel information of petitioner’s
wife, it failed to identify her destination for her trip on 12 to 29 July
1996. The travel information also states
that petitioner’s wife was in
It is
a long jump to conclude just from the BID travel records that the foreign
travels taken by petitioner and his wife were beyond their financial
capacity. As this Court has already
found, petitioner had other sources of lawful income apart from his salary as a
public official. His wife was also
earning substantial income from her businesses.
Now the question is, whether the petitioner and his wife could afford
all their trips abroad considering their combined income.
Obviously,
before this question can be answered, the cost of the trips must be initially
determined. The investigating officers
of the PNP-CIDG estimated the cost of each trip to be P100,000.00, an
estimation subsequently adopted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of
Appeals. This Court, though, cannot
simply affirm such estimation.
Other than the P100,000.00 each, offered no
explanation or substantiation for the same.
With utter lack of basis, the figure of P100,000.00 as cost for
each foreign travel is random and arbitrary and, thus, unacceptable to this
Court. Without a reasonable estimation
of the costs of the foreign travels of petitioner and his wife, there is no way
to determine whether these were within their lawful income.
This Court finds equally baseless the conclusion that petitioner’s
children are without substantial income of their own, hence, their properties
and foreign travels should be attributed to petitioner and considered as
additional evidence of his unexplained wealth.
Petitioner’s
children are all grown up with the youngest, at the time the case was pending
before the Office of the Ombudsman, being 27 years old. Russel and Mary
Grace Pleyto, the two older children, are engaged in
businesses, while Salvador Pleyto, Jr., is gainfully
employed in his mother’s businesses. The
following real properties are registered and duly covered by certificates of
title in their names:
a)
Russel Pleyto
– (2 properties)
1.
one residential house and lot measuring 632 sq. m. in Poblacion, Sta. Maria, Bulacan;
2.
one (1) residential lot measuring 113 sq. m. in Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan;
b)
Mary Grace Pleyto – (2
properties)
1.
one (1) residential lot measuring 138 sq. m. in Pulong Buhangin, Bulacan;
2.
one (1) commercial lot measuring 133 sq. m., broken
down into three lots at 41, 59, and 43 sq. m., in Poblacion,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan; and
c)
1. one (1) residential lot measuring 244 sq. m. in Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[52]
Given these circumstances, the presumption in Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 1379, cannot be automatically extended to the properties that are
registered in the names of petitioner’s children. The burden
is upon the PNP-CIDG, as the complainant against petitioner, to establish that
these properties are actually owned by petitioner by proving first that his
children had no financial means to acquire the said properties. Fundamental is the rule that the burden of
evidence lies with the person who asserts an affirmative allegation.[53] Unfortunately, the PNP-CIDG miserably failed
in this regard.
Without presenting any supporting evidence, the investigating officers of
the PNP-CIDG alleged in their Joint Affidavit that “it can be immediately
deduced that the real properties, both the houses and lots,
registered in the names of their three (3) children, namely: Russel Pleyto,
Mary Grace Pleyto and Salvador Juan Pleyto, Jr., are [petitioner’s] unexplained
wealth, since all of them have no substantial income to show that they have the
capacity to lawfully acquire the same.”[54] The use of the words “immediately deduced” is
very revealing of the attitude and approach taken by the investigating officers
in this case, again, jumping to a conclusion without reference to and
presentation of the evidence in support thereof. The same can also be said of the foreign
travels of Russel Pleyto
and Salvador Pleyto, Jr., which, without any explanation
or basis whatsoever, were included in the computation of travel expenses charged
against petitioner.
It is thus
surprising that the Office of the Ombudsman affirmed the bare allegations of
the investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG, by ruling that:
[T]he following real properties registered in the name of respondent Pleyto’s three (3) children, are actually the [petitioner]’s unexplainable wealth, since all of them have no substantial income to show that they have lawfully acquired the same, x x x.
x x x x
The annexes submitted do not show
substantial net disposable income earned by them. With respect to P200,000.00
from the parents of respondent Russel Pleyto’s wife. As to
the alleged donation of P60,000.00, it admittedly came from respondent’s
This Court cannot sustain such
finding.
Although
strictly, the burden of evidence had not shifted to petitioner, he still
endeavored to elucidate on how his children legitimately acquired their
respective properties, to wit:
As to Russel
G. Pleyto, the following facts and explanations are uncontroverted by any contrary evidence –
·
Since 1991 or for over ten years, Russel and
his wife, Shirley Yap, daughter of established businessman in Bulacan, have been engaged in businesses in Sta. Maria,
starting with grocery and garments which they built from a meager capital of
Php60,000.00 extended by Mr. and Mrs. Pleyto by way
of a deed of donation during their marriage as well as Php200,000.00 from
Shirley’s parents. They also obtained financial accommodations and stocks for
their grocery and garments from Shirley’s family who are also engaged in the same
line of business.
·
Their financial capacity is shown by documentary evidence such as
business permits/licenses of their business enterprises; financial statements
and income tax returns from 1998 to 2002, showing gross sales/receipts from
grocery and video sales rentals amounting to P7,271,137; various credit
lines extended to Shirley Yap-Pleyto in the grocery
business.
·
In the course of their business, Russel and
Shirley Yap-Pleyto were able to acquire two (2)
properties: the first refers to their residential house and lot in Poblacion, Sta. Maria, which was acquired six years after
their marriage; the second refers to a small parcel of land consisting
of 113 sq. meters in the interior side of Pulong Buhangin. Since both
of them are engaged in gainful business, there is no way they cannot acquired (sic)
the subject properties.
As to Mary Grace G. Pleyto, the following explanations and evidence are uncontroverted by any contrary evidence –
·
Mary Grace has been an entrepreneur since 1995, starting off with small
laundry business and branching to water refilling and video sales. While she obtained her course from UP, she
learned the ropes of entrepreneurship from her own mother. And if she has received any assistance in her
business, it was also from her mother, and not from any imputed “unexplained
wealth” of her father. Like her mother,
she also made use of banks to support her business requirements.
·
From 1997 to 2001, she was able to acquire the commercial property in
Sta. Maria measuring 143 sq. meters, broken down into three (3) lots at 41
sq. meters, 59 sq. meters, and 43 sq. meters. This property was broken down into three lots
because she acquired it portion by portion and in a span of four years. In addition, she also acquired a residential
lot in the interior side of Pulong Buhangin measuring only 138 sq. meteres
(TCT No. 397717[M]).
·
When she purchased her first two properties valued at Php131,600, her
BIR records and financial statements for the preceding years (1995-1996) already
reflect an income of Php531,930, which is more than enough to cover the
purchase. As proof of her financial
capacity, she has been extended loans by Metrobank
using as collateral the same property she acquired. Based on her income tax return and loan
documents, there is no reason why she cannot acquire the two (2) properties
owned and registered in her name.
As to Salvador G. Pleyto, Jr., the following explanations and evidence
are uncontroverted by any contrary evidence –
·
Salvador Jr., a P186, 520.
·
In 2001, he was able acquire a property in the interior side of Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria for
only P20,000 as evidenced by the purchase document.
·
Considering his reported income in the preceding years (1999 to 2000)
as reflected in his BIR tax records, there is no reason why he could not have
acquired the subject property for Php20,000.[56]
To
substantiate his foregoing assertions, petitioner presented the TCTs in his children’s names, deeds of sale executed by the
previous owners to his children, his children’s income tax returns and
financial statements, business registrations, and bank documents on loans and
credit lines.[57]
Certificates of title are the best
proof of ownership[58]
that may only be rebutted by competent evidence to the contrary. In this case, the TCTs
are in the names of petitioner’s children.
Indubitably, mere allegation that the properties covered by the TCTs are actually owned by someone else is insufficient.
The Office
of the Ombudsman disparaged the other documentary evidence submitted by
petitioner because they “do not show substantial net disposable income earned”
by petitioner’s children. To the
contrary, the petitioner presented his children’s income tax returns and
financial statements that state their gross income, as well as expenses, taxes,
and any other deductible liabilities, from which the children’s respective net
incomes may be determined. Moreover, it
is futile for the Office of the Ombudsman to require the petitioner to present
the net disposable income of his children when the PNP-CIDG failed to establish
the acquisition costs of these properties.
What the investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG stated in their
Joint-Affidavit were the adjusted market values of the children’s properties. As this Court has ruled, financial capacity
shall be adjudged vis-à-vis the cost of the properties at the time of
acquisition. The subsequent increase (or
decrease) in the value of the properties is irrelevant. Without the acquisition costs of the
properties, there are no figures that may be measured against the earning
capacity of petitioner’s children at the time they acquired their
properties.
Furthermore,
faced with overwhelming evidence that petitioner’s two older children, Russel and Mary Grace Pleyto, had
their own businesses from which they derived substantial income, the Office of
the Ombudsman changed the direction of its attack by questioning their source
of capital. This is plainly a different
theory from the one originally presented in the PNP-CIDG complaint that
petitioner’s children could not have acquired their properties because they had
no substantial income of their own. No
longer is it just a question of ownership of the properties in the children’s
names, but it is now extended to the ownership of the children’s
businesses. Just the same, the assertion
that petitioner’s children could not have established and maintained their own
businesses must be supported by evidence, of which none was submitted herein.
As a final
note on this matter, the charges that petitioner is the true owner of the
properties registered in his children’s names and that he spent for their
foreign travels must be proven by the PNP-CIDG as the complainant in the
administrative case, before the burden of evidence shifts to the petitioner to
prove the contrary. The PNP-CIDG cannot
just make bare allegations, with tremendous implications and damaging effects,
then leave it to the public official charged to successfully and effectively
defend himself with controverting evidence. Such is what has happened in this case. Worse, despite the total absence of evidence
on the part of the PNP-CIDG regarding the properties and sources of income of
petitioner’s children, the Office of the Ombudsman hastily dismissed the value
of petitioner’s evidence.
The
last administrative charge against petitioner is that he failed to declare all
his assets in the SALN, of which the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of
Appeals found petitioner guilty. The
Court of Appeals made the following findings on this point:
Second,
failing to declare all his assets in the SALN.
A treasure trove of properties admitted by the petitioner to be owned by
him and his wife could not be accounted for in the SALN. The non-declaration of his numerous
acquisitions was thus willful. The
Ombudsman senses that the unexplained rise in the reported net worth of the
petitioner would be more astronomical if he were forthright in his
declarations.
x x x x
The
Ombudsman has found that there are, indeed, properties not reported in the
SALN. The laundry list of undeclared
assets include properties acquired in 1979, 1980, 1982, 1988, 1993, 1995, 1996,
1997 and 1999. While the petitioner’s
wife claims to be extensively engaged in business, the SALN also did not report
the nature and other particulars of these concerns. She signed the 2001 SALN without answering
the question: Do you have any business interest and other financial connections
including those of your spouse x x x?
It is clear that the SALN does not reflect a true and accurate record of the assets of the petitioner in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The addition of the acquisition costs of the unreported assets to the net worth, moreover, will increase it. As dramatized by the Ombudsman’s table, the increase in the net worth could not be explained by the petitioner’s salary alone and, hence should be treated as unexplained wealth.[59]
Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
requires that a public officer file his statement of assets and liabilities
under the following circumstances:
SEC. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. – Every public officer, within thirty days after assuming office and, thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of Head of Department or Chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first statement or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of said calendar year.
A similar requirement is provided in
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which reads:
SEC.
8. Statements and Disclosure. –
Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets,
liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of
their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living
in their households.
(A)
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. – All public officials and employees, except
those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary
workers, shall file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age
living in their households.
The
two documents shall contain information on the following:
(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;
(d) liabilities; and
(e)
all business interests and financial connections.
The documents must be filed:
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c)
within thirty (30) days after separation from service.
All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents shall also execute within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may show their liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and financial connections in previous years, including, if possible the year when they first assumed any office in the government.
It is undisputed that petitioner has been religiously
filing his SALN every year while he was in government service. The allegation of gross misconduct and
dishonesty against him is rooted in his purported failure to declare all his
assets and business interests in his SALNs.
Petitioner’s 2002 SALN declared only 13 properties with a
total acquisition cost of P9,384,090.25.
Petitioner though admitted in the course of these proceedings that he
and his wife owned 28 of the 33 real properties identified by the PNP-CIDG,
with the clarification that four of those are mere improvements consisting of
piggery structures. Hence, petitioner professes
ownership by him and his wife of 24 lots, plus the improvements found
thereon. He further volunteers the
information that he and his wife acquired two more additional properties in Caysio, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, in
2002, thus, bringing the total number of his and his wife’s real property
acquisition to 26.
Petitioner denies he was being dishonest or that he had the
deliberate intent to conceal his wealth in his 2002 SALN, although he
acknowledges that he failed to pay attention to the details therein. His SALNs are
prepared by a family bookkeeper/accountant.
Also, his wife has been running their financial affairs, including
property acquisitions which form part and parcel of her lending business. Thus, as he was not directly involved in the
various transactions relating to the lending business, petitioner failed to
keep track of the real property acquisitions by reason thereof.
Consequently, petitioner’s SALN was not filed in proper
form, containing several inaccurate information, such as discrepancies in the
year and mode of acquisition of the declared properties, and imprecise
descriptions of the said properties since some of the properties were not
broken down to their individual titles and, instead, treated as one entry since
they are contiguous to one another and to fit all the information in the
limited number of spaces provided in the printed SALN form. And these inaccuracies are repeated year
after year, since the common practice is copying the entries in the immediately
preceding year and just adding any subsequent acquisitions.
In his 2004 SALN,[60]
petitioner took pains to rectify the inaccuracies in his previous SALN and
declared his real properties as follows:
|
Kind |
Location |
Year |
Mode of Acquisition |
Acquisition Cost (Land,
Bldg., Imrpovement, etc.) |
|
1 H & L |
|
197[7] |
Purchase |
2,630,000.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 H & L |
Caypombo, Bulacan |
1980 |
Purchase |
190,000.00 |
|
1 |
- do - |
1982 |
- do - |
|
|
I |
- do - |
|
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
|
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
|
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
|
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
|
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
|
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
1979 |
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
|
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
1979 |
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
|
- do - |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 H & L |
Poblacion, Bulacan |
1988 |
Purchase |
1,937,700.00 |
|
1 |
- do - |
1987 |
Inheritance |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
1991 |
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
1993 |
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
1995 |
Purchase/Foreclosure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
P. Buhangin,
Bulacan |
1996 |
Purchase/Foreclosure |
1,898,700.00 |
|
1 |
- do - |
1996 |
- do - |
|
|
1 H & L |
- do - |
1997 |
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
1998 |
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
1999 |
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
1999 |
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
1999 |
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
1999 |
- do - |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
Catmon, Bulacan |
1998 |
Purchase/Foreclosure |
1,300,000.00 |
|
1 |
- do - |
|
- do - |
|
|
1 |
- do - |
|
- do - |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 Lots w/ imprv’t |
Caysio, Sta. Maria, Bulacan |
2002 |
Purchase/Foreclosure |
1,427,690.25 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
P. Buhangin,
Bulacan |
2003 |
Purchase/Foreclosure |
100,000.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TOTAL COST |
|
Except for the lot in Pulong Buhangin, Bulacan, which was purchased only in 2003, the afore-quoted
declaration of petitioner’s real properties in his 2004 SALN tallies with that
in his 2002 SALN. Disregarding the most
recent acquisition, the longer and more detailed list of real properties in the
2004 SALN has the same total acquisition cost as the 13 entries in the 2002
SALN, i.e., P9,384,090.25.
As additional proof that his 2002 SALN actually includes all his real
properties, petitioner points out that the total acquisition cost thereof, P9,384,090.25, is not so far off their 2003 adjusted
market value (excluding the real properties in the names of petitioner’s
children) of P14,002,109.20 as determined by the PNP-CIDG;
the difference can be accounted for by the increase in the value of the real
properties through the years.
In contrast, according to the investigating officers of the
PNP-CIDG, “[s]ince
Mr. Pleyto did not specify in his SALs
the exact location of the real properties he and his own wife own, it would not
be too easy for the investigators to ascertain which specifically of these
numerous real estate properties acquired by the spouses were or were not
declared in his latest statement of assets.”[61] Hence, there is no categorical finding by
the investigating officers that certain properties were intentionally excluded
or concealed by petitioner from his 2002 SALN.
Much of the difficulty in reconciling the list of real
properties in the names of petitioner and his wife vis-à-vis the entries
in petitioner’s 2002 SALN is due to the inaccuracies in the latter as
previously discussed. Without considering
the elucidation offered by petitioner and refusing to concede that inaccuracies
were committed in the preparation of the 2002 SALN, the Office of the Ombudsman
could not reconcile any of the real properties admittedly owned by petitioner
and his wife with the real properties declared in the 2002 SALN. This includes petitioner’s residence in
Petitioner is charged with gross misconduct and dishonesty
for failing to comply with Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and Section 8 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, requiring the submission of a statement of assets and
liabilities by a public officer or employee.
As for gross misconduct, the adjective is “gross” or serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling; while the noun is "misconduct," defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The word "misconduct" implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. For gross misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.[62]
And as for dishonesty, it is committed by intentionally making a
false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice
any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment
or promotion. Dishonesty is understood
to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity.[63]
Clear from the foregoing legal definitions of gross misconduct and dishonesty is that intention is an important element in both. Petitioner’s candid admission of his shortcomings in properly and completely filling out his SALN, his endeavor to clarify the entries therein and provide all other necessary information, and his submission of supporting documents as to the acquisition of the real properties in his and his wife’s names, negate any intention on his part to conceal his properties. Furthermore, in view of this Court’s findings that these properties were lawfully acquired, there is simply no justification for petitioner to hide them. Missing the essential element of intent to commit a wrong, this Court cannot declare petitioner guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.
Neither can petitioner’s failure to answer the question, “Do you have any business interest and other financial connections including those of your spouse and unmarried children living in your house hold?” be tantamount to gross misconduct or dishonesty. On the front page of petitioner’s 2002 SALN, it is already clearly stated that his wife is a businesswoman, and it can be logically deduced that she had business interests. Such a statement of his wife’s occupation would be inconsistent with the intention to conceal his and his wife’s business interests. That petitioner and/or his wife had business interests is thus readily apparent on the face of the SALN; it is just that the missing particulars may be subject of an inquiry or investigation.
An act done in good faith, which constitutes only an error of judgment and for no ulterior motives and/or purposes, does not qualify as gross misconduct, and is merely simple negligence.[64] Thus, at most, petitioner is guilty of negligence for having failed to ascertain that his SALN was accomplished properly, accurately, and in more detail.
Negligence is the omission of the
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.[65] In the case of public officials, there is
negligence when there is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation,
and there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[66] Both Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
Section 8 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees require the accomplishment and submission of a true, detailed and
sworn statement of assets and liabilities.
Petitioner was negligent for failing to comply with his duty to provide
a detailed list of his assets and business interests in his SALN. He was also negligent in relying on the
family bookkeeper/accountant to fill out his SALN and in signing the same
without checking or verifying the entries therein. Petitioner’s negligence, though, is only
simple and not gross, in the absence of bad faith or the intent to mislead or
deceive on his part, and in consideration of the fact that his SALNs actually disclose the full extent of his assets and
the fact that he and his wife had other business interests.
Gross misconduct and dishonesty are serious charges which warrant the removal or dismissal from service of the erring public officer or employee, together with the accessory penalties, such as cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. Hence, a finding that a public officer or employee is administratively liable for such charges must be supported by substantial evidence.
The quantum of evidence required in administrative cases is substantial evidence. The landmark case Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[67] laid down the guidelines for quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, including the following:
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion (City of Manila
vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI 0.G.
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial.” (
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs.
L. & N. R. Co., 227
In the Petition at bar, great, if not absolute, reliance was made by the Office of the Ombudsman on the Complaint of the PNP-CIDG and the attached Joint Affidavit of its investigating officers. Although certain pieces of documentary evidence were also attached to the said Complaint, such as TCTs and tax declarations of the real properties in the names of petitioner, his wife, and his children, and the travel information provided by the BID, these mostly prove facts which were not denied by petitioner, but for which he had credible explanation or qualification. These pieces of evidence may have been sufficient to give rise to a prima facie presumption of unlawfully acquired wealth against petitioner; however, such a presumption is disputable or rebuttable. When petitioner presented evidence in support of his defense, the Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to question and challenge and, ultimately, disregard in totality petitioner’s evidence, despite the fact that the PNP-CIDG no longer presented any evidence to controvert the same.
Each party in an administrative case must prove his affirmative allegation with substantial evidence – the complainant has to prove the affirmative allegations in his complaint, and the respondent has to prove the affirmative allegations in his affirmative defenses and counterclaims.[68] In this case, contrary to the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals, this Court pronounces that substantial evidence sways in favor of the petitioner and against complainant PNP-CIDG.
While this Court commends the efforts of the PNP-CIDG and the Office of the Ombudsman to hold accountable public officers and employees with unexplained wealth and unlawfully acquired properties, it cannot countenance unsubstantiated charges against a hapless public official just to send a message that the government is serious in its campaign against graft and corruption. No matter how noble the intentions of the PNP-CIDG and the Office of the Ombudsman are in pursuing this administrative case against petitioner, it will do them well to remember that good intentions do not win cases; evidence does.
Petitioner’s
third assignment of error concerns the review and compliance procedure provided
in Section 10 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, reproduced in full below:
SEC. 10. Review
and Compliance Procedure. – (a) The designated Committees of both Houses of
the Congress shall establish procedures for the review of statements to
determine whether said statements have been submitted on time, are complete and
are in proper form. In the event a
determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the appropriate
Committee shall so inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the
necessary corrective action.
(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under
this Act, the designated Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall base
the power, within their respective jurisdictions, to render any opinion
interpreting this Act, in writing, to persons covered by this Act, subject in
each instance to the approval by affirmative vote of the majority of the
particular House concerned.
The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any
other individual involved in a similar factual situation, and who, after
issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not be
subject to any sanction provided in this Act.
(c) The heads of
other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections (a) and (b) hereof
insofar as their respective offices are concerned, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Justice, in the case of the Executive Department and the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Judicial Department.
Petitioner argues that he should have
been given the opportunity to correct his obviously incomplete and/or not
properly filed SALN in accordance with the afore-quoted review and compliance
procedure. This Court is unconvinced.
From
a reading of the provision in question, it is apparent that it primarily
imposes upon the heads of offices the duty to review the SALNs
of their subordinates. If a head of
office finds that the SALN of a certain subordinate is incomplete or not in the
proper form, then the head of office must inform the subordinate concerned and
direct him to take corrective action.
Unquestionably, it is an internal procedure limited within the office
concerned. It does not even provide for
instances when a complainant, not the head of office, may question the SALN of
a public officer or employee.
Such a procedure does not find
application in the Petition at bar, because petitioner’s SALN was not being
reviewed or questioned by his head of office, but by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Whether or not petitioner’s
SALN was actually reviewed by his head of office is irrelevant and cannot bar
the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an investigation of petitioner for
violation of Section 8 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, as well as Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, upon the filing of a Complaint by the PNP-CIDG.
The mandate of the Office of the
Ombudsman is expressed in Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution, in this
wise:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Section
13 thereof, vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the following powers,
functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
(2) Direct, upon
complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as
of any government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter, to
perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and
correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency; and
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
The authority of the Ombudsman to
conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, intended to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary
authority. The provisions of The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication
which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold
hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and
require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public
officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate
penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the
evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty.[69]
Given its
mandate, the Office of the Ombudsman can review the SALN of a public officer or
employee if a complaint is filed against the latter, separate and independent
of the review of the SALN by the public officer or employee’s head of
office. In the event that a complaint is
filed against a public officer or employee concerning his SALN, the Office of
the Ombudsman shall be obliged to comply, not with the review procedure for
heads of office in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, but with the procedure for administrative complaints
as laid out in Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Although in an administrative
case before the Office of the Ombudsman, the public officer or employee is no
longer afforded the opportunity for corrective action on his SALN, he is still
allowed to file counter-affidavits and other evidence in his defense.[70]
In sum,
this Court finds substantial evidence that petitioner and his wife have lawful
sources of income other than petitioner’s salary as a government official that
enabled them to acquire several real properties in their names and travel
abroad. It also rules that while petitioner
may be guilty of negligence in accomplishing his SALN, he did not commit gross
misconduct or dishonesty, for there is no substantial evidence of his intent to
deceive the authorities and conceal his other sources of income or any of the
real properties in his and his wife’s names.
Hence, the imposition of the penalty of removal or dismissal from public
service and all other accessory penalties on petitioner is indeed too
harsh. Nevertheless, petitioner failed
to pay attention to the details and proper form of his SALN, resulting in the
imprecision of the property descriptions and inaccuracy of certain information,
for which suspension from office for a period of six months, without pay, would
have been appropriate penalty.[71]
However, this Court takes judicial
notice that petitioner’s birth date is on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision, dated 20 July 2005, and
Resolution, dated 4 October 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87086, which affirmed the Decision, dated 28 June 2004, and Order, dated 12
October 2004, of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I, dismissing
petitioner Salvador A. Pleyto from service for grave
misconduct and dishonesty, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Salvador A. Pleyto is found GUILTY of NEGLIGENCE in accomplishing his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 2002, and as penalty therefor, it is ORDERED that the amount equivalent to his salary for six
(6) months be forfeited from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-82.
[2] Penned by the Ombudsman Investigating Panel composed of Special Prosecutor Officer III (Chairman) Orlando I. Ines, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II (Member) Ma. Isabel A. Alcantara, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II (Member) Evangeline Y. Grafil, and Special Prosecution Officer III (Member) Roberto T. Agagon; reviewed by Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau (PIAB) Director Jose T. de Jesus, Jr., with the recommending approval of Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol, and approved by Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Simeon V. Marcelo, id. at 603-624.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring, id. at 86-96.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] In OMB-C-C-03-05130-1, the Ombudsman, in its Resolution, dated 14 April 2004, found petitioner liable for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, Republic Act No. 1379 (Forfeiture of Ill-Gotten Wealth), and perjury.
[8] Penned by Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Simeon V. Marcelo. Rollo, pp. 115-125.
[9] Penned by the Ombudsman
Investigating Panel composed of Special Prosecutor Officer III (Chairman)
Orlando I. Ines, Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer II (Member) Ma. Isabel A. Alcantara, Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer II (Member) Evangeline Y. Grafil, and Special Prosecution Officer III (Member)
Roberto T. Agagon; reviewed by Preliminary
Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau (PIAB) A Director Jose T.
de Jesus, Jr. with the recommending approval of Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol and approved
by Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Simeon V. Marcelo.
[10]
[11] Penned by the Ombudsman
Investigating Panel composed of Special Prosecutor Officer III (Chairman)
Orlando I. Ines, Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer II (Member) Ma. Isabel A. Alcantara, Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer II (Member) Evangeline Y. Grafil, and Special Prosecution Officer III (Member)
Roberto T. Agagon with the recommending approval of
Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau (PIAB) A
Director Jose T. de Jesus, Jr., reviewed by Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol and approved
by Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Simeon V. Marcelo.
[12]
[13] Penned by Associate Justice Mario L.
Guariña III with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Santiago Javier Ranada,
concurring.
[14]
[15] Penned by Associate Justice Mario L.
Guariña III with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Santiago Javier Ranada
concurring.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] 366 Phil. 86 (1999).
[21] 437 Phil. 289 (2002).
[22] 356 Phil. 787, 804-805 (1998).
[23] Section 6(a).
[24] Paragraph 6(a).
[25] It is in the special civil action for certiorari under Section 5, of Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, where the court or judge is required to be joined as
party defendant or respondent. (See Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System v. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 585, 588 (1986); and Philippine
Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova, 229 Phil.
388, 390 (1986).
[26] Calderon v. Solicitor General,
G.R. Nos. 103752-53,
[27] Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, supra note 20 at 104-105.
[28] 378 Phil. 466 (1999).
[29] G.R. No. 149999,
[30]
[31] Clavecilla
v. Quitain, G.R. No. 147989,
[32] Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 780, 784 (1996).
[33] Blue Bar Coconut
[34] Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture & Natural
Resources, 123 Phil. 354, 357 (1966).
[35] Gravador v. Mamigo, 127 Phil. 136, 142 (1967).
[36] Rollo, pp. 102-114.
[37]
[38]
[39] Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II (7th Revised edition), p. 636.
[40] Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
[41] Rollo, pp. 38-40.
[42] Records, pp. 213-220.
[43]
[44]
[45] Rollo, p. 94.
[46]
[47] Depreciation is a reasonable allowance for deterioration of property arising out of its use or employment in business or trade. It is allowed as a deduction for income tax purposes only, but it is not actually paid out. (See Section 34(F) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.)
[48] Records, pp. 11-12.
[49]
[50] Rollo, p. 56.
[51] The 9 unofficial foreign trips taken by petitioner, plus the 17 foreign trips taken by his wife.
[52] Rollo, p. 13.
[53] Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil. 225, 245 (2000); Philippine Fruit & Vegetable Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 369 Phil. 929, 938 (1999).
[54] Records, p. 10.
[55] Rollo, pp. 619-620.
[56]
[57]
[59] Rollo, pp. 91-94.
[60]
[61] Record, p. 10.
[62] In re Impeachment of Judge Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214 (1922).
[63] Brucal v. Desierto, G.R. No. 152188,
[64] Camus v. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 112 Phil. 301, 306 (1961).
[65] Article 1173, Civil Code.
[66] Juan v. Arias, A.M. No.
P-310,
[67] 69 Phil. 635, 642-644 (1940).
[68] Aklan
Electric Cooperative v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 53
at 245; Philippine Fruit & Vegetable Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, supra note 53 at 938.
[69] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160675, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 92, 116.
[70] SEC. 5. Administrative Adjudication; How Conducted. – (a) If the complaint is docketed as an administrative case, the respondent shall be furnished with a copy of the affidavits and other evidences submitted by the complainant, and shall be ordered to file his counter-affidavits and other evidences in support of his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, together with proof of service of the same on the complainant who may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the counter-affidavits of the respondent.
[71] This Court, in Cavite
Crusade for Good Government v. Judge Cajigal, 422
Phil. 1 (2001), found Judge Cajigal guilty of violation of Section 7, Republic Act No.
3019, and Section 8, Republic Act No. 6713 for failing to file his Statements
of Assets and Liablities. However, considering his record in the
judiciary and the fact that the Statements of Assets and Liabilities were later
filed, this Court suspended him from office for a period of six months, without
pay, ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.