Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD
DIVISION
|
SOLEDAD CAÑEZO, substituted
by WILLIAM CAÑEZO and VICTORIANO CAÑEZO Petitioners, - versus - CONCEPCION ROJAS, Respondent. |
G.R. No.
148788
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: November
23, 2007 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals, dated
On January 29, 1997, petitioner Soledad
Cañezo filed a Complaint[2]
for the recovery of real property plus damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Naval, Biliran, against her father’s second wife, respondent Concepcion
Rojas. The subject property is an
unregistered land with an area of 4,169 square meters, situated at Higatangan,
Naval, Biliran. Cañezo attached to the complaint a Joint Affidavit[3]
executed on
In her complaint, the petitioner alleged
that she bought the parcel of land in 1939 from Crisogono Limpiado, although
the transaction was not reduced into writing. Thereafter, she immediately took
possession of the property. When she and her husband left for
In
her Answer, the respondent asserted that, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, it
was her husband, Crispulo Rojas, who bought the property from Crisogono
Limpiado in 1948, which accounts for the tax declaration being in Crispulo’s name. From then on, until his death in 1978, Crispulo
possessed and cultivated the property. Upon
his death, the property was included in his estate, which was administered by a
special administrator, Bienvenido Ricafort. The petitioner, as heir, even received her
share in the produce of the estate. The
respondent further contended that the petitioner ought to have impleaded all of
the heirs as defendants. She also argued
that the fact that petitioner filed the complaint only in 1997 means that she
had already abandoned her right over the property.[6]
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Court finds a preponderance of evidence in favor of
plaintiff Soledad Cañezo and against defendant Concepcion Rojas by declaring
plaintiff the true and lawful owner of the land more particularly described
under paragraph 5 of the complaint and hereby orders defendant Concepcion Rojas:
a)
To vacate and surrender possession of the land to
plaintiff;
b)
To pay plaintiff the sum of P34,000.00 actual
damages,
P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees
and
litigation expenses; and
c)
To pay the costs.
SO
ORDERED.[7]
Despite
the respondent’s objection that the verbal sale cannot be proven without
infringing the Statute of Frauds, the MTC gave credence to the testimony of the
petitioners’ two witnesses attesting to the fact that Crisogono Limpiado sold
the property to the petitioner in 1939. The MTC also found no evidence to show that Crispulo
Rojas bought the property from Crisogono Limpiado in 1948. It held that the 1948 tax declaration in
Crispulo’s name had little significance on respondent’s claim, considering that
in 1948, the “country was then rehabilitating
itself from the ravages of the Second World War” and “the government was more
interested in the increase in tax collection than the observance of the
niceties of law.”[8]
The
respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval,
Biliran. On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Biliran awarding ownership of the disputed land to the plaintiff and further allowing recovery of damages is hereby REVERSED in toto. There is no award of damages.
The said property remains as the legitime
of the defendant Concepcion Rojas and her children.
SO ORDERED.[9]
However, acting on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC amended
its original decision on
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision of this Court dated
A
parcel of land situated at Higatangan, Naval, Biliran, bounded on the North by
Policarpio Limpiado; on the South by Fidel Limpiado; on the East by Seashore;
and on the West by Crispolo (sic) Limpiado with an approximate area of 4,169
square meters per Tax Declaration No. 2258, later under Tax Declaration No. 4073
in the name of Crispolo Rojas and later in the name of the Heirs of Crispolo
Rojas.
Further,
ordering defendant-appellant Concepcion Rojas and all persons claiming rights
or interest under her to vacate and surrender possession of the land aforecited
to the plaintiff or any of her authorized representatives, Ordering the
Provincial and/or Municipal Assessor’s Office to cancel the present existing
Tax Declaration in the name of Heirs of Crispolo Rojas referring to the
above-described property in favor of the name of Soledad Rojas Vda. De Cañezo,
Ordering the defendant-appellant Concepcion Rojas to pay the plaintiff-appellee
the sum of P34,000.00 in actual damages, and to pay for the loss of her
share in money value of the products of the coconuts of said land from 1979 to
1997 and to pay further until the case is terminated at the rate of P200.00
per quarter based on the regular remittances of the late Crispolo Rojas to the
plaintiff-appellee, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The respondent filed a motion to
reconsider the Amended Decision but the RTC denied the same in an Order dated
She then filed a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the Amended Decision of the RTC
on
WHEREFORE,
the amended decision dated
SO
ORDERED.[12]
The CA held that the petitioner’s
inaction for several years casts a serious doubt on her claim of ownership over
the parcel of land. It noted that 17
years lapsed since she discovered that respondent was in adverse possession of
the property before she instituted an action to recover the same. And during the probate proceedings, the
petitioner did not even contest the inclusion of the property in the estate of
Crispulo Rojas. [13]
The CA was convinced that Crispulo
Rojas owned the property, having bought the same from Crisogono Limpiado in
1948. Supporting this conclusion, the appellate
court cited the following circumstances: (1) the property was declared for taxation
purposes in Crispulo’s name and he had been paying the taxes thereon from 1948
until his death in 1978; (2) Crispulo adversely possessed the same property
from 1948 until his death in 1978; and (3) upon his death in 1978, the property
was included in his estate, the proceeds of which were distributed among his
heirs.[14]
The CA further held that, assuming
that there was an implied trust between the petitioner and her father over the
property, her right of action to recover the same would still be barred by prescription
since 49 years had already lapsed since Crispulo adversely possessed the
contested property in 1948.[15]
On
In this petition for review, the
petitioner, substituted by her heirs, assigns the following errors:
That
the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside
petitioner’s contention that the Petition for Review filed by respondent
CONCEPCION ROJAS before the Court of Appeals was FILED OUT OF TIME;
That
the Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it decided that the filing of the case by
SOLEDAD CAÑEZO for Recovery of Real Property was already barred by PRESCRIPTION
AND LACHES.[17]
The petitioner insists that the respondent’s
petition for review before the CA was filed out of time. The petitioner posits that the CA may not
grant an additional extension of time to file the petition except for the most
compelling reason. She contends that the
fact that respondent’s counsel needed additional time to secure the certified
copy of his annexes cannot be considered as a compelling reason that would justify an additional period of
extension. She admits, though, that this issue was raised
for the first time in their motion for reconsideration, but insists that it can
be raised at any time since it concerns the jurisdiction of the CA over the
petition.
The petitioner further posits that
prescription and laches are unavailing because there was an express trust
relationship between the petitioner and Crispulo Rojas and his heirs, and
express trusts do not prescribe. Even assuming
that it was not an express trust, there was a resulting trust which generally
does not prescribe unless there is repudiation by the trustee.
For her part, the respondent argues
that the petitioners are now estopped from questioning the CA Resolution granting
her second motion for extension to file the petition for review. She notes that
the petitioner did not raise this issue in the comment that she filed in the
CA. In any case, the grant of the second extension of time was warranted
considering that the certified true copy of the assailed RTC orders did not
arrive at the office of respondent’s counsel in
On the
merits, the respondent asserts that the complaint is barred by prescription,
laches and estoppel. From 1948 until his death in 1978, Crispulo cultivated the
property and was in adverse, peaceful and continuous possession thereof in the
concept of owner. It took the petitioner
49 years from 1948 before she filed the complaint for recovery of the property
in 1997. Granting that it was only in 1980 that she found out that the
respondent adversely possessed the property, still petitioner allowed 17 years to
elapse before she asserted her alleged right over the property.
Finally, the
respondent maintains that the other co-owners are indispensable parties to the
case; and because they were not impleaded, the case should be dismissed.
The
petition has no merit.
On the
procedural issue raised by the petitioner, we find no reversible error in the
grant by the CA of the second motion for extension of time to file the
respondent’s petition. The grant or denial of a motion for extension
of time is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court.[18] The
CA obviously considered the difficulty in securing a certified true copy of the
assailed decision because of the distance between the office of respondent’s counsel
and the trial court as a compelling reason for the request. In the absence of any showing that the CA
granted the motion for extension capriciously, such exercise of discretion will
not be disturbed by this Court.
On
the second issue, the petitioner insists that her right of action to recover
the property cannot be barred by prescription or laches even with the
respondent’s uninterrupted possession of the property for 49 years because
there existed between her and her father an express trust or a resulting
trust. Indeed, if no trust relations
existed, the possession of the property by the respondent, through her
predecessor, which dates back to 1948, would already have given rise to
acquisitive prescription in accordance with Act No. 190 (Code of Civil
Procedure).[19] Under Section 40 of Act No. 190, an action
for recovery of real property, or of an interest therein, can be brought only
within ten years after the cause of action accrues. This period coincides with the ten-year
period for acquisitive prescription provided under Section 41[20] of the
same Act.
Thus,
the resolution of the second issue hinges on our determination of the existence
of a trust over the property --- express or implied --- between the petitioner
and her father.
A
trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable
ownership of property and another person owning the legal title to such
property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the
performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter.[21] Trusts are either express or implied.[22] Express trusts are those which are created by
the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will,
or by words evincing an intention to create a trust.[23] Implied trusts are those which, without being
expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of
intent or, independently, of the particular intention of the parties, as being
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of
equity.[24] An implied trust may either be a resulting
trust or a constructive trust.
It is true
that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire by
prescription a property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust.[25] The
following discussion is instructive:
There is a rule
that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership
of property entrusted to him, or that an action to compel a trustee to convey
property registered in his name in trust for the benefit of
the cestui que trust
does not prescribe, or that the defense of prescription cannot
be set up in an action to recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of another, or that property held in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of
time.
That rule applies
squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the possession of a
trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the property held in trust. Thus, Section 38
of Act 190 provides that the law of prescription does not
apply "in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust."
The rule of
imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee
has not repudiated the trust.
x x x x
Acquisitive
prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an
express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the
trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the cestui que trust; (b) such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive.[26]
As a rule,
however, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its
existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence
of the trust and its
elements.[27] The presence of the following
elements must be proved: (1) a trustor or settlor who executes the instrument
creating the trust; (2) a trustee, who is the person expressly designated to
carry out the trust; (3) the trust res, consisting of duly identified
and definite real properties; and (4) the cestui que trust, or
beneficiaries whose identity must be clear.[28] Accordingly, it was incumbent upon petitioner
to prove the existence of the trust relationship. And petitioner sadly failed to discharge that
burden.
The
existence of express trusts concerning real property may not be established by
parol evidence.[29] It must
be proven by some writing or deed. In this case, the only evidence to support the claim that an
express trust existed between the petitioner and her father was the self-serving
testimony of the petitioner. Bare allegations do not constitute evidence
adequate to support a conclusion. They are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.[30]
In one
case, the Court allowed oral testimony to prove the existence of a trust, which
had been partially performed. It was stressed
therein that what is important is that there should be an intention to create a
trust, thus:
What is crucial is
the intention to create a trust. While oftentimes the intention is manifested
by the trustor in express or explicit language, such intention may be
manifested by inference from what the trustor has said or done, from the nature
of the transaction, or from the circumstances surrounding the creation of the
purported trust.
However, an inference of the intention to create a trust, made from language, conduct or circumstances, must be made with reasonable certainty. It cannot rest on vague, uncertain or indefinite declarations. An inference of intention to create a trust, predicated only on circumstances, can be made only where they admit of no other interpretation.[31]
Although no particular words are
required for the creation of an express trust, a clear intention to create a
trust must be shown; and the proof of fiduciary relationship must be clear and
convincing. The creation of an express trust must be manifested with reasonable
certainty and cannot be inferred from loose and vague declarations or from
ambiguous circumstances susceptible of other interpretations.[32]
In the case at bench, an intention to
create a trust cannot be inferred from the petitioner’s testimony and the attendant
facts and circumstances. The petitioner testified only to the effect that her
agreement with her father was that she will be given a share in the produce of
the property, thus:
Q:
What was your agreement with your father Crispulo Rojas when you left this property
to him?
A:
Every time that they will make copra, they will give a share.
Q:
In what particular part in
A: Bansalan, Davao del Sur.
Q:
And while you were in Bansalan, Davao del Sur, did Crispolo Rojas comply with
his obligation of giving your share the proceeds of the land?
A:
When he was still alive, he gave us every three months sometimes P200.00
and sometimes P300.00.[33]
This allegation, standing alone as it
does, is inadequate to establish the existence of a trust because profit-sharing
per se, does not necessarily
translate to a trust relation. It could
also be present in other relations, such as in deposit.
What distinguishes a trust from other
relations is the separation of the legal title and equitable ownership of the
property. In a trust relation, legal title is vested in the fiduciary while
equitable ownership is vested in a cestui
que trust. Such is not true in this case. The petitioner alleged in her
complaint that the tax declaration of the land was transferred to the name of
Crispulo without her consent. Had it been her intention to create a trust and make
Crispulo her trustee, she would not have made an issue out of this because in a
trust agreement, legal title is vested in the trustee. The trustee would
necessarily have the right to transfer the tax declaration in his name and to
pay the taxes on the property. These acts would be treated as beneficial to the
cestui que trust and would not amount
to an adverse possession.[34]
Neither can
it be deduced from the circumstances of the case that a resulting trust was
created. A resulting trust is a species of implied
trust that is presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the
intention as to which can be found in the nature of their transaction although
not expressed in a deed or instrument of conveyance. A resulting trust is based on the equitable
doctrine that it is the more valuable consideration than the legal title that
determines the equitable interest in property.[35]
While implied
trusts may be proved by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and
received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on
loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required
because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.[36] In order to establish an implied trust in real property by
parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving
rise to the trust obligation are proven by an authentic document. An implied
trust, in fine, cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof.[37]
In the present case, there was no evidence of any transaction between the
petitioner and her father from which it can be inferred that a resulting trust was
intended.
In
light of the disquisitions, we hold that there was no express trust or resulting
trust established between the petitioner and her father. Thus, in the absence of a trust relation, we
can only conclude that Crispulo’s uninterrupted possession of the subject
property for 49 years, coupled with the performance of acts of ownership, such
as payment of real estate taxes, ripened into ownership. The statutory period
of prescription commences when a person who has neither title nor good faith,
secures a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have
adversely claimed ownership of the lot.[38] While
tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do
not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession,
they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of
ownership through prescription.[39] Moreover,
Section 41 of Act No. 190 allows adverse possession in any character to
ripen into ownership after the lapse of ten years. There could be prescription under the said section even in the absence of
good faith and just title.[40]
All the
foregoing notwithstanding, even if we sustain petitioner’s claim that she was
the owner of the property and that she constituted a trust over the property
with her father as the trustee, such a finding still would not advance her case.
Assuming
that such a relation existed, it terminated upon Crispulo’s death in 1978. A
trust terminates upon the death of the trustee where the trust is personal to
the trustee in the sense that the trustor intended no other person to
administer it.[41] If Crispulo
was indeed appointed as trustee of the property, it cannot be said that such
appointment was intended to be conveyed to the respondent or any of Crispulo’s
other heirs. Hence, after Crispulo’s death, the respondent had no right to
retain possession of the property. At such point, a constructive trust would be
created over the property by operation of law. Where one mistakenly retains
property which rightfully belongs to another, a constructive trust is the
proper remedial device to correct the situation.[42]
A
constructive trust is one created not by any word or phrase, either expressly
or impliedly, evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but one which arises in order to satisfy the demands of
justice. It does not come about by agreement or intention but in the main by
operation of law, construed against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, to hold.[43]
As previously stated, the rule that a
trustee cannot, by prescription, acquire
ownership over property entrusted to him until and unless he repudiates the
trust, applies to express trusts and resulting implied trusts. However, in
constructive implied trusts, prescription may supervene even if the trustee
does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of the said trust
is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.[44] A constructive trust, unlike an express
trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in
an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or
fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor
any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts
any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.[45] The relation of trustee and cestui que
trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a constructive trust is
for the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse.
In addition, a number of other
factors militate against the petitioner’s case.
First, the petitioner is estopped from asserting ownership over the
subject property by her failure to protest its inclusion in the estate of
Crispulo. The CA, thus, correctly
observed that:
Even in the probate proceedings instituted by the heirs of
Crispulo Rojas, which included her as a daughter of the first marriage, Cañezo
never contested the inclusion of the contested property in the estate of her
father. She even participated in the project of partition of her father’s
estate which was approved by the probate court in 1984. After personally
receiving her share in the proceeds of the estate for 12 years, she suddenly
claims ownership of part of her father’s estate in 1997.
The principle of estoppel in pais applies when -- by one’s acts,
representations, admissions, or silence when there is a need to speak out --
one, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe
certain facts to exist; and the latter rightfully relies and acts on such
belief, so as to be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence
of those facts.[46] Such a situation obtains in the instant case.
Second, the action is barred by laches. The petitioner
allegedly discovered that the property was being possessed by the respondent in
1980.[47]
However, it was only in 1997 that she filed the action to recover the property.
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to it has either abandoned or
declined to assert it.[48]
Finally, the respondent asserts
that the court a quo ought to have
dismissed the complaint for failure to implead the other heirs who are
indispensable parties. We agree. We note that the complaint filed by the
petitioner sought to recover ownership, not just possession of the property; thus, the suit is in the nature of an action
for reconveyance. It is axiomatic that owners of property over which
reconveyance is asserted are indispensable parties. Without them being impleaded, no relief is
available, for the court cannot render valid judgment. Being indispensable
parties, their absence in the suit renders all subsequent actions of the trial
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present. Thus, when indispensable parties are not
before the court, the action should be dismissed.[49]
At any rate, a resolution of this issue is now purely academic in light of our
finding that the complaint is already barred by prescription, estoppel and
laches.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T.
REYES
Associate Justice
A T
T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E
R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona, with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 21-33.
[2] Rollo, p. 158.
[3]
[4] Also spelled “Crispolo” in the pleadings.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Id at 32.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Cosmo Entertainment Management, Inc. v. La
Ville Commercial Corporation, G.R. No. 152801,
[19] Article 1116 of the Civil Code of the
ART. 1116. Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein required for prescription should elapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws, a longer period might be required.
[20] Title to land by prescription. – Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to the person under disabilities the rights secured by the next section. In order to constitute such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims must be actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all claimants x x x
[21] Tigno v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 486, 497 (1997), citing Morales v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 282 (1997).
[22]
Article 1441, Civil Code of the
ART. 1441. Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law.
[23] Buan Vda. de Esconde v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 81, 89 (1996).
[24]
[25]
[26] Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones, G.R. No. 150175, February 5, 2007, 514 SCRA 197, 214-215. (Citations omitted.)
[27] Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14, at 300.
[28] Ringor v. Ringor, G.R. No. 147863,
[29] Civil Code, Art. 1443.
[30] Filipinas Port Services, Inc. v. Go,
G.R. No. 161886,
[31] Ringor v. Ringor, supra note 28, at 497-498.
[32]
[33] TSN,
[34]
See
[35] Heirs of
[36] Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18.
[37] Heirs of
[38] Heirs of
[39]
[40] Vda. de Rigonan v. Derecho, G.R. No.
159571,
[41] Booth v. Krug, 368
[42] Yamaha Motor Corp.,
[43] Heirs of
[44] Buan Vda. de Esconde v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23, at 92.
[45] Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying,
G.R. No. 144773, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA
496, 508.
[46] Cuenco v. Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra, G.R.
No. 149844,
[47] The
petitioner testified that she discovered that the property was in the
respondent’s possession in 1978, when her father died. TSN,
[48] Pahamotang v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 156403, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 681, 699-700.
[49] MWSS
v. Court of Appeals, 357
Phil. 966, 986-987 (1998).