SECOND DIVISION
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ARTURO M. ROMERO, |
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G.R. No. 142803 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
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COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CBM INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, HADI HAIDER & BROS. CO.,
and ELPIDIO TAN, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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November
20, 2007 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition
for review assails the Resolutions dated 29 October 1999[1]
and 6 March 2000[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55119. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Arturo M. Romero (Romero)
questioning the Resolutions dated 12 March 1999 and 31 May 1999 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Antecedent Facts
On 3 July 1995, Hadi Haider & Bros. Co. (HHBC) hired
Romero and deployed him to Saudi Arabia.
In October of 1995, HHBC sent back Romero to the Philippines to recruit
workers for deployment to Syria.
According to Romero, HHBC did not remit his full salary for the period
beginning October to December 1995.
Romero thus requested for the differential. Instead of receiving his salary
differential, Romero received on 6 March 1996 a notice from HHBC terminating
his employment as of 19 February 1996.
HHBC further instructed Romero to cease recruiting workers in Manila and
to return to Saudi Arabia.
Instead of returning to Saudi Arabia, Romero filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against HHBC before the Labor Arbiter. Romero likewise impleaded in his complaint
CBM International Manpower Services (CBM), the local recruiter, and its owner
Elpidio Tan.
In its Answer, CBM alleged that Romero has no cause of
action against it because it was not the agency responsible for deploying
Romero to Saudi Arabia.
In a Decision[3]
dated 27 April 1998, the Labor Arbiter ruled that Romero failed to establish
that CBM processed his employment papers and was responsible for his deployment
to Saudi Arabia. Hence, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Romero’s complaint for lack
of merit:
Nowhere in the records of the case, specially
in the evidence presented by the complainant, would show or establish the fact
that it was the respondent agency which processed the employment papers and was
therefore responsible for his deployment in Saudi Arabia. Although it is an established principle in
law that in illegal dismissal cases, it is the employer (or the respondent)
that has the burden of proof in showing that the employee concerned was
dismissed for a just cause, it is, however, incumbent upon the complainant
employee to show the existence of employee-employer relationship, or in this
case complainant has to show his relationship with the respondent placement
agency and the fact that it was said agency which caused his employment to
Saudi Arabia, failing such, his action must necessarily fail.[4]
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the decision of the Labor
Arbiter in a Resolution dated 12 March 1999.[5] The NLRC likewise denied Romero’s motion for
reconsideration.[6]
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition based on Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Circular No. 39-98, which took effect on 1 September 1998.
The Court of
Appeals stated that when Romero filed his motion for reconsideration on 26
April 1999, twelve (12) days had elapsed from 14 April 1999, the day Romero
received the NLRC Resolution dated 12 March 1999. Since Romero received
the denial of his motion for reconsideration on 9 August 1999, the Court of
Appeals held that when Romero filed his petition for certiorari on 28 September
1999, sixty two (62) days had lapsed since his receipt of the NLRC Resolution
of 12 March 1999. The Court of Appeals
thus dismissed Romero’s petition for being filed out of time.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues before this Court:[7]
I.
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing Romero's petition for certiorari for being
filed out of time;
II.
Whether the NLRC erred in
finding that HHBC did not illegally dismiss
Romero; and
III.
Whether the NLRC erred in finding that CBM was not responsible for
the recruitment and deployment of Romero.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has merit.
When the
Court of Appeals dismissed Romero’s petition, Circular No. 39-98, which embodied the amendments to
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, was already in effect. The Circular provides:
SEC. 4. Where
and when petition to be filed. – The petition may be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the
same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is
in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or
reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order or resolution,
the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied,
the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice
of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
However, Romero claims that the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing his petition since he filed the same within the 60-day reglementary
period. According to Romero, he received the Resolution of the NLRC on 14 April
1999 and he filed his Motion for Reconsideration on 26 April 1999, since the 10th
day, 24 April 1999, fell on a Saturday.
Romero posits that 26 April 1999 should now be considered as the 10th
day, thus he still had a period of fifty (50) days upon receipt of the denial
of his motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Since he received the denial of his motion for reconsideration on 9
August 1999, Romero argues that he filed the petition on time on 29 September
1999.
Romero’s argument that 26 April 1999, which is a Monday,
should be considered as the 10th day considering that the 10th
day, 24 April 1999, fell on a Saturday
is bereft of merit. The case of Narzoles v. NLRC[8] is
instructive on the manner of computation of the 60-day period under Circular No. 39-98:
There
is no question that the amendments brought about by Circular
No. 39-98, which
took effect on September 1, 1998, were already in force, and therefore
applicable when petitioners filed their petition. Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive
in that sense. No
vested rights attach to procedural laws. Consequently, the CA, in accordance
with Circular No. 39-98, correctly deducted the 16 days (the
fifteenth day was a Sunday) it took for petitioners to file their motion for
reconsideration from the 60 day reglementary period. As petitioners only had the
remaining period of 44 days from 19 October 1998, when it received a copy of
the resolution denying reconsideration, to file the petition for certiorari, or
until 8 December 1998, the filing of the petition on 17 December 1998 was nine
(9) days too late.[9]
(Emphasis supplied)
At the time Romero filed his petition for Certiorari before
the appellate court, Circular No. 39-98 was already in
force, hence the appellate court correctly dismissed his petition. Likewise, Circular No. 39-98 was still in
force when Romero filed his motion for reconsideration, thus the appellate
court correctly dismissed his motion on the ground that his petition was filed
two days late.
However, on
The Court has observed that Circular
No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion resulting in the
dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because,
historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for
the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would
have been resolved on the merits. Hence, the Court deemed it wise to revert to
the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from notice of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Earlier
this year, the Court resolved, in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC,
to further amend Section 4, Rule 65 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. When and
where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the
Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of
a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in
and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15)
days.
The latest
amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in the
Manila Bulletin on August 4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
August 7, 2000, two newspapers of general circulation.
In view of
its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65 can only be
described as curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes
are applicable.
Curative statutes are enacted to
cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements.
They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain
evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they
have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by
reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They
make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their
purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. Curative statutes,
therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.
Accordingly,
while the Resolution states that the same “shall take effect on September 1,
2000, following its publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation,” its retroactive application cannot be
denied. In short, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court on 17
December 1998 is deemed to be timely, the same having been made within the
60-day period provided under the curative Resolution. We reach this conclusion
bearing in mind that the substantive aspects of this case involves the rights
and benefits, even the livelihood, of petitioner-employees.[11]
(Citations omitted)
In view of the application of A.M. No.
00-2-03-SC, Romero’s petition before the Court of Appeals was filed on
time.
Considering that the issues on whether
HHBC illegally dismissed Romero and whether CBM was responsible for Romero’s
foreign employment are factual in nature, there is a need to remand this case
to the Court of Appeals for proper determination of these issues.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the
petition. We SET ASIDE the Court
of Appeals’ Resolutions of 29 October 1999 and 6 March 2000. We REMAND this case to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 43. Penned by Hon. Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, concurred in by Hon. Romeo A. Brawner and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
[2] Id. at 44-45.
[3] Id. at 106-109. Penned by Labor Arbiter Emerson C. Tumanon.
[4] Id. at 108-109.
[5] Id. at 137-143. Penned by Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Victoriano T. Calaycay.
[6] Id. at 157.
[7] Id. at 275-276.
[8] 395 Phil. 758 (2000).
[9] Id. at 763.
[10] Dela Cruz v. Golar Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 141277, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 173; Ramatek Philippines, Inc. v. De Los Reyes, G.R. No. 139526, 25 October 2005, 474 SCRA 129; PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Go Ko, G.R. No. 148641, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 586. .
[11] Supra note 8, at 763-765.