THIRD DIVISION
|
BPI FAMILY BANK, Petitioner, - versus - AMADO FRANCO and COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 123498
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Banks
are exhorted to treat the accounts of their depositors with meticulous care and
utmost fidelity. We reiterate this
exhortation in the case at bench.
Before
us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] in
CA-G.R. CV No. 43424 which affirmed with modification the judgment[2] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55,
This
case has its genesis in an ostensible fraud perpetrated on the petitioner BPI
Family Bank (BPI-FB) allegedly by respondent Amado Franco (Franco) in
conspiracy with other individuals,[3]
some of whom opened and maintained separate accounts with BPI-FB, San Francisco
del Monte (SFDM) branch, in a series of transactions.
On
P100,000,000.00,
to mature one year thence.
Subsequently,
on P500,000.00 each, while
the time deposit account had P1,000,000.00 with a maturity date of P2,000,000.00 used to open these accounts is traceable
to a check issued by Tevesteco allegedly in consideration of Franco’s introduction
of Eladio Teves,[7] who was
looking for a conduit bank to facilitate Tevesteco’s business transactions, to Jaime
Sebastian, who was then BPI-FB SFDM’s Branch Manager. In turn, the funding for the P2,000,000.00
check was part of the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI-FB from FMIC’s time
deposit account and credited to Tevesteco’s current account pursuant to an
Authority to Debit purportedly signed by FMIC’s officers.
It appears, however, that the signatures of FMIC’s officers
on the Authority to Debit were forged.[8] On
P80,000,000.00
covered by the forged Authority to Debit) amounting to P37,455,410.54,
including the P2,000,000.00 paid to Franco.
On
In
the meantime, two checks[13]
drawn by Franco against his BPI-FB current account were dishonored upon
presentment for payment, and stamped with a notation “account under garnishment.”
Apparently, Franco’s current account was garnished by virtue of an Order of
Attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Makati RTC) in Civil
Case No. 89-4996 (Makati Case), which had been filed by BPI-FB against Franco et al.,[14]
to recover the P37,455,410.54 representing Tevesteco’s total withdrawals
from its account.
Notably, the dishonored
checks were issued by Franco and presented for payment at BPI-FB prior to
Franco’s receipt of notice that his accounts were under garnishment.[15]
In fact, at the time the Notice of Garnishment dated
It
was only on
With
respect to Franco’s savings account, it appears that Franco agreed to an
arrangement, as a favor to Sebastian, whereby P400,000.00 from his
savings account was temporarily transferred to Domingo Quiaoit’s savings
account, subject to its immediate return upon issuance of a certificate of
deposit which Quiaoit needed in connection with his visa application at the
Taiwan Embassy. As part of the arrangement, Sebastian retained custody of Quiaoit’s
savings account passbook to ensure that no withdrawal would be effected
therefrom, and to preserve Franco’s deposits.
On
P63,189.00 from the remaining balance of the time
deposit account representing advance interest paid to him.
These
transactions spawned a number of cases, some of which we had already resolved.
FMIC
filed a complaint against BPI-FB for the recovery of the amount of P80,000,000.00
debited from its account.[17] The
case eventually reached this Court, and in BPI
Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. First Metro Investment Corporation,[18] we upheld the finding of the courts
below that BPI-FB failed to exercise the degree of diligence required by the
nature of its obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care. Thus, BPI-FB was found
liable to FMIC for the debited amount in its time deposit. It was ordered to pay P65,332,321.99
plus interest at 17% per annum from
In a related case, Edgardo
Buenaventura, Myrna Lizardo and Yolanda Tica (P500,000.00 check proceeding from the P80,000,000.00
mistakenly credited to Tevesteco, likewise filed suit. Buenaventura et al., as in the case of Franco, were also
prevented from effecting withdrawals[20] from
their current account with BPI-FB, Bonifacio Market, Edsa, Caloocan City
Branch. Likewise, when the case was elevated to this Court docketed as BPI Family Bank v. Buenaventura,[21] we ruled that BPI-FB had no right to
freeze Buenaventura, et al.’s accounts
and adjudged BPI-FB liable therefor, in addition to damages.
Meanwhile,
BPI-FB filed separate civil and criminal cases against those believed to be the
perpetrators of the multi-million peso scam.[22]
In the criminal case, Franco, along with the other accused, except for Manuel
Bienvenida who was still at large, were acquitted of the crime of Estafa as
defined and penalized under Article 351, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.[23]
However, the civil case[24]
remains under litigation and the respective rights and liabilities of the
parties have yet to be adjudicated.
Consequently,
in light of BPI-FB’s refusal to heed Franco’s demands to unfreeze his accounts
and release his deposits therein, the latter filed on
BPI-FB
traversed this complaint, insisting that it was correct in freezing the
accounts of Franco and refusing to release his deposits, claiming that it had a
better right to the amounts which consisted of part of the money allegedly
fraudulently withdrawn from it by Tevesteco and ending up in Franco’s accounts.
BPI-FB asseverated that the claimed consideration of P2,000,000.00 for
the introduction facilitated by Franco between George Daantos and Eladio Teves,
on the one hand, and Jaime Sebastian, on the other, spoke volumes of Franco’s
participation in the fraudulent transaction.
On
WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Franco]
and against [BPI-FB], ordering the latter to pay to the former the following
sums:
1. P76,500.00
representing the legal rate of interest on the amount of P450,000.00
from
2. P498,973.23
representing the balance on [Franco’s] savings account as of
3. P30,000.00
by way of attorney’s fees; and
4. P10,000.00
as nominal damages.
The
counterclaim of the defendant is DISMISSED for lack of factual and legal
anchor.
Costs
against [BPI-FB].
SO ORDERED.[28]
Unsatisfied
with the decision, both parties filed their respective appeals before the CA.
Franco confined his appeal to the Manila RTC’s denial of his claim for moral
and exemplary damages, and the diminutive award of attorney’s fees. In
affirming with modification the lower court’s decision, the appellate court
decreed, to wit:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED with modification ordering [BPI-FB] to pay [Franco] P63,189.00
representing the interest deducted from the time deposit of
plaintiff-appellant. P200,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00
as exemplary damages, deleting the award of nominal damages (in view of the
award of moral and exemplary damages) and increasing the award of attorney’s
fees from P30,000.00 to P75,000.00.
Cost
against [BPI-FB].
SO ORDERED.[29]
In this recourse, BPI-FB ascribes
error to the CA when it ruled that: (1) Franco had a better right to the
deposits in the subject accounts which are part of the proceeds of a forged
Authority to Debit; (2) Franco is entitled to interest on his current account;
(3) Franco can recover the P400,000.00 deposit in Quiaoit’s savings
account; (4) the dishonor of Franco’s checks was not legally in order; (5)
BPI-FB is liable for interest on Franco’s time deposit, and for moral and
exemplary damages; and (6) BPI-FB’s counter-claim has no factual and legal
anchor.
The
petition is partly meritorious.
We
are in full accord with the common ruling of the lower courts that BPI-FB
cannot unilaterally freeze Franco’s accounts and preclude him from withdrawing
his deposits. However, contrary to the
appellate court’s ruling, we hold that Franco is not entitled to unearned
interest on the time deposit as well as to moral and exemplary damages.
First. On the issue of who has a better
right to the deposits in Franco’s accounts, BPI-FB urges us that the legal
consequence of FMIC’s forgery claim is that the money transferred by BPI-FB to
Tevesteco is its own, and considering that it was able to recover possession of
the same when the money was redeposited by Franco, it had the right to set up
its ownership thereon and freeze Franco’s accounts.
BPI-FB
contends that its position is not unlike that of an owner of personal property
who regains possession after it is stolen, and to illustrate this point, BPI-FB
gives the following example: where X’s television set is stolen by Y who
thereafter sells it to Z, and where Z unwittingly entrusts possession of the TV
set to X, the latter would have the right to keep possession of the property
and preclude Z from recovering possession thereof. To bolster its position,
BPI-FB cites Article 559 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
BPI-FB’s
argument is unsound. To begin with, the
movable property mentioned in Article 559 of the Civil Code pertains to a
specific or determinate thing.[30] A
determinate or specific thing is one that is individualized and can be
identified or distinguished from others of the same kind.[31]
In this case, the deposit in Franco’s
accounts consists of money which, albeit characterized as a movable, is generic
and fungible.[32] The
quality of being fungible depends upon the possibility of the property, because
of its nature or the will of the parties, being substituted by others of the
same kind, not having a distinct individuality.[33]
Significantly, while Article 559
permits an owner who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable to
recover the exact same thing from the current possessor, BPI-FB simply claims
ownership of the equivalent amount of money, i.e., the value thereof, which it had mistakenly debited from FMIC’s
account and credited to Tevesteco’s, and subsequently traced to Franco’s
account. In fact, this is what BPI-FB did in filing the Makati Case against
Franco, et al. It staked its claim on the money itself which
passed from one account to another, commencing with the forged Authority to
Debit.
It bears emphasizing that money bears
no earmarks of peculiar ownership,[34]
and this characteristic is all the more manifest in the instant case which involves
money in a banking transaction gone awry. Its primary function is to pass from
hand to hand as a medium of exchange, without other evidence of its title.[35]
Money, which had passed through various transactions in the general course of banking
business, even if of traceable origin, is no exception.
Thus, inasmuch as what is involved is
not a specific or determinate personal property, BPI-FB’s illustrative example,
ostensibly based on Article 559, is inapplicable to the instant case.
There is no doubt that BPI-FB owns
the deposited monies in the accounts of Franco, but not as a legal consequence
of its unauthorized transfer of FMIC’s deposits to Tevesteco’s account. BPI-FB
conveniently forgets that the deposit of money in banks is governed by the
Civil Code provisions on simple loan or mutuum.[36]
As there is a debtor-creditor relationship between a bank and its depositor,
BPI-FB ultimately acquired ownership of Franco’s deposits, but such ownership
is coupled with a corresponding obligation to pay him an equal amount on
demand.[37] Although
BPI-FB owns the deposits in Franco’s accounts, it cannot prevent him from
demanding payment of BPI-FB’s obligation by drawing checks against his current
account, or asking for the release of the funds in his savings account. Thus, when Franco issued checks drawn against
his current account, he had every right as creditor to expect that those checks
would be honored by BPI-FB as debtor.
More importantly, BPI-FB does not
have a unilateral right to freeze the accounts of Franco based on its mere
suspicion that the funds therein were proceeds of the multi-million peso scam
Franco was allegedly involved in. To grant BPI-FB, or any bank for that matter,
the right to take whatever action it pleases on deposits which it supposes are
derived from shady transactions, would open the floodgates of public distrust
in the banking industry.
Our pronouncement in Simex International (
The banking system is an indispensable institution in the modern world and plays a vital role in the economic life of every civilized nation. Whether as mere passive entities for the safekeeping and saving of money or as active instruments of business and commerce, banks have become an ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come to regard them with respect and even gratitude and, most of all, confidence. Thus, even the humble wage-earner has not hesitated to entrust his life’s savings to the bank of his choice, knowing that they will be safe in its custody and will even earn some interest for him. The ordinary person, with equal faith, usually maintains a modest checking account for security and convenience in the settling of his monthly bills and the payment of ordinary expenses. x x x.
In every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost fidelity, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can dispose of as he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever directs. A blunder on the part of the bank, such as the dishonor of the check without good reason, can cause the depositor not a little embarrassment if not also financial loss and perhaps even civil and criminal litigation.
The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. x x x.
Ineluctably,
BPI-FB, as the trustee in the fiduciary relationship, is duty bound to know the
signatures of its customers. Having failed to detect the forgery in the Authority
to Debit and in the process inadvertently facilitate the FMIC-Tevesteco
transfer, BPI-FB cannot now shift liability thereon to Franco and the other
payees of checks issued by Tevesteco, or prevent withdrawals from their
respective accounts without the appropriate court writ or a favorable final
judgment.
Further, it boggles the mind why
BPI-FB, even without delving into the authenticity of the signature in the Authority
to Debit, effected the transfer of P80,000,000.00 from FMIC’s to Tevesteco’s
account, when FMIC’s account was a time deposit and it had already paid advance
interest to FMIC. Considering that there is as yet no indubitable evidence establishing
Franco’s participation in the forgery, he remains an innocent party. As between
him and BPI-FB, the latter, which made possible the present predicament, must
bear the resulting loss or inconvenience.
Second. With
respect to its liability for interest on Franco’s current account, BPI-FB
argues that its non-compliance with the Makati RTC’s Order Lifting the Order of
Attachment and the legal consequences thereof, is a matter that ought to be
taken up in that court.
The argument is tenuous. We agree
with the succinct holding of the appellate court in this respect. The Manila
RTC’s order to pay interests on Franco’s current account arose from BPI-FB’s
unjustified refusal to comply with its obligation to pay Franco pursuant to
their contract of mutuum. In other words, from the time BPI-FB refused Franco’s
demand for the release of the deposits in his current account, specifically, from
Undeniably, the Makati RTC is vested
with the authority to determine the legal consequences of BPI-FB’s
non-compliance with the Order Lifting the Order of Attachment. However, such
authority does not preclude the Manila RTC from ruling on BPI-FB’s liability to
Franco for payment of interest based on its continued and unjustified refusal
to perform a contractual obligation upon demand. After all, this was the core issue raised by
Franco in his complaint before the Manila RTC.
Third. As to
the award to Franco of the deposits in Quiaoit’s account, we find no reason to
depart from the factual findings of both the Manila RTC and the CA.
Noteworthy is the fact that Quiaoit
himself testified that the deposits in his account are actually owned by Franco
who simply accommodated Jaime Sebastian’s request to temporarily transfer P400,000.00
from Franco’s savings account to Quiaoit’s account.[40]
His testimony cannot be characterized as hearsay as the records reveal that he
had personal knowledge of the arrangement made between Franco, Sebastian and
himself.[41]
BPI-FB makes capital of Franco’s
belated allegation relative to this particular arrangement. It insists that the transaction with Quiaoit
was not specifically alleged in Franco’s complaint before the Manila RTC.
However, it appears that BPI-FB had impliedly consented to the trial of this
issue given its extensive cross-examination of Quiaoit.
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.— When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is now within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made. (Emphasis supplied)
In
all, BPI-FB’s argument that this case is not the right forum for Franco to
recover the P400,000.00 begs the issue. To reiterate, Quiaoit, testifying
during the trial, unequivocally disclaimed ownership of the funds in his
account, and pointed to Franco as the actual owner thereof. Clearly, Franco’s
action for the recovery of his deposits appropriately covers the deposits in
Quiaoit’s account.
Fourth. Notwithstanding all the
foregoing, BPI-FB continues to insist that the dishonor of Franco’s checks
respectively dated September 11 and 18, 1989 was legally in order in view of
the Makati RTC’s supplemental writ of attachment issued on
The
argument is specious. In this argument,
we perceive BPI-FB’s clever but transparent ploy to circumvent Section 4,[42]
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. It should
be noted that the strict requirement on service of court papers upon the
parties affected is designed to comply with the elementary requisites of due
process. Franco was entitled, as a
matter of right, to notice, if the requirements of due process are to be
observed. Yet, he received a copy of the
Notice of Garnishment only on
Additionally,
it should be remembered that the enforcement of a writ of attachment cannot be
made without including in the main suit the owner of the property attached by
virtue thereof. Section 5, Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court specifically provides that “no levy or attachment pursuant
to the writ issued x x x shall be enforced unless it is preceded, or
contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, together with a copy of
the complaint, the application for attachment, on the defendant within the
Philippines.”
Franco
was impleaded as party-defendant only on
Fifth. Anent the CA’s finding that
BPI-FB was in bad faith and as such liable for the advance interest it deducted
from Franco’s time deposit account, and for moral as well as exemplary damages,
we find it proper to reinstate the ruling of the trial court, and allow only the
recovery of nominal damages in the amount of P10,000.00. However, we
retain the CA’s award of P75,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
In
granting Franco’s prayer for interest on his time deposit account and for moral
and exemplary damages, the CA attributed bad faith to BPI-FB because it (1)
completely disregarded its obligation to Franco; (2) misleadingly claimed that
Franco’s deposits were under garnishment; (3) misrepresented that Franco’s
current account was not on file; and (4) refused to return the P400,000.00
despite the fact that the ostensible owner, Quiaoit, wanted the amount returned
to Franco.
In
this regard, we are guided by Article 2201 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 2201. In
contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have
foreseen or could have reasonable foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or
wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
We
find, as the trial court did, that BPI-FB acted out of the impetus of
self-protection and not out of malevolence or ill will. BPI-FB was not in the corrupt state of mind
contemplated in Article 2201 and should not be held liable for all damages now
being imputed to it for its breach of obligation. For the same reason, it is
not liable for the unearned interest on the time deposit.
Bad
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it
partakes of the nature of fraud.[44]
We have held that it is a breach of a known duty through some motive of
interest or ill will.[45] In
the instant case, we cannot attribute to BPI-FB fraud or even a motive of
self-enrichment. As the trial court found, there was no denial whatsoever by
BPI-FB of the existence of the accounts. The computer-generated document which
indicated that the current account was “not on file” resulted from the prior
debit by BPI-FB of the deposits. The remedy of freezing the account, or the
garnishment, or even the outright refusal to honor any transaction thereon was
resorted to solely for the purpose of holding on to the funds as a security for
its intended court action,[46]
and with no other goal but to ensure the integrity of the accounts.
We
have had occasion to hold that in the absence of fraud or bad faith,[47]
moral damages cannot be awarded; and that the adverse result of an action does
not per se make the action wrongful, or the party liable for it. One may err,
but error alone is not a ground for granting such damages.[48]
An
award of moral damages contemplates the existence of the following requisites:
(1) there must be an injury clearly sustained by the claimant, whether
physical, mental or psychological; (2) there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award for
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.[49]
Franco
could not point to, or identify any particular circumstance in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code,[50] upon
which to base his claim for moral damages.
Thus,
not having acted in bad faith, BPI-FB cannot be held liable for moral damages
under Article 2220 of the Civil Code for breach of contract.[51]
We
also deny the claim for exemplary damages. Franco should show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before the court may even
consider the question of whether exemplary damages should be awarded to him.[52]
As there is no basis for the award of moral damages, neither can exemplary
damages be granted.
While
it is a sound policy not to set a premium on the right to litigate,[53]
we, however, find that Franco is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees for
having been compelled to go to court in order to assert his right. Thus, we affirm the CA’s grant of P75,000.00
as attorney’s fees.
Attorney’s
fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to
protect his interest,[54]
or when the court deems it just and equitable.[55]
In the case at bench, BPI-FB refused to unfreeze the deposits of Franco despite
the Makati RTC’s Order Lifting the Order of Attachment and Quiaoit’s unwavering
assertion that the P400,000.00 was part of Franco’s savings account.
This refusal constrained Franco to incur expenses and litigate for almost two
(2) decades in order to protect his interests and recover his deposits.
Therefore, this Court deems it just and equitable to grant Franco P75,000.00
as attorney’s fees. The award is reasonable in view of the complexity of the
issues and the time it has taken for this case to be resolved.[56]
Sixth. As for the dismissal of BPI-FB’s
counter-claim, we uphold the Manila RTC’s ruling, as affirmed by the CA, that
BPI-FB is not entitled to recover P3,800,000.00 as actual damages.
BPI-FB’s alleged loss of profit as a result of Franco’s suit is, as already pointed
out, of its own making. Accordingly, the
denial of its counter-claim is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Eugenio S. Labitoria, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Portia Alino Hormachuelos,
concurring; rollo, pp. 40-55.
[2] CA
rollo, pp. 70-79.
[3] Antonio
T. Ong, Manuel Bienvenida, Jr., Milagros Nayve, Jaime Sebastian, Ador de Asis,
and Eladio Teves. Rollo, pp. 160-207. RTC,
[4] Account No. 840-107483-7.
[5] Account No. 1668238-1.
[6] Account No. 08523412.
[7] President of Tevesteco.
[8] BPI-FB’s
Memorandum, rollo, pp. 104-105.
[9] Executive Vice-President of FMIC.
[10] The new BPI-FB SFDM branch manager
who replaced Jaime Sebastian.
[11] BPI-FB’s
Memorandum, rollo, p. 105.
[12] Id.
[13] Respectively dated September 11 and
18, 1989. The first check dated P50,000.00 was
honored by BPI-FB.
[14] Supra note 3. The names of other defendants in Crim. Case
No. Q91-22386.
[15] Franco received the Notice of
Garnishment on
[16] Franco’s Memorandum, rollo, p. 137.
[17] Docketed as Civil Case No. 89-5280
and entitled “First Metro Investment
Corporation v. BPI Family Bank.”
[18] G.R. No. 132390,
[19] Officers of the
[20] The checks issued by Buenaventura et al. were dishonored upon presentment
for payment.
[21] G.R. No. 148196,
[22] Supra note 3.
[23] Rollo,
pp. 160-208.
[24] The Makati Case for recovery of the P37,455,410.54
representing Tevesteco’s total withdrawals wherein Franco was belatedly
impleaded, and a Writ of Garnishment was issued on Franco’s accounts.
[25] P450,000.00.
[26] The reflected amount of P98,973.23
plus P400,000.00 representing what was transferred to Quiaoit’s account
under their arrangement
[27] P63,189.00.
[28] CA
rollo, p. 79.
[30] See
Article 1460, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code. A thing is determinate when it is
particularly designated or physically segregated from all others of the same
class.
[31] Tolentino, Civil Code of the
[32] See
Article 418 of the Civil Code, taken from Article 337 of the Old Civil Code
which used the words “fungible or non-fungible.”
[33] Tolentino, Civil Code of the
[34]
[35]
[36] Article 1980 of the Civil Code:
Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions
shall be governed by the provisions concerning loan. See
Article 1933 of the Civil Code.
[37] Article 1953 of the Civil Code: A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
[38] G.R. No. 88013,
[39] See
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 97412,
[40] TSN,
[41]
[42] SEC.
4. Papers required to be filed and
served.— Every judgment, resolution, order, pleading subsequent to the
complaint, written motion, notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment or
similar papers shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties
affected.
[43] See
Sievert v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-84034,
[44] Board
of Liquidators v. Heirs of Maximo Kalaw, et al., 127 Phil. 399, 421 (1967).
[45] Lopez,
et al. v. Pan American World Airways,
123 Phil. 256, 264-265 (1966).
[46] CA rollo, p. 74.
[47] Suario
v. Bank of the Philippine
[48] Bank
of the Philippine
[49] United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ramos, 461 Phil. 277, 298 (2003); citing Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Spouses Vazquez, 447 Phil. 306 (2003).
[50] Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brother and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
[51] Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
[52] Article 2234 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
[53] Bank
of the Philippine
[54] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2208, par. (2).
[55] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2208, par. (11).
[56] Ching
Sen Ben v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 544, 555 (1999).