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ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY.
NORMANDICK DE GUZMAN,
Petitioners, -versus- COMELEC and MARINO “BOKING” MORALES,
Respondents. x---------------------------------------------x ANTHONY D. DEE, Petitioner, -versus- COMELEC and MARINO “BOKING” MORALES,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 167591 G.R. No. 170577 Present: Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, CARPIO, *AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, * CARPIO MORALES, azcuna, TINGA, chico-nazario, GARCIA, velasco, jr., and **nachura, JJ. Promulgated: May
9, 2007 |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution are two
consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions dated
G.R. No.
167591
ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY. NORMANDICK DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC and MARINO “BOKING” MORALES
In the May 2004 Synchronized National
and Local Elections, respondent Marino “Boking” Morales ran as candidate for mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Prior
thereto or on
On
In his answer to the petition,
respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term
commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June
30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June
30, 2001 only as a “caretaker of the
office” or as a “de facto officer”
because of the following reasons:
a. He was not
validly elected for the second term 1998 to 2001 since his proclamation as
mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Angeles
City in its Decision dated April 2, 2001 in Election Protest Case (EPC) No.
98-131. The Decision became final and
executory on
b. He was
preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from
On
On
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
G.R. No.
170577
ANTHONY DEE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARIO
“BOKING” MORALES
On
In his answer, respondent Morales
raised the following defenses:
a. He was not
validly elected for the term 1998 to 2001 since the RTC, Branch 57,
b. He was preventively
suspended for six months by the Ombudsman, during the same term in an
anti-graft case, an interruption in the continuity of his service as municipal
mayor of Mabalacat.[1]
In its Decision dated November 22,
2004, the RTC dismissed petitioner Dee’s petition for quo warranto on the ground that respondent Morales did not serve the
three-term limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat, but
petitioner Dee in the May 1998 elections for the term 1998 to 2001, thus:
Respondent, Marino Morales, was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the May 1998 elections for the term 1998 to 2001 because although he was proclaimed as the elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, had assumed office and discharged the duties of mayor, his close rival, the herein petitioner, Anthony D. Dee, was declared the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the Decision promulgated on April 2, 2001 in Election Protest EPC No. 98-131 filed by Anthony Dee against herein respondent, Marino Morales, and decided by RTC, Br. 57, Angeles City. x x x.
Petitioner Dee interposed an appeal
to the COMELEC First Division, alleging that respondent Morales violated the
three-term limit rule when he ran for re-election (fourth time) as mayor in the
2004 elections. Consequently, his proclamation as such should
be set aside. In a Resolution dated
On
Hence, petitioner Dee’s instant
petition for certiorari.
Both cases may be decided based on
the same facts and issues.
It is undisputed that respondent
Morales was elected to the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following
consecutive terms:
a)
b)
c)
d)
THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE. –
Respondent Morales argued and the
Comelec held that the
Respondent Morales is wrong. This
Court, through Mr. Justice Cancio C. Garcia, resolved the same issue in Ong v. Alegre[2]
with identical facts, thus:
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by the COMELEC winner in the contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elected for the municipality of San Vicente.
x x x
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question of whether or not petitioner Francis’ assumption of office as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Respondent COMELEC
resolved the question in the affirmative.
Petitioner Francis, on the other hand, disagrees. He argues that, while he indeed assumed
office and discharged the duties as Mayor of San Vicente for three consecutive
terms, his proclamation as mayor-elected in the May 1998 election was contested
and eventually nullified per the Decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte
dated
x x x
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
With the view we take of
the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively
barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte in the
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term,” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would-under the three-term rule-be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
Petitioner cites, but, to
our mind, cannot seek refuge from the Court’s ruling in Lonzanida v. Comelec, citing
Borja v. Comelec. In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was
elected and served for two consecutive terms as mayor of
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty elections was declared a nullity for the stated reason of “failure of election,” and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of the mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. But more importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis’ service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited
above, Francis Ong was elected and
assumed the duties of the mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three
consecutive terms. But his
proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was declared void by the RTC of
Daet, Camarines Norte in its Decision dated
Here, respondent Morales invoked not
only Lonzanida v. COMELEC,[3] but
also Borja, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections[4] which is
likewise inapplicable. The facts in Borja are:
Private
respondent Jose T. Capco was elected vice-mayor
of Pateros on
On
On
This Court held that Capco’s
assumption of the office of mayor upon the death of the incumbent may not be
regarded as a “term” under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). He held the position from
Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC,[5]
this Court ruled that assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election
for the remaining term is not the “term” contemplated under Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government
Code). As the Court observed, there was
a “break” in the service of private respondent Ramon T. Talanga as mayor. He was a “private citizen” for a time before
running for mayor in the recall elections.
Here, respondent Morales was elected for
the term
Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution can not be more clear and explicit –
The
term of the office of elected local officials x x x, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. x x x
Upon
the other hand, Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code)
clearly provides:
No local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. x x x
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been
mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since
In
Latasa v. Comelec,[7]
the Court explained the reason for the maximum term limit, thus:
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas Ople stated during the deliberations:
x x x I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent re-elections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate these powers and prerequisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. x x x
x x x
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or a break in the service of local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents therein lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
This Court reiterates
that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern
them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power
over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in
the same office. To allow petitioner
Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of
the framers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive term as mayor of the City
of
This is the very situation in the instant case. Respondent Morales maintains that he served
his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de
facto officer.” Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official serves in the same position for three
consecutive terms. Whether as
“caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys
the prerequisites of the office which enables him “to stay on indefinitely”.
Respondent
Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of Mabalacat.
G.R. No. 167591 –
Having
found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. – The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
in relation to Section 211 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which provides:
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the voter’s will:
x x x
19. Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for an office for which he did not present himself shall be considered as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate the whole ballot.
x x x
In the light of the foregoing,
respondent Morales can not be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him
SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.
G.R. No. 170577 –
Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED
from continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the instant petition for quo
warranto has become moot.
Going back to G.R. No. 167591, the
question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve
for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term.
In Labo v. Comelec,[8]
this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as
a substitute winner, thus:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
x x x
It
is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified,
the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be
considered null and void. This would
amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people
of
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed, under no circumstances can minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; GR No. 105111).
x x x
As
a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the
contested office has occurred. This
should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the
Local Government Code, to wit:
Sec.
44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of
the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the
vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591 is GRANTED. Respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy
dated
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice (On leave) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice (On leave) MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice (No part) CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice (No part) ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On leave.
** No part.
[1] The COMELEC Second Division, in its
Resolution dated
[2] G.R. Nos. 163295 & 163354,
[3] G.R. No. 135150,
[4] G.R. No. 133495,
[5] G.R. No. 147927,
[6] Supra.
[7] G.R. No. 154829,
[8] G.R. Nos. 105111 & 105384, July 3,
1992, 211 SCRA 297; Abella v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 100710 & 100739,
September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 253; and Benito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 106053,
August 17, 1994, 235 SCRA 436.