THIRD
DIVISION
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LEONARDO
R. OCAMPO, Complainant, - versus - HONORABLE GINA M. BIBAT-PALAMOS,
PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, Respondent. |
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A.M. No. MTJ-06-1655
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-1814-MTJ) Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR.,* CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ.** Promulgated: March 6, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is respondent’s Second
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 30 August 2006, which
censured respondent Judge Gina M. Bibat-Palamos, for her delay in issuing the writ of execution in Civil Case No.
754-95 entitled, “Leonardo R. Ocampo v.
Leonora Tirona,” an ejectment case
on which the decision has already become final and executory.
On
1. That the instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2.
That respondent Executive Judge Gina M. Bibat-Palamos
be CENSURED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.[1]
The report ratiocinated thus:
The
Motion for Execution was filed by herein complainant way back
It
is an elementary rule that in ejectment proceedings the decision in favor of
the plaintiff is immediately executory. The plaintiff is entitled to reacquire
possession of the subject property, after judgment is ruled in his favor, in
order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of
the property in question. (Hualam
Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
85466, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 612). While we give respondent credit for
finally issuing the order for a Writ of Execution, we cannot but observe that
the same could have been issued at the outset when the motion for execution was
filed in accordance with the law. The fact that she finally complied with the
requirements of the law is of no moment. Respondent cannot now be allowed to
evade the effects of her inaction or ignorance of procedural law that give rise
to this administrative complaint.
Her failure to comprehend the basic
purpose of resolving the Motion for Execution in Ejectment cases promptly and
expeditiously albeit one already resolved and decided by the Supreme Court
constitutes gross ignorance of the law, for which she may be held
administratively liable. It must be emphasized that the adoption of the Rule on
Summary Procedure is part of the commitment of the judiciary to enforce the
constitutional right of litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases. It
was promulgated for the purpose of achieving “an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases.” Any member of the Judiciary who causes delay sought to
be prevented by the Rule is sanctionable. (Velez
v.
Deliberating
on the case, the First Division (now Third Division) adopted the findings and
conclusion of the OCA.[3]
A
Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied in a Resolution[4]
dated
In
her second motion for reconsideration, respondent explained there was no delay
in her acting on the complainant’s motion for execution, thus:
5. x x x [T]he Motion
for Execution was filed by the complainant on
and that therefore, the motion for
execution was resolved within the reglementary period. The respondent further
explained:
6. That the alleged
delay between the issuance of the Order dated January 11, 2006 and its
subsequent mailing on February 17, 2006 can be explained by the fact that the
Court during that said period was
conducting a Physical Inventory of all its cases as required (sic)
Administrative Circular No. 1, January 28, 1988, and all records of the Court
has to be sorted out and filed by the Court’s staff and Orders that (sic)
required to be sent to mail likewise
needs to be sorted out.
7. That while the
undersigned agrees with the complainant’s claim that “the resolution of the
motion is a matter of duty on his part- it is not a complicated matter as he
could not anymore revised or modify the judgment,” it is equally the
undersigned’s duty, taking note that case may still be compromised
notwithstanding the finality of the decision therein, to exhaust every
means to shift the attitudes of the parties from adversarial to a
problem-solving opportunity to resolve their differences in ways that are productive
for their lives. This principle is inculcated in the minds of today’s judges by
no other than our Supreme Court. Furthermore, the undersigned has to check if there is any supervening event that may render
the issuance of a Writ of Execution moot and academic taking note that a
considerable length of time has lapsed between the promulgation of Petition for
Review and the filing of the “Motion for Execution.” Prudence dictates and
justice requires that a judge should hear both parties and not rely on the one-sided
allegation of another.[5]
Article
VIII, Section 15, par. 1 of the 1987 Constitution states:
All cases or matters
filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within twenty four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, twelve
(12) months for all lower collegiate courts, and three (3) months for all other lower courts.
Further, Paragraph 2 of the said Section further states:
A case or matter
shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the
court itself.
As may be gleaned above, lower court
judges are to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within three
(3) months or ninety (90) days from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum.
As a rule, the prescribed periods for
the performance of certain acts must be followed with fealty as they are
designed primarily to speed up the final disposition of the case. Such
reglementary periods are indispensable interdictions against needless delays
and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. Deviations from the rules
cannot be tolerated. More importantly, its observance cannot be left to the
whims and caprices of the parties.[6]
Applying the foregoing discussion in
the case at bar, we are persuaded that the resolution of the subject motion for
execution filed by complainant sufficiently complied with the period provided.
As a matter of fact, complainant had seven (7) days left when the motion was
decided within eighty three (83) days from the time it was submitted for
decision. The period to resolve the “Motion for Execution” of herein
complainant commenced to run from the time that the period given to the defendant
in the ejectment case has lapsed which was on
Furthermore, the allegations in the
complaint do not evince any malice, bad faith, or corrupt motives on the part
of respondent. In fact, she should be
lauded for exerting best efforts to afford due process to all parties by
setting the motion for execution for hearing and giving defendant the opportunity
to comment on the motion. This, to our
mind, justifies the dismissal[7] of
the charges of gross ignorance of the
law, gross inefficiency, and neglect of duty filed against her.
To constitute gross ignorance of the
law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence, but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption. Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and a person
who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the grounds
for the accusation.[8] Good
faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge.[9]
We scrutinized closely respondent’s
record and found no trace of wrongdoing on her part. This is the first time
that she has been administratively charged.
While indeed a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, we have allowed it in certain cases. Besides, in administrative cases involving the
discipline of judges and court personnel, we have allowed second or even third
motions for reconsideration whenever justified by the circumstances.[10] In the case at bar, and considering the
foregoing observations, we have resolved to give due course to the second
motion for reconsideration and grant the same.
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The penalty of censure is hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
On leave
Associate Justice Associate Justice
No part
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
* On leave.
** No part.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] LTS Philippines Corporation v. Maliwat, G.R. No. 159024,
[7] Salvador
v. Limsiaco, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-06-1626,
[8] Suarez-De
leon v. Judge Estrella, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1935,
[9] Sps. Chan v. Judge Lantion, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1945,
[10] Soria v. Judge Villegas, A.M. No.
RTJ-03-1812,