Republic of
the
THIRD DIVISION
|
JULIO B. VERZOSA, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE
MANUEL E. CONTRERAS,
Municipal Trial Court,
Ocampo, Camarines Sur, Respondent. |
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1636
[Formerly
OCA IPI No. 05-1662-MTJ] Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR.,* CHICO-NAZARIO,
and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - x
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Verified Complaint[1] dated December 30, 2004 of Julio B. Verzosa (complainant) charging Judge Manuel E. Contreras (respondent), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Ocampo, Camarines Sur with Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct (Harassment and Oppression), and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to Criminal Case No. 2071, entitled “People of the Philippines v. Rodrigo E. Candelaria.”
Complainant
alleges: he is a forest ranger of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Protected Area Office. On
In his
Comment,[2]
respondent contends: on the latter part of March 2004, he went on mountain
hiking at
In the Agenda Report,[3] the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION:
x x x
x
The complainant, in branding the respondent Judge as
the mastermind of the alleged treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur, relied heavily on the narrations of and affidavits
executed by Myrna Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza and Mary Ann Candelaria. Clearly, these narrations/affidavits
are not based on the complainant's own personal knowledge but rather on the
personal knowledge of the said persons.
The same are, thus, considered hearsay because their probative force
depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons
other tha[n] the complainant. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R.
Nos. 146710-15,
With
respect to the issuance of warrant of arrest, such issue is judicial and may be
best resolved through judicial adjudication.
As correctly pointed out by the respondent Judge, if there are
irregularities in the issuance of warrant against the complainant, the latter
has all available judicial remedies, such as filing a motion to quash, an
action for habeas corpus, or a special civil action for certiorari. However, the complainant chose not to avail
of any judicial remedy.
To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistake
committed by a judge should be patent, gross, malicious, deliberate, or done in
bad faith and absent a clear showing that the judge has acted errantly; the
issue becomes judicial in character and would not properly warrant the
imposition of administrative punishment (Godinez vs. Alano, 303 SCRA 259).
At any rate, the respondent Judge followed the letter
of the law, specifically Rule 112,
Section 6, paragraph b, when, prior
to the issuance of warrant of arrest against the complainant, he personally
conducted preliminary examination in the form of searching questions and
answers on witness Jose Credo and upon finding probable cause and the necessity
to place the complainant under custody in order [not] to frustrate the ends of
justice.
Anent the respondent Judge's failure to inhibit
himself in conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071,
he violated Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (now Canon 3, Section 5
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct) for taking part in a proceeding where he
has personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary facts. Respondent Judge admitted having prior
knowledge of the looting and dismantling of the
It should be noted, however, that while no motion for
inhibition of respondent judge was filed by the complainant during the
preliminary investigation stage of the case, this does not mean that respondent
can freely act on the same despite the lingering doubt created in the minds of
the parties that he would not be impartial in his judgment.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above. While the first
paragraph of Article 137 provides for the specific grounds for disqualification
and gives the judicial officer no discretion to sit in a case, the second
paragraph leaves the matter of inhibition to the sound discretion of the judge
(People vs. Serrano, 203 SCRA 17).
It does not explicitly enumerate the specific grounds
for inhibition but provides a broad policy-oriented ground for disqualification
of judges for just and valid reasons other than those enumerated in the first
paragraph (Geotina vs. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66).
The judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just and valid
reasons (Parayno vs. Meneses,
231 SCRA 807) other than those mentioned in Rule 137, Section 1. The ultimate test in determining the validity
of the court's inhibition is whether or not the petitioner is deprived of fair
and impartial trial (Associacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay
Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294) and the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the
consideration of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that:
1. The instant matter be re-docketed as a regular
administrative case;
2. Judge Manuel E. Contreras, Municipal Trial Court of Ocampo, Camarines Sur be admonished for violation of Canon 3, Section 5 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
On
We agree with the findings of the OCA except that respondent should be reprimanded instead of being merely admonished.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.[4]
The issue of whether a judge should voluntarily inhibit himself is addressed to his sound discretion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, which provides that a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for a just or valid reason other than those mentioned in the first paragraph.[5]
However, respondent failed to consider the proscription under Rule
3.12(a) of Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Rule 3.12. - A judge should take no part in a proceeding
where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others,
proceedings where:
(a) the judge has
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
In Oktubre v. Velasco,[6] citing Perez v. Suller,[7] we held that the rule on disqualification of judges under Rule 3.12 and Section 1, Rule 137 -
[S]tems from the principle
that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent.
A Judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived to be
susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is intended to preserve the
people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice.[8]
True, a
judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe and
enforce the law. However, it is more
important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties
before him have confidence in his impartiality.
Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of
partiality is proscribed.[9]
Records
reveal that respondent had prior knowledge of the looting and dismantling at
the
Respondent's averment that prior
knowledge of the commission of a crime is not a mandatory ground for the first
level court judge to recuse himself
from conducting preliminary investigation, holds no water. As a judge,
respondent must keep himself abreast with the law. He should have known that it is well
entrenched in the Code of Judicial Conduct, prevailing at that time, that
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding disqualifies him from taking part in such proceeding
as the same would
necessarily spawn a perception that he is bias and impartial. It is of no moment that the finding of
probable cause was sustained by the provincial prosecutor. What is of
paramount importance is the perceived bias and impartiality by the
complainant against respondent in his conduct of the preliminary investigation
due to respondent's prior knowledge of the looting at the PLDT Tower,
respondent being instrumental in the apprehension of the robbers.
Although
respondent should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary
investigation, it did not render as void the act of respondent in issuing a
warrant of arrest. He acted within the
bounds of the then existing Section 6(b), Rule 112[10]
of the Rules of Court which provides, inter alia,
that without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may
issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under
oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice.
The OCA
rightly observed that respondent followed the letter of the existing Rule,
when, prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest against complainant,
respondent personally conducted preliminary examination in the form of
searching questions and answers on witness Credo. The purpose of issuing the warrant of arrest was to place the
respondents under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.[11] Whether it is necessary to place the accused in custody is
left to the judge’s sound judgment.[12]
Moreover,
the OCA correctly sustained respondent’s claim that if ever complainant perceived
that irregularities attended the issuance of warrant of arrest against him, he
has all available judicial remedies,[13]
such as filing a motion to quash warrant of arrest, habeas corpus
proceedings, or certiorari, but none was availed of by complainant.
In Lumbos v. Baliguat,[14] we held that as a matter of
policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. He cannot
be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or
administrative - for any of his official
acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.[15] To hold, otherwise, would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[16] An inquiry into the administrative liability
of a judge may be resorted to only after the available remedies have been
exhausted and decided with finality.[17] For until there is a final declaration by the
appellate court that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous,
there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent is administratively
liable.[18] The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of
the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter
can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.[19] Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge
commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or
with deliberate intent to do an injustice.[20] Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge x x x can find refuge.[21]
Anent the
allegation that respondent is the mastermind behind the treasure hunting
activities in Ocampo, Camarines
Sur, we find the allegation to be devoid of
merit.
In Español v. Mupas,[22] we held that in
administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Thus, when the complainant relies mainly on
second-hand information to prove the charges against the respondent, the
complaint is reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation.[23] The Court cannot give credence to charges
based on mere suspicion or speculation.
In this case, complainant failed to discharge that burden. As aptly observed by the OCA, complainant has
no personal knowledge of the treasure hunting by respondent as he relied only
on the information relayed to him by the relatives of the accused Candelaria in the robbery case.
Furthermore,
we find that the affidavits of Myrna Dacer, Daisy
Moran, Salvacion Candelaria,
Analiza Candelaria, and
Mary Ann Candelaria relate to the incident
surrounding the arrest of Dante Dacer, one of the
accused in the robbery case. The police
blotter which is not even a certified true copy is an alleged threat made by
respondent against Mary Ann Candelaria. Nowhere in the said documents do we find that
respondent was being tagged as the mastermind of the treasure hunting. Taken all together, these documents have no prima
facie evidentiary value as to warrant further investigation on the matter.
In Mataga v. Rosete,[24]
we held that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always
be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by
their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the
sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial misconduct in
the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced.[25] If a judge should be disciplined for
misconduct, the evidence against him should be competent.[26]
In fine, we
find that respondent is merely guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct
in not recusing himself from conducting preliminary
investigation.
WHEREFORE,
the Court finds Judge Manuel E. Contreras, MTC, Ocampo,
Camarines Sur guilty of violation
of Rule 3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is REPRIMANDED
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
(On Leave)
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
* On Leave.
[1] Rollo, pp.
1-8.
[2]
[3]
[4] Sec. 1, Rule 112, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[5] Section 1. Disqualification of
judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related
to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil
law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties
in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
[6] A.M. No.
MTJ-02-1444,
[7] 320 Phil. 1 (1995).
[8]
[9]
[10] Subsequently amended by SC Resolution dated
[11]
[12] Sesbreño v. Aglugub,
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1581,
[13]
[14] A.M. No.
MTJ-06-1641,
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Balsamo v. Judge Suan, 458 Phil. 11, 23 (2003).
[20]
[21]
[22] A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348,
[23]
[24] A.M. No. MTJ-03-1488,
[25]
[26]