RUFA
C. SUAN, A.C. No. 6377
Complainant,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Callejo,
Sr.,
Chico-Nazario, and
Nachura, JJ.
ATTY. RICARDO D. GONZALEZ,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March
12, 2007
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant administrative complaint filed by Rufa C. Suan
charges respondent Atty. Ricardo D. Gonzalez with violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, perjury and forum shopping, and prays for his
suspension or disbarment. Complainant is
a Director and Vice President of Rural Green Bank of Caraga, Inc., a rural
banking corporation with principal place of business at
The antecedent facts are
as follows:
On February 11, 2004,
respondent filed a case for Mandamus, Computation of Interests, Enforcement
of Inspection, Dividend and Appraisal Rights, Damages and Attorney’s Fees against the Rural Green Bank of Caraga, Inc.
and the members of its Board of Directors before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 33, praying, inter alia, that a temporary restraining
order be issued enjoining the conduct of the annual stockholders’ meeting and
the holding of the election of the Board of Directors.
On
Based on the foregoing,
Suan filed this complaint alleging that respondent engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct when he submitted the certification to
the RTC despite knowing that the same is applicable only for transactions before
the MTCC; and that the bond was defective because it was released by SICI despite
respondent’s failure to put up the required P100,000.00 collateral.
Suan
also claimed that in the complaint filed by respondent, together with Eduardo, Purisima,
Ruben, and Manuel, all surnamed Tan, before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP) against Ismael E. Andaya and the members of the Board of Directors of the
Rural Green Bank of Caraga, Inc. for alleged gross violation of the principles
of good corporate governance, they represented themselves as the bank’s
minority stockholders with a total holdings amounting to more or less P5
million while the controlling stockholders own
approximately 80% of the
authorized capital stock.
Suan averred that respondent
committed perjury because the above
allegations were allegedly inconsistent with respondent’s averments in the
complaint pending before the RTC where he claimed that the majority
stockholders own 70% ( and not 80%) of the outstanding capital
stock of the Rural Green Bank of Caraga, Inc. while the minority stockholders’
stake amounted to P6 million (and not P5 million).
Complainant
finally claimed that respondent is guilty of forum shopping because the causes
of action of the cases he filed before the RTC and the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas are the same.
Respondent
denied the allegations against him. He alleged
that it was the bonding company which inadvertently attached the certification
pertaining to the MTCC; that when he discovered the inadvertence, he immediately
filed with the RTC an ex-parte motion to replace the certification with
the one pertaining to the RTC; that he had satisfactorily complied with the
requirements of SICI as shown in the letter of Ms. Evelyn R. Ramirez, SICI’s
Officer-in-Charge, dated March 19, 2004; that there is no inconsistency in the
allegations contained in the complaints pending before the RTC and the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas thus he could not be held liable for perjury; that
there is no forum shopping because the causes of action and the reliefs prayed
for in the cases pending before the trial court and the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas are different; and that it is complainant who is guilty of forum
shopping since this is the second disbarment suit that she filed against him.
In
her Reply, complainant insisted that she is not guilty of forum shopping; that
she only filed one disbarment suit against respondent while the other two suits
were filed by Joseph Omar Andaya and Dr. Arturo Cruz based on different acts
committed by the respondent.
On
In its Resolution dated
Complainant
is now before us on appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the
assailed Resolution arguing that it failed to state clearly the facts and the
reasons on which it is based and that the evidence she presented were ignored
and not considered.
Complainant
maintains that contrary to the findings of the IBP, respondent’s act of
submitting a wrong certification to the RTC, relative to SICI’s capacity to
issue bonds, was deliberate and with intent to mislead, thereby constituting a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She claims that respondent who is interested
in the issuance of a temporary restraining order is expected to examine all the
documents as well as the attachments, hence there is no reason why he would
“inadvertently” attach the certification intended for the MTCC.
We
are not persuaded.
Complainant’s
insistence that respondent deliberately attached the MTCC certification instead
of the RTC certification lacks merit. We are inclined to believe the findings of
the IBP that the MTCC certification was inadvertently attached and that it was
not deliberate. Indeed, respondent as
well as every litigant is expected to examine all the documents he files in
court. However, not every mistake or
oversight he commits should be deemed dishonest, deceitful or deliberate so as
to mislead the court. Respondent has
nothing to gain by submitting the wrong certification. On the contrary, he runs
the risk that his complaint be dismissed or denied outright.
There is no reason for
respondent, or even the bonding company, to attach the wrong certification as
the latter was equally qualified to issue bonds in civil or criminal cases
pending before the RTC. Further, what militates against complainant’s
insistence that the filing of the wrong certification was deliberate and with
intent to deceive was the fact that after respondent knew of the inadvertence
he immediately filed a manifestation with motion that the same be replaced with
the certification applicable to the RTC.
It is well-settled that
in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and
the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. Considering the
serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary
to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.[1] In the instant case, complainant Suan failed
to show that respondent willfully and deliberately resorted to falsehood and
unlawful and dishonest conduct. She failed
to show not only the dubious character of the act done but the motivation as
well.[2]
Complainant
next claims that the injunction bond was wrongfully released to respondent by
SICI as the latter failed to put up the required collateral, as shown in the
The argument is without
merit.
The IBP correctly
disregarded the
Anent the allegation of
perjury, the same is likewise bereft of merit.
In the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice,[3] the
Court held that a mere assertion of a false, objective fact, a falsehood, is
not enough to warrant a finding of perjury, thus:
There
are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by the defendants must
be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe
those statements to be true.
x
x x x
A
conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn
statements of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the
two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by other
evidence than the contradicting statement.[4]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus,
it is necessary that there must be contradictory statements for perjury to exist. In the instant case, we find that respondent
made no contradicting statements. Indeed, he alleged in the complaint before
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that the minority stockholders
own more or less P5 million while the controlling stockholders own approximately
80% of the authorized capital stock. These figures are mere estimates and in no
way contradict respondent’s allegations in the complaint pending before the RTC
that the minority’s stake is P6 million while the
majority’s stockholdings is 70% of the outstanding capital stock.
Besides, for perjury to
prosper it is necessary that complainant prove the falsity of the statements
and that respondent did not believe any of the statements to be true. We find that complainant failed to meet the
required standard of proof to sustain the charge of perjury. The IBP correctly noted that no malice was
shown when respondent made the foregoing allegations and that respondent’s
failure to allege the exact shareholdings was due to the bank’s refusal to allow
respondent to inspect the books.
We agree with the
findings of the IBP that there is no forum shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing
of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment.[5] There is forum shopping when, between an
action pending before this Court and another one, there exist: a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions, b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts, and c) the identity of the two preceding particulars
is such that any judgment rendered in
the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration; and said requisites also
constitutive of lis pendens.[6]
The filing of the
intra-corporate case before the RTC does not amount to forum-shopping. It is a formal demand of respondent’s legal
rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the
law with respect to the controversy involved.[7] The relief sought in the case is primarily to
compel the bank to disclose its stockholdings, to allow them the inspection of
corporate books and records, and the payment of damages. It was also prayed that a TRO be issued to
enjoin the holding of the annual stockholder’s meeting and the election of the
members of the Board, which, only courts of justice can issue.
On the other hand, the
complaint filed with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas was an invocation
of the BSP’s supervisory powers over banking operations which does not amount
to a judicial proceeding. It brought to
the attention of the BSP the alleged questionable actions of the bank’s Board
of Directors in violation of the principles of good corporate governance. It prayed for the conduct of an investigation
over the alleged unsafe and unsound business practices of the bank and to make
necessary corrective measures to prevent the collapse of the bank.
As such, the two
proceedings are of different nature praying for different relief. Likewise, a ruling by the BSP concerning the
soundness of the bank operations will not adversely or directly affect the
resolution of the intra-corporate controversies pending before the trial court.
Furthermore, to merit
disciplinary action, forum shopping must be willful and deliberate.[8] Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
requires that, should there be any pending action or claim before any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency, a complete statement of its status should be given.
The Certification of Non-Forum-shopping attached by respondent substantially
complied with this requirement by providing therein that he has also filed a
Complaint before the BSP. Likewise, such
disclosure negates the allegation that he willfully and deliberately committed
forum-shopping.
It bears stressing that disbarment proceedings are matters
of public interest, undertaken for public welfare and for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of the persons
unfit to practice them.[9] However, the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution and only in a clear case of misconduct which
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and member of the bar.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, we AFFIRM
the Resolution
dated December 17, 1005, of the Integrated Bar of the
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
[1] Concepion v.
Fandiño, Jr., 389 Phil.
474, 481 (2000).
[2] Rudecon Management
Corporation v. Camacho, Adm.
Case No. 6403, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 202, 208.
[3] G.R. No. 162187,
November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 495.
[4]
[5] Tiboli
Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. v. Solilapsi, 442 Phil. 499, 507 (2002).
[6] Prubankers
Association v. Prudential Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 131247, January 25, 1999, 302 SCRA 74, 83-84.
[7] Supena v. De La Rosa, 334 Phil. 671, 677
(1997).
[8] SECTION 5. Certification against
forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or
in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and,
to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements
shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or
non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
[9] Urban Bank, Inc. v. Peña, 417
Phil. 70, 77 (2001).
[10] Resurreccion v. Sayson, 360
Phil. 313, 321 (1998).