PEOPLE OF
THE
Appellee,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Callejo,
Sr.,
Chico-Nazario, and
Nachura, JJ.
RAYMUNDO
DADULLA
@ “MUNDO”, Promulgated:
Appellant.
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us for review is the September
15, 2006 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00204 affirming with modification the
Decision[2]
dated May 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Guiuan, Eastern Samar, Branch
3, in Criminal Case No. 1524, finding appellant Raymundo Dadulla guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple rape.
On
That on or about the 22nd day of May, 1995, at about 12:00 o’clock high noon more or less at the house of the accused at x x x and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by means of trick was able to convince AAA to enter a room in his house, and while AAA was inside the room alone, and was the only person in the house of the accused and by means of force and intimidation AAA become unconscious did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously did lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge with said AAA without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law.[3]
When
arraigned, appellant pleaded “not guilty.”
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The
facts as summarized by the Solicitor General are as follows:
At
Appellant,
a brother-in-law of the victim, then entered the house and asked the private
complainant’s help to treat his (appellant) sick common-law-wife (BBB) at their
home at Barangay 10. The private
complainant, a pharmacist by training, grabbed a blood pressure monitoring
instrument and followed appellant to the latter’s home. Upon entering their house, the private
complainant inquired where BBB was; appellant directed her to a room where his
common-law-wife was purportedly in bed.
As she entered the room, appellant followed her, locked the door behind
him and blocked said entrance.
Finding that BBB was not around, the
private complainant told appellant to open the door as she was going out; but
appellant did not do so. The private
complainant became afraid, especially when she saw a bolo hanging at a corner
of the room’s wall. The victim began
feeling chest pains, laid down on the bed on appellant’s instruction and then
sat down on the floor of her own volition.
She then asked for water; but appellant did not give her any. The accused told her something bad would
happen to her; that he would kill her.
They then discussed appellant’s family problems which prompted him to
plan and to sexually abuse private complainant.
The private complainant then fainted.
When the private complainant regained
consciousness, she was lying on the floor, her shorts and panty gone, and
appellant, naked from the waist down, on top of her and copulating with
her. After he had finished, appellant
stood up and put on his brief and shorts.
The private complainant likewise stood up, put on her panty and shorts,
left the appellant’s house and went home.
That same afternoon, the private
complainant, accompanied by her sister, went to see [their Barangay Chairman]
and reported the incident perpetrated by appellant. Since the private complainant was trembling, could
not yet speak well and felt bad, [the Barangay] Chairman CCC scheduled a
confrontation between the parties the following day.
During the confrontation, appellant
admitted raping the private complainant (“I raped her and that is true; that I
raped her”) and complied with Chairman CCC’s directive to execute a handwritten
note to that effect. Appellant also
admitted having written another note in the possession of the private
complainant, wherein he asked forgiveness for the wrong he had done and
requested the private complainant to desist from filing a complaint against
him.
After
the confrontation, Chairman CCC accompanied the private complainant to
The
private complainant also reported the incident to the police authorities,
executing a sworn statement for the purpose. She had also executed a complaint or denuncia
dated
When
the information for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, appellant
was ordered arrested and was placed under detention on
The defense presented the appellant
as its lone witness. He denied having
raped AAA on
Appellant alleged that AAA was mad at
him for trying to end their affair hence she fabricated the charges against him.
He testified that in the morning of
Appellant acknowledged that he signed
a document during the confrontation at the barangay hall on
On
WHEREFORE,
this Court hereby SENTENCES accused Raymundo Dadulla, alias Mundo to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is likewise ordered to pay
the complainant, AAA the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00)
Pesos as moral damages and the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos as exemplary damages. The accused is likewise ordered to pay the costs of
the suit.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.[8]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty of rape but
reduced the amount of moral damages from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.[9]
Hence, this appeal where appellant
raises the following issues:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT [AAA] MORE CREDIBLE THAN
THAT OF THE ACCUSED RAYMUNDO DADULLA.
II. LIKEWISE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
At the outset, we note that appellant
assails the credibility of AAA’s testimony; that it is allegedly full of
inconsistencies and highly incredible. He
cites as example AAA’s testimony that she was initially hesitant to go to
appellant’s house because of his previous criminal record of having killed
somebody in
We are not persuaded.
The assessment of the credibility of
the witness’ testimony lies with the trial court, for it is in a better
position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence having the full opportunity
to directly observe the witness’ deportment and manner of testifying. Well settled is the rule that unless the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts of substance and
value which, if considered, might affect the outcome of the case, its findings
carry great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal.[10]
The
trial judge’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness is generally accorded
not only the highest degree of respect, but also finality, unless some
circumstances of weight and substance, which could change the result of the
case, have been ignored or misunderstood. As the trial judge had the opportunity to
observe the witness on the stand, he/she was in a vantage position to assess the
witness’ demeanor and determine whether or not he/she was telling the truth.[11]
In the
instant case, we find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court
that:
The
issue in this case being only credibility and as the testimony of the offended
party is more credible than that of the accused, this Court arrived at a
considered opinion that the prosecution indeed successfully proved that the
complainant had been sexually attacked by the accused, resulting in the
consummation of the sexual act by the accused on the complainant. The guilt of the accused for the commission
of Rape as charged in this case had been therefore proved beyond reasonable
doubt.[12]
Moreover, the findings of the trial
court on AAA’s credibility was affirmed by the appellate court, to wit:
We
are not persuaded by this contention of the accused-appellant. Although private complainant admitted she was
hesitant to go to appellant’s house due to the latter’s criminally violent
reputation, this circumstance is still consistent with her act of immediately
entering appellant’s house because she had intended to help what she thought
was the sick common- law-wife of the appellant who was in need of immediate
medical attention and treatment, as misrepresented by appellant.
Although
private complainant did not persist in pushing appellant away after he had
blocked her way inside [the] house, and she did not shout for help out of fear,
such conduct remains natural even if
appellant had no deadly weapon on his person at the time.
Private
complainant’s behavior must be viewed in the light of her perception and
judgment at the time of the rape and not by any hard and fast rule. She had already been trapped in the room by
her brother-in-law, whom she knew had once killed a man in
The
workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and
people react differently. Some may
shout, others, as in this case, may faint and be shocked into
insensibility. But such conduct does not
impair the credibility of a rape victim.
More
importantly, the victim’s subsequent act of promptly disclosing and complaining
about the incident to the authorities and taking immediate steps to subject
herself to medical examination as the availability of medical personnel
permitted, done at a time when her seaman husband was abroad and was in no
position to immediately discover the sexual assault perpetrated by his brother
upon his wife, represent conduct consistent with her straightforward, logical
and probable testimony that she was in fact raped by appellant on May 22,
1995. They represent strong and
compelling factors that enhance complainant’s credibility as a witness.[13]
AAA’s failure to shout
for help does not negate the commission of rape. Although there was a basketball court located outside
of the appellant’s house, AAA testified that she did not notice if there were
people at the basketball court at the time of rape.[14]
She also said that the nearest
neighboring house was 25 meters away[15]
and the sight of a bolo hanging on the wall and the continuing intimidation by
appellant sufficiently cowed her into submission. Indeed, the failure to shout or offer
tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission to the
criminal act of the offender.[16] Physical resistance need not be proved in
rape when intimidation, as in this case, is exercised upon the victim and she
submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s advances because of fear for
her life and personal safety. It
suffices that the intimidation produces fear in the mind of the victim that if
she did not submit to the bestial demands of the accused, something worse would
befall her at the time she was being molested.[17]
Different people react
differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience. One person’s
spontaneous thinking, or even instinctive, response to a horrid and
repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while another person's reaction may be
cold indifference.[18]
AAA’s failure to seek help from people in the nearby basketball court, assuming
there were indeed any, or from appellant’s neighbors does not make the sexual
congress voluntary or make AAA any less a rape victim. Resistance is not an element of rape as it
could be committed through force and intimidation. Lack of physical resistance can not be
considered consent.
Appellant’s contention that the
Medico Legal Report belies the commission of rape as it contains no findings of
physical injuries allegedly sustained by AAA lacks merit. The gravamen of the offense of rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman against her will or without her consent. All that is necessary is that force and
intimidation were employed by the appellant against her which enabled him to
commit the crime. It is not necessary
for the victim to sustain physical injuries.[19] Moreover, a medical examination or certificate
has never been considered an indispensable element in the prosecution of rape cases[20] being merely corroborative in nature.[21] We have ruled in People
v. San Juan[22]
that in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the victim is
not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime, as
her testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused thereof.
The
“sweetheart defense” is also unavailing.
It is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and
consequently places on the accused the burden of proving the alleged
relationship by substantial evidence. Appellant’s sweetheart defense must be rejected
for lack of corroboration, by some documentary and/or other evidence like
mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like.[23]
In the instant case, other than his
self-serving statement, appellant presented nothing to prove that such romantic
relationship existed.
We are likewise not persuaded by appellant’s attempt to discredit the
credibility of AAA regarding the date when the rape incident occurred. He ascribes error on AAA’s testimony that she
was raped on May 22, 1995 which he
claims was contradicted by Chairman CCC’s declaration that she reported the
incident on May 21, 1995. This is only a minor inconsistency which does
not belie the commission of rape by appellant. The exact date of the commission of the
offense of rape is not an element of the crime[24] for
the gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her will.
More
importantly, appellant admitted in writing before the Barangay Chairman that he
raped AAA. He also wrote a letter to AAA
asking for her forgiveness and praying that she desist from filing a
complaint. The following is the English
translation of the letter:
“To AAA,
AAA, I
admit that I have committed a wrong against your person, I deliberate regret
for what I have done against you, so its all up to you, because if you submit
to the municipal office, I would directly be incarcerated and I greatly pity my
mother, because if I will be imprisoned and be transfered to the Guiuan Jail,
so AAA try to decide yourself not file a complaint at the Municipal office.
AAA, I cried so hard while I am writing this letter of apology.
Your younger brother
pleading for mercy,
(Sgd.) Raymundo Dadulla”[25]
As regards the amount of damages,
this Court has consistently held that civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of rape. We note that both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals failed to award civil indemnity. Hence, appellant should be made to pay P50,000.00
in civil indemnity. On the other hand, moral
damages is awarded upon such finding of rape without need of further proof
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling the victim to such award.[26] Hence, the appellate court correctly awarded P50,000.00
as moral damages to the victim consistent with existing jurisprudence on the
matter.[27]
However, with respect to the award of
exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that it may be
imposed as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. Considering
that no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the
award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is without basis
and should be deleted.[28]
WHEREFORE, the
Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00204 finding appellant Raymundo Dadulla guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim, AAA P50,000.00
as moral damages is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity. The award of
exemplary damages of P50,000.00 is DELETED
for lack of basis. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-8. Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon
and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Priscilla
Baltazar-Padilla.
[2]
Records, pp. 116-125. Penned by Judge
Ricardo B. Lapesura.
[3]
[4] CA
rollo, pp. 92-96.
[5]
TSN,
[6]
[7]
[8]
Records, p. 125.
[9] Rollo, p. 7.
[10] People v. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236,
[11] People v. Valla, 380 Phil. 31, 40 (2000).
[12]
Records, p. 124.
[13] Rollo, pp. 5-6.
[14]
TSN,
[15]
[16] People v. Glodo, G.R. No. 136085,
[17]
[18] People v. Roncal, 338 Phil. 749, 755 (1997).
[19] People v. Torres, G.R. No. 134766,
[20] People v. Agustin, G.R. Nos. 135524-25,
[22]
G.R. No. 105556,
[23] People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 157269,
[24] Ordinario v. People, G.R. No. 155415,
[25]
Exhibit “H,” records, p. 430.
[26] People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566,
[27]
[28]