SECOND DIVISION
THE PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
ARTEMIO
CASELA and FELIBERT VELASCO, JR.,
JJ.
INSIGNE,
Accused,
ARTEMIO
CASELA, Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant.
March
23, 2007
x
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
Appellant
Artemio Casela (Casela) assails the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
In
an Information[4] dated
That on or about the 3rd day of January, [sic] 2003, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one RONALDO RAŅIN with the use of a bladed weapon, which the accused have provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following wounds, to wit:
1. Stabbed (sic) wound 5 cm x 2 cm x 13 cm (R) anterior chest at level of manubrium sterni with sternal fracture.
2. Stabbed (sic) wound 3.5 cm x 1.4 cm x 15 cm (R) anterior chest at level of 4th ICS along sternal line.
3. Stabbed (sic) wound 2.2 cm x 1 cm x 13 cm (R) anterior chest along anterior axillary line at level of 9th ICS.
4. Stabbed (sic) wound 10 cm x 2.5 cm x 6 cm (L) arm middle 3rd, lateral aspect.
which wounds caused the death of said Ronaldo Raņin.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[6]
On
The
prosecution espoused the following version of the incident, as established by
the testimony of Makabenta:
At
around 10:00 oclock in the evening of 2 January 2003, Makabenta, the victim Raņin
and three (3) other friends started their drinking spree in Barangay Sawang,
Carigara, Leyte. Later, at around
Dr.
Profetana, who conducted the post-mortem examination of the victim, testified
that she found four (4) stab wounds on the victim. The first wound, directed
backwards, was fatal as it likely hit the heart. The second one was likewise
fatal, hitting vital organs such as the lungs and heart. The third stab wound
was also fatal, hitting the liver. The fourth wound, which only lacerated the victims
arm, was not fatal. She identified the cause of death to be hypovolemic shock
secondary to blood loss. Thus, the victim died due to the decrease in the
volume of blood secondary to bleeding caused by the multiple wounds he
sustained on the anterior chest. In light of the extent of the injuries
suffered and the vital organs damaged, Dr. Profetana opined that the victim
could not have survived the attack.[12]
In
his defense, appellant avers that he had no participation in the attack on Raņin
which resulted in the latters death. He testified that at about
Appellant
also presented SPO4 Teofilo Lucelo (SPO4 Lucelo) to refute the assertions of
Makabenta that he had reported the incident to the police and, consequently, to
cast doubt on his claim that he had personally witnessed the events that led to
the death of Raņin. SPO4 Lucelo testified that from
Finding
that the prosecution had proven the guilt of appellant for the crime of murder beyond
reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against appellant on P75,500.00; (2) P18,500.00
as actual damages; (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) cost.[19]
With
the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on
automatic review. However, pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v.
Mateo,[20] the
case was transferred to the Court of Appeals.[21]
On
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Having discounted the appreciation of conspiracy and nighttime as generic aggravating circumstances, the crime in the case at bench was not aggravated, and there being no mitigating circumstance, in accordance with Article 61, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed. Thus, for the murder of Ronaldo Raņin, we reduce the penalty of accused-appellant Artemio Casela from death to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING with MODIFICATION the Decision dated February 10, 2004 of
the RTC of Carigara,
SO
ORDERED.[22]
On
I
THE COURT A-QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTIONS ALLEGED EYEWITNESS.
II
THE COURT A-QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE COURT A-QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER INSTEAD OF
HOMICIDE.[25]
Simply
put, the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the guilt of
appellant for the crime as charged has been established beyond reasonable
doubt. The determination of the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to sustain
a conviction hinges primarily on the credibility of its sole eyewitness.
Appellant
argues that it was error for the trial court to have relied mainly on
Makabentas testimony that he positively identified appellant as the victims
assailant considering that the latters claim that he personally reported the
stabbing incident to the police authorities was categorically disputed by SPO4
Lucelo. He further avers that a certain Maimai Aguillon (Aguillon) was the
actual eyewitness to the incident but that the prosecution failed to present
her during the trial, thus leaving the testimony of Makabenta doubtful.[26]
After carefully sifting the evidence
on record, we find no reason to depart from the findings of the RTC on the
credibility of Makabenta. As a general rule, the trial court is in the best
position to determine facts and to assess the credibility of witnesses as it is
in a unique position to observe the witnesses deportment while testifying, an
opportunity denied the appellate court.[27]
Hence, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled
to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless: (1) it is found
to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded; (2) some substantial fact or circumstance
that could materially affect the disposition of the case was overlooked,
misunderstood, or misinterpreted; or (3) the trial judge gravely abused his or
her discretion.[28]
That Makabenta was the sole
eyewitness to the killing of Raņin presented against appellant is not, by
itself, determinative. Criminals are convicted not on the number of witnesses
against them but on the quality of the testimony given under oath. Even one witness will suffice provided he or she succeeds
in convincing the court of the
guilt of the accused with moral
certainty.[29] The testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to sustain a conviction, even of a charge of murder, if it is
positive and credible.[30]
Moreover, the prosecution is under no
duty to present a definite number of witnesses. The discretion to decide whom
it wants to call to the witness stand lies with the prosecution. It is
axiomatic that witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of a
single witness may suffice for conviction if otherwise trustworthy and reliable
for there is no law which requires that the testimony of a single witness needs
corroboration except where the law expressly mandates otherwise.[31] Accordingly,
the prosecutions decision to forego the presentation of Aguillon as
corroborating witness is a matter of discretion and does not by itself militate
against the credibility of Makabenta. Curiously, if the defense found
Aguillons testimony to be of such consequence, it is a wonder why it did not
so present her to bolster appellants assertions.
Ultimately, the presentation of
Makabenta at the trial as the sole eyewitness to the whole event should not by
itself erode his credibility. It is worthy to note that Makabenta testified
with candor and consistency in recounting the material events of the crime. A
witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner and remains consistent is a credible witness.[32] What
is more, where conditions of visibility are favorable and the eyewitness
assertion as to the identity of the assailant is not tainted with bias, said
assertion as to the identity of the malefactor can very well be accepted.[33] There
is no evidence to show any dubious or improper circumstances or motive why Makabenta
would prevaricate against appellant and his co-accused or falsely implicate them
in a heinous crime as he was friends not only with the victim, but with
appellant and Insigne as well.[34] Hence,
appellants bare denial cannot overcome his positive identification by the
prosecution witness.[35]
On record, Makabenta declared under oath and in
unequivocal terms that he saw, from a distance of approximately three to six
meters, in a well-lit place how appellant and his co-accused had attacked the
victim. He was unambiguous and positive in naming appellant and his co-accused
as the perpetrators of the killing, and in narrating the specifics of the criminal
incident, viz:
x x x x
Atty. Canamaque:
Q Do you know the accused Artemio Casela, Jr.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A Because he is my barkada.
Q How long have you been a barkada with (sic) Artemio Casela, Jr.?
A Long time.
x x x x
Q How about Felibert Insigne, do you know him personally?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A He is also my barkada.
Q How long have you been a barkada of Felibert Insigne?
A Long time, sir.[36]
x x x x
Q And did you know where Onie go (sic) to
buy cigarette(s)?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At the Videokes place.
Q Did Onie Raņin return back to the place
where you were drinking?
A No, sir.
Q So, what did you do?
A So, I went there at (sic) the place where there is a Videoke and I used my bike in going there and I saw Onie who was about to ride his bike too.
Q Where is this Videoke located?
A Naglor Videoke.
Q Where is that?
A At Brgy. Baybay, Carigara,
Q Where particularly in Baybay, Carigara,
A Within the premises of the public market.
Q Were you able to reach that place?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell this Honorable Court whether that place is well lighted since it is a market?
A Yes, sir there (sic) was.
Q Now, you said Onie Raņin was about to ride on his bike, what happened?
A He was successively stabbed by Felibert.
Q Was Onie Raņin hit by the stabbing blow of Felibert Insigne?
A Yes, sir.
Q After Felibert Insigne stabbed [sic], what happened next?
A He was again stabbed.
Q By whom?
A That person. [(]Witness pointing to a person in the courtroom who when asked of his name identified himself as Artemio Casela, Jr.[)]
Q After Artemio Casela, Jr.[,] the accused herein [,] followed the stab (sic) of Felibert Insigne, what happened?
A Onie ran.
Q Towards what?
A To the place of his mother.
Q Now, when he was running, what happened?
A He was chased by them.
Q Was he overtaken by the two accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the two accuse overtook Onie Raņin, what happened?
A He was stabbed again.
Q Was Onie Raņin hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q And particularly Felibert Insigne was able to hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about Artemio Casela, Jr. was he able to hit also Onie Raņin?
A Yes, sir.
Q After hitting by the two stabbing blow (sic) by these two accused, what happened to Onie?
A He fell to the ground.
x
x x x[37]
Appellant contends that Makabentas
testimony is rendered dubious by the testimony of his witness SPO4 Lucelo.
There is nothing contradictory between the eyewitness account of Makabenta and
the testimony of SPO4 Lucelo. Makabenta makes no declaration that he reported
the incident to Lucelo himself. In fact, in SPO4 Lucelos own testimony, he
admits that there were other police officers then on-duty, including his
assistant investigator. In the end, SPO4Lucelos
claim that he did not see Makabenta reporting the incident does not detract
from the positive assertions made by the prosecution witness on the matter of
the killing of the victim.
After weighing the clashing versions
of the prosecution and the defense, we agree with the trial courts conclusion that
the prosecutions version is more credible.[38]
However, was the offense committed murder or only homicide?
The trial court and the appellate
court, in convicting appellant of murder, ruled that the killing was qualified
by treachery. There is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially
insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.[39] To establish treachery, two elements must
concur: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular
means of attack employed.[40] The
RTC made the following observations on the matter
With
the number, location and nature of the wounds sustained by the victim Ronaldo
Raņin, there is apparent treachery in the execution of the dastardly acts by
the perpetrators. The victim was unarmed and totally defenseless, without any
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate against the accused, could be
gleaned from the fact that accused Artemio Casela, Jr. and Felibert Insigne did
not suffer even a single scratch on their body after the stabbing incident.[41]
In concurring with the RTC that the
killing was qualified by treachery, the appellate court made this
pronouncement, thus
x x x Gleaned from
the testimony of Makabenta, the deceased was unarmed and about to ride his
bicycle when he was suddenly and successively stabbed by Insigne and then the
accused-appellant also joined in the stabbing of the deceased. The deceased
tried to run but he was chased and was successfully overtaken by the two
assailants. Insigne and the accused-appellant successfully stabbed the deceased
until the latter fell to the ground.
Under the foregoing circumstances,
the deceased was clearly not in any position to defend himself from the sudden
and unexpected attack of the accused-appellant and Insigne. These circumstances
are manifestly indicative of the presence of the conditions under which
treachery may be appreciated, i.e.,
the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that said means of execution
was deliberately or consciously adopted.[42]
We find the rulings of the RTC and CA
amply supported by the evidence on record. Treachery attended the stabbing of Raņin
because he was unarmed and the attack on him was swift and sudden. He had no means and there was no time for him
to defend himself. The prosecution was able to establish that appellants
attack on the victim was without any slightest provocation on the latters part
and that it was sudden and unexpected.
This is a clear case of treachery. There being treachery, appellants
conviction for murder is in order.
The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any
real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to
the aggressor. In this case, treachery
was already present when appellant and Insigne, armed each with a bolo,
approached the victim and suddenly stabbed him. Raņin did not have the faintest
idea that he was vulnerable to an attack, considering that he was boarding his
bicycle, oblivious of the sinister intent of appellant and Insigne. The fact
that the victim was facing his malefactors at the time of the latters attack
did not erase its treacherous nature. Even if the assault were frontal, there
was treachery if it was so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no time to
prepare for his defense.[43]
Even more, the fact that appellant and Insigne chased the victim to inflict
more stabbing blows after the latter had already been gravely wounded clearly exhibits
the treacherous nature of the killing of the victim.
The attendance of treachery in the
slaughter of Raņin can be plainly deduced from the following excerpts of
Makabentas testimony
x x x x
Q Now, you said Onie Raņin was about to ride on his bike, what happened?
A He was successively stabbed by Felibert.
Q Was Onie Raņin hit by the stabbing blow of Felibert Insigne?
A Yes, sir.
Q After Felibert Insigne stabbed, what happened next?
A He was again stabbed.
Q By whom?
A That person. [(]Witness pointing to a person in the courtroom who when asked of his name identified himself as Artemio Casela, Jr.[)]
Q After Artemio Casela, Jr. the accused herein followed the stab (sic) of Felibert Insigne, what happened?
A Onie ran.
Q Towards what?
A To the place of his mother.
Q Now, when he was running, what happened?
A He was chased by them.
Q Was he overtaken by the two accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the two accused overtook Onie Raņin, what happened?
A He was stabbed again.
Q Was Onie Raņin hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q And particularly Felibert Insigne was able to hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about Artemio Casela, Jr.[?] was he able to hit also Onie Raņin?
A Yes, sir.
Q After hitting by the two stabbing blow (sic) by these two accused, what happened to Onie?
A He fell to the ground.
x
x x x[44]
In light of the foregoing, the Court holds
that the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the Court of Appeals
should be sustained. With respect to the civil liability of appellant, the
award should be modified in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Therefore,
appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Ronaldo Raņin in the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P18,500.00 as actual damages for funeral expenses, P50,000.00
as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.[45]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 00248, finding appellant ARTEMIO CASELA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
As modified, appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Ronaldo Raņin
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P18,500.00 as
actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Rollo,
pp. 4-14. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by
Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
[27]People v.
Hormina, G.R. No. 144383, January 16, 2004, 420 SCRA 102; People v. Rafael, 432 Phil. 515, 529
(2002); Hugo v. Court of Appeals, 437
Phil. 260, 268 (2002) citing People v.
Araneta, 335 SCRA 1, 8 (2000) and People
v. Francisco, et al., 332 SCRA
305, 331 (2000). See also People v.
Ponsaran, 426 Phil. 836 (2002); People
v. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 (1997); People
v. Virtucio, Jr., 326 SCRA 198 (2000); People
v. Hermosa et al., G.R. No. 131805,
[29]Hugo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 25
at 272 citing People v Abubu, 322
SCRA 407, 413 (2000), citing People v.
Sanchez, 313 SCRA 254, 268 (1999).
[30]Hugo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 25
citing People v. Salcedo, 273 SCRA
473, 495 (1997) and People v. Asoy,
251 SCRA 682, 687-688 (1995).
[33]People v. Hormina, supra note 25 at 849;
citing People v. Bragat, G.R. No.
134490, 4 September 2001, 364 SCRA 425, 430.
[35]See People v.
Ubaldo, 396 Phil. 509, 521 (2000) citing People v. Sotto, 275 SCRA 191, 202-203 (1997).
[38]People v. Hormina, supra note 25 at 111,
citing People v. Enfectana, G.R. No.
132028, 19 April 2002, 381 SCRA 359, 368.
[39]People v. Hormina, supra, citing People v. Coca, Jr., G.R. No. 133739,
[40]People v.
Jarlos, 445 Phil. 801, 809 (2003), citing People v. Rabanal, G.R. No. 146687,