FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - ENRIQUE LOPEZ and BIENVENIDA MISERICORDIA,
Defendants-Appellants. |
|
G.R. No.
172369 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: March 7, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
On appeal to this Court is the
October 12, 2005 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00411
affirming an earlier decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 98, which found herein appellants
Enrique Lopez y Diodor (Lopez) and Bienvenida Misericordia y Reytas @ “Nida” (Misericordia)
guilty of violating Section 4, Article II in relation to Section 2(e)1, F and
I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended by Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 179,
otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
On
That on or about the 8th day of July,
1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized
by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug,
did then and there willfully and feloniously sell or offer for sale 51.98 grams
of marijuana hashish, a prohibited drug to poseur-buyer SPOIII VENUSTO T.
JAMISOLAMIN, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, both
accused entered a plea of “Not Guilty” to the crime charged.
However, on the day
the trial was originally scheduled to commence, both accused,
through counsel, manifested their willingness to plead
guilty. Accordingly, counsel moved for a suspension of the
trial in order to file the necessary pleading and to obtain the prosecution's
conformity to the intended plea of guilty. The trial court granted the motion.
Later, the two accused, again through counsel,
filed a motion for a re-examination of the
allegedly confiscated item to determine the qualitative and quantitative contents thereof of
marijuana hashish in the hope of availing of the right to bail. Counsel,
however, failed to attend several subsequent hearings impelling the trial court
to appoint a new counsel in behalf of both accused. The new
counsel reiterated the earlier motion for a re-examination of
the confiscated item expressing intention towards plea bargaining should the results of the re-examination justify the filing of a
new and
less serious charge. Though granted, the desired re-examination yielded
the same result.
In time, trial
ensued. Two conflicting versions of events emerged from the varying testimonies
of the prosecution and defense witnesses.
To substantiate its charge, the
prosecution presented police narcotics operatives SPO2 William Manglo, a member of
the buy-bust team, and SPO4 Venusto Jamisolamin, the alleged poseur-buyer.
The testimony of the forensic chemist was dispensed with after
stipulations were made as to what she would have testified on.
As narrated by SPOs Manglo and
Jamisolamin, the prosecution’s version of the incident is as follows:
At
On
SPO4
Jamisolamin and it was agreed that a bigger volume of marijuana would be made
available the next night.
At P10,000.00 boodle money and a Voyager alarm signal. When SPO4
Jamisolamin flashed the money, Lopez ordered Misericordia to get the drugs and the
latter promptly handed over to SPO4 Jamisolamin a
rectangular object wrapped in aluminum foil. While examining the
object, SPO4 Jamisolamin pressed the Voyager alarm
and returned to where his companions were stationed. The team then apprehended the
two accused and brought them to the police station while the seized evidence was
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for technical analysis. The standard
tests were conducted, the
result of which proved that the
seized evidence was positive for
marijuana resin (or hashish), a prohibited drug.
The defense has an
entirely different account of what supposedly transpired on the evening of
Through the testimonies of the two
accused who both categorically denied having sold marijuana hashish
on the evening in question, the defense belabored to establish that at about
In a decision[4] dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this
Court finds both accused Enrique Lopez y Diodor and Bienvenida Misericordia y
Reytas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II in
relation to Section 2(e) 1, F and I of R.A. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 179 in selling 51.98 grams of marijuana resin and are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance present. The prohibited drug seized from
the accused is hereby forfeited in favor of the government, to be disposed in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom,
both accused went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 00411. As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in its decision[5] of
WHEREFORE,
the appeal is DENIED and the appealed
Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, appellants’ present
recourse raising the sole issue of whether or not the two courts below gravely
erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 4, Article II in relation to Section 2(e)1, F and I
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by BP Blg. 179.
We DENY.
Appellants' main arguments rest on their two submissions, namely:
1)
Lack of credibility of the testimonies of prosecution's
witnesses; and
2)
Failure of the prosecution to present the police confidential
informant.
It is appellants’ posture that the immediate sale to
SPO4 Jamisolamin of an enormous amount of marijuana hashish on the evening of July 8, 1997, even as they
met Jamisolamin only that evening, is not in
conformity with knowledge, nor consistent with the experience of mankind, hence
incredible and unworthy of belief.[6] On this
score, they invoke the ruling in People v. Pagaura,[7]where the Court
stated inter alia:
The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses not only appear to be improbable but also incredible. We find it
rather foolish that one who peddles illegal drugs would boldly and unashamedly
present his wares to total strangers, lest he be caught in flagrante when, as has
been demonstrated in similar cases, such nefarious deals are carried on with
utmost secrecy or whispers to avoid detection.
Pagaura, however,
stems from an entirely different factual milieu. There, the accused approached
the police-witnesses who were then in civilian clothes requesting the
latter’s assistance in securing a boat ticket at the wharf. Pagaura
allegedly insisted on their help since he was afraid of the inspection due to
his black bag containing a kilo of marijuana. To convince the men, Pagaura
allegedly opened his bag right then and there to show them the marijuana.
It is not difficult to understand
why the Court in Pagaura dismissed such a tall tale of the
prosecution. For it is indeed hard to
believe that a person carrying
a known prohibited substance would
approach complete strangers to display his wares on the pretext that he was
eliciting help from those absolute strangers.
In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses do not suffer from the same inherent incredibility, as in Pagaura. SPO4 Jamisolamin was accompanied by the informant who was familiar with
the appellants. Furthermore, the night prior to the actual buy-bust operation, the informant
and Jamisolamin had met with the appellants, successfully concluded a test-buy and
agreed to meet again the following night for the sale
of a larger quantity. A case more in point would be People v.
Chua:[8]
xxx In a string of
cases we have held that it is not uncommon for drug dealers to sell their
commodities to total strangers heedless of time or place. Besides, the law does
not prescribe as an element of the crime that the vendor and vendee be familiar
with each other. What matters in a drug related case is not the existing
familiarity between the seller and the buyer, but their agreement and the acts
constituting the same and delivery of the prohibited drugs. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx [D]rug pushers
do not confine their trade to known customers; complete strangers are
accommodated provided they have the money to pay. Moreover, why a dealer would
trust a buyer, which is to say the motive behind a drug deal, is not an
essential element of drug-related offense.
It is appellants' next submission that the
prosecution should have presented the confidential
informant as a witness, failing in which a hiatus exists in the
prosecution’s evidence. To back up their submission, appellants cite People v.
Bagano[9] and People
v. Rojo.[10] Sadly, however, the cases relied upon do not again factually
sit squarely with the case at hand.
In general, the presentation of an
informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it
indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be
merely corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal
drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the sale
itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the
contraband, the non-presentation of the informer would not necessarily create a
hiatus in the prosecution's evidence.[11]
For sure, unlike the
instant case, Bagano and Rojo arose from a
set of circumstances which provide exceptions to the foregoing general
rule. In the two cases invoked by appellants, the
testimony of the informant would not be merely corroborative and cumulative,
but was direct and material to the defense of the accused. Hence, it was
absolutely necessary that the accused in those cases were offered the chance
to cross-examine the informants. In both Bagano and Rojo, the
testimony of the witnesses presented by the prosecution in lieu of the
informants suffered from the defect of being merely hearsay as only the
confidential informant was in a position to testify from personal knowledge as
to the actual sale.
In Bagano, the testimonies of the
prosecution's principal witness were mere translations and/or interpretations
of what the accused supposedly said in the dialect to and interpreted by the
informant. As such, the informant’s testimony was pure
hearsay. Not only that. In Bagano, the
informant's testimony was particularly crucial due to the accused's claim in that
case that the prohibited drug belonged to the informant himself. The
Court went on to say in Bagano:
Emateo's non-production as a witness could
have been excused had he merely played the part of a true informer. An informer
is one who communicates knowledge of someone having committed or about to
commit a crime to the proper authorities who by themselves, acting
independently, may obtain evidence necessary for the prosecution of the
offender. On the contrary, he did more than
that. He played a substantial
part
in the act complained of and is in fact claimed by the appellant as the real
owner of the subject marijuana.
The case of Sorrentino v.
“If the person whom Grady called
an informer had been an informer and nothing more, appellant would
not have been entitled to have his identity disclosed; but the person whom
Grady called an informer was something more. He was the person to whom
appellant was said to have sold and dispensed the opium described in the
indictment. Information as to this person's identity was therefore material to
appellant's defense xxx.”
The particular factual backdrop in Rojo likewise
provided for the indispensability of the confidential informant as a crucial
witness:
The theory of the prosecution is that the
informant acted as buyer in the entrapment proceedings. However, the alleged
informant was never presented as a witness. His identity was never revealed
because it was supposed to be confidential information.
The evidence of the prosecution on
the matter of the participation of the informant as alleged buyer in the
entrapment proceedings is contradictory. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, there is a fatal flaw in
the prosecution's evidence on how the alleged entrapment proceedings took
place. The so-called
informant was never presented as a witness and he was never identified. His having acted
as buyer in the alleged entrapment proceedings was not established as a fact by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt because of the contradictory evidence as to
who really posed as buyer. There is now even a doubt as to whether or not the
entrapment proceedings ever took place at all.
xxx xxx xxx
These are the facts as found by the
trial court which show that none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw the
appellant deliver the alleged bag of flowering tops of marijuana which was
allegedly sold to the informant. It also indicates that they did not see the
informant pay the alleged consideration of the sale with a 10-peso bill. They
just assumed that the transaction was consummated upon a signal from the
informant. There is, therefore, no direct evidence, much less conclusive proof,
to establish the alleged unlawful sale of marijuana
being pinned on appellant.
On the other hand, the present
case does not confront us with a situation where it can
be said that the informant's testimony is indispensable such that a conviction
would be baseless without it. Here, it was SPO4 Jamisolamin, whose
testimony was duly adduced, that acted as poseur-buyer. He
testified as to his own personal knowledge of the sale that had taken place.
The informant's testimony, then, would have been merely
corroborative and cumulative because the fact of sale of the prohibited
drug was already established by the direct testimony of
SPO4 Jamisolamin who actively took part in the transaction. If the
prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, it need not
present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of
proof necessary to establish the
guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed
with for being merely corroborative in nature.[12]
We have, in
numerous cases, made clear the policy of the Court, founded on reason
and experience, to sustain the factual findings of the trial court in criminal
cases. We give full credence to the appreciation of testimonial evidence by the
trial court especially if what is at issue is the credibility of the
witnesses. The oft-repeated principle is that where the credibility of a witness
is an issue, great respect is accorded to the trial court’s evaluation
thereof. This is as it should be. For, in the nature of
things, the trial court is in the best position to assess issues of
credibility because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.[13]
Besides, credence
is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they enjoy the
presumption of having performed their duties in a regular manner, unless, of
course, there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on their part or
deviation from the regular performance of their duties,[14] none of which exists in this case.
There is absolutely no evidence to show that the members of
the buy-bust team who were presented as witnesses were motivated by any reason
other than
their official duty. If indeed there was a frame-up, the officers must have
known appellants prior to the incident.[15] However, appellant Lopez
himself admitted neither knowing these police officers nor having any kind of
history with them.
Absent proof of any intent on the part of the police
officers to falsely impute commission of a crime against appellants, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands.
Appellants’ self-serving claim of a frame-up must simply collapse.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED and
the assailed decision of the CA, affirmatory of that of the trial court, is AFFIRMED.
Costs
against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios (now deceased), with Associate Justices Mario L. Guarina III and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring; Rollo, pp. 2-9.
[2] CA Rollo, pp. 63-78.
[3]
[4] Supra note 2.
[5] Supra note 1.
[6] People
v.
[7] G.R. No. 95352,
[8] G.R. No. 133789,
[9] G.R. No. 77777,
[10] G.R. No. 82737,
[11] People
v. Salazar, G.R. No.
98060,
[12] People
v. Mamalayan, G.R. No.
115282,
[13] VHT
Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126780, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 638.
[14] People
v. Dulay, G.R. No. 150624,
[15] People
v. Saludes, G.R. No.
144157,