THIRD DIVISION
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people of the Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - eduardo moran
jr. y Gordula, Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 170849 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01352 which affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 70, finding accused-appellant Eduardo Moran, Jr. y Gordula
guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and ordering him to pay the costs of the suit.
The Court of Appeals, however, modified the RTC
decision ordering the accused-appellant to pay the victim, AAA,[2]
the amount of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages by deleting the
award of exemplary damages. It fixed the
award of moral damages to P50,000.00 and added the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity.
On
That on or about the 4th day of November
1994, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with AAA who was under 14 years of age, without her consent
and against her will.[3]
During his arraignment on
Trial on the merits ensued after appellant
waived the pre-trial conference.
The evidence of the prosecution, as
culled from the collective testimonies of the victim (AAA), the victim’s aunt (BBB),
the victim’s cousin (CCC), PO3 Digna Cas, and Dr. Rosalie Cosidon, are
as follows:
The victim was a 14-year old high
school student living under the custody of her aunt, BBB, at the time of the
alleged incident. In the evening of
At about two o’clock the following
morning, AAA decided to sleep in the house of DDD, another aunt of hers whose
house is just a few meters away from where the wake was held. AAA slept on a bench near the door. Also sleeping in the same house were her
cousins, nine-year old CCC and four-year old EEE. AAA purposely left the door unlocked because
she expected her aunt DDD to come home anytime after attending the wake.
AAA, however, was roused from her sleep
when she felt that somebody, whom she could not recognize then because it was
dark, hit her in the abdomen. The
aggressor’s second blow made her unconscious.
When she regained consciousness, she found herself lying on the bench
feeling drained and weak with her body aching.
She was no longer wearing her shorts and underwear. Glancing at her side, she vaguely saw the
face of one whom she later identified as the appellant who was standing beside
her. She had earlier seen the appellant,
together with her Uncle XXX and Kuya YYY, drinking
during the wake. AAA shouted for help
but appellant immediately covered her mouth with his hand while poking a pointed
object on the right side of her body.
Appellant covered her with a blanket, punched her again twice on the
stomach and threatened to kill her if she will report the incident. As appellant went out of the house, AAA
peeped through the door and with the illumination from a nearby lightpost, she was able to see vividly appellant’s face.
Appellant’s acts of covering AAA with
a blanket and punching her were witnessed by CCC as the latter was awakened when
appellant grabbed his blanket and used the same to cover AAA.
When appellant left, AAA turned on
the light right away, went to the toilet and washed off the sticky substance
from her private part. She went out of
the toilet and found her cousins CCC and EEE awake and crying. Gripped in fear, she locked the door. Later, someone knocked at the door. AAA refused to open it for she was
afraid. Neither did her cousins move. When the person asked: “AAA, buksan mo ang pintuan. Bakit ka umiiyak?” CCC
recognized that it was their Uncle XXX. CCC
opened the door. Uncle XXX asked AAA why
she was sobbing and she replied: “May pumasok na lalake, natatakot
po ako.”
Thereafter, the victim’s cousins, CCC
and EEE, hurriedly left the house to look for their aunt BBB. When they found their aunt they told her: “Pinasok si Ate ng lalake.” BBB immediately rushed to DDD’s
house and found AAA seated on the sofa with her legs folded, crying and
shouting hysterically: “Papano na ang kinabukasan ko? Natatakot ako.” When she
asked AAA what had happened, the latter said that appellant violated her
womanhood. Not being able to contain
herself, BBB went back to the wake where she confronted appellant.
At around
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly
developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with pinkish brown
areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are
full, convex and gaping with the congested labia minora
presenting in between. On separating the
same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep healed lacerations at 3
and
CONCLUSION:
Subject
is in non-virgin state physically.
There
are no external signs of application of any form of violence.
REMARKS:
Vaginal
and peri-urethral smears are positive for
gram-negative diplococci but negative for
spermatozoa.[4]
After receiving the medico-legal
report, they proceeded to the Eastern Police Station where they reported the
incident to PO3 Digna Cas
and filed a complaint for rape against the appellant.
Appellant denied the charge. He offered a different story. He declared that from
Appellant also stated that the case
was concocted by NNN, the wife of the deceased and the aunt of the victim, because
she wanted to get back at him for being a bad influence to her husband.
Appellant further testified that it
was only in the evening of
The trial court, in convicting the
appellant, gave credence to the version of the prosecution and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant
was also ordered to indemnify his victim in the amount of P100,000.00 by
way of moral and exemplary damages.
In finding appellant guilty of the
crime of rape, the trial court made the following findings:
The evidence of the prosecution consisting principally
in the testimony of the complainant, AAA, substantially points to the fact that
she was sexually abused while in a state of unconsciousness after being punched
twice in the abdomen by somebody whom she later identified as herein
accused. AAA who was only 14 years old
at the time of the incident was then sleeping at the house of her Tita DDD in Barrio Kapitolyo,
Anent the identity of the perpetrator, there is no
question in the Court’s mind that it is the accused, Jun Moran, who raped
private complainant. As AAA vividly
narrated in her direct testimony:
Q. When
you felt ache in your body when you regain (sic) consciousness, who (sic) did
you see?
A. Naaninagan ko lang po yon mukha
ni Jun Moran pero hindi po ako
sigurado na siya nga po
talaga iyon (TSN, May 30, 1995, p. 14)
x x x
x
Q. The
first time that you saw the face of Jun Moran, you said that the face of Jun
Moran was illuminated that’s why you saw him, how far was this Jun Moran when
you first saw him from you?
A. Malapit lang po. He was standing
where I was lying (TSN, May 30, 1995, p. 17).
x x x
x
Q. And
what was you first reaction when you saw Jun Moran standing?
A. Sumigaw po ako ng saklolo
pero bigla po niyang tinakpan
ang bibig ko (TSN, May 30, 1995, p. 19).
x x x
x
Q. After
Jun Moran held your mouth with his hand, what else did he do if any?
A. He
poked something on the right side of my body (TSN, May 30, 1995, p. 20).
x x x
x
Q. After
you felt this what else happened?
A. Kinumutan niya po ako tapos
sinuntok niya ako ulit ng
dalawang beses.
x x x x
Q. What
happened after you were hit by the punch?
A. Sabi niya “huwag kang magsumbong
kahit kanino. Pag nagsumbong ka, papatayin kita” (TSN, May
30, 1995, p. 21).
Accused’s identity as the defiler of the complainant was
further and more firmly ascertained when the latter testified that when accused
went out of the house, she peeped thru the door and saw accused clearly through
the illumination given by a light post, thus:
Q. After
Jun Moran went out of the door, what did you do?
A. Sinilip ko siya sa may pintuan
at nakita ko siya talaga.
Q. What
direction did Jun Moran go after he went out of the house?
A. Papunta po sa likod ng
bahay.
COURT:
How were you able to recognize the face of Jun Moran
and you were able to confirm that it was he indeed?
A. Kasi po yong pintuan at may ilaw sa dulo,
sa may poste (TSN, May
30, 1995, pp. 23-24).
Prosecution witness, CCC corroborated private
complainant’s testimony when he testified that he saw herein accused covering AAA
with a blanket and boxing her thrice in the stomach (TSN, Jan. 14, 1998, pp.
6-7).
Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature
are credible. No woman especially of
tender age would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private part, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public
trial, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to tell the truth and to
have the culprit apprehended and punished (People v. Henson, 270 SCRA 634).
The defense of accused Eduardo Moran, Jr. that the
instant case is a mere brainchild of AAA’s aunt NNN as the latter had an ax to
grind against him is difficult to believe.
No person, much less an aunt of a 14-year old child, would use her niece
and allow her to be subjected to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial
and to expose her private part to examination just to settle a score with the
accused (which is itself unclear) (People v. Perez, 270 SCRA 526).
Anent the findings of the PNP-medico legal officer,
Dr. Rosalie Cosidon, that complainant is in a
non-virgin state and the vaginal smears are negative for spermatozoa, these do
not preclude a finding of rape.
As admitted by complainant in her cross-examination,
she has had a previous sexual encounter while she was in the sixth grade, or
more than two years ago (1992). The
absence of spermatozoa in the vaginal smears is not very material in the prosecution
for rape case since it is well-settled that penetration, however slight, and
not ejaculation, constitutes rape (People v. Antonio De la Paz, Jr., G.R. No.
118316, Nov. 24, 1998). What is
essential to prove is the entrance or introduction of the male organ into the
labia of the pudendum (Ibid). Neither
would the absence of freshly broken hymen or fresh laceration disprove rape
(People v. Oliva, 282 SCRA 470).
In the instant case, the medico-legal officer
testified that the reddening of private complainants labia minora
could be produced by the rubbing or friction with a hard rough object, not
limited to a hardened penis. Since the
Court is convinced of the veracity of AAA’s testimony, it has no doubt that the
reddening of her labia minora was caused by accused’s hardened penis.
All-told, accused’s attempt
to exculpate himself of liability based on his testimony alone, cannot prevail
vis-à-vis AAA’s testimony which was given in clear, straight-forward and
convincing manner.[5]
Appellant filed a notice of appeal.[6]
The trial court ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the case to
this Court. Thereafter, this Court ordered the referral of the case to the
Court of Appeals conformably with the ruling in the case of People v. Mateo.[7]
The Court of Appeals, on P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The dispositive
portion of the decision pronounces:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated P50,000.00 as moral damages and the additional sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.[8]
Hence, the instant recourse.
First, the appellant claims that the
Court of Appeals erred in convicting him despite the absence of positive
identification since no one witnessed the commission of the crime or could
pinpoint him as the perpetrator thereof.
Second, he questions the veracity of the victim’s narration of what had
transpired in the early morning of
Appellant’s contentions are not
meritorious.
In cases where the victim could not
testify on the actual commission of the rape because she was rendered
unconscious at the time the crime was perpetrated, Rule 133, Section 4, of the
Revised Rules on Evidence sanctions the courts to rule on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, viz:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial
evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
A related rule is that the totality
or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proved leads to no other logical
conclusion than the guilt of the appellant.[9]
There
have already been instances when this Court convicted an accused of the crime
of rape, committed while their victims were unconscious, based on
circumstantial evidence. In People v. Villanueva,[10]
the Court affirmed the conviction for rape, overruling the defense’s posture
that the prosecution failed to present evidence of the actual defloration. In that case, the accused-appellant claimed
that if the victim was unconscious during the sexual assault, she would be
incapable of knowing that, indeed, she was raped. Debunking the claim of the accused-appellant
that the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to prove rape, the Court,
taking into consideration the events that transpired before and after the
victim lost consciousness, i.e., the
perpetrator compulsorily commanded her to remove her panty and forced her to
lie down then punched her in the stomach which rendered her unconscious and
that when she came to, she felt pain in the nest of womanhood, found
accused-appellant guilty of rape.
In People v. Santiago,[11] the
accused therein was convicted of rape despite the fact that the prosecution
failed to adduce direct evidence as to the actual act of coitus.
Also,
in the case of People v. Tolentino,[12]
it was shown that the accused therein struck the victim’s head that made her
pass out. Later, the victim was found on
the street near the accused’s house still
unconscious. When she regained
consciousness, she declared that she had been raped and that she could identify
the person who molested her. It was in
the police line-up that the victim pinned down her assailant. Notwithstanding the absence of details as to
how the victim was raped, the Court found the accused guilty of the charge.
In the case under consideration, the
prosecution adequately established the following: first,
appellant was within the vicinity where the incident happened; second, appellant knocked the victim out
by punching her twice in the abdomen; third,
when she regained consciousness, she felt pain all over her body and she was no
longer wearing her shorts and underwear;
fourth, appellant was beside
her and covered her mouth when she attempted to shout for help and then covered
her with a blanket, punched her again and threatened to kill her if she told anyone
of his brutish act; fifth, when she touched her private part, she found sticky
substance; sixth, the act of covering
the victim and boxing her was corroborated by the victim’s cousin; seventh, the medical findings revealed
that the labia minora of the victim was congested or
reddened which is consistent with her claim that she was molested.
Taken together, the circumstances
establish beyond moral certainty that AAA was ravished while she was deprived
of consciousness and that appellant was the one culpable for defiling her. These
pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution constitute an unbroken chain of
events which ineluctably points to appellant as the guilty person.
Appellant capitalizes much on the
fact that no one witnessed his dastardly act of sexually assaulting the
victim.
This argument deserves scant
consideration. Definitely, the victim
could not have witnessed the bestial act of the appellant while she was in the
state of unconsciousness. As articulated
in People v. San Pedro[13]-
Of course, an unconscious woman will not know who is
raping her. If the defense theory were
to be adopted, then it would be impossible to convict any person who rapes an
unconscious woman, except only where a third person witnesses the crime. Henceforth, the clever rapist would simply
knock his potential victim out of her senses before actually raping her, to be
later immunized from conviction for insufficient identification.
It is precisely when the sexual
intercourse is performed when the victim is unconscious that the act
constitutes the statutory offense of rape specially when, as in this case, the
loss of consciousness was the result of appellant’s violent act.[14] Thus, while AAA was asleep, appellant knocked
her out by hitting her twice in the stomach.
It was then that appellant succeeded in satisfying his bestial desires. This is evidenced by the fact that the lass,
upon regaining consciousness, saw her underwear removed. Appellant threatened to kill her if she
squealed. She also felt pain all over
her body. Her private part was wet with
a sticky substance.
In dire need of an alibi to exculpate
him from the charge, appellant clutches at straws. He claims that the instant case is a
brainchild of AAA’s aunt NNN as the latter had an ax to grind against him. He
also insinuates that this case is the victim’s attempt to redeem her lost
honor, having been caught in a voluntary sexual congress with the appellant. This is preposterous. As correctly ruled by the trial court, no
person, much less an aunt of a 14-year old child, would utilize her niece and
allow her to be subjected to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and
to expose her private part to examination just to get even with the
appellant. Likewise incredulous is the
claim that AAA had voluntarily consented to the act of the appellant. It takes a lot of perversity for a 14-year
old child to acquiesce to a coitus accompanied by violence and threat. Only a sexually depraved person can even
think of this kind of defense. Besides, appellant’s defense that what had
transpired was consensual is inconsistent with his defense of denial and alibi.
Appellant further endeavors to
discredit the victim’s credibility, stating that- (a) it is strange that AAA
left the door of her aunt’s residence unlocked during the early morning of 4
November 1994; (b) he could not have punched her before raping her since he
could have easily satisfied his lust while she was asleep; (c) the incident
could not have taken place within the
hearing and seeing distance of her cousins; (d) it is incredible that he did
not escape before AAA recovered her consciousness; and (e) AAA’s wetness as a
result of the incident negates rape.
The victim clarified that she left
the door unlocked because she was expecting her aunt to come into the house
anytime after attending the wake in the nearby chapel and for her not to be
disturbed from her sleep. This
explanation is credible. Young as she
is, the victim was unsuspecting that someone who knew her grief over the loss
of a relative was lurking in the dark ready to devour her maidenhood. Protecting her safety from despicable-minded
mortals was the least of her concerns.
The assertion that appellant need not
hit the victim as he could have raped her while she was slumbering is feeble. Appellant purposely knocked her out so he
could have carnal knowledge of her without any resistance and to prevent her
from creating noise that could possibly wake up her cousins who were also
sleeping beside her.
Appellant cannot put premium on the
victim’s admission that she had sexual intercourse two years before the questioned
incident. Suffice it to state that the
reddening of AAA’s labia minora could not have been caused by her sexual
experience two years before the assailant raped her.
The fact that appellant did not leave
the house before AAA regained consciousness does not at all demonstrate his
innocence. He stayed and waited for her
to wake up in order to threaten her not to tell the incident to anyone and to instill
insurmountable fear in the young mind of the lass that if she told anyone he
would make good his threat.
As to appellant’s suggestion that AAA
experienced an orgasm, thus, rendering the incident consensual, is unfounded. When she declared that there was sticky
substance that came out of her organ, she was implying that such substance came
from appellant, thus:
Q – After you
saw Moran left the house, what did you do?
A – Binuksan ko po yong
ilaw at pumunta agad ako sa
banyo at naghugas ako.
Q – Why did
you wash?
A – Kasi po marami pong lumabas sa kin na…
Q – You were
wet?
A – Opo.
Q – You said that
maraming lumabas sayo, was this thing sticky?
A – Opo.[15]
The Court has long adhered to the
rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great respect unless it overlooked substantial facts
and circumstances, which, if considered, would materially affect the result of
the case.[16] In rape cases, the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the
judge has the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if
they are telling the truth or not.[17] This deference to the trial court’s appreciation
of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the
principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility,
that alone is sufficient to convict the accused.[18] In the case under consideration, this Court
finds that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals committed no error
in giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution and finding appellant
guilty of the charge.
The
Court of Appeals’ ruling deleting the award of exemplary damages and awarding
to the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity in addition to
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages is also affirmed.
Jurisprudence has it that exemplary
damages may be given only when one or
more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and proved during
the trial.[19] Here, none are attendant. Thus, the deletion
of the award of the same is proper.
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,
the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity in favor of the victim is in
order.[20] Likewise, the award of P50,000.00 as
moral damages is justified conformably with the recent pronouncement of the
Court.[21]
WHEREFORE, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 October 2005, affirming the Decision
dated 7 July 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig
City, in Criminal Case No. 107249-H, finding accused-appellant Eduardo Moran,
Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with
the MODIFICATION that he is ordered
to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages, is hereby AFFIRMED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-13.
[2] Under Republic Act No. 9262 also known as “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004” and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim and those of her immediate family members are withheld and fictitious initials are instead used to protect the victim’s privacy.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4]
[5] Rollo, pp. 18-21.
[6] Records, p. 250.
[7] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[8] Rollo, p. 10.
[9] People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 139834,
[10] 459 Phil. 856, 867-868 (2003).
[11] G.R. No. 46132,
[12] G.R. No. 139351,
[13] G.R. No. 94128,
[14] People
v. Palapal, G.R. No. L-42646,
[15] TSN,
[16] People
v. Dagpin, G.R. No. 136254,
[17] People v. Digma, 398 Phil. 1008, 1023 (2000).
[18] People v. Cula, 385 Phil. 742, 752 (2000).
[19] People v. Invencion, 446 Phil. 775, 792 (2003); Talay v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 257, 278-279 (2003).
[20] People
v. Alviz, G.R. Nos. 144551-55,
[21] People
v. Tolentino, supra note 10 at 444; People v. Cultura,
G.R. No. 133831,