SECOND DIVISION
|
FELICIANO ESGUERRA, CANUTO ESGUERRA, JUSTA ESGUERRA, ANGEL ESGUERRA, FIDELA ESGUERRA, CLARA ESGUERRA, and PEDRO ESGUERRA, Petitioners,
- versus - Respondents. |
G.R. No. 169890 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Involved in the present controversy
are two parcels of land located in Camalig,
Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Felipe Esguerra and Praxedes de Vera
(Esguerra spouses) were the
owners of several parcels of land in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan – among them a 35,284-square
meter parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 10374, half of which
(17,642 square meters) they sold to their grandchildren, herein petitioners Feliciano,
Canuto, Justa, Angel, Fidela, Clara and Pedro, all surnamed Esguerra; and a
23,989-square meter
parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 12080, 23,489 square meters of which they also sold to
petitioners, and the remaining 500 square meters they sold to their other
grandchildren, the brothers Eulalio and Julian Trinidad (
Also sold to the Trinidad brothers
were a 7,048-square meter parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9059, a
4,618-square meter parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 12081, and a
768-square meter parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 13989.
The Esguerra spouses executed the necessary
Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners on
Eulalio Trinidad later sold his share
of the land to his daughters-respondents herein, via a notarized Kasulatan
ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa[3]
dated
On respondents’ application for
registration of title, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan, by
Decision[4] of
February 20, 1967, awarded Lot No. 3593 in their favor in Land Registration
Case No. N-323-V. Pursuant to the
Decision, the Land Registration Commission (LRC, now the Land Registration
Authority [LRA]) issued Decree No. N-114039 by virtue of which the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan issued OCT No. 0-3631[5] in
the name of respondents.
Meanwhile, under a notarized Bilihan ng Lupa[6] dated
During the same cadastral survey
conducted in the late 1960s, it was discovered that the about 5,000-square
meter portion of petitioners’ parcel of land sold to the Trinidad spouses which
was assigned Lot No. 3591 actually measured 6,268 square meters.
In a subsequent application for
registration of title over Lot No. 3591, docketed as Land Registration Case No.
N-335-V, the CFI, by Decision[8] of
Upon the death of the
Petitioners, alleging that upon
verification with the LRA they discovered the issuance of the above-stated two
OCTs, filed on
In the first complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 737-M-94, petitioners sought the cancellation of OCT No. 0-3631.
In the other complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 738-M-94, petitioners sought the cancellation of OCT No. 0-6498.
Both cases were consolidated and
tried before Branch 79 of the RTC which, after trial, dismissed the cases by
Joint Decision[10] of
Their appeal with the Court of Appeals
having been dismissed by Decision of
Petitioners fault the appellate court
1. . . . in misappreciating the fact that the act of the respondent Eulalio Trinidad in acquiring the property from Felipe Esguerra constituted fraud.
2. . . . in the [i]nterpretation and application of the provisions of Article 1542 of the New Civil Code.
3. . . . in ruling that there is prescription, res judicata, and violation of the non-[forum] shopping.[12]
In their Comment, respondents assailed
the petition as lacking verification and certification against forum shopping and
failing to attach to it an affidavit of service and material portions of the
record in support thereof. Petitioners
counter that the procedural deficiencies have been mooted by the filing of a
Compliance.
A check of the rollo shows that attached to the petition are an Affidavit of
Service dated November 21, 2005 and the appellate court’s Decision of February
28, 2005 and Resolution of October 3, 2005; and that on January 16, 2006 or
almost three months following the last day to file the petition, petitioners
submitted, not at their own instance,[13] a
Verification and Sworn Certification on Non-Forum Shopping signed by petitioner
Pedro Esguerra who cited honest and excusable mistake behind the omission to
submit the same.
This Court has strictly enforced the
requirement of verification and certification, obedience to which and to other procedural
rules is needed if fair results are to be expected therefrom.[14] While exceptional cases have been considered to
correct patent injustice concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of
procedure, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his failure
to comply with the rules.[15] In petitioners’ case, no such explanation
has been advanced.
With
regard to petitioners’ failure to attach material portions of the record in
support of the petition, this requirement is not a mere technicality but an
essential requisite for the determination of prima facie basis for
giving due course to the petition.[16] As a rule, a petition which lacks copies of
essential pleadings and portions of the case record may be dismissed. Much discretion is left to the reviewing
court, however, to determine the necessity for such copies as the exact nature
of the pleadings and portions of the case record which must accompany a
petition is not specified.[17]
At all events, technicality aside,
the petition must be denied.
It is settled that fraud is a
question of fact and the circumstances constituting the same must be alleged
and proved in the court below.[18]
In the present cases, as did the
trial court, the appellate court found no fraud in respondents’ acquisition and
registration of the land, viz:
. . . Appellant Pedro Esguerra even testified that he does not know how appellees were able to secure a title over the lot in question and that they never sold Lot No. 3593 to Virginia Trinidad since it is part of the whole lot of 23,489 square meters. The said testimony is a mere conclusion on the part of appellants. On the other hand, the evidence shows that appellees acquired title over the subject property by virtue of a deed of sale executed by their father Eulalio Trinidad in their favor.
x x x x
[T]hey failed to establish that appellees’ acquisition of the certificate of title is fraudulent. In fact, in their two complaints, appellants acknowledged that appellees observed and took the initial procedural steps in the registration of the land, thus ruling out fraud in the acquisition of the certificate of title. . . .[19]
Factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
final, conclusive and binding on this Court,[20]
which is not a trier of facts,[21] hence,
bereft of function under Rule 45 to examine and weigh the probative value of
the evidence presented,[22]
its jurisdiction being limited only to the review and revision of errors of
law.[23] Albeit there are exceptions[24]
to this rule, the cases at bar do not fall thereunder, there being no showing
that the trial and appellate courts overlooked matters which, if considered,
would alter their outcome.
Under the Torrens System, an OCT enjoys
a presumption of validity, which correlatively carries a strong presumption
that the provisions of the law governing the registration of land which led to
its issuance have been duly followed.[25] Fraud being a serious charge, it must be
supported by clear and convincing proof.[26] Petitioners failed to discharge the burden
of proof, however.
On the questioned interpretation and application
by the appellate court of Article 1542 of the Civil Code reading:
In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although there be a greater or less areas or number than that stated in the contract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold for a single price; but if, besides mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its area or number should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number specified in the contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion to what is lacking in the area or number, unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been stipulated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
while petitioners admittedly sold Lot
No. 3591 to the
In sales involving real estate, the
parties may choose between two types of pricing agreement: a unit price
contract wherein the purchase price is determined by way of reference to a
stated rate per unit area (e.g., P1,000 per square meter), or a lump
sum contract which states a full purchase price for an immovable the area
of which may be declared based on an estimate or where both the area and
boundaries are stated (e.g., P1 million for 1,000 square meters,
etc.). In Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,[27] the Court discussed the distinction:
. . . In a unit price contract, the statement of area of immovable is not conclusive and the price may be reduced or increased depending on the area actually delivered. If the vendor delivers less than the area agreed upon, the vendee may oblige the vendor to deliver all that may be stated in the contract or demand for the proportionate reduction of the purchase price if delivery is not possible. If the vendor delivers more than the area stated in the contract, the vendee has the option to accept only the amount agreed upon or to accept the whole area, provided he pays for the additional area at the contract rate.
x x x x
In the case where the area of the immovable is stated in the contract based on an estimate, the actual area delivered may not measure up exactly with the area stated in the contract. According to Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although there be a greater or less areas or number than that stated in the contract. . . .
x x x x
Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared, the area covered within the boundaries of the immovable prevails over the stated area. In cases of conflict between areas and boundaries, it is the latter which should prevail. What really defines a piece of ground is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. In a contract of sale of land in a mass, it is well established that the specific boundaries stated in the contract must control over any statement with respect to the area contained within its boundaries. It is not of vital consequence that a deed or contract of sale of land should disclose the area with mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is objectively indicated with sufficient precision to enable one to identify it. An error as to the superficial area is immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate object.[28] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The courts below correctly
characterized the sale of P1,000.00 on a predetermined,
albeit unsurveyed, area of 5,000 square meters and not on a particular rate per
unit area. As noted by the Court of Appeals,
the identity of the realty was sufficiently described as riceland:
It is clear from the afore-quoted Bilihan ng Lupa that what appellants sold to Eulalio was the “bahaging palayan.” Though measured as 5,000 square meters, more or less, such measurement is only an approximation, and not an exact measurement. Moreover, we take note of the fact that the said deed of sale mentioned the boundaries covering the whole area of 33,489 square meters, including the “bahaging palayan.” Had appellants intended to sell only a portion of the “bahaging palayan,” they could have stated the specific area in the deed of sale and not the entire “bahaging palayan” . . . .[29]
In fine, under Article 1542, what is
controlling is the entire land included within the boundaries, regardless of
whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the
deed. This is particularly true since the
area of the land in OCT No. 0-6498 was described in the deed as “humigit
kumulang,” that is, more or less.[30]
A caveat is in order, however. The use of “more or less” or similar words in
designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the
description “more or less” with reference to its area does not thereby ipso
facto take all risk of quantity in the land.[31]
Numerical data are not of course the
sole gauge of unreasonableness of the excess or deficiency in area. Courts must consider a host of other factors. In one case,[32]
the Court found substantial discrepancy in area due to contemporaneous
circumstances. Citing change in the
physical nature of the property, it was therein established that the excess
area at the southern portion was a product of reclamation, which explained why
the land’s technical description in the deed of sale indicated the seashore as
its southern boundary, hence, the inclusion of the reclaimed area was declared
unreasonable.
In OCT No. 0-6498, the increase by a
fourth of a fraction of the area indicated in the deed of sale cannot be
considered as an unreasonable excess.
Most importantly, the circumstances attendant to the inclusion of the
excess area bare nothing atypical or significant to hint at
unreasonableness. It must be noted that
the land was not yet technically surveyed at the time of the sale. As vendors who themselves executed the Bilihan
ng Lupa, petitioners may rightly be presumed to have acquired a good
estimate of the value and area of the bahaging palayan.
As for the last assigned error, the
appellate court, in finding that the complaints were time-barred, noted that
when the complaints were filed in 1994, more than 27 years had elapsed from the
issuance of OCT No. 0-3631 and more than
20 years from the issuance of OCT No. 0-6498.
The prescriptive period of one (1) year had thus set in.
Petitioners’
reliance on Agne v. Director of Lands[33]
is misplaced since the cancellation of title was predicated not on the ground
of fraud but on want of jurisdiction.
Even assuming that petitioners’ actions are in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, which is imprescriptible, the actions still necessarily fail
since petitioners failed to establish the existence of fraud.
A word on Republic Act No. 7160[34]
which was raised by petitioners in their petition. It expressly requires the parties to undergo
a conciliation process under the Katarungang Pambarangay, as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court,[35] non-compliance
with this condition precedent does not prevent a court of competent
jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over a case unless the
defendants object thereto. The objection
should be seasonably made before the court first taking cognizance of the
complaint, and must be raised in the Answer or in such other pleading allowed
under the Rules of Court.[36]
While petitioners admittedly failed
to comply with the requirement of barangay conciliation, they assert that
respondents waived such objection when they failed to raise it in their
Answer. Contrary to petitioners’ claim,
however, the records reveal that respondents raised their objection in their
Amended Answers[37] filed
in both cases.
IN FINE,
it is a fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Such indefeasibility commences after the
lapse or expiration of one year from the date of entry of the decree of
registration when all persons are considered to have a constructive notice of
the title to the property. After the
lapse of one year, therefore, title to the property can no longer be contested.
This system was so effected in order to quiet title to land.[38]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, pp. 501-502.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo, p. 20.
[8] Records, pp. 709-711.
[9]
[10]
[11] Rollo, pp. 30-40, 42. Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with the concurrence of Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion and Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, penned both Decision and Resolution in the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57263.
[12]
[13]
[14] See Clavecilla v. Quitain, G.R. No.
147989,
[15] See Suzuki v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 146979, July 27, 2006; see also Pedrosa v. Hill, 327 Phil. 153 (1996) where “sheer inadvertence” was not taken as a satisfactory reason for non-compliance with a rule.
[16] Vide Far East Bank and Trust
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 138919,
[17] See Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora,
G.R. No. 148247,
[18] Philippine American Life Insurance Company v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 559 (2000); Periquet, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69996, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA 697.
[19] Rollo, pp. 34, 36.
[20] Lubos v. Galupo, 424 Phil. 665 (2002); Mindex Resources Dev’t. v. Morillo,
428 Phil. 934 (2002).
[21] Far
East Bank and Trust Co. v. Querimit, 424 Phil.
721 (2002).
[22] Asia
Trust Development Bank v. Concepts Trading Corp., 452 Phil. 552 (2003).
[23] Changco v. Court of
Appeals, 429 Phil. 336 (2002).
[24] These include instances “(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.” Siasat v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 139, 145 (2002).
[25] Vide Tichangco v. Enriquez,
G.R. No. 150629,
[26] Quinsay v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67935, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 268, 282.
[27] G.R. No. 122463,
[28]
[29] Rollo, p. 37.
[30] Vide Balantakbo v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 436 (1995).
[31] See Roble v. Arbasa, 414 Phil. 343 (2001).
[32]
[33] G.R. No. 40399,
[34] Local Government Code of 1991, Sec. 412 (a).
[35]
[36] Espino v. Legarda, G.R. No. 149266,
[37] Records, pp. 192, 229.
[38] Vda.
de Retuerto v. Barz, 423 Phil. 1008, 1016 (2001); Tichangco v. Enriquez,
supra.