EN
BANC
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NELSON P. COLLANTES,
Petitioner, - versus
- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 169604 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO
MORALES, CALLEJO,
SR.,** AZCUNA,*** TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO,
JR., and NACHURA,
JJ.* Promulgated: March 6, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
A decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact and law; and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court in the land.[1]
What would
happen, however, if two separate decisions, irreconcilably conflicting with
each other, both attained finality?
Quite clearly, to hold that both decisions are immutable and unalterable
would cause not only confusion and uncertainty, but utter bewilderment upon the
persons tasked to execute these judgments.
This is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision[2]
dated
The
undisputed facts of this case are summarized by the Court of Appeals:
Petitioner Nelson Collantes (hereafter,
Collantes) was conferred Career Executive Service Eligibility on
With the change of administration,
Collantes allegedly received word from persons close to then President Ejercito
Estrada to give up his position so that the President could unreservedly
appoint his key officials. As such,
Collantes relinquished his post at the DILG.
Thereafter, on
Unfortunately, Collantes was not given any
other post in the government, as in fact, he received a letter from President
Estrada terminating his services effective
The termination of Collantes’ services,
notwithstanding, President Estrada accorded Collantes the highest rank in the
CES ranking structure, CESO Rank I, on
Taking definite action on the matter,
Collantes instituted a Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus before Us on
Meanwhile, on
Then, on
“By such actuations of the petitioner, the Court finds
that he has (sic) effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary of
the DND, and the public respondents are under no compulsion to reinstate him to
his old position.
x x x x
“In this case, petitioner has undoubtedly shown his
intention to relinquish his public office, and has in fact surrendered such
post to the Chief Executive, who, on the other hand, has shown his acceptance
of the same by appointing a new person to the position relinquished by the
petitioner.
x x x x
Quo warranto, it must be pointed out, is unavailing in
the instatnt case, as the public office in question has not been usurped,
intruded into or unlawfully held by the present occupant. Nor does the incumbent undersecretary appear
to have done or suffered an act which forfeits his assumption. (Section 1, Rule
66, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Furthermore, it appears that the action for quo warranto, assuming it is
available, has already lapsed by prescription, pursuant to Section 11 of the
pertinent Rule ...
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
for Quo Warranto and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.”
The controversy reached the Supreme Court
as G.R. No. 149883. Nevertheless, the
case was considered closed and terminated when Collantes manifested his desire
not to pursue his appeal and withdraw his Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Thereafter, Collantes moved
for the execution of CSC Resolution No. 011364, which was accordingly granted
through CSC Resolution No. 020084 dated
In a Letter dated
Consequently, in complete turnabout from
its previous stance, the CSC issued Resolution No. 021482 dated
“WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of
Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Leticia A. Gloria of the department of
National Defense (DND) is hereby GRANTED and CSC Resolutions Nos. 01-1364 dated
Forthwith, Collantes moved for a
reconsideration of this Resolution, but was denied by the CSC in the second
assailed Resolution No. 030542 dated
On
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari
is hereby DISMISSED. No grave abuse of
discretion may be imputed against the Civil Service Commission for rendering
Resolution Nos. 021482 and 030542, dated
The Motion
for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in the assailed
Petitioner filed
the present Petition for Review, seeking the reversal of the foregoing Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. In
view of his
A.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DECISION IN CA-G.R. NO. 62874 IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS IS A BAR TO IMPLEMENT THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DATED
B.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT FIND THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT REVERSED ITS VERY OWN DECISION WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AND IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
C.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WHICH HELD THAT PETITIONER MAY BE REMOVED FROM HIS POSITION AS UNDERSECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WITHOUT THE CONCOMITANT TRANSFER TO A
POSITION EQUIVALENT IN RANK OR BE REMOVED THEN, BE FLOATED PERPETUALLY, WHICH
IS TANTAMOUNT TO A CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO
SECURITY OF TENURE AS A CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE ELIGIBLE.[7]
Both
petitioner and herein respondents CSC and Department of National Defense (DND) invoke
the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.
Petitioner
claims that the
Respondents,
on the other hand, invoke the same doctrine of immutability of final judgments,
this time with respect to the
Forum Shopping, Res
Judicata, and Litis Pendentia
Our
rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent such eventualities as conflicting
final decisions as in the case at bar. We
have ruled that what is important in determining whether forum shopping exists
or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who
asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related
causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issues.[11]
More particularly, the elements of forum shopping are:
(a) identity of parties or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of
the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.[12]
Forum shopping can be
committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet
(where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and
the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the
ground for dismissal is res judicata);
and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with
different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for
dismissal is also either litis pendentia
or res judicata).[13] If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of the two
grounds mentioned above. However, if the
forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both
(or all, if there are more than two)
actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.[14]
Petitioner
disputes respondents’ claim, and the CSC’s ruling,[15] that
he had lodged two separate actions.
Petitioner explains that he never filed a case before the CSC. He merely sought the assistance of the Career
Executive Service Board (CESB) in a letter-request dated
Petitioner
claims that, considering that two years had already lapsed without any response
from the CESB, he filed on
In repeatedly asserting that he
did not file two separate actions, petitioner is arguing, without stating it
categorically, that he cannot be held liable for forum shopping. However, what one cannot do directly cannot
be done indirectly. Petitioner had been
aware, through the
Petitioner’s
above actuation is, in fact, a violation of his certification against forum
shopping with the Court of Appeals, a ground for dismissal of actions distinct from
forum shopping itself. As petitioner
knew from the receipt of the CESB letter that another claim was pending in a
quasi-judicial agency concerning these issues, he was bound by his
certification with the Court of Appeals to report such fact within five days
from his knowledge thereof. This
circumstance – of being surprised by the discovery of another pending claim
with another court or quasi-judicial agency – is the very situation
contemplated by letter (c) in the first paragraph of Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed. (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioner,
however, further asserts that the issues brought in the Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals on
There is a clear distinction between the right of
petitioner to the position of Undersecretary for Civilian Relations and his
right to be re-appointed to another position of equivalent rank, in view of his
CESO I status. The former issue may have
been resolved by the Court of Appeals when it ruled that petitioner Collantes
had “effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary of the DND, and
the public respondents are under no compulsion to reinstate him to his old
position.” The latter issue, or the
right of petitioner Collantes to be given a new assignment fitting to his CESO
I rank, arises from his right to security of tenure as a Career Executive
Service Eligible, and not from his appointment to the DND.[22]
This
allegedly clear distinction springs from petitioner’s claim that he resigned
from his position, but not from his rank as a Career Executive Service Officer
(CESO). Petitioner claims that, as a CESO, there is a “great
difference between (1) resigning from one’s position and (2) resigning or
relinquishing one’s rank, as position is different from one’s rank. POSITION refers to the particular or specific
office from which one may be appointed.
RANK, on the other hand, refers not to a particular position but to the
class to which one belongs in the hierarchy of authority in an organization or
bureaucracy.”[23]
Petitioner cites Cuevas
v. Bacal[24]:
[S]ecurity of tenure to members of the CES does not
extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed --- a concept
which is applicable only to the first and second-level employees in the civil
service --- but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President.
x x x x
Mobility
and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, the better to cope with the
exigencies of public service, is thus the distinguishing feature of the Career
Executive Service. x x x.
and General v. Roco[25]:
In addition, it must be stressed that the
security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first
and second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not
to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may
be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his
rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of
salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is
compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or
office he occupies.
While there
is indeed a distinction between position and rank, such that a CESO may be transferred
or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank, there can
be no distinction between resigning from a position and resigning from a rank. The rank of a CESO is deactivated upon separation
from the government service, which includes the resignation of a CESO from his
position. The CESB has clarified this
concept of being in the inactive status in its Resolution No. 554, series of
2002:
Rule II
x x x x
7.
CESO in Inactive Status - is a CESO who no longer occupies a position
in the CES as a result of any of the modes of separation from the government
service, provided that such separation is not due to dismissal from the service
for cause.
x x x x
Rule IV
Section
1. Modes of Deactivating a CES Rank.
– There are three (3) modes by which the CES Rank of a CESO may be deactivated
from the CES:
1.
Acceptance of a
position by virtue of an appointment outside the coverage of the CES;
2.
Dropping from the
rolls of government officials and employees; and
3.
Other modes of
separation from the CES, provided that separation from the CES resulting from
dismissal from the service for cause and after due process shall result in the
loss of CES rank and shall not be considered as a mode of deactivation.
x x x x
Sec. 2.
Effect of Deactivation of CES Rank. – A CESO whose CES rank has been
deactivated by the Board loses all the rights and privileges accorded to
him/her by law on account of his/her CES rank.
Likewise, it
would be absurd for us to rule that a civil servant who resigns from his
position can compel the President to appoint him to another position. Such a ruling would effectively derogate the
discretion of the appointing authority,[26]
as it will give the CESO the option to choose which position he or she wants,
by the simple expediency of resigning from the position he or she does not
want.
In sum,
there is an identity of issues in the two cases which resulted in the two
conflicting final and executory decisions. But while, as stated above, the second
petition can be dismissed on the ground of either res judicata or non-compliance with the undertakings in
petitioner’s certification against forum shopping, these grounds can only be
invoked when the case is still pending.
As petitioner points out, the Resolution of the CSC had already become
final and executory.
The
Two Conflicting Final and Executory
Decisions
Jurisprudence in the
Where there have been two former
actions in which the claim or demand, fact or matter sought to be religated has
been decided contrarily, the rule that, where there is an estoppel against an
estoppel, it “setteth the matter at large” has been applied by some
authorities, and in such case both parties may assert their claims anew. Other authorities have held that, of two
conflicting judgments on the same rights of the same parties, the one which is
later in time will prevail, although it has also been held that the judgment
prior in time will prevail. It has been
held that a decision of a court of last resort is binding on the parties,
although afterward, in another cause, a different principle was declared.[27]
There are
thus three solutions which we can adopt in resolving the case at bar: the first
is for the parties to assert their claims anew, the second is to determine
which judgment came first, and the third is to determine which of the judgments
had been rendered by a court of last resort.
As there
are conflicting jurisprudence on the second solution, it is appropriate for
this Court to adopt either the first or the third solution. The first solution involves disregarding the
finality of the two previous judgments and allowing the parties to argue on the
basis of the merits of the case anew. The third solution merely involves the
determination of which judgment has been rendered by this Court, the court of
last resort in this jurisdiction.
Adopting the
third solution will result in the denial of this Petition for Certiorari. Whereas the finality of the 13 August 2001
CSC Resolution came about by the failure to file a motion for reconsideration
or an appeal within the proper reglementary periods, the finality of the 30
August 2001 Court of Appeals Decision was by virtue of the 12 November 2001
Resolution[28]
of this Court which declared the case closed and terminated upon the
manifestation of petitioner that he decided not to pursue his appeal and was
thus withdrawing the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
on certiorari.
The better
solution, however, is to let the parties argue the merits of the case anew, and
decide the case on the basis thereof. We
can do this either by remanding the case to a lower court, or by resolving the
issues in this disposition. The latter
recourse is more appropriate, for three reasons: (1) all the facts, arguments,
and pleadings in support of the parties’ contentions are now before us, with
the parties advancing the very same contentions as those in this Petition; (2)
a remand to the Court of Appeals would entail asking the latter to resolve the
very same issues it had passed upon twice; and (3) a remand to the Court of
Appeals would only entail another unnecessary delay in the termination of the
case when the case is now ripe for adjudication before us.
The merits of the case are the focus
of petitioner’s third assignment of error in the present petition. Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed
a grave and reversible error when it upheld the resolution of the CSC which allegedly
effectively held “that petitioner may be removed from his position as
Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense without the concomitant
transfer to a position equivalent in rank or be removed then, be floated
perpetually, which is tantamount to a constructive dismissal, in violation of
his right to security of tenure as a career executive service eligible.”[29]
Petitioner’s
arguments presuppose that he had been removed from his position as Undersecretary of the DND. He, however, did not present any evidence to
that effect, whether in this Petition or in his earlier Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals.
If he is implying that he was removed from office by virtue of his
account that he was approached by persons close to President Joseph Estrada who
asked him to relinquish his post, which he did, then this Petition must fail,
for, by his own deliberate deed, he resigned from his position.
There are
no special legal effects when a resignation is one of a courtesy
resignation. The mere fact that the
President, by himself or through another, requested for someone’s resignation
does not give the President the obligation to appoint such person to another
position. A courtesy resignation is just
as effectual as any other resignation.
There can be no implied
promises of another position just because the resignation was made out of
courtesy. Any express promise of another position, on the other hand, would be
void, because there can be no derogation of the discretion of the appointing
power,[30]
and because its object is outside the commerce of man.[31] As held by the Court of Appeals in its
In the first place, petitioner has not
established by any quantum of certainty the veracity of his claim that he was
promised an equivalent position in the government. Assuming, however, that such promise was
true, petitioner, as a ranking member of the bureaucracy, ought to have known
that such promise offers no assurance in law that the same would be complied
with. The time-honored rule is that
public office is a public trust, and as such, the same is governed by law, and
cannot be made the subject of personal promises or negotiations by private
persons.[32]
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari is DENIED. No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice |
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice |
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ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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(No
Part)
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MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
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(On
Leave)
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CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO,
SR.
Associate Justice
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(On
Official Leave)
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ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
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(No Part) |
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ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice |
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Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
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* No part.
** On leave.
*** On official leave.
[1] Ramos v. Ramos, 447 Phil. 114, 119 (2003).
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Japar
B. Dimaampao with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Edgardo F. Sundiam,
concurring; rollo, pp. 50-58.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771, 776 (1997).
[12] Mondragon
Leisure and Resorts Corporation v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No.
154187,
[13] Ao-As v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128464, 20 June 2006, 491 SCRA 339, 354, citing, for the last part, RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, Section 4; But see Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 510 (1996), which distinguishes forum shopping from res judicata.
[14] See Administrative Circular No. 04-94, now incorporated in the Rules of Court under Rule 7, Section 5.
[15] Rollo, p. 124.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 19,
[22] Rollo, p. 205.
[23] Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 20-21; rollo, pp. 206-207.
[24] G.R. No. 139382,
[25] G.R. Nos. 143366 & 143524,
[26] See Manalang v. Quioriano, 94 Phil. 903, 911 (1954); Bermudez v. Executive Secretary Torres, 370 Phil. 769 (1999).
[27] 49 Corpus Juris Secundum § 445, citing Kahl v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., D.C. Ill., 299 F. 793 (U.S.); Donald v. J. J. White Lumber Co., C.C.A.Miss., 68 F.2d 441 (U.S.); Witty v. Rose, Civ.App., 148 S.W.2d 962 (Tex.); Frost v. Frost, 21 S.C. 501 (S.C.).
[28] CA rollo, p. 104. The Resolution provides:
G.R. No. 149883 (Nelson P. Collantes vs. Hon. Secretary Orlando Mercado, etc., et al,). – The Court Resolves to:
(a) NOTE the manifestation of petitioner that he decided not to pursue anymore his appeal, thus he is withdrawing the motion for extension to file a petition for review on certiorari; and
(b) NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the motion for an extension of thirty (30) days from September 21, 2001 within which to file a petition for review on certiorari in view of the manifestation for the withdrawal of the motion.
This case is deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
[29] Rollo, p. 221.
[30] Supra note 26.
[31] Civil
Code, Article 1409(4).
[32] Rollo, p. 108.