SECOND DIVISION
|
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus - PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and PEDRO BALUBAL, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 169596 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: March
28, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for review is
the Court of Appeals’ Decision[1]
dated
Petitioner is a corporation engaged
in the business of providing public transportation. On December 13, 1990, one of its buses, while
traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, swerved and
crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction
Company (PNCC).
The incident was initially
investigated by respondent PNCC’s toll way patrol, Sofronio Salvanera, and respondent
Pedro Balubal (Balubal), then head of traffic control and security department
of the
Subsequently, petitioner made several
requests for PNCC to release the bus, but respondent Balubal denied the same,
despite petitioner’s undertaking to repair the damaged radio room. Respondent Balubal instead demanded the sum
of P40,000.00, or a collateral with the same value, representing
respondent PNCC’s estimate of the cost of reconstruction of the damaged radio
room. By petitioner’s estimate, however,
the damage amounted to P10,000.00 only.[5]
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for
recovery of personal property (replevin) with damages[6] against
respondents PNCC and Balubal with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon,
praying as follows:
x x x x
2. after trial on the issues, judgment be rendered –
a) adjudging that plaintiff has the right to the possession of subject personal property and awarding the material possession of said property to plaintiff as the sole and absolute owner thereof;
b) ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the following:
(1) the sum of P500,000.00 representing unrealized income as of the date of the filing of the instant complaint and, thereafter, the sum of P7,500.00 daily until subject passenger bus shall have been delivered to and in actual material possession of plaintiff;
(2) the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;
(3) the sum of P20,000.00 as litis expenses; and
(4)
the cost of suit.[7]
In view of its inability to put up
the bond for the issuance of a writ of replevin, petitioner opted to forego the
same and just wait for the court’s final judgment.
In respondents’ Answer[8] to
the complaint, they claimed that they merely towed the bus to the PNCC compound
for safekeeping pursuant to an order from the police authorities; that
respondent Balubal did not release the bus to petitioner in the absence of an
order from the police authorities; that petitioner, in claiming the bus, failed
to present the certificate of registration and official receipt of payment to
establish ownership thereof; and that the bus subject of the complaint was not
the same bus involved in the December 13, 1990 accident.
By way of Counterclaim, respondents prayed
for the award of P40,326.54 in actual damages, P50,000.00 in
exemplary damages, and P130,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
By Decision of P40,320.00 representing
actual damages to the radio room.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals[9]
which held that the storage of the bus for safekeeping purposes partakes of the
nature of a deposit, hence, custody or authority over it remained with Lopera
who ordered its safekeeping; and that Lopera acted as respondent PNCC’s agent,
hence, absent any instruction from him, respondent PNCC may not release the
bus.
The appellate court thus concluded
that the case should have been brought against the police authorities instead of
respondents.
Hence,
the present petition for review.
The
petition is impressed with merit.
Before proceeding to the substantive
issues raised in the petition, the Court resolves to dispose first the
procedural issues raised by respondents in their Comment.[10]
Respondents contend that the petition
raises only questions of fact and suffers from a procedural defect in that it failed
to include “such material portions of the record as would support the petition”
as required under Section 4, Rule 45[11]
of the Rules of Court, hence, it should be dismissed outright.
Contrary to respondents’ contention, the
petition raises questions of law foremost of which is whether the owner of a personal
property may initiate an action for replevin against a depositary and recover
damages for illegal distraint.
In any event, while it is settled
that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination
of the evidence presented by the parties, a number of exceptions have
nevertheless been recognized by the Court.
These exceptions are enumerated in Insular
Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals:[12]
It
is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review,
the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive
and binding on the Court. However, the
Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings
of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. x x
x (Italics in original; underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
As will be discussed below, number 11
of the foregoing enumeration applies in the present case.
Respecting the second procedural
issue, as a rule, the failure of a petitioner to comply with any of the
requirements under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents
of and the documents which should accompany the petition constitutes sufficient
ground for its dismissal.[13]
In the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, however, procedural lapses may be disregarded so that a case may
be resolved on its merits. As held in Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan:[14]
It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.
x x
x x (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
The facts and circumstances attendant
to the case dictate that, in the interest of substantial justice, this Court
resolves it on the merits.
On to the substantive issues. Tillson
v. Court of Appeals[15] discusses
the term replevin as follows:
The
term replevin is popularly understood as “the return to or recovery by a person
of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully
taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to try the
matter in court and return the goods if defeated in the action;” “the writ by
or the common-law action in which goods and chattels are replevied,” i.e.,
taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin;” and to replevy, means to recover possession by an action of replevin;
to take possession of goods or chattels under a replevin order. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin as
“a form of action which lies to regain
the possession of personal chattels which have been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully
x x x, (or as) the writ by virtue of which the sheriff proceeds at once to take
possession of the property therein described and transfer it to the plaintiff
upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his
title, or return the chattels taken if he fail so to do; the same authority
states that the term, “to replevy” means “ to re-deliver goods which have been
distrained to the original possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an
action of replevin.” The term therefore may refer either to the
action itself, for the recovery of personality, or the provisional remedy
traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtain[ed]
by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
In a complaint for replevin, the
claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled
to the possession of the object sought to be recovered,[16] and
that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully
detains the same.[17]
Petitioner’s ownership of the bus being
admitted by respondents,[18] consideration
of whether respondents have been wrongfully detaining it is in order.
Following the conduct of an
investigation of the accident, the bus was towed by respondents on the request
of Lopera.[19] It was thus not distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or
preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis.
In upholding the dismissal of
petitioner’s complaint, the Court of Appeals held that while “there is no law
authorizing the impounding of a vehicle involved in an accident by the police
authorities, x x x neither is there a law making the impounding of vehicles
involved in accidents illegal.” It added
that “the Supreme Court is of the view that there is yet no clear-cut policy or
rule on the matter.”[20] The appellate court is mistaken.
The Constitution grants the right against
unreasonable seizures. Thus, Section 2, Article III provides:
The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
(Underscoring supplied)
The seizure and impounding of petitioner’s
bus, on Lopera’s request, were unquestionably violative of “the right to be let
alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.[21]
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Victory Liner, Inc. v. Bellosillo [22] to justify the impounding of vehicles
involved in accidents by police authorities is misplaced. The Victory Liner case was an administrative
case against a trial court judge. This Court
explicitly declined to rule on the legality of such an order:
In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of the legality of respondent’s order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should have raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly to us, and much less by way of an administrative case. x x x
x x
x x
To
allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly
from us through an administrative case would be to countenance a disregard of
the established rules of procedure and of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able to evade compliance
with the requirements inherent in the filing of a property petition, including
the payment of docket fees. Hence, we
shall shun from passing upon that issue in this case.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
This Court’s statement in Victory Liner on the lack of a
“clear-cut policy” refers to the practice, rightly or wrongly, of trial court
judges of issuing orders for the impounding of vehicles involved in
accidents. It has no application to the
instant case which involves the seizure and distraint implemented by
respondents upon a verbal order by Lopera without the benefit or color of
legality afforded by a court process, writ or order.
That a year after the incident the
driver of the bus was criminally charged for reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property in which the bus could possibly be held as evidence does not
affect the outcome of this case.[24] As explained in Bagalihog v. Fernandez:[25]
It
is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be
replevied. But the rule applies only
where the property is lawfully
held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless
searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that
fact alone in custodia legis. As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar, [26] “A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected
to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his
execution of a legal writ.” Only when
property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered
in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics
in the original; citations omitted)
Petitioner’s prayer for recovery of
possession of the bus is, in light of the foregoing discussion, thus in order.
As for petitioner’s claim for
damages, the Court finds that it cannot pass upon the same without impleading
Lopera and any other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and
distraint of the bus. The police authorities,
through Lopera, having turned
over the bus to respondents for
safekeeping, a contract of deposit[27] was
perfected between them and respondents.
Petitioner’s failure to implead
indispensable parties is not, of course, fatal to its cause of action, misjoinder
or non-joinder of parties not being a ground for its dismissal.[28] Domingo
v. Scheer[29] elucidates:
However, the non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or such times as are just.
If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition
for the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
For petitioner to pursue its claim
for damages then, it or the trial court motu
proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties ─ Lopera
and any other responsible police officers.
WHEREFORE, the
assailed Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
The prayer of petitioner, Superlines
Transportation Company, Inc., for recovery of possession of personal property
is GRANTED.
The records of the case are REMANDED to the court of origin, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, which is DIRECTED to REINSTATE petitioner’s
complaint to its docket if petitioner is still interested to pursue its claim
for damages and to act in accordance with the foregoing pronouncement of the
Court.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso; CA rollo, pp. 147-158.
[2] TSN,
[3] Description:
Make –
Fuso (replaced with Nissan Engine)
Type – Bus
Motor
Number – 072020 (replaced with Motor No. 05184)
Serial/Chassis
Number – BM 115LL-20359
Certificate
of Registration No. – 0200047-1
Official
Receipt No. – 316890066
Bus Body No. - 719
Plate No. – TB-DVN-19
(CA rollo, pp. 148-149; Folder of Exhibits, pp. 1-2)
[4] TSN,
[5] TSN,
[6] Records, pp. 1-8.
[7]
[8]
[9] CA
rollo, pp. 147-158.
[10] Rollo, pp. 42-47.
[11] Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Contents of petition. – The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioner or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; 9c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.
[12] G.R. No. 126850,
[13] Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[14] G.R. No. 167136,
[15] G.R. No. 89870,
[16] Distilleria Washington, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 622 (1996).
[17] Twin Ace
Holdings Corporation v. Rufina and Company, G.R. No. 160191,
[18] Records, p. 16.
[19] TSN,
[20] CA rollo, p. 156.
[21] Vide
Bagalihog v. Fernandez, G.R. No.
96356,
[22] A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321,
[23] Supra at 87-88.
[24] Folder of Exhibits, p. 43.
[25] Supra at 621.
[26] 108 Phil. 560 (1960).
[27] Article 1962 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is not deposit but some other contract.
[28] Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. – Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
[29] G.R. No. 154745,