THIRD DIVISION
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RICARDO PORTUGUEZ, Petitioner, - versus - GSIS FAMILY BANK (Comsavings Bank) and THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 169570 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,* CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
For resolution is a Petition
for Review by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, of
the Decision[1]
dated
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, the assailed NLRC Decision dated January 30, 2004, together with the Resolution dated June 22, 2004, are RECALLED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered DISMISSING NLRC NCR CA No. 037015-03 (NLRC NCR Case. No. 07-05075-2002). No pronouncement as to costs.[3]
The factual
and procedural antecedents of this instant petition are as follows:
Petitioner was
employed by the respondent bank as utility clerk on
In addition to his regular duties as BDPR Officer,
petitioner was designated as a member of the Procurement Bidding and Awards
Committee (PBAC), Oversight Committee and Investigating Committee of the
respondent bank.[5]
On
Respondent
bank, on the other hand, is a banking institution duly authorized and existing
as such under the Philippine laws. It
was originally known as Royal Savings Bank.
In 1983 and the early part of 1984, respondent bank underwent serious
liquidity problems and was placed by the Central Bank of the
In 1987, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) acquired the interest of the Commercial Bank of
Accordingly,
Amando Macalino (Macalino) was appointed as President of the respondent bank
on
In line
with its policy to attain financial stability, respondent bank adopted measures
directed to cut down administrative overhead expenses through
streamlining. Thus, respondent bank came
up with an early voluntary retirement program.
On P1.324 Million as retirement
pay.[10]
On
In a Decision[13]
dated
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding
complainant to have been illegally dismissed.
Concomitantly, Respondents are jointly and solidarily
liable to pay RICARDO PORTUGUEZ the following:
P1,148,333.33
– representing backwages;
1,280,000.00 – representing separation pay;
443,884.32
– representing salary differentials;
500,000.00 – representing moral damages;
400,000.00 – representing exemplary damages;
Ten
percent of the total award as attorney’s fees.
Other
claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
The detailed computation of the Computation & Examination
Unit, National Capital Region is made part of this Decision.[14]
Aggrieved,
respondent bank appealed the adverse decision to the NLRC which adopted in toto the findings of the Labor Arbiter. In a Decision[15]
dated
Respondent bank’s Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied by the NLRC in its Resolution[16]
dated
Shortly
thereafter, on
Pending
resolution of its petition and application for the issuance of TRO and/or writ
of preliminary injunction before the appellate court, the Labor Arbiter, on
Acting on
the application for TRO, the Court of Appeals enjoined the implementation of
the NLRC decision dated
Eventually,
the appellate court issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[22]
permanently enjoining the execution of the NLRC decision dated
On 25 April
2005, the Court of Appeals resolved the controversy by reversing the judgment
of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and ruling out constructive dismissal
considering that petitioner’s separation from service was voluntary on his part
when he chose to avail himself of the respondent bank’s early retirement
program and received the amount of P1.324 Million as retirement pay.[23]
Similarly
ill-fated was Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution[24]
dated
Hence, this
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.[25]
For the
resolution of this Court are the following issues:
I.
WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT
CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED FROM EMPLOYMENT.
II.
WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED
TO SALARY DIFFERENTIAL.
Before we
delve into the merits of the case, it is best to underscore that the factual
findings of the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter, who are deemed to
have acquired expertise on the matters within their jurisdiction, when
sufficiently supported by evidence on record, are accorded respect if not
finality, and are considered binding on this Court.[26] It is equally true, however, that when the
findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are inconsistent with that of the
Court of Appeals, there is a need to review the records to determine which of
them should be preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts.[27]
As borne by
the records, it appears that there is a divergence between the findings of the
Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC, and those of the Court of Appeals. For the purpose of clarity and intelligibility,
therefore, this Court will make an infinitesimal scrunity
of the records and recalibrate and reevaluate the evidence presented by the
parties all over again.
We have
already repeatedly held that this Court is not a trier
of facts. Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court limits the office of a Petition for Review to questions of law and
leaves the factual issues as found by the quasi-judicial bodies, as long as
they are supported by evidence.[28] We never fail to stress as well that when the
rulings of the labor tribunal and the appellate court are in conflict, we are
constrained to analyze and weigh the evidence again.[29]
Substantively,
petitioner alleges that respondent bank, through Macalino,
subjected him to all forms of unbearable harassment that can be mustered in
order to force him to resign. Petitioner
specifically claims that he was deprived of his salary and other benefits and
privileges appurtenant to his position as the Acting Assistant Vice-President,
including his office. Respondent bank
allegedly granted much higher salary to the newly hired bank officers compared
to what he was receiving during his tenure.
In contrast, respondent bank maintains that petitioner
was not coerced to resign but voluntarily opted to avail himself of the early
retirement program and was duly paid his retirement benefits. It posits that petitioner was merely holding
the position of Assistant Vice-President in acting capacity subject to the
ratification of the respondent bank’s Board of Directors and since his
appointment has never been ratified by the Board, respondent bank cannot
therefore grant him the salary and benefits accorded to such position.
In finding that petitioner was not constructively dismissed from employment, the Court of Appeals stressed that there was no showing that petitioner’s separation from employment was due to involuntary resignation or forced severance. Neither was it shown that there was a decrease in salary and privileges or downgrading of petitioner’s rank. What can be clearly deduced from the evidence was that until his voluntary retirement in 2001, petitioner was holding the position of Acting Assistant Vice-President and was receiving the salary and benefits accorded thereto.
After
scrupulously examining the contrasting positions of the parties, and the
conflicting decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, on one hand, and the
appellate court, on the other, we find the records of the case bereft of
evidence to substantiate the conclusions reached by both the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC that petitioner was constructively dismissed from employment.
It is upon the
aforementioned legal tenet that petitioner anchored his case. Petitioner strenuously argues that while the
newly hired bank officers were given higher salaries and fat allowances, he was
merely paid the amount of P15,000
basic pay and P4,000 allowance for the position of Acting Assistant Vice-President
which, according to him, was way below what the newly hired bank officers were
enjoying. Stated differently, petitioner
avers that he was discriminated against by the respondent bank in terms of
payment of salary and grant of benefits and allowances.
We do not
agree.
Upon careful perusal of the position papers, memoranda
and other pleadings submitted by petitioner from the Labor Arbiter up to this
Court, including the evidence appended thereon, we find that no evidence,
substantial or otherwise, was ever submitted by petitioner to buttress the very
premise of his position that there was discrimination.
Discrimination has been defined as the failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored.[32] Thus, before a claim for discrimination can prosper, it must be established that, first, there is no reasonable distinction or classification that can be obtained between persons belonging to the same class, and second, persons belonging to the same class have not been treated alike.[33]
Apropos thereto,
petitioner failed to establish that he possessed the same skills, competencies
and expertise as those of the newly hired bank officers so as to eliminate any
possibility of substantial distinction that may warrant the unequal treatment
between them. No proof was likewise
presented by petitioner to show that the functions, duties and responsibilities
he was performing are the same as those of the newly hired bank officers.
Petitioner likewise failed to present any proof
tending to show that he was discriminated against by the respondent bank. While he vigorously cried that the newly
hired bank officers were afforded higher salaries and benefits compared to what
he was earning, petitioner, however, miserably failed to substantiate his
claim. No evidence was ever offered by
petitioner to prove the amount of salaries and bonuses actually enjoyed by the
newly hired bank officers, except for his bare allegations contained in his
demand letter[34]
dated
Mr. Portuguez has reliably learned
that Bank records could show that your newly hired officers are being paid the
basic salaries in the range of P25,000 to P30,000.[35]
Such bare and sweeping statement contains nothing but empty imputation of a fact that could hardly be given any evidentiary weight by this Court. It is indeed true that the demand letter made reference to bank records upon which petitioner purportedly derived his allegation but no such bank records were ever presented as evidence at any stage of the proceedings.
Indubitably, such self-serving and unsubstantiated
declaration is insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial
bodies. Well-entrenched is the rule that
the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in quasi-judicial bodies
is substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable
minds might opine otherwise.[36]
It is beyond question that the evidence presented by
petitioner cannot be considered as substantial evidence. Verily, petitioner’s case is devoid of
substance to convince even the unreasonable minds, for evidently the records
are stripped of supporting proofs to, at the very least, even just verify his
claim.
In addition, petitioner asseverates that in cases of
constructive dismissal, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that
the employee was dismissed on a valid and just cause.[37] And failing to discharge such presumption, as
in the case at bar, respondent bank should be adjudged guilty of illegal
dismissal.
Again, we are not persuaded. We are not unaware of the statutory rule that
in illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the onus probandi to show
that the employee’s separation from employment is not motivated by
discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or
demotion without sufficient cause.[38] It bears stressing, however, that this legal
principle presupposes that there is indeed an involuntary separation from
employment and the facts attendant to such forced separation was clearly
established.
This legal principle has no application in the instant
controversy for as we have succinctly pointed above, petitioner failed to
establish that indeed he was discriminated against and on account of such
discrimination, he was forced to sever his employment from the respondent bank.
What is undisputed is the fact that
petitioner availed himself of respondent bank’s early voluntary retirement program and accordingly received his
retirement pay in the amount of P1.324 Million under such program. Consequently, the burden of proof will not
vest on respondent bank to prove the legality of petitioner’s separation from
employment but aptly remains with the petitioner to prove his allegation that
his availment of the early voluntary retirement
program was, in fact, done involuntarily.
As we have explicitly ruled in Machica
v. Roosevelt Service Center, Inc.[39]:
The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their
allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that the evidence
to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden
of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here because the respondents
deny having dismissed the petitioners.
(Emphases supplied.)
Verily, petitioner did not present any clear, positive
or convincing evidence in the present case to support his claims. Indeed, he never presented any evidence at
all other than his own self-serving declarations. We must bear in mind the legal dictum that, “he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.”[40]
In the same breath, we are constrained to deny
petitioner’s claim for salary differentials.
We are not unmindful that the amount of P19,000 a month may not
be commensurate compensation to the position of Acting Assistant Vice-President,
but in the case at bar, the facts and the evidence did not establish even at
least a rational basis for how much the standard compensation for the said
position must be. It is not enough that
petitioner perceived that he was receiving a very low salary in the absence of
a comparative standard upon which he can peg his supposed commensurate
compensation.
Petitioner’s incessant reliance on the findings of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is equally unavailing. At the outset, we have already laid down that
findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies are conclusive and are not subject to
review by the Court. However, this rule
does not apply if such findings are tainted with mistake or not supported by
evidence. [41]
In finding that respondent bank is guilty of
constructive dismissal, the Labor Arbiter mainly hinges its ruling on the
Constitutional dogma that due to the lopsided power of capital over labor, the
State shall intervene as an equalizer consistent with the social justice policy
affording protection to labor.[42]
While we agree with the Labor Arbiter that in light of
this Constitutional mandate, we must be vigilant in striking down any attempt
of the management to exploit or oppress the working class, it does not mean,
however, that we are but bound to uphold the working class in every labor
dispute brought before this Court for our resolution.
While our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and on the protection of labor, it does
not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has
rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of
fair play.[43]
It should be remembered that the Philippine
Constitution, while inexorably committed towards the protection of the working
class from exploitation and unfair treatment, nevertheless mandates the policy
of social justice so as to strike a balance between an avowed predilection for
labor, on the one hand, and the maintenance of the legal rights of capital, the
proverbial hen that lays the golden egg, on the other. Indeed, we should not be unmindful of the
legal norm that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed
with in light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing
jurisprudence.[44]
The presumption in favor of labor cannot defeat the
very purpose for which our labor laws exist: to balance the conflicting interest
of labor and management and to guaranty that labor and management stand on
equal footing when bargaining in good faith with each other, not to tilt the
scale to favor one over the other.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring.
[2] Rollo, p. 61.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] CA rollo, pp. 2-22.
Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The NLRC
Decision dated
[19] Rollo, pp. 205-208.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Bolinao
Security and Investigation Service, Inc. v. Toston,
G.R. No. 139135,
[27] Philippine
American Life Gen. Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, G.R.
No. 156963,
[28] Dusit
Hotel
[29] J.A.T.
General Services v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 148340,
[30] Unicorn Safety Glass, Inc. v. Basarte, G.R. No. 154689, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 287, 294-295.
[31]
[32] Philippine
American Life Gen. Insurance
[33] Wise
and Co., Inc. v. Wise and Co., Inc. Employees Union-NATU, G.R. No. 87672,
[34] Rollo, p. 80.
[35]
[36] Vertudes
v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 153166,
[37] Suldao
v. Cimtech System Construction, Inc., G.R. No.
171392,
[38] Mendoza v. Rural Bank of Lucban, G.R. No. 155421,
[39] G.R. No. 168664,
[40] Kar
Asia, Inc. v.
[41] J.A.T. General Services v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 29.
[42] Rollo, pp. 114-115.
[43]
[44] Cebu Metal Corporation v. Roberto Saliling, G. R. No. 154463,