THIRD
DIVISION
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SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS &
ESPERANZA LATI
Petitioners, - versus
- SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA
LUMBAO, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 169129 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR.,* CHICO-NAZARIO,
and NACHURA,
JJ. Promulgated: March 28, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and
set aside the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60450 entitled, Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F.
Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos, dated
8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, which granted the appeal filed by
herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao (Spouses Lumbao)
and ordered herein petitioners Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses
Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F.
Santos to reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to
pay the latter attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, thus, reversing the Decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, dated 17 June 1998 which
dismissed the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses
Lumbao for lack of merit.
Herein
petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed
Herein
respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao
are the alleged owners of the 107-square meter lot (subject property), which
they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime.
The
facts of the present case are as follows:
On
two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her
deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on
After
acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual
possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying
as exclusive owners up to the present.
As the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses
Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and
thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents
to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Spouses
Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior
to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver
the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her
and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.
On
2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently
and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement,[6]
adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the estate
left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No. 81729[7] of
the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.
On
Petitioners filed their Answer
denying the allegations that the subject property had been sold to the
respondents Spouses Lumbao. They
likewise denied that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently
executed because the same was duly published as required by law. On the contrary, they prayed for the
dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action because respondents Spouses
Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which
repealed Presidential Decree No. 1508[10]
requiring first resort to barangay conciliation.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with
leave of court, amended their Complaint because they discovered that on P30,000.00. The said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was
annotated at the back of TCT No. PT-81729 on
During the trial, respondents Spouses
Lumbao presented Proserfina Lumbao and Carolina Morales as their witnesses,
while the petitioners presented only the testimony of petitioner Virgilio.
The trial court rendered a Decision
on
Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Considering
that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to protect their interest,
[respondents spouses Lumbao] are hereby directed to pay [petitioners], to wit:
1) the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses,
and 2) costs of the suit.[11]
Aggrieved,
respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court of Appeals. On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated June 17, 1998 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 in
Civil Case No. 62175 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered ordering
[petitioners] to reconvey 107 square meters of the subject [property] covered
by TCT No. PT-81729 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Metro Manila, and
to pay to [respondents spouses Lumbao] the sum of P30,000.00 for
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
No
pronouncement as to costs.[12]
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but it was denied in the
Resolution of the appellate court dated
Hence,
this Petition.
The
grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, THEREBY CREATING A VARIANCE ON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TWO COURTS.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO RECONVEY THE SUBJECT [PROPERTY] TO THE RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES
LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE GUILTY OF LACHES, HENCE THEY CANNOT
RECOVER THE
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO BE IN GOOD FAITH IN EXECUTING THE “DEED OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT” DATED [
IV.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPPOSED
BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [
V. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO’S] ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE WITH DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN UNENFORCEABLE DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981].
VI. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO’S] COMPLAINT FOR RECONVEYANCE IS DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF THE MANDATE OF [P.D. NO.] 1508, AS AMENDED BY Republic Act No. 7160.
VII. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR PETITIONERS’ CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[‘]S FEES.
Petitioners ask this Court to
scrutinize the evidence presented in this case, because they claim that the
factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting. They allege that the findings of fact by the
trial court revealed that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo did not witness the
execution of the documents known as “Bilihan ng Lupa”; hence, this finding runs
counter to the conclusion made by the appellate court. And even assuming that they were witnesses to
the aforesaid documents, still, respondents Spouses Lumbao were not entitled to
the reconveyance of the subject property because they were guilty of laches for
their failure to assert their rights for an unreasonable length of time. Since respondents Spouses Lumbao had slept on
their rights for a period of more than 12 years reckoned from the date of
execution of the second “Bilihan ng Lupa,” it would be unjust and unfair to the
petitioners if the respondents will be allowed to recover the subject property.
Petitioners allege they are in good
faith in executing the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement because even
respondents Spouses Lumbao’s witness, Carolina Morales, testified that neither
petitioner Virgilio nor petitioner Tadeo was present during the execution of
the “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Petitioners affirm that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement was published in a newspaper of general circulation to
give notice to all creditors of the estate subject of partition to contest the
same within the period prescribed by law.
Since no claimant appeared to interpose a claim within the period
allowed by law, a title to the subject property was then issued in favor of the
petitioners; hence, they are considered as holders in good faith and therefore
cannot be barred from entering into any subsequent transactions involving the
subject property.
Petitioners
also contend that they are not bound by the documents denominated as “Bilihan
ng Lupa” because the same were null and void for the following reasons: 1) for being
falsified documents because one of those documents made it appear that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were witnesses to its execution and that they
appeared personally before the notary public, when in truth and in fact they
did not; 2) the identities of the properties in the “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property in litigation
were not established by the evidence presented by the respondents Spouses
Lumbao; 3) the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to lay their claim over
the subject property had already been barred through estoppel by laches; and 4)
the respondents Spouses Lumbao’s claim over the subject property had already
prescribed.
Finally, petitioners claim that the
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao was
dismissible because they failed to comply with the mandate of Presidential Decree
No. 1508, as amended by Republic Act No. 7160, particularly Section 412 of Republic
Act No. 7160.
Given the foregoing, the issues
presented by the petitioners may be restated as follows:
I. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao is dismissible for their failure to comply with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R.A. No. 7160.
II. Whether or not the documents known as “Bilihan ng Lupa” are valid and enforceable, thus, they can be the bases of the respondents spouses Lumbao’s action for reconveyance with damages.
III.
Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to
comply with the “Bilihan ng Lupa” dated
It is well-settled that in the
exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the court is not a trier of
facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering
that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on
the Court.[13] But, the rule is not without exceptions. There are several recognized exceptions[14]
in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court. One of these exceptions is when the findings
of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. This exception is present in the case at bar.
Going
to the first issue presented in this case, it is the argument of the
petitioners that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by
respondents Spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for failure to comply with the
barangay conciliation proceedings as mandated by the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160.
This argument cannot be sustained.
Section
408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular No. 14-93[15]
provide that all disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality are subject to barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition
before filing a complaint in court or any government offices. Non-compliance with the said condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and
make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action
or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent
jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it,
where the defendants failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction.[16]
While
it is true that the present case should first be referred to the Barangay Lupon
for conciliation because the parties involved herein actually reside in the
same city (Pasig City) and the dispute between them involves a real property,
hence, the said dispute should have been brought in the city in which the real
property, subject matter of the controversy, is located, which happens to be
the same city where the contending parties reside. In the
event that respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the said condition
precedent, their Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages can be dismissed. In this case, however, respondents Spouses
Lumbao’s non-compliance with the aforesaid condition precedent cannot be
considered fatal. Although petitioners
alleged in their answer that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed
by respondents spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for their failure to comply
with the condition precedent, which in effect, made the complaint prematurely
instituted and the trial court acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case, yet,
they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said complaint.
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners
could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case
had they filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of doing so, they invoked
the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer seeking an affirmative relief
from it. Worse, petitioners actively
participated in the trial of the case by presenting their own witness and by
cross-examining the witnesses presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is elementary that the active
participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court is
tantamount to recognition of that court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on
impugning the court’s jurisdiction.[17] It is also well-settled that the non-referral
of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not
jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably in a motion to dismiss.[18] Hence, herein petitioners can no longer raise
the defense of non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings to
seek the dismissal of the complaint filed by the respondents Spouses Lumbao,
because they already waived the said defense when they failed to file a Motion
to Dismiss.
As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are null and void for being falsified documents as it is made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the execution of the said documents and that the identities of the properties in those documents in relation to the subject property has not been established by the evidence of the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Petitioners also claim that the enforceability of those documents is barred by prescription of action and laches.
It is the petitioners’ incessant barking
that the “Bilihan ng Lupa” documents dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981 were falsified because it was made to appear that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the executions thereof, and their
allegation that even respondents Spouses Lumbao’s witness Carolina Morales
proved that said petitioners were not present during the execution of the aforementioned
documents. This is specious.
Upon examination of the aforesaid
documents, this Court finds that in the “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Now, you said, Mr. Witness…Virgilio Santos, that you don’t know about this document which was marked as Exhibit “A” for the [respondents spouses Lumbao]?
ATTY. BUGARING:
The question is misleading, your Honor. Counsel premised the question that he does not have any knowledge but not that he does not know.
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Being… you are one of the witnesses of this document? [I]s it not?
WITNESS:
A. No, sir.
Q. I am showing to you this document, there is a signature at the left hand margin of this document Virgilio Santos, will you please go over the same and tell the court whose signature is this?
A. I don’t remember, sir, because of the length of time that had passed.
Q. But that is your signature?
A. I don’t have eyeglasses… My signature is different.
Q. You never appeared before this notary public Apolinario Mangahas?
A. I don’t remember.[20]
As a general
rule, facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed admissions of that party
and are binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact which
the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence.[21] And in spite of the presence of judicial
admissions in a party’s pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to
consider other evidence presented.[22] However, in the case at bar, as the Court of
Appeals mentioned in its Decision, “[herein petitioners] had not adduced any
other evidence to override the admission made in their [A]nswer that [petitioners
Virgilio and Tadeo] actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979]
except that they were just misled as to the purpose of the document, x x x.”[23] Virgilio’s answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the admissions
made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in
this case.
On the
testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbao’s witness Carolina Morales, this Court
adopts the findings made by the appellate court. Thus -
[T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question during cross-examination if the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with her and the vendor [Rita] during the transaction. It must be pointed out that earlier in the direct examination of said witness, she confirmed that [respondents spouses Lumbao] actually bought the lot from [Rita] (“nagkabilihan”). Said witness positively identified and confirmed the two (2) documents evidencing the sale in favor of [respondents spouse Lumbao]. Thus, her subsequent statement that the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with them during the transaction does not automatically imply that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] did not at any time sign as witnesses as to the deed of sale attesting to their mother’s voluntary act of selling a portion of her share in her deceased mother’s property. The rule is that testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.[24]
Furthermore,
both “Bilihan ng Lupa” documents
dated
The defense of petitioners that the
identities of the properties described in the “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated
It is noteworthy that at the time of
the execution of the documents denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa,” the entire
property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and
her co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only
description that can be placed in the “Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979
and 9 January 1981” because the exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold
to respondents Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that time. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract
of sale between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law
and jurisprudence have categorically held that even while an estate remains
undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots or
undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them.[28] The co-owner, however, has no right to sell
or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common,
because such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion
without any physical division. In any
case, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a concrete portion does
not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with respect to
the aliquot share of the selling co-owner.
Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon
the termination of the co-ownership.[29]
In the case at bar, when the estate
left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the
petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from the total lot,
inherited by them in representation of their deceased mother, which in this
case measures 467 square meters. The 107-square
meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited
by the petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as
it was already sold during the lifetime of their mother.
Likewise, the fact that the property
mentioned in the two “Bilihan ng
Lupa” documents was described as “a portion of a
parcel of land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-018-01674,” while the subject
matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the property described in Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3216 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal in the name of Maria is of no moment because in the “Bilihan ng Lupa,”
dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, it is clear that there was only one
estate left by Maria upon her death. And this fact was not refuted by the
petitioners. Besides, the property
described in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and the property mentioned in TCT
No. 3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario,
The defense of prescription of action
and laches is likewise unjustifiable. In
an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead
is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person’s name to its rightful or legal owner,
or to the one with a better right. It
is, indeed, true that the right to seek reconveyance of registered property is
not absolute because it is subject to extinctive prescription. However, when
the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, prescription
cannot set in. Such an exception is
based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield
for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.[30]
In the case at bar, the right of the
respondents Spouses Lumbao to seek reconveyance does not prescribe because the
latter have been and are still in actual possession and occupation as owners of
the property sought to be reconveyed, which fact has not been refuted nor
denied by the petitioners. Furthermore,
respondents Spouses Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches because from the
very start that they bought the 107-square meter lot from the mother of the
petitioners, they have constantly asked for the transfer of the certificate of
title into their names but Rita, during her lifetime, and the petitioners,
after the death of Rita, failed to do so on the flimsy excuse that the lot had
not been partitioned yet. Inexplicably,
after the partition of the entire estate of Maria, petitioners still included
the 107-square meter lot in their inheritance which they divided among
themselves despite their knowledge of the contracts of sale between their
mother and the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
Under the above premises, this Court holds
that the “Bilihan ng Lupa” documents dated
Finally, the general rule that heirs
are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest applies
in the present case. Article 1311[32]
of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It
is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the
decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of
succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the
decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs.[33] Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal
consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest
because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting
their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them
and their deceased mother. They only
succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against
her is also valid and binding as against them.
The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which
involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the
personal representatives of the deceased.
Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when
the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.[34]
In the end, despite the death of the petitioners’
mother, they are still bound to comply with the provisions of the “Bilihan ng
Lupa,” dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
On leave
Associate Justice Associate Justice
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ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring, rollo, pp. 47-62.
[2]
[3] Penned by Judge Ma. Cristina C. Estrada, rollo, pp. 103-114.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] A decree, “Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay Level.”
[11] Rollo, p. 114.
[12]
[13] Almendrala
v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408,
[14] Recognized exceptions to this rule
are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the finding of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee
and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion [Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank,
G.R. No. 139437, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 542; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commissions, 390 Phil. 1228, 1243
(2000); Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phils.), Inc., 364 Phil. 541,
546-547 (1999); Sta. Maria v. Court of
Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998); Almendrala
v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408,
[15] Guidelines on the Katarungang Pambarangay Conciliation Procedure to Prevent Circumvention of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Sections 399-442, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, R.A. No. 7160,otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991] issued by the Supreme Court on 15 July 1993.
[16] Royales
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-65072,
[17] Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation v. Amante,
G.R. No. 112526,
[18]
Bañares II v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624,
[19] Rollo, pp. 87, 97.
[20] TSN,
[21] Atillo
III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119053,
[22]
[23] Rollo, p. 55.
[24]
[25] Rule 132, Section 19(b) of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
[26] Id., Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence; Medina v. Greenfield Development Corporation, G.R. No. 140228, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 150, 160; Agasen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115508, 15 February 2000, 325 SCRA 504, 511.
[27]
[28] Barcenas
v. Tomas, G.R. No. 150321,
[29] Heirs
of the Late Spouses Aurelio and Esperanza Balite v. Lim, G.R. No. 152168,
[30] Heirs of Pomposa Saludares v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128254, 16 January 2004, 420 SCRA 51, 56-58.
[31] Heirs of Eduardo Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125585, 8 June 2005, 459 SCRA 412, 426.
[32] Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.
[33]
[34] DKC Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 118248, 5 April 2000, 329 SCRA 666, 674-675.
[35] Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs cannot be recovered, except:
(1) x x x
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) x x x