SECOND DIVISION
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ROLANDO TING, Petitioner, - versus - HEIRS OF
DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA
L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 168913 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Decision of
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became
final and executory on
On
The herein
respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely:
Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L.
Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who
were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner’s application
by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer[2] calling attention to the December 10, 1976
decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory on
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata. [3]
Hence,
the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of
whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision
in LRC No. N-983 had become final and
executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the
Land Registration Authority (LRA);[4]
it was only on July 26, 2003 that the “extinct” decision belatedly surfaced as
basis of respondents’ motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N;[5]
and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents
after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, “the cause of action in
the dormant judgment passé[d] into extinction.”[6]
Petitioner
thus concludes that an “extinct” judgment cannot be the basis of res
judicata.[7]
The
petition fails.
Section
30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree
provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. – The judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days[8] to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and
executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in
accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance
of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in
favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)
In
a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land,
with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of
the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration
in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole
world.[9] It becomes final when no appeal within the
reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.[10]
The
land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration
court’s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza’s
application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding
on the whole world including petitioner.
Explaining
his position that the
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before
said resurvey may be used in court; and that the spouses Lirio did not comply
with the said requirement for they instead submitted to the court a mere
special work order.[11]
There is, however, no showing that
the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer Belleza and that it reported such
claim to the land registration court for appropriate action or reconsideration
of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners
insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the
decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act
under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the
decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no
discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in
relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to
refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the
court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the
court. They are specifically called upon
to “extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings.”[12] (Emphasis
supplied)
As for petitioner’s claim that under
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC.
6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date
of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
The revived judgment may also be
enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred
by the statute of limitations[,]
the
Sta.
Ana v. Menla, et al.[13]
enunciates the raison d’etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in
land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT
THE
We fail to understand the arguments
of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it
supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has
become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years,
except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for
this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment
may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10
years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to
civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party,
and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided
in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In
special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a
person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the
ownership has been proved and confirmed
by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,
except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and
the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no
provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except
the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of
possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon
the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of
the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
Costs
against petitioner, Rolando Ting.
SO
ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 8.
[2] Records, pp. 219-220.
[3] Rollo, p. 23.
[4]
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7]
[8] The first paragraph of Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129 or The Judiciary Reorganization Act OF 1980 provides:
SEC. 39. Appeals.
– The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution , award, judgment, or decision appealed
from: Provided, however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment
appealed from.
[9] Noblejas and Noblejas, Registration Of Land Titles And Deeds 136 (1992 ed.)
[10]
[11] Rollo, p. 13.
[12] Gomez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-77770,
[13] 111 Phil. 947, 951 (1961); vide also Cacho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123361, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 159,
170-171.