THIRD
DIVISION
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ANTONIO B. MONFORT III and ILDEFONSO B.
MONFORT, Petitioners, -versus
– MA. ANTONIA M. SALVATIERRA, PAUL MONFORT, RAMON
H. MONFORT, JACQUELINE M. YUSAY, YVETTE M. BENEDICTO, ESTER
Respondents.
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G.R. No.
168301 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: March
5, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
In this
Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners Antonio B. Monfort
III and Ildefonso B. Monfort
seek to set aside the Decision dated 28 January 2005[2] and
Resolution dated 26 May 2005[3] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67109. In its Decision and Resolution, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Resolutions dated
The
factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioners
are children of the late Antonio H. Monfort, Jr., one
of the original stockholders/incorporators of the Monfort
Hermanos Agricultural Development Corporation
(MHADC).[6] On
Subsequently,
private respondents filed their joint counter-affidavits dated
Private
respondents thus argue that they cannot be held liable for perjury since one of
the elements of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is that the
assertion of falsehood must be willful and deliberate; that the terms willful
and deliberate imply malice and evil intent in asserting falsehood; and that
this element is lacking in the case at bar.[9]
Thereafter,
Investigating Prosecutor Abraham E. Tionko
(Investigator Tionko) issued a Resolution dated
As to
the matter of whether or not the stockholders may hold their annual meeting on
a date other than that specified in its by-laws, Investigator Tionko opined that such is not within the province of his
office to rule.[12]
He,
thereafter, made the following findings: that it was not impossible for the
MHADC stockholders to have conducted their annual meeting on 16 October 1996;
that there would have been willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on the
part of the private respondents only if no error was committed in the
preparation of the 1996 GIS of MHADC; that private respondent Ramon H. Monfort was not aware of the said errors at the time he
subscribed and swore to the correctness of the 1996 GIS of MHADC as
Vice-President thereof; that upon the discovery of the errors, the LDA sent a
letter to the SEC providing the latter with the correct information; that such
should be considered as mere negligence and imprudence on the part of private
respondent Ramon H. Monfort; and that the crime of
perjury cannot be committed by negligence or imprudence. The dispositive
portion of Investigator Tionko’s Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the
undersigned believes there is no probable cause to support a finding of perjury
against all of the respondents and this complaint is hereby dismissed.[13]
Petitioners
appealed the aforementioned Resolution to the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor for Region VI. In his
Resolution dated
We then ruled and so
rules here, that an erroneous document is incorrect and therefore not the
truth. It cannot be used as basis to charge the respondents for Perjury, for
the simple reason that it is not an evidence that they lied under oath. In
fact, it is an evidence not only of it being an incorrect document but also of
the fact that the
In view of the
foregoing, the appeal should be, as it is hereby dismissed.[17]
Petitioners,
then, appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Finding no reversible error in Prosecutor Aragona’s Resolution dated
This resolves the appeal
from the resolution of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region VI,
Section 9 of Department
Order No. 223 dated June 30 1993, as amended, (now Section 12 in relation to
Section 7 of Department Circular No. 70 dated 3 July 2000), prescribing rules
on appeals from resolution in preliminary investigations provides that the
Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio, dismiss outright an appeal if there is showing
of any reversible error in the questioned resolution. We have carefully examined
the record of the case and we found no such error committed by the prosecutor
that would justify a reversal of his resolution, which is in accord with the
law and evidence on the matter.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.[19]
Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of Undersecretary Puno’s
Resolution dated
A perusal of the motion
shows no new matter which was not taken into consideration in our review of the
case. Hence, we find no compelling
reason to alter or modify our resolution.
WHEREFORE, the motion
for reconsideration is hereby DENIED with finality.[21]
Petitioners
appealed the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the petition
filed in this case and AFFIRMING the Resolutions dated
Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals
in its Resolution dated
Petitioners
filed the present petition raising the sole issue of whether or not the Court
of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the Secretary of Justice that there
is no probable cause to indict the private respondents for the crime of perjury.[26]
According
to the petitioners, the insistence of the private respondents that the annual
stockholders’ meeting of MHADC took place on 16 October 1996, and that they
were elected during the said meeting as board directors constitute willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood because it is not in harmony with the
constitution and by-laws of MHADC which provides that the annual stockholders’
meeting and the election of board directors shall be held every last Thursday
of November for each year. They stressed
the fact that the date
Petitioners
also averred that the correction of the alleged erroneous entries in the 1996
GIS of MHADC was made by the LDA, MHADC’s corporate
accountant, only after the lapse of two years from the execution of the said
document. They argued that the same was
a futile attempt on the part of the private respondents to escape criminal
liability since: a) at the time the corrections were made, they had already
charged private respondent Ramon H. Monfort with
perjury and falsification of private document for including in the 1996 GIS of
the MHADC the names of stockholders who were already deceased as elected board
directors of MHADC;[28]
b) the alleged errors in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC, particularly in the
composition of the alleged elected board of directors, is belied by the 1997
GIS of MHADC filed by private respondent Ramon H. Monfort
which reiterated the names of the deceased stockholders as elected directors of
MHADC; this is not just one mistake but two mistakes already; c) there was
ill-motive on the part of the private respondents when it sent, through LDA, a
letter to the SEC to correct the alleged errors because at the time such letter
was received by the SEC, the City Prosecutor of Cadiz had already issued a
resolution in I.S. No. 7883 finding probable cause for perjury against private
respondents; and d) at the time of the correction of errors, a total of six or
more criminal cases for perjury were already filed by the petitioners against
private respondents and some are still pending resolution.[29]
Petitioners
further asseverated that the private respondents’ statements in their
respective counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998 in I.S. No. 7883 that they
were elected board directors during the 16 October 1996 annual stockholders’ meeting show willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood since the private respondents had made these
same statements as their bases in filing civil cases for forcible entry and
delivery of personal property against petitioners which cases, however, were
eventually dismissed by this Court in G.R. No. 152542 and No. 155472.[30] They posited that this Court had dismissed the
civil cases as the private respondents failed to establish the fact that they
were duly elected as board directors of MHADC and, as such, were not authorized
to file the said cases. Based on these premises, petitioners concluded that
there is more than enough evidence to support the finding of probable cause for
perjury against private respondents.[31]
These
contentions are devoid of merit.
It
should be emphasized at the outset that the function of a preliminary
investigation is to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.[32] It is through the conduct of a preliminary
investigation that the prosecutor determines the existence of a probable cause
that would warrant the prosecution of a case.[33]
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined
as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the private respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe
or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean “actual or positive cause;”
nor does it import absolute certainty. It
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.[34]
In this
proceeding, the prosecutor is vested with authority and discretion to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of corresponding
information.[35] If the prosecutor found probable cause to
indict the respondent for a criminal offense, it is his duty to file the
corresponding information in court.[36] However, it is equally his duty not to
prosecute when after an investigation, the evidence adduced is not sufficient
to establish a prima facie case.[37] We explained the rationale in the case of People v. Pineda,[38]
thus:
A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his
office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where
he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or
that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the
commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a
prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his
conviction. In case of doubt, we should
give him the benefit thereof. A contrary
rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious
cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect’s
right to due process - the sporting idea of fair play - may be transgressed. x x x.
Perjury
is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter.[39]
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code states the definition of and penalty for
perjury, thus:
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury
in solemn affirmation. The penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly make
untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next
preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case
of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the
falsehoods mentioned made in this and the three preceding articles of this
section shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.
As can
be gleaned from the foregoing, the elements of perjury are as follows:
(a)
That
the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter.
(b)
That
the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath.
(c)
That
in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.
(d)
That
the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.[40]
The
third element of perjury requires that the accused had willfully and
deliberately asserted a falsehood. A
mere assertion of a false objective fact is not sufficient. The assertion must be deliberate and willful.[41]
In the
instant case, the petitioners failed to establish the fact that the private respondents
made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in their
counter-affidavits dated
Private
respondent Ramon H. Monfort had sufficiently and
reasonably explained the circumstances surrounding the preparation and his
signing of the erroneous statements in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC. He narrated that as Vice-President of the
MHADC, he signed and certified the same under oath; that he was not, however,
aware of the erroneous statements therein at the time when he signed it; that
it was LDA as MHADC’s corporate accountant which had
solely prepared the 1996 GIS of the MHADC; that he always relied on the
accuracy of LDA; that he hastily signed it since, at that time, the LDA
representative was in a hurry to beat the deadline in submitting the same to
the SEC; that after being informed of
the erroneous statements, the LDA sent a letter to the SEC informing the latter
of the mistakes and supplying the correct informations
therein; that the erroneous statements were due to the oversight of the LDA;
and, that he admitted that he was negligent in not carefully reading and
analyzing the statements therein.[42]
The naïve
reliance of the private respondents on the foregoing circumstances in executing
their respective counter-affidavits dated
In this
case, the private respondents believed in good faith that, based on the
above-explained events, their statements in their respective counter- affidavits
dated
It
should also be borne in mind that perjury cannot be willful where the oath is
according to belief or conviction as to its truth. Bona fide
belief in the truth of a statement is an adequate defense.[46] The private respondents had consistently
claimed that the 1996 GIS of the MHADC is erroneous on its face. They have maintained all along their stand
that the annual stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held on
Further,
the Secretary of Justice had found that the 1996 GIS of the MHADC is patently erroneous.
It concluded that the same is worthless
and has no probative value in evidence because it does not establish the fact
that the true date of the annual stockholders’ meeting for the year 1996 took
place on
As a
general rule, this Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information
against an offender.[49] As an exception, however, this Court may
inquire into the determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation if, based on the records, the prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion.[50] In the case at bar, the City Prosecutor of
Cadiz, the Regional State Prosecutor for Region VI, and the Secretary of
Justice had consistently ruled that there is no probable cause to indict the
private respondents for the crime of perjury.
We find no grave abuse of discretion or manifest error on their part
considering the fact that their non-finding of probable cause is supported by
the evidence on record. It is well to
state, too, that the resolution of the Secretary of Justice declaring the
absence or existence of a probable cause and affirmed by the Court of Appeals
is accorded high respect and generally conclusive on this Court.[51] We find no exceptional reasons to deviate
from this principle.
The pronouncements
of this Court in G.R. No. 152542 and No. 155472[52]
do not automatically imply that there is sufficient evidence or probable cause
to indict the private respondents for the crime of perjury. It should be
underscored that in G.R. No. 152542 and No. 155472, there is no finding with
regard to the correct date of the 1996 annual stockholders’ meeting and the
election of the board of directors as to bind this Court in the Petition at
bar.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67109 dated
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice |
*
On leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-20.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican
with Associate Justices Sesinado E. Villon and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.,
concurring; rollo,
pp. 163-172.
[3]
[4] Penned
by Undersecretary of Justice Regis V. Puno; id. at 320-321.
[5] Penned
by Undersecretary of Justice Manuel A.J. Teehankee; id.
at 328.
[6] Records
of the Department of Justice, Exh. D.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] The
following MHADC stockholders passed away during the 1980’s: Antonio H. Monfort, Jr., Jesus Antonio H. Monfort,
Francisco H. Monfort, and Joaquin H. Monfort.
[12] Rollo, pp. 61-63.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] Promulgated
[31] Rollo, pp. 17-19.
[32] Rule
112, Section 1, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[33] Alonzo v.
[34] Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice, G.R.
No. 162187,
[35] Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944, 946 (1958).
[36] Rollo, pp. 15-17.
[37]
[38] G.R.
No. L-26222,
[39] Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice, supra
note 34 at 513.
[40] Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 65006,
[41]
[42] Rollo, pp.
371-373.
[43]
[44]
[45] Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for
[46] Rollo, p. 514.
[47]
[48] Records
of the Department of Justice, Exh. 3.
[49] Punzalan v. Dela Pena, G.R.
No. 158543,
[50] Filadams Pharma, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132422, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 460, 470.
[51] Rollo, p. 512.
[52]