THIRD
DIVISION
|
ROWELL INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus
- HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOEL TARIPE, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 167714 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: March
7, 2007 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
case is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to set aside the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74104, entitled, Rowell Industrial Corp., and/or Edwin Tang vs. National Labor Relations
Commission and Joel Taripe, dated 30 September 2004 and 1 April 2005,
respectively, which affirmed the Resolutions[3] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 7 June 2002 and 20 August
2002, finding herein respondent Joel Taripe (Taripe) as a regular employee who had
been illegally dismissed from employment by herein petitioner Rowell Industrial
Corp. (RIC), thereby ordering petitioner RIC to reinstate respondent Taripe
with full backwages, subject to the modification of exonerating Edwin Tang, the
RIC General Manager and Vice President, from liability and computing the backwages
of herein respondent Taripe based on the prevailing salary rate at the time of
his dismissal. The NLRC Resolutions
reversed the Decision[4] of
the Labor Arbiter dated
Petitioner RIC is a corporation engaged in
manufacturing tin cans for use in packaging of consumer products, e.g., foods, paints, among other things. Respondent Taripe was employed by petitioner
RIC on 8 November 1999 as a “rectangular power press machine operator” with a
salary of P223.50 per day, until he was allegedly dismissed from his
employment by the petitioner on 6 April 2000.
The controversy of the present case
arose from the following facts, as summarized by the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals:
On
[
[Petitioner
RIC], for [its] part, claim[s] that [respondent Taripe] was a contractual
employee, whose services were required due to the increase in the demand in
packaging requirement of [its] clients for Christmas season and to build up
stock levels during the early part of the following year; that on [6 March
2000], [respondent Taripe’s] employment contract expired. [Petitioner RIC] avers that the information
update for union members, which was allegedly filled up by [respondent Taripe]
and submitted by the Union to [petitioner] company, it is stated therein that
in the six (6) companies where [respondent Taripe] purportedly worked, the latter’s
reason for leaving was “finished contract,” hence, [respondent Taripe] has
knowledge about being employed by contract contrary to his allegation that the
document he was signing was not explained to him. [Petitioner RIC] manifest[s] that all benefits,
including those under the [Social Security System], were given to him on [
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring this complaint of [herein respondent Taripe] against [herein petitioner RIC] and Mr. Edwin Tang for illegal dismissal DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, on ground of compassionate justice, [petitioner RIC and Mr. Edwin Tang] are hereby ordered to pay [respondent Taripe] the sum of PHP5,811.00 or one month’s salary as financial assistance and holiday pay in the sum of PHP894.00, as well as attorney’s fees of 10% based on holiday pay (Article 110, Labor Code).[6]
Aggrieved,
respondent Taripe appealed before the NLRC. In a Resolution dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein respondent Taripe’s] appeal is GRANTED. The Labor Arbiter’s [D]ecision in the above-entitled case is hereby REVERSED. It is hereby declared that [respondent Taripe’s] employment with [herein petitioner RIC and Mr. Edwin Tang] is regular in status and that he was illegally dismissed therefrom.
[Petitioner
RIC and Mr. Edwin Tang] are hereby ordered to reinstate [respondent Taripe] and
to jointly and severally pay him full backwages from the time he was illegally
dismissed up to the date of his actual reinstatement, less the amount of P1,427.67. The award of P894.00 for holiday pay is AFFIRMED but the award of P5,811.00 for
financial assistance is deleted. The
award for attorney’s fees is hereby adjusted to ten percent (10%) of
[respondent Taripe’s] total monetary award.[7]
Dissatisfied,
petitioner RIC moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but it
was denied in the Resolution of the NLRC dated
Consequently,
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of
Appeals with the following assignment of errors:
I. THE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND IS IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT MISINTERPRETED ARTICLE 280 OF THE LABOR CODE AND IGNORED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DECIDED THAT [RESPONDENT TARIPE] IS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE AND THUS, ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.
II. THE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND IS IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED [EDWIN TANG] TO (sic) JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR MONETARY CLAIMS OF [RESPONDEN TARIPE].
III. THE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND IS IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED PAYMENT OF MONETARY CLAIMS COMPUTED ON AN ERRONEOUS WAGE RATE.[8]
The Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision on
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated [7
June 2002] and [20 August 2002] of [the NLRC] are affirmed, subject to the
modification that [Edwin Tang] is exonerated from liability and the computation
of backwages of [respondent Taripe] shall be based on P223.50, the last salary
he received.[9]
A Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Decision was filed by petitioner RIC, but the same was denied for
lack of merit in a Resolution[10]
of the Court of Appeals dated
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner RIC comes before this
Court with the lone issue of whether the Court of Appeals misinterpreted Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, and ignored jurisprudence when it
affirmed that respondent Taripe was a
regular employee and was illegally dismissed.
Petitioner RIC, in its Memorandum,[11]
argues that the Court of Appeals had narrowly interpreted Article 280 of the
Labor Code, as amended, and disregarded a contract voluntarily entered into by
the parties.
Petitioner RIC emphasizes that while an
employee’s status of employment is vested by law pursuant to Article 280 of the
Labor Code, as amended, said provision of law admits of two exceptions, to
wit: (1) those employments which have
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination
of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employment;
and (2) when the work or services to be performed are seasonal; hence, the
employment is for the duration of the season.
Thus, there are certain forms of employment which entail the performance
of usual and desirable functions and which exceed one year but do not
necessarily qualify as regular employment under Article 280 of the Labor Code,
as amended.
The Petition is unmeritorious.
A closer examination of Article 280
of the Labor Code, as amended, is imperative to resolve the issue raised in the
present case.
In declaring that respondent Taripe
was a regular employee of the petitioner and, thus, his dismissal was illegal,
the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this manner:
In determining the employment status of [herein respondent Taripe], reference must be made to Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:
x x x x
Thus, there are two kinds of regular employees, namely: (1) those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and (2) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. [Respondent Taripe] belonged to the first category of regular employees.
The purported contract of employment providing that [respondent Taripe] was hired as contractual employee for five (5) months only, cannot prevail over the undisputed fact that [respondent Taripe] was hired to perform the function of power press operator, a function necessary or desirable in [petitioner’s] business of manufacturing tin cans. [Herein petitioner RIC’s] contention that the four (4) months length of service of [respondent Taripe] did not grant him a regular status is inconsequential, considering that length of service assumes importance only when the activity in which the employee has been engaged to perform is not necessary or desirable to the usual business or trade of the employer.
As aptly ruled by [the NLRC]:
“In the instant case, there is no
doubt that [respondent Taripe], as power press operator, has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in [petitioner RIC’s]
usual business or trade of manufacturing of tin cans for use in packaging of
food, paint and others. We also find
that [respondent Taripe] does not fall under any of the abovementioned exceptions. Other that (sic) [petitioner RIC’s] bare
allegation thereof, [it] failed to present any evidence to prove that he was
employed for a fixed or specific project or undertaking the completion of which
has been determined at the time of his engagement or that [respondent Taripe’s]
services are seasonal in nature and that his employment was for the duration of
the season.”[12]
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as
amended, provides:
ART. 280. REGULAR AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. - The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An
employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to
the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while
such activity exists. [Emphasis supplied]
The aforesaid Article 280 of the
Labor Code, as amended, classifies employees into three categories, namely: (1)
regular employees or those whose
work is necessary or desirable to the usual business of the employer; (2) project
employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project
or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season; and (3) casual employees or
those who are neither regular nor project employees.[13]
Regular employees are further
classified into: (1) regular employees by nature of work; and (2) regular
employees by years of service.[14] The former refers to those employees who perform
a particular activity which is necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, regardless of their length of service; while the latter
refers to those employees who have been performing the job, regardless of the
nature thereof, for at least a year.[15]
The aforesaid Article 280 of the
Labor Code, as amended, however, does not proscribe or prohibit an employment
contract with a fixed period. It does
not necessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist of
activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the
employer, the parties are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the
performance of such activities. There is
nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and
the nature of the employee’s duties.[16] What Article 280 of the Labor Code, as
amended, seeks to prevent is the practice of some unscrupulous and covetous
employers who wish to circumvent the law that protects lowly workers from
capricious dismissal from their employment.
The aforesaid provision, however, should not be interpreted in such a
way as to deprive employers of the right and prerogative to choose their own
workers if they have sufficient basis to refuse an employee a regular
status. Management has rights which
should also be protected.[17]
In the case at bar, respondent Taripe
signed a contract of employment prior to his admission into the petitioner’s
company. Said contract of employment
provides, among other things:
4. That my employment shall be contractual for the period of five (5) months which means that the end of the said period, I can (sic) discharged unless this contract is renewed by mutual consent or terminated for cause.[18]
Based on the said contract,
respondent Taripe’s employment with the petitioner is good only for a period of
five months unless the said contract is renewed by mutual consent. And as claimed by petitioner RIC, respondent
Taripe, along with its other contractual employees, was hired only to meet the increase
in demand for packaging materials during the Christmas season and also to build
up stock levels during the early part of the year.
Although Article 280 of the Labor
Code, as amended, does not forbid fixed term employment, it must, nevertheless,
meet any of the following guidelines in order that it cannot be said to
circumvent security of tenure: (1) that the
fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the
parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear
upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or
(2) it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being
exercised by the former on the latter.[19]
In
the present case, it cannot be denied that the employment contract signed by
respondent Taripe did not mention that he was hired only for a specific
undertaking, the completion of which had been determined at the time of his
engagement. The said employment contract
neither mentioned that respondent Taripe’s services were seasonal in nature and
that his employment was only for the duration of the Christmas season as purposely
claimed by petitioner RIC. What was
stipulated in the said contract was that respondent Taripe’s employment was contractual
for the period of five months.
Likewise, as the NLRC mentioned in
its Resolution, to which the Court of Appeals agreed, other than the bare
allegations of petitioner RIC that respondent Taripe was hired only because of
the increase in the demand for packaging materials during the Christmas season,
petitioner RIC failed to substantiate such claim with any other evidence. Petitioner RIC did not present any evidence
which might prove that respondent Taripe was employed for a fixed or specific
project or that his services were seasonal in nature.
Also, petitioner RIC failed to
controvert the claim of respondent Taripe that he was made to sign the contract
of employment, prepared by petitioner RIC, as a condition for his hiring. Such contract in which the terms are prepared
by only one party and the other party merely affixes his signature signifying
his adhesion thereto is called contract
of adhesion.[20] It is an agreement in which the parties bargaining
are not on equal footing, the weaker party’s participation being reduced to the
alternative “to take it or leave it.”[21] In the present case, respondent Taripe, in
need of a job, was compelled to agree to the contract, including the five-month
period of employment, just so he could be hired. Hence, it cannot be argued that respondent
Taripe signed the employment contract with a fixed term of five months
willingly and with full knowledge of the impact thereof.
With regard to the second guideline,
this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner RIC and respondent
Taripe cannot be said to have dealt with each other on more or less equal terms
with no moral dominance exercised by the former over the latter. As a power press operator, a rank and file
employee, he can hardly be on equal terms with petitioner RIC. As the Court of Appeals said, “almost always,
employees agree to any terms of an employment contract just to get employed
considering that it is difficult to find work given their ordinary
qualifications.”[22]
Therefore,
for failure of petitioner RIC to comply with the necessary guidelines for a valid
fixed term employment contract, it can be safely stated that the aforesaid
contract signed by respondent Taripe for a period of five months was a mere
subterfuge to deny to the latter a regular status of employment.
Settled
is the rule that the primary standard of determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee
in relation to the casual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of
the particular business or trade in its entirety.[23]
Given the foregoing, this Court
agrees in the findings of the Court of Appeals and the NLRC that, indeed,
respondent Taripe, as a rectangular power press machine operator, in charge of
manufacturing covers for “four liters rectangular tin cans,” was holding a
position which is necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of
petitioner RIC, which was the manufacture of tin cans. Therefore, respondent Taripe was a regular
employee of petitioner RIC by the nature of work he performed in the company.
Respondent Taripe does not fall under
the exceptions mentioned in Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, because
it was not proven by petitioner RIC that he was employed only for a specific
project or undertaking or his employment was merely seasonal. Similarly, the position and function of power
press operator cannot be said to be merely seasonal. Such position cannot be considered as only
needed for a specific project or undertaking because of the very nature of the
business of petitioner RIC. Indeed,
respondent Taripe is a regular employee of petitioner RIC and as such, he
cannot be dismissed from his employment unless there is just or authorized
cause for his dismissal.
Well-established is the rule that
regular employees enjoy security of tenure and they can only be dismissed for
just cause and with due process, notice and hearing.[24] And in case of employees’ dismissal, the
burden is on the employer to prove that the dismissal was legal. Thus, respondent Taripe’s summary dismissal,
not being based on any of the just or authorized causes enumerated under
Articles 282,[25] 283,[26] and
284[27]
of the Labor Code, as amended, is illegal.
Before concluding, we once more
underscore the settled precept that factual findings of the NLRC, having deemed
to acquire expertise in matters within its jurisdiction, are generally accorded
not only respect but finality especially when such factual findings are
affirmed by the Court of Appeals;[28] hence, such factual findings are binding on
this Court.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
(On Leave)
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Josefina Guevara-Salonga, concurring, rollo, pp. 17-27.
[2]
[3] Penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay with Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan, concurring, id. at 36-48; NLRC Records, pp. 147-148.
[4] Penned by Labor Arbiter Natividad M. Roma, id. at 29-35.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Supra note 2.
[11] Rollo, pp. 98-104.
[12]
[13] Pangilinan vs. General Milling Corporation, G.R. No. 149329,
[14] E.
Ganzon, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123769,
[15] Pangilinan vs. General Milling Corporation, supra note 13 at 169-170.
[16]
[17] Pantranco
North Express, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 106654,
[18] CA rollo, p. 27.
[19] Philippine
National Oil Co.-Energy Dev’t. Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 97747,
[20] Fabrigas
vs.
[21] Qua Chee Gan vs. Law
[22] Rollo, p. 25.
[23] Lopez vs. Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System, G.R. No. 154472,
[24] Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
vs.
[25] ART. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER. – An employer may terminate an employment for
any of the following causes.
(a)
Serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b)
Gross and
habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c)
Fraud or willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representatives;
(d)
Commission of a
crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[26] ART. 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL. – The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry of Labor and Employment [now Secretary of Labor] at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
[27] ART. 284. DISEASE AS GROUND FOR TERMINATION. – An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
[28] Land
and Housing Development Corporation vs. Esquillo, G.R. No. 152012,