FIRST DIVISION
|
JAIME M. DE GUZMAN, Petitioner, -
versus - PEOPLE
OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. No. 167492
Present: PUNO, C.J.,
Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: March 22, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed
and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the Resolution[1]
dated 12 October 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), as reiterated in its Resolution[2]
of 17 February 2005, dismissing the petitioner’s appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 28277 for failure to file his appellant’s brief in
connection with his appeal from an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, which found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide against the person of one Antonio De
Vera.
Briefly,
the material facts may be stated as follows:
On
That on or about the 27th
day of June, 2000, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, JAIME “BINONG” DE
GUZMAN, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and PAUL DOE, being then armed with a deadly
weapon, with intent to kill one ANTONIO DE VERA, confederating together, acting
jointly and helping each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by
stabbing and hitting him on vital parts of his body, the said accused having
thus performed all the acts of execution which could have produced the crime of
homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason
of some causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is due to the
timely and able medical attendance rendered to him, to the damage and prejudice
of said ANTONIO DE VERA.
On
arraignment, petitioner, as accused, entered a plea of “Not Guilty.” Thereafter, trial ensued.
In
a decision[3]
dated
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Jaime “Binong” De
Guzman GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide and
pursuant to law, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
from Six (6) Years of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to Ten (10) Years of
Prision Mayor in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered to pay P46,000.00 representing
actual expenses incurred by the complainant.
SO ORDERED.
In
time, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
whereupon the records of the case were elevated to the CA.
In
the CA, petitioner, as appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO),
filed a Motion for Extension of Time To
File Appellant’s Brief,[4]
therein praying for an extension of
sixty (60) days or until
Unfortunately,
no appellant’s brief was filed by the petitioner within the extended 60-day period.
Hence, in the herein assailed Resolution[5]
of
Despite extension granted which expired on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED
pursuant to Section 8 Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Upon
receipt of the aforequoted dismissal resolution, petitioner, again through the
PAO, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (With
Motion to Admit Attached Brief for the Accused-Appellant[6])
therein alleging, through counsel, that it was only “upon receipt of the
resolution dismissing his appeal that counsel became aware of her inadvertence in failing to file the
required brief within the extended period” and that the delay in filing the
required appellant’s brief was without any malicious intent to delay the
disposition of the case, adding that the admission of the appellant’s brief
attached to the motion “will not cause any prejudice to public interest, but
would promote and enhance the administration of justice.”
In its next assailed Resolution[7]
of
The Court has studied the PAO’s explanations for
non-filing of brief for the accused within the extended period prayed for by
PAO and We find no cogent reason to revise, amend, and much less, reverse Our
October 12, 2004 Resolution dismissing the appeal, for appellant’s failure to
file brief, pursuant to Sec. 8 Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, appellant’s
SO ORDERED.
Hence,
petitioner’s present recourse, contending in the main that the CA should have
admitted his appellant’s brief since the failure to file the same within the
extended period was due to his counsel’s inadvertence. He adds that the
admission of his brief will not prejudice any party.
We
GRANT the petition.
Undoubtedly, this Court has invariably
ruled that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who
seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the
rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. [8]
Nonetheless, we find cogent reason to relax
the rule in this case.
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure states that the CA may, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal
if the appellant fails to file his brief within the period prescribed by the
rules, except where appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
Clearly, if the
appellant is represented by a counsel de
parte and he fails to file his brief on time, the appeal may be dismissed
on motion of the appellee or by the CA with notice to the appellant. However,
the rule takes exception when the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio as in this case.
For sure, in Foralan v. CA,[9] which
is akin to this case, the Court allowed the admission of an appellant’s brief even
if filed out of time because the appellant therein was represented by a counsel
de oficio, and ruled that it was error on the part of the appellate
court to dismiss the appeal motu proprio instead
of first giving to appellant a notice to show cause why his appeal should not
be dismissed.
In several
cases, the Court had set aside technicalities in the
Rules in order to give
way to justice and equity. The Court can overlook the short delay in the filing
of pleading if strict compliance with the Rules would mean sacrificing justice
to technicality. The imminence of a
person being deprived unjustly of his liberty due to a procedural lapse of
counsel is a strong and compelling reason to warrant suspension of the Rules.[10] A
healthy respect for petitioner’s rights should caution courts against motu proprio dismissals of appeals,
especially in criminal cases where the liberty of the accused is at stake. The
rules allowing motu proprio
dismissals of appeals merely confer a power
and do not impose
a duty; and the same are not mandatory
but merely directory which thus require a great deal of circumspection,
considering all the attendant circumstances.[11]
Courts are not exactly impotent to enforce their orders, including those
requiring the filing of appellant’s brief.
This is precisely the raison
d’etre for the courts’ inherent contempt
power.[12]
Motu proprio dismissals of appeals are thus not always called for. Although the right to appeal is a statutory,
not a natural, right, it is an essential part of the judicial system and courts
should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this prerogative,
but instead, afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities.[13] More so must this be in criminal cases where,
as here, the appellant is an indigent
who could ill-afford the services of a counsel de parte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the petition is GRANTED and the assailed
resolutions of the CA are SET ASIDE. The
appellate court is ordered to REINSTATE petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 28277, entitled People of the
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (ret.) and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring; Rollo, p. 40.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Prospero Balgami v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Aplomina, G.R. No. 131287, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 591.
[9] G.R. No. 109832,
[10] Alonzo v. Villamor, et al., 16 Phil. 315 (1910).
[11] Reyes
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41680,
[12] Paredes-Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120654,
[13] Moslares
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129744,