NORA
BUENO PASION, G.R. No. 166558
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
SIMPLICIO
R. MELEGRITO, VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
represented
by ANSELMA TIMONES,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
On
Court (MCTC),
On
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants, Filipina Bueno & Divina
Bueno or their agents or any person or persons, [sic] occupying said
building in question in their names or by virtue of any authority by them:
(1)
To vacate the premises occupied by said
house/improvements thereon or to remove said building or improvements
constructed thereon and restore the said possession to [respondent];
(2)
To pay [respondent] attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00
plus P500.00 appearance fee per hearing;
(3)
To pay the sum of P2,000.00 as damages
representing the monthly rental of the land from February 1999 until possession
is fully restored to [respondent]; and
(4)
To pay the costs of suit.
SO
ORDERED.[3]
Acting
on the appeal[4] interposed
by the Bueno sisters, on
Respondent thereafter filed a
petition for review before the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals.[6] On
On
remand of the case, the MCTC granted respondent’s motion for execution and that
led to the issuance of a writ of execution on
Subsequently, on
On
4 November 2002, petitioner Nora Bueno Pasion (petitioner), the recognized agricultural
tenant on a portion of respondent’s land and sister of the Bueno sisters, filed
with the RTC, Branch 65, Tarlac, a Complaint[9]
for Injunction with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order and Damages against respondent, Judge Luisito T. Adaoag,[10]
and the Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac, seeking to restrain the enforcement of
the writ of demolition issued in Civil Case No. 1243-99. Petitioner claimed
that the judgment in Civil Case No. 1243-99 was being implemented against her although
she was not a party to the case. She further claimed that she was a bonafide agricultural tenant of respondent and that she, as
such tenant, owned and actually occupied the house sought to be demolished
which was a reconstructed old family house on the lot. She offered as proof of
such ownership the building permit[11]
for the house’s construction and a tax declaration covering the house.[12]
On
7 November 2002, the RTC, Branch 65, granted a temporary restraining order for
a period of seventy-two (72) hours,[13]
which was extended for another seventeen (17) days, completing the maximum twenty
(20) day lifetime.[14]
On
On
8 January 2003, petitioner filed a Petition[16]
for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 65 in allowing a writ of
demolition to be enforced against her although she was not a party to Civil
Case No. 1243-99 and in finding that she was not the owner of the house sought
to be demolished.
On
In denying petitioner’s petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the writ of demolition issued by the 5th MTC of Gerona-Ramos-Pura, public respondent Judge had as its basis the findings of [the] MTC, which
was later affirmed
by the 4th Division of this court. Their findings indicate that the
house which is now the subject of a writ of demolition, was erected by the
sisters of the petitioner and not by petitioner herself. On this score alone,
public respondent Judge denied petitioner’s application for injunction. The
rule is well-entrenched that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the right of party in a pending
case rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court.[18]
Rule 58, Section 7 of the Rules of Court gives generous latitude to the trial
court in this regard for the reason that conflicting claim[s] in an application
for a provisional writ more often that not involve a factual determination
which is not the function of the appellate courts. Hence, the exercise of sound
judicial discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters must not be
interfered with except when there is manifest abuse.
Also,
it is worthy to note that in this case, petitioner’s grounds in support of the
petition calls for an evaluation of the evidence presented which is not within
the province of certiorari. Even if this court were to delve on the grounds
raised by the petitioner, the findings of this Court would preempt the trial
court’s findings wherein the main action for injunction is still pending.
Moreover,
the assailed Order of the public respondent Judge is only a denial of
petitioner’s application for a preliminary injunction, which is distinct from
the main action for injunction filed with the trial court. Thus, in the case of
Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals,[19]
the Supreme Court held: the inquiry in the proceedings for the issuance or
denial of a writ of preliminary injunction is premised solely on initial
evidence, and the findings thereon by the trial court should be considered to
be merely provisional until after the trial on the merits of the case would
have been concluded.[20]
Petitioner
moved for reconsideration[21]
of the
Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
The issue raised by petitioner may be formulated as
follows: whether the denial of petitioner’s
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a writ
of demolition issued in another case to which she was not a party is tenable.
Questioning the enforcement of the writ of demolition
against her, petitioner claims ownership of the structure sought to be
demolished on the strength of a building permit and a tax declaration as well
as harps on the fact that she was not a party to Civil Case No. 1243-99. Being
a non-party in said case, she asserts, the judgment therein may not be
implemented to prejudice her rights as the alleged owner and possessor of the
subject structure.
The petition is without merit.
An ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein
judgment is binding only upon parties properly impleaded and given an
opportunity to be heard.[23]
However, the rule admits of the exception that even a
non-party is bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the
following: (a) trespasser, squatter or
agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the
judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the
defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d)
sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or
(f) member of the family, relative or
privy of the defendant.[24]
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that petitioner falls
under situation (f) above because she is a relative of the Bueno sisters, the
defendants in Civil Case No. 1243-99.[25] She
herself admitted this fact in her complaint in Civil Case No. 9420 when she
referred to the Bueno sisters as her legitimate sisters.
Besides,
petitioner cannot deny her knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 1243-99.
Even the judgment in the said case acknowledges the fact that she went to the
hearings with Geronimo Zafra, the representative of her sisters.
Indeed,
if she truly had an interest in the structure sought to be demolished as she
claims, she could have so informed respondent even before the filing of the
case to enable the latter to take the necessary and appropriate action. Had respondent
known that petitioner was claiming ownership over the structure, he could have,
for example, allowed her to merely continue with its possession or he could
have impleaded her in Civil Case No. 1243-99 as a necessary party, defined in
Sec. 8, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court as “one who is not indispensable but who
ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of the action.” However, respondent apparently had been unaware of petitioner’s
ownership claim over the structure as she divulged the same only when she filed
the complaint in Civil Case No. 9420.
Even if petitioner
was prevented by the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure from intervening
in Civil Case No. 1243-99, a motion for intervention being a prohibited
pleading therein, she was not precluded from filing a separate case to assert
and claim her ownership over the structure. Curiously, it was only on
and reversed by the Court
of Appeals. Through all these court proceedings spanning a number of years, petitioner
did not do or say anything. She claims having filed a motion to quash the writ
of demolition but even this came too late in the day and was definitely not enough
to negate her apparent lackadaisical attitude in protecting her alleged right.
Verily, the principle of equitable estoppel
would now operate to prevent petitioner from asserting her alleged
ownership over the structure and defeating the alias writ of execution
issued in execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 1243-99. Sec. 2(a), Rule
131 of the Rules of Court states:
Whenever
a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act
or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
Thus, we have held:
The
principles of equitable estoppel, sometimes called estoppel in pais, are
made part of our law by Art. 1432 of the Civil Code. Coming under this class is estoppel by
silence, which obtains here and as to which it has been held that:
x x
x an estoppel may arise from silence as well as from words. ‘Estoppel by silence’ arises where a person, who by force
of circumstances is under a duty to another to speak, refrains from doing so
and thereby leads the other to believe in the existence of a state of facts in
reliance on which he acts to his prejudice.
Silence may support an estoppel whether the failure to speak is
intentional or negligent.
‘Inaction
or silence may under some circumstances amount to a misrepresentation and
concealment of facts, so as to raise an equitable estoppel. When the silence is of such a character
and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud on the other party to
permit the party who has kept silent to deny what his silence has induced the
other to believe and act on, it will operate as an estoppel. This doctrine rests on the principle that if
one maintains silence, when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar
him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be heard to
speak when he should be silent.’
x x x x
x x
x Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential
to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the
fruits of the verdict. Courts must
therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.[26]
[Emphasis supplied.]
The rule on estoppel in pais is a well-settled rule
of equity which has been adopted by the courts of law that where for instance A
has, by his acts or representations, or by his silence when he ought to speak
out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induced B to believe certain
facts to exist, and B has rightfully acted on his belief, so that he will be
prejudiced if A is permitted to deny the existence of such facts, A is
conclusively estopped to interpose a denial thereof.[27]
In the case at bar, petitioner had, by her silence, induced
respondent to believe that she did not have any interest on respondent’s
property other than being his tenant. Thus, respondent rightfully acted on this
belief and filed the forcible entry case only against petitioner’s sisters whom
he thought were the owners of the structure constructed on his land. Verily, to
permit petitioner to deny the fact that she does not own the structure would
work to prejudice the rights of respondent as the winning litigant in Civil
Case No. 1243-99. Indeed, petitioner is conclusively estopped from interposing
her claim of ownership against the writ of demolition issued to execute the
decision in said case.
Furthermore,
what is sought to be enjoined is a judgment that has long become final and
executory. Under Sec. 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution shall issue
as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the
action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if
no appeal has been duly perfected. As in the case at bar, respondent, as the
prevailing party in Civil Case No. 1243-99, is entitled to a writ of execution,
and the issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of the court compellable by mandamus.[28]
A writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued upon a
clear showing: (1) that there exists a right to be protected, and (2) that the
action sought to be enjoined is violative of that right.[29]
In the
case at bar, the RTC found that, in accordance with the MCTC’s findings in
Civil Case No. 1243-99 as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Bueno sisters,
and not petitioner, were the owners of the structure sought to be demolished.
Clearly, the trial court found that petitioner had no actual right that needs
to be protected by a writ of preliminary injunction. Verily, we find no reason
to disturb this finding of the trial court. It is well to remember that the
general rule is that the grant or denial of an injunction rests on the sound
discretion of the lower court in the exercise of which this Court will not
intervene except in a clear case of abuse.[30]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[4]Docketed as Civil Case No. 8908.
[6]Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57075.
[7]Records, pp. 30-48.
[9]
[11]Records, p. 51.
[12]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[20]CA rollo, pp. 119-121.
[22]
[23]Biscocho v. Marero, 431 Phil. 147, 150 (2002), citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 600, 606 (1999).
[24]Biscocho v. Marero, supra, citing Oro Cam Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 444, 454 (1999). See also Sunflower Neighborhood Association v. Court of Appeals, 457 Phil. 404, 409-410 (2003).
[25]Ariem
v. Hon. de
[26]Philippine
Bank of Communication v. Court of Appeals,
344 Phil. 90, 99 (1997) citing Santiago Syjuco, Inc. v. Castro, 175 SCRA 171 (1989).
[27]See R.J., Francisco, Evidence 403-404 (3rd
ed., 1996) citing Am. &
[28]See 2 O.M. Herrera., Remedial Law 255-256 (2000 ed.), pp. 255-256. See also Munez v. Court of Appeals, L-46010, 23 July 1987, 152 SCRA 197; City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100626, 29 November 1991, 204 SCRA 362.
[29]See 3 O.M. Herrera,, Remedial Law 72 (2000 Ed.) citing Buayan Cattle Co. v. Quintillian, 128 SCRA 276; Sales v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 54330, 13 January 1989, 330 Phil. 590 (1996); National Power Corporation v. Vera, G.R. No. 83558, 27 February 1989, 170 SCRA 721; Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 64220, 31 March 1992, 207 SCRA 622; Saulog v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 590 (1996); Sps. Arcega v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 166 (1997).