SECOND DIVISION
CONSTANCIA DULDULAO, G.R. No. 164893
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and
Respondents. Promulgated:
March
1, 2007
x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
Tinga,
J.:
For the Court’s adjudication is a petition for review under
Rule 45, seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58291, which affirmed the 30 September
1999 Decision[2] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CASE RAB-CAR-02-0076-97,
NLRC NCR CA NO. 018861-99.
The
facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner
Constancia P. Duldulao was hired by respondent Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF)
as secretary/clerk-typist and assigned to the
On 1 October 1996, Dean Honorato V.
Aquino of the
DEPARTMENT
ORDER
To:
Mrs. Constancia Duldulao
Re: Transfer of assignment
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.
Effective
tomorrow
2. You shall render regular duty in those offices until further notice.
3.
Please be guided accordingly.
On
Petitioner
filed a case with the BCF Grievance Committee, citing her “unceremonious, capricious,
whimsical and arbitrary reassignment from her position as Secretary of the
In the interim, upon the request of
several students from the
The Department Order notwithstanding,
petitioner did not report for work and instead took a vacation leave and
several other leave of absences from October 1996 to January 1997. Finally, on
On
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Executive
Labor Arbiter’s decision, sustained petitioner’s transfer, and dismissed the
complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.[9] In the Decision, the Commission gave weight to the argument that petitioner was
neither demoted nor dismissed, as her salary, benefits and other privileges remained the same despite her reassignment. Neither was there any violation of due
process since petitioner was granted an initial period and several extensions
within which to file her answer to the complaint against her. Even as
petitioner continued to display a hostile attitude in work by refusing
to report at her new assignment under the guise of leave of absences,
respondent did not impose any disciplinary action, the Commission added.
The
Court of Appeals, in turn, upheld the decision of the NLRC. The appellate court ruled that petitioner was
not constructively dismissed, finding that petitioner was unable to point to
any evidence that her reassignment was prompted by the malevolence or ill-will
of respondent. Besides, respondent did
not intend petitioner’s transfer to be a disciplinary sanction against her but
merely a temporary measure to prevent controversy within the
In the instant petition, petitioner reiterates
her posture that her transfer was a case
of constructive dismissal, tainted with bad faith and intended as punishment
for an erring employee, whereupon she
claims entitlement to backwages, benefits and moral damages.
On the other hand, respondent asserts that petitioner’s temporary
transfer from the Office of the Dean of
the College of Law to the Office of the
Principals of the High School and Elementary Departments was premised on
certain considerations, namely: (i) the
polarization of the students as a result of the controversy between
petitioner and the complaining student; (ii) petitioner’s failure to
file her answer to the complaint against her; and (iii) petitioner’s
having expressly admitted her fraternization with some students.[11] Respondent
justifies its reassignment of petitioner
as a legitimate exercise of its management
prerogative.[12]
Essentially, the issue in this case
is whether petitioner’s transfer as
secretary/clerk-typist from the
The
petition deserves rejection.
It is a well-settled rule that
findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the NLRC, are accorded not
only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.[13] This
is especially so in this case, where the findings of the NLRC were affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. The findings of
fact made therein can only be set aside upon showing of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law, none of which has been shown in this case.
There is constructive dismissal if an
act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
so unbearable on the part of the employee that it would foreclose any choice by
him except to forego his continued employment.[14]
It exists where there is cessation of work because “continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion
in rank and a diminution in pay.”[15] The factual milieu in this case is
different. Thus, the NLRC and the Court
of Appeals both ruled that the treatment accorded petitioner does not
constitute constructive dismissal.
At the onset, it must be stressed
that petitioner has no vested right to the position of secretary/clerk-typist
of the College of Law that may operate to deprive respondent of its prerogative
to change or transfer her assignment to another department where she
will be most useful in its
judgment. After all, petitioner was employed by respondent
which is the BCF system itself, not the
We have long recognized the
prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another
within the same business establishment, as the exigency of the business may
require, provided that the transfer does not result in a demotion in rank or a
diminution in salary, benefits and other privileges of the employee; or is not
unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the latter; or is not used as a
subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker.[16] In the case of Philippine Japan Active
Carbon Corp. v. NLRC,[17]
the Court ruled:
It
is the employer’s prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its
employees’ qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in
the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain where they
will function with maximum benefit to the company. An employee’s right to security of tenure
does not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive the
company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he
will be most useful. When his transfer
is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him, and it does not
involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other
privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive
dismissal.[18]
The
Court does not see how petitioner’s
transfer from the College of Law to the Office of the Principals of the
Elementary and High School Departments can be described as unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to her. In
her complaint, petitioner alleged that by reason of the transfer, she would
incur additional transportation expenses, be constrained to engage the services
of a househelp, and suffer a demotion in
rank and status. As explained by respondent, the difference in traveling distance
is not so large as to cause great inconvenience to petitioner as in fact, by
merely changing the route to take, the distance from petitioner’s house to the
Neither is the transfer equivalent to a
demotion in rank and status. Petitioner
was a secretary/clerk-typist of the
Petitioner argues that she was denied
her right to due process when she was transferred to another department even
before she was able to file her answer. Reassignments made by management
pending investigation of irregularities allegedly committed by an employee fall
within the ambit of
management prerogative.[20] The transfer, while
incidental to the pending charges
against petitioner, was not meant to be a penalty, but rather a preventive
measure to avoid further damage to the
This Court has, in several instances,
upheld reassignments/transfers pending investigations of the irregularities
allegedly committed by employees, the rationale being that the purpose of
reassignments is no different from that of preventive suspension which
management could validly impose as a measure of
protection of the company’s property pending investigation of any
malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.[21]
The BCF system that is respondent is
more than a business venture; it is, first and foremost, an educational
institution, engaged in the noble task of teaching and preparing our youth for the career paths they intend to
take. In the same way that an ordinary
business cannot afford to put at risk its resources while there is a pending
complaint or investigation against a possible erring employee, respondent could
not afford to have a discordant
studentry, and a college tainted with controversy. Surely, the harmony and integrity of its
faculty, staff and students are as important as, if not more important than,
any of the properties of respondent.
Petitioner cannot claim constructive
dismissal simply because her transfer to
another department was against her
wishes and, in her view, amounts to a demotion.
“Certainly, the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an
employee opposes his employer’s decision to transfer him to another work place,
there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either party, it
is the employee’s wishes that should be made to prevail.”[22] Mere incidental inconvenience is not enough to
warrant a claim of constructive dismissal.[23]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[14]The Philippine American Life and
General Insurance
[15]Phil. Employ Services and Resources, Inc. v.
Paramio, G.R. No. 144786,
[17]G.R. No. 83239,
[22]Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v.
Laplana, G.R. No. 76645, 23 July
1991, 199 SCRA 485, 494-495.