THIRD
DIVISION
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VICTORY LINER, INC., Petitioner, -
versus - PABLO M. RACE, Respondent. |
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G.R. No.
164820 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: March
28, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,[1]
petitioner Victory Liner Inc. seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated
Culled
from the records are the following facts:
In June
1993, respondent was employed by the petitioner as a bus driver. As a requisite
for his hiring, the respondent deposited a cash bond in the amount of P10,000.00
to the petitioner. Respondent was assigned to the Alaminos, Pangasinan - Cubao,
On the
night of
In
January 1998, the respondent, still limping heavily, went to the petitioner’s
office to report for work. He was,
however, informed by the petitioner that he was considered resigned from his
job. Respondent refused to accede and
insisted on having a dialogue with the petitioner’s officer named Yolanda
Montes (Montes). During their meeting,
Montes told him that he was deemed to have resigned from his work and to accept
a consideration of P50,000.00. Respondent
rejected the explanation and offer. Thereafter, before Christmas of 1998, he
again conversed with Montes who reiterated to him that he was regarded as
resigned but raised the consideration therein to P100,000.00. Respondent rebuffed the increased offer.[7]
On
In its
Position Paper dated 27 March 2000, petitioner claimed that respondent was paid
strictly on commission basis; that respondent was a mere field personnel who
performed his duties and functions outside the petitioner’s premises and whose
time of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; that petitioner,
therefore, was exempted from paying the respondent overtime compensation, night
shift differential, holiday pay and service incentive leave; that
notwithstanding the specific exemptions provided for in the Labor Code, the petitioner
gave the respondent benefits better than those received by the other bus
drivers of the petitioner; that during his employment, respondent was charged
with and found guilty of numerous offenses which were sufficient bases for his
dismissal; that the prescriptive period for the filing of an action or claim
for reinstatement and payment of labor standard benefits is four years from the
time the cause of action accrued; and that the respondent’s cause of action
against petitioner had already prescribed because when the former instituted
the aforesaid complaint on 1 September 1999, more than five years had already
lapsed from the accrual of his cause of action on 24 August 1994.[9]
In his
Reply dated 30 June 2000, respondent explained that when he stated in his
complaint that he was illegally dismissed on 24 August 1994, what he meant and
referred to was the date when he was no longer in a position to drive since he
was hospitalized from 24 August 1994 up to 10 October 1994. Respondent also
admitted that it was only in January 1998 that he informed the petitioner of
his intent to report back for work.[10]
On
Further,
Labor Arbiter Nambi opined that respondent was not a
regular employee but a mere field personnel and, therefore, not entitled to
service incentive leave, holiday pay, overtime pay and 13th month
pay. He also ruled that respondent
failed to present evidence showing that the latter was entitled to the abovestated money claims. The fallo of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the
causes of action in this case rooted from the purported illegal dismissal of
Pablo M. Race on August 24, 1994 when he figured in a vehicular accident, or on
October 10, 1994 when he was released from the hospital, and he filed his
complaint only on September 1, 1999 after a lapse of more than five (5) years,
the action has long prescribed, aside from the fact that there is absolutely no
evidence that respondent Victory Liner, Inc. is guilty of unfair labor practice
and unjust dismissal, in addition to its specific exemptions from the letters
of Article 82 of the Labor Code, as amended, the complaint and money claims are
hereby DISMISSED by reason of
prescription and for utter lack of merit and total absence of legal and factual
basis in support thereof.[11]
Respondent
appealed to the NLRC. On
WHEREFORE, in view of
all the foregoing, respondent-appellee’s company is
hereby ordered to reinstate complainant-appellant to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and benefits with full
backwages computed from the time of his illegal dismissal on (sic) January 1988
up to his actual reinstatement. Except for this modification, the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED.[12]
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision alleging, among other
things, that the award of backwages to the respondent computed from January 1988
up to the promulgation of the NLRC Decision on
Petitioner
assailed the NLRC Decision and Resolution, dated
Race did not abandon his work and
continued to be an employee of Victory Liner, and their contemporaneous conduct
show this. He has his pay slip covering the period of
It also
found that the petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of due process
in terminating the employment of respondent. The decretal portion
of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.[14]
Petitioner filed the
instant petition on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD IN THE ASSAILED DECISION
THAT:
A.
THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF RESPONDENT FOR
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED DESPITE HAVING BEEN FILED AFTER FOUR
(4) YEARS AND NINE (9) MONTHS FROM THE ACCRUAL OF THE ALLEGED ACTIONABLE WRONG;
B.
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT
WITH FULL BACKWAGES AND OTHER BENEFITS CONSIDERING THAT THE TERMINATION OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT BY PETITIONER WAS LEGAL AND JUSTIFIED.[15]
Anent
the first issue, petitioner insisted that respondent had already abandoned his
work and ceased to be its employee since November 1994; that the alleged “pay
slip” for the period August 1-15, 1998 was not actually a pay slip but a mere
cash advance/monetary aid extended to the respondent as the large amount of P65,000.00
stated therein was clearly inconsistent and disproportionate to the
respondent’s low salary of P192.00 a day; that the petitioner
merely accommodated the respondent as its former employee when the latter
consulted the petitioner’s physician on 28 October 1996 and 21 July 1997; that
the respondent’s letter dated 18 March 1996 to the petitioner’s Vice-President Gerarda Villa was only an application for the position of
dispatcher or conductor and that such application was not granted; and that the
foregoing circumstances cannot be considered as an indication of
employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and respondent.[16]
Moreover,
petitioner asserted that although the respondent reported for work twice a
month after he was discharged from the hospital, it does not imply that the
respondent was still considered as an employee at that time by the petitioner;
that it allowed the respondent to have a 120-day sick leave because the latter
was a former employee; and that it granted disability leave to the respondent
since the latter was a former employee and that respondent’s application for
disability leave implied an admission on the part of the respondent that he was
no longer fit to work as a bus driver.[17]
Petitioner
also asseverated that, based on the four-fold tests in determining the
employer-employee relationship which includes the payment of wages and power to
control the conduct of the employees, the respondent was no longer its employee
upon the latter’s discharge from the hospital in November 1994 because at such
time, the respondent was no longer fit to work as a bus driver and respondent
did not render services to the petitioner. Thus, petitioner reasoned that it had no more
power to control the conduct of, and it no longer paid any wages to, the
respondent.[18]
Petitioner
also argued that the cause of action of respondent had accrued on 10 November
1994; that from 10 November 1994 up to November 1998, the respondent did not
render any services to nor filed a case or action against the petitioner; that
the respondent’s filing of a complaint against petitioner on 1 September 1999 was
clearly beyond the four-year prescriptive period allowed by law; that if the
reckoning period of the accrual of a cause of action would be the time when the
written demand was made by the respondent on the petitioner, then the four-year
prescriptive period would be interminable as it could be extended to one or
more years; that this is not the spirit or intent of the law; that otherwise
there is no more need to provide the four-year prescriptive period as any
complainant may simply allow the lapse of four years and file the action
thereafter and that it would be considered as a compliance by simply making a
purported demand for reinstatement after more than four years.[19]
These
contentions are devoid of merit.
It
should be emphasized at the outset that as a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor
cases. Hence, factual findings of
quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those
of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded
respect and even finality by this Court. But where the findings of the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter are contradictory, as in the present case, this Court may delve
into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings.[20]
In
illegal dismissal cases, the employee concerned is given a period of four years
from the time of his dismissal within which to institute a complaint. This is based on Article 1146 of the New Civil
Code which states that actions based upon an injury to the rights of the
plaintiff must be brought within four years. We explained the rationale in the case of Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc.,[21]
thus:
[O]ne’s
employment, profession, trade or calling is a “property right,” and the
wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered
to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due
process of law. Clearly then, when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of
his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality
of one’s dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action
predicated “upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff,” as contemplated
under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four years.
The four-year
prescriptive period shall commence to run only upon the accrual of a cause of
action of the worker. It is settled that in illegal dismissal cases, the cause of
action accrues from the time the employment of the worker was unjustly terminated.[22]
Thus, the four-year prescriptive period
shall be counted and computed from the date of the employee’s dismissal up to
the date of the filing of complaint for unlawful termination of employment.[23]
Proceeding
therefrom, we shall now discuss and determine when
the respondent’s cause of action accrued in order to ascertain whether the same
had already prescribed.
It is
error to conclude that the employment of the respondent was unjustly terminated
on
The
respondent must be considered as unjustly terminated from work in January 1998
since this was the first time he was informed by the petitioner that he was
deemed resigned from his work. During
that same occasion, the petitioner, in fact, tried to convince the respondent
to accept an amount of P50,000.00 as a consolation for his dismissal but
the latter rejected it.[25] Thus, it was only at this time that the respondent’s
cause of action accrued. Consequently,
the respondent’s filing of complaint for illegal dismissal on
It is
also significant to note that from
As to
the alleged abandonment of work by the respondent on
It is
apparent that respondent did not abandon his work. His absence from work for a long period of
time was obviously due to the fact that he was still recuperating from two
operations on his fractured leg. Petitioner
knew this very well. In fact, petitioner
shouldered the respondent’s medication and hospital expenses during the
latter’s confinement and operation in two hospitals.[27] Moreover, when the respondent was able to walk,
although limping heavily, he still reported for work to the petitioner and was
granted sick and disability leave.[28] Clearly then, respondent did not abandon his
job on
In the
same vein, the employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and
respondent cannot be deemed to have been extinguished on
Applying
the aforecited tests, the employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
respondent continued even after the latter’s discharge from the hospital in
December 1994 up to 1997. Respondent had
reported for work to the petitioner after his release from the hospital in
December 1994. Subsequently, respondent was also granted a 120-day sick leave
and disability leave by the petitioner.[30] Respondent also availed himself of the
services of the petitioner’s physician on two occasions after his release from
the hospital in December 1994.[31]
On the
other hand, the petitioner failed to establish the fact that the respondent
ceased to be its employee on
Evidently,
these circumstances clearly manifest that petitioner exercised control over the
respondent and that the latter was still under the employment of the petitioner
even after December 1994.
Given
the foregoing considerations, petitioner’s assertion that the respondent’s
cause of action accrued on
Apropos
the second issue, petitioner contended that the order for the reinstatement of
the respondent as bus driver was unconstitutional for being tantamount to
involuntary servitude; that when the respondent filed his complaint for illegal
dismissal, the latter no longer desired to be reinstated to his former position
as bus driver; that the respondent’s unwillingness to be reinstated as bus
driver was also evident from his letter to the petitioner where the respondent
manifested his intention to be hired as a dispatcher or conductor; and that to
reinstate the respondent as bus driver despite the fact that it is against his
will is involuntary servitude.[32]
Petitioner
also argued that the order for the reinstatement was contrary to law; that as a
common carrier, it is obliged under the law to observe extra-ordinary diligence
in the conduct of its business; that it will violate such obligation if it will
reinstate the respondent as bus driver; that to allow the respondent to drive a
bus, despite the fact that the latter sustained a fractured left leg and was
still limping, would imperil the lives of the passengers and the property of
the petitioner; and that the award of backwages to the respondent was
unjustified.[33]
The
Labor Code mandates that before an employer may legally dismiss an employee
from the service, the requirement of substantial and procedural due process
must be complied with. Under the
requirement of substantial due process, the grounds for termination of
employment must be based on just or authorized causes. The following are just causes for the
termination of employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(a)
Serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b)
Gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c)
Fraud
or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d)
Commission
of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e)
Other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
Abandonment
of work, or the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment, may be a just cause for the termination of employment under
paragraph (b) of Article 282 of the Labor Code since it is a form of neglect of
duty.
As
earlier discussed, the petitioner insisted that respondent had already
abandoned his work on
It has
been established that petitioners failed to comply with the requirement of
substantial due process in terminating the employment of respondent. We will now determine whether the petitioner
had complied with the procedural aspect of a lawful dismissal.
In the
termination of employment, the employer must (a) give the employee a written
notice specifying the ground or grounds of termination, giving to said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; (b) conduct a hearing
or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if the employee so desires, is given the opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(c) give the employee a written notice of termination indicating that upon due
consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify
his termination.[35]
Petitioner
miserably failed to comply with the foregoing requirements. There was nothing
in the records which evinces that petitioner had sent a written notice to the
respondent informing him of the ground or grounds of his termination or the
reason why he was deemed resigned. It
does not also appear that the petitioner held a hearing or conference where the
respondent was given the opportunity to answer the charges of abandonment,
insubordination and habitual neglect of duty against him. Neither did the petitioner send a written
notice to the respondent informing the latter that his service is terminated
after considering all the circumstances.
In view
of the fact that the petitioner neglected to observe the substantial and
procedural due process in terminating the employment of respondent, we rule
that the latter was illegally dismissed from work by the petitioner.
Consequently,
the respondent is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights,
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement as provided for under Article 279 of the
Labor Code.
It
appears, however, that respondent was not seeking reinstatement. In his
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner, respondent stated:
R E L I E F
Complainant/s pray/s for
the following:
Reinstatement:
No More.[36]
Respondent also sent to the petitioner a
letter applying for the position of a dispatcher or conductor.[37] In the said letter, the respondent explained
that since he cannot drive anymore due to his leg injury, he was willing to be
hired as a dispatcher or conductor. The abovestated facts obviously show that respondent was
unwilling to be reinstated as a bus driver.
Even assuming
that respondent is willing to be reinstated as petitioner’s bus driver, the
reinstatement is still unwarranted. There
is a serious doubt as to whether the respondent is physically capable of
driving a bus based on the following undisputed facts: (1) respondent was
operated on and confined twice in two different hospitals for a fractured left
leg; (2) steel plates were attached to his fractured leg;[38]
(3) each confinement lasted for a month; (4) after his discharge from the
second confinement, respondent was still limping heavily; (5) when respondent
had reported for work to the petitioner in January 1998, he was also limping;[39]
and (6) respondent does not have a medical certificate which guarantees that
his leg injury has already healed and that he is now physically capable of
driving a bus.
It
should be stressed that petitioner is a common carrier and, as such, is obliged
to exercise extra-ordinary diligence in transporting its passengers safely.[40] To allow the respondent to drive the
petitioner’s bus under such uncertain condition would, undoubtedly, expose to
danger the lives of the passengers and the property of the petitioner. This would place the petitioner in jeopardy of
violating its extra-ordinary diligence obligation and, thus, may be subjected
to numerous complaints and court suits. It
is clear therefore that the reinstatement of respondent not only would be
deleterious to the riding public but would also put unreasonable burden on the
business and interest of the petitioner. In this regard, it should be remembered that
an employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such persons whose
continuance in the service will patently be inimical to his interests.[41]
Based
on the foregoing facts and circumstances, the reinstatement of the respondent
is no longer feasible. Thus, in lieu of
reinstatement, payment to respondent of separation pay equivalent to one month
pay for every year of service is in order.[42]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as it prays for
the non-reinstatement of respondent. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision/Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision/Resolution were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 18-34.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios with Associate Justices Sergio L. Pestano and Vicente Q. Roxas,
concurring; rollo,
pp. 39-48.
[3] NLRC
records pp. 119-135 and 148-149.
[4] Rollo, pp. 58-67.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] NLRC
records, pp. 32-49.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, p. 45.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Tres Reyes v. Maxim’s Tea House, 446 Phil.
388, 401-402 (2003).
[21] 229
Phil. 279, 288-289 (1986).
[22] Ramos v. Our Lady of
[23] Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Ople,
G.R. No. 57642,
[24] NLRC
records, pp. 55-57.
[25]
[26] Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 158693,
[27] Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, supra note 23.
[28] Ramos v. Our Lady of Peace School, supra
note 22.
[29] Abante, Jr. v. Lamadrid
Bearing and Parts Corp., G.R. No. 159890, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 368, 379.
[30] Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra
note 26.
[31] NLRC
records, p. 115.
[32] Rollo, pp. 31-32.
[33]
[34] NLRC
records, pp. 32-49.
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39] Rollo, p. 71.
[40] New
Civil Code, Article 1733: ART. 1733.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. (Italics
supplied.)
[41] NLRC
records, p. 607.
[42] Electruck Asia v. Meris,
G.R. No. 147031,