SECOND DIVISION
JERTY PASCUAL CONTRERAS G.R. No. 164819
(deceased), represented by her
mother, LOURDES PASCUAL,
Petitioner, Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, Former Twelfth
Division, and SPOUSES DANILO Promulgated:
ALCANTARA and ISABELITA
ALCANTARA, March 9, 2007
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
The antecedents that have given rise to this petition for review allude to several potentially interesting questions of law borne out of a complicated factual milieu. Yet the issues actually raised by this petition are relatively trivial, and can be disposed of against petitioner with ease.
It is established that years
before the emergence of the present controversy, a house (subject house) owned
by Eulalia Leis (Leis) was constructed on a parcel of
land (subject land) owned by Filomena Gatchalian (Gatchalian). This
segregate ownership of land and improvement, unreconciled
to date, has ultimately spawned the present dispute.
As early as 1949, Leis openly manifested her rights to the subject house which was constructed on the
subject land situated on San Jose Street, Antipolo, Rizal through a Tax Declaration she had secured that year.[1] While the house had been initially constructed
with light materials, and covering an area of 25.25 square meters,[2] it
appears that by 1974, the house had been renovated and built out of strong
materials and with an expanded floor space.[3] By this time, the house had been mortgaged to
the Rural Bank of Teresa (Rizal), Inc. (RBTRI), which
would eventually acquire ownership over the house after the mortgagor had failed
to pay the loan and redeem the house. However, in 1980, respondent Isabelita Bumatay (Isabelita), the daughter of Leis, purchased the house back
from the bank, as evidenced by a deed of sale.
A different trail of ownership
attaches to the subject land. It was owned by Gatchalian
when the house was first constructed thereon by Leis by around 1949.
Eventually, ownership of the land passed to the spouses Felipe Matawaran and Ofelia Oliveros
(spouses Matawaran), though the records do not bear
how they acquired such property. In 1980, the spouses Matawaran
executed two real estate mortgage contracts with the Capitol City Development
Bank (CCDB), covering the land, together with the house, as security for a loan
of P200,000.00. Specifically, the mortgage deeds
stated that the mortgaged property includes a two-storey residential building
with a floor area of 220 sq. meters.[4]
After the spouses had failed to pay
the loan, CCDB foreclosed on the mortgage and acquired the mortgaged property
in 1984.[5]
After no redemption was made, CCDB consolidated title to the property with Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 115486 issued in its name.[6]
In the meantime, Isabelita,
who had since married respondent Danilo Alcantara, had purchased in July of 1983, from Florencio Oliveros, a 76 square meter
lot adjacent to the house which she earlier bought from RBTRI.[7] It is not clear whether the spouses Alcantara had resided in the house, but beginning in 1987
they rented out the lower floors of the house to petitioner Jerty
Contreras (Contreras), who resided therein.
CCDB advertised its intention to sell
the subject land, but there were no buyers from 1986 until 1990. In March 1990,
CCDB and Contreras entered into a Contract to Sell
involving the subject land, “together with the improvements existing thereon.”[8]
This was followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated P212,400.00,
the subject land “together with the improvements existing thereon.”[9]
Even before the Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed, the Alcantaras wrote CCDB concerning
the Contract to Sell between it and Contreras.
Therein, they informed the bank that they were the owners of the adjacent lot;
that they had not been made aware of the Contract to Sell
until after its execution; and that they were willing to avail of their
preferential right to purchase as provided by the Civil Code.[10]
In 1991, the Alcantaras
filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo,
Rizal, seeking the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Contreras and CCDB.[11] Impleaded as
defendants were Contreras and her husband Renato,
CCDB, and the spouses Matawaran. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 91-222 and raffled to Branch 71 of the Antipolo RTC.
In their complaint, the Alcantaras identified the lot on which the house stood as
Lot A-4 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-282785, as identified in TCT No.
N-37840 in the name of the spouses Matawaran, and its
replacement in TCT No. 115486, which was issued in the name of CCDB. The Alcantaras asserted their ownership over the house even as
the land on which it stood belonged to a different party. As such, they argued
that the Matawaran spouses had no capacity to include
the house as part of the property mortgaged to CCDB, as they were not the
owners of the structure. In turn, CCDB
could not have acquired ownership of the house when it foreclosed on the
mortgage and, consequently too, the sale between CCDB and Contreras could not have
included the house either.
Still, the Alcantaras
prayed for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale between CCDB and
Contreras. Reiterating their ownership of the lot adjacent to the subject land,
the Alcantaras claimed that they are entitled to
exercise their right of pre-emption and redemption under Article 1622 of the
Civil Code, and thus specifically prayed that the trial court “[allow] the
plaintiffs to exercise their right of pre-emption and redemption under Article
1622 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.” A claim for damages was also posed
in the complaint.
An attempt by Contreras to move for
the dismissal of the case was initially successful but the victory proved to be
short-lived as the RTC reconsidered its earlier order of dismissal. She then
filed her answer with a counterclaim for damages, wherein she asserted that the
subject house was included in the sale between the CCDB and herself. This
answer was filed by Atty. Melanio Zoreta
in behalf not only of Contreras, but of all defendants, “save Matawaran and Oliveros.”[12]
CCDB, through a different counsel,
would eventually file its own answer independent of the Contreras spouses. An
accompanying motion manifested that CCDB had not been aware that Atty. Zoreta, who had represented the bank in all of its court
cases, was also acting as counsel for Contreras.[13] While CCDB’s new
answer also prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, it also lodged a
cross-claim against the Contreras and the Matawaran
spouses, seeking to hold them liable to CCDB “in the remote event that judgment
is rendered against” the bank.
The Matawaran
spouses also filed their own Answer,[14]
wherein they admitted that the Alcantaras are the
owners of the subject house, even as it was built on their former property. The
Matawarans further claimed that they never
misrepresented to CCDB that they had owned the subject house, and that the bank
had very well known that the house was actually owned by the Alcantaras.[15]
In the midst of the trial that
ensued, Contreras died and was substituted by her parents, Francisco and
Lourdes Pascual.[16]
On 15 April 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision[17]
that affirmed the Alcantaras’ ownership over the subject
house; ordered the surrender of possession of the house to the Alcantaras; declared the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 13
November 1990 as null and void; and ordered the conveyance by CCDB to the Alcantaras of “the subject property described as Lot A-4 covered
by TCT No. 115486 upon payment by [the Alcantaras] to
[CCDB] the amount of P212,400.00, but which amount should be returned to
defendant spouses Francisco and Lourdes Pascual by
the defendant bank.”[18]
In ruling in this manner, the RTC
found that the evidence clearly established the Alcantaras’
ownership of the subject house, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale between RBTRI
and Isabelita, the various tax declarations, the
testimony of Lourdes Pascual that petitioner had
rented the house from the Alcantaras beginning in
1987, and the declaration of the Matawarans that they
were not the owners of the house. These facts, found by the RTC, were
sufficient to “negate the general presumption that the accessory follows the
principal.” From this finding, the RTC held that it was error on the part of
CCDB to have included the subject house in the deed of sale it executed with Contreras
when in fact the said house was never included in the mortgage executed by the
spouses Matawaran, who had no capacity anyway to mortgage
such house.
The RTC further held that the Alcantaras were entitled to exercise the right of
pre-emption:
It is [a] well-settled rule that the owner of an adjoining land is given the right of pre-emption when the said land is to be sold.
The situation in the instant case may not be exactly the case called for under Article 1622 of the New Civil Code, but the principle laid down under the said rule may be applied in this case in the absence of a particular law.
It is only but just and fair that the owner of the adjoining lot is given the right of pre-emption as it would be more beneficial to him. In the instant case, the Court honestly believes that the plaintiffs, who are not only the owners of the lot adjoining the property foreclosed by the defendant bank, but also owners of the house erected on a portion of the said property, be given the preferential right to buy the property.[19]
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision
to the Court of Appeals.[20]
On
The present petition raises only two
issues. The first issue deserves scant consideration.
Concerning the first issue, petitioner
alleges that the copy they had received of the Court of Appeals decision dated
Petitioner’s contention could have
been a source of worry had the decision, as filed with the official records of
the Court of Appeals, failed to bear the signatures of the members of the
Twelfth Division. But that is not the case. The decision, as attached to the rollo
of the Court of Appeals, does bear the signature of the ponente and the two concurring
Justices from the Twelfth Division. Petitioner further admits that the
certified photocopy of the decision she secured from the Court of Appeals prior
to the filing of this petition reflects the complete signatures of the three
members of the Twelfth Division.
The signature requirement under
Section 1 of Rule 36, which is rooted in the most common of senses, is
necessitated as indubitable proof that the judges who prepared and concurred in
the decision actually did so. Such proof, in this case, is reflected in the
copy of the decision that appears in the official records of the Court of
Appeals. Moreover, in this case, there is no difference at all between the
unsigned page 6 attached by petitioner, and the signed page 6 that appears on
the record. There is no alteration or intercalation in either copy that may
have indicated a difference between the decision the justices were actually
signing and the decision actually sent to the parties. Considering that the
copy sent to petitioner does bear, in all other pages save for the sixth, the
initials of the ponente,
and the certifications of the clerk of court and the division chairperson, we
are wont to believe that the transmission of the unsigned page six to
petitioner is nothing more than a clerical error. Insofar as such clerical
error may give rise to suspicions of untoward behavior, the Court of Appeals
may be faulted. Yet it cannot give rise to the nullification of the decision
which, as recorded in the official files of the Court of Appeals, has no such
formal infirmity.
The second issue raised by petitioner
is the claim that the RTC, in ordering the bank to convey the subject land to
the Alcantaras upon payment of the amount of P212,400.00, exceeded its jurisdiction by “award[ing] reliefs not asked for by
[the Alcantaras].”[26]
Petitioner alleges that “nowhere in the whole complaint, in the reliefs prayed for or in the evidence presented did [the Alcantaras] ever demand from [petitioner] that the house
and lot containing an area of [354] square meters with a residential house
erected thereon be sold to them at a measly sum of [P214,400.00].[27]
As it happens, that “measly sum”
happens to be the exact amount for which CCDB had sold the subject property to
petitioner, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which petitioner herself had
attached to her Answer before the RTC.[28] It is hardly the case of the trial court
pulling a rabbit out of the hat, for the precise relief granted by the RTC is
drawn from the Alcantaras’ specific prayer in their
complaint that sought a judgment “allowing the plaintiffs to exercise their
right of pre-emption and redemption under Article 1622 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, and directing [CCDB] to instead convey Lot A-4 registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-115486 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal in favor of the plaintiffs.”[29]
Petitioner has taken the effort of
reproducing the entire complaint in the text of the present petition[30]
to stress that what the Alcantaras were merely
claiming was “a portion of the house, but never the whole house and lot as what
the Regional Trial Court illegally ruled.”[31]
This is erroneous. For one, the complaint proceeded from the premise that the Alcantaras were still the owners of the whole house, and
thus sought a judicial affirmation of such ownership. In paragraph 20 of the
complaint the Alcantaras further explained that they
are also the owners of the adjacent lot, while in paragraph 23 they manifested
that they “are now actively asserting their right of ownership over the HOUSE
in question and their pre-emptive right
over the lot whereon it stands.” Finally, in paragraph 29 they asserted that
they “should therefore be allowed to exercise their right of pre-emption and
redemption under Article 1622 of the Civil Code of the
Clearly, it is sufficiently alleged
in the complaint that the Alcantaras are entitled to
exercise their right of pre-emption and redemption under Article 1622 of the
Civil Code. They specifically prayed that judgment be rendered entitling them
to exercise such right, which under Article 1622 entails the following:
Art. 1622. Whenever a piece of urban
land which is so small and so situated that a major portion thereof cannot be
used for any practical purpose within a reasonable time, having been bought
merely for speculation, is about to be re-sold, the owner of the adjoining land
has a right of pre-emption at a reasonable price.
If the re-sale has been perfected, the owner of the adjoining land shall have a right of redemption, also at a reasonable price.
x x x x
The petition betrays a lack of understanding on petitioner’s
part that the
exercise of the right of redemption would entail the reconveyance
to petitioner of the subject land on which the house stands. This relief stands
apart from the judicial affirmation in the same RTC decision that the Alcantaras are also the owners of the house. It was not the
case, as petitioner says, of the Alcantaras lodging a
claim only as against the house, as they had also lodged a claim against the
subject land proceeding from their right of redemption under Article 1622. In
the case at bar, the trial court found that the Alcantaras
were entitled to exercise their rights under Article 1622, but it would not
have been sufficient nor correct for it to just make
the corresponding pronouncement in the decision and then stop. The relief assailed by petitioner as
unwarranted is nothing more but the affordance of the
right of redemption to the Alcantaras at the same
reasonable price the bank had sold the property to petitioner. We see no error in granting such relief.
We are somewhat mystified why petitioner, through this
petition, has confined herself to issues that are utterly formalistic in
nature, yet ultimately unmeritorious. The decision of the RTC raises a host of
potential controversies, such as whether Article 1622 should apply in this case
or whether the ownership of the Alcantaras of the
house in question was indeed sufficiently proven considering that the main
basis of such ownership appears to have been the long-standing regard that her
predecessor-in-interest, Leis, was unquestionably the owner of the house. Given
the unequivocal rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals on the points, it
would be expected of petitioner to squarely argue that there was no sufficient
proof establishing that the Alcantaras are the owners
of the house or that the requisites for applying Article 1622 are present. That petitioner has not couched her arguments clearly
to that effect can only lead to the conclusion that she agrees with the
findings of the lower courts that the Alcantaras are
the owners of the house and that the requisites under Article 1622 have been
met. Considering that such questions are ultimately rooted in findings of fact,
which the Court is not wont to review, there is no cause for us to deeply
inquire into such issues. Since the arguments which are actually raised in the
petition lack merit, the expedient dismissal of the petition is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice