THIRD
DIVISION
|
PILAR ESPINA, ELEANOR G. AQUINO,
LORENE C. BARNUEVO, MARICRIS S. J. BANDINO, JULIO M. PETALIO, JR., NOEL T. DE
BORJA, REMEGIO P. BASCO, MATEO D. DEOCAREZA, EMILIANO A. EBREO, BENJAMIN PAZ,
LEONORA PAZ, CLAUDIO DE LOS REYES, LEANDRO R. CELIS, PATERNO FERNANDEZ,
ANICETO M. RODRIGUEZ, DONATO M. PUNZALAN, LOURDES ALFONSO Q., ALLAN PANLILIO,
DAISY V. ARCEO, ALEJANDRO D. PASCUAL, MA. CORAZON T. BAJO, ARNOLD M. BLANCO,
CRISTITO S. ABELA, DIOSCORO FAJANILAG, and AGUSTIN WONG, Petitioners, - versus
- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MONDE M.Y. SAN
BISCUIT CORP., M.Y. SAN BISCUIT INC., MRS. MHEW WHA LIM and MR. KENG SUN MAR, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 164582 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., CHICO-NAZARIO,
and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the
following Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78797 entitled,
“Pilar Espina, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.”: (a)
Resolution[1]
dated 23 September 2003 which dismissed petitioners’ appeal for failure of all
of the petitioners to sign the certification of non-forum shopping; (b) Resolution[2]
dated 3 March 2004, denying petitioners’ motion to drop the names of their
co-workers who failed to sign the certification of non-forum shopping; and (c) Resolution[3]
dated 23 June 2004, denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The
factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent M.Y. San Biscuits, Inc. (M.Y.
San) was previously engaged in the business of manufacturing biscuits and other
related products.
On 27 December 2000, in a
conciliation proceeding before the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) NCMB-NCR Director Leopoldo de Jesus, the duly
authorized representative of M.Y. San Worker’s Union-PTGWO and M.Y. San Sales
Force Union-PTGWO was informed of the closure or cessation of business
operations of respondent M.Y. San as a result of the intended sale of the
business and all the assets of respondent M.Y. San to respondent Monde M.Y. San
Corporation (Monde) and was notified of their termination, effective 31 January
2001. It was agreed that:
In the interest of industrial peace, the union and management have agreed as follows:
1. In consideration of the length of service of the employees, the management will pay separation package in accordance with their existing Collective Bargaining Agreement. In addition the company will likewise grant nine (9) days per year of service on top of what is provided for in the CBA.
2. The computation of separation package shall
be based on employees’ present basic daily rate for year 2000 plus the increase
of P15.00 per day for all employees.
3. The cut-off date of the length of service is
on
4. The Company shall extend to all affected employees the cash equivalent of their vacation and sick leaves, as follows:
Vacation leaves
1-5 years ----------- 17 days
5-10 years ----------- 17 days
10-20 years ----------- 17 days
20-30 years ----------- 30 days
30-35 years ----------- 32 days
Sick leaves
1-5 years ---------- 17 days
5-10 years ---------- 17 days
10-20 years ---------- 17 days
20-30 years ---------- 30 days
30-up ---------- 32 days
5. The Company will pay one-half of the total union dues for year 2001.
6. The existing local unions affiliated with PTGWO is directly and voluntarily recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees at Monde M.Y. San Corporation, the new owner/name of M.Y. San Biscuits Inc. The company promises to give PTGWO a written confirmation of recognition from the new owner/company.
7. That the separation pay is Tax-Free.
8. That the SSS and PAG-IBIG loans shall be directly remitted by the employees’ concerned.
9. The company will submit list of all employees to the new owner for purposes of rehiring, subject to the new qualifications that may be imposed by the new owner/company. The said employees, however, shall be given hiring preference.
10. As requested, the company furnished the union with a copy of the list of affected employees and announcement letter from the President of M.Y. San Biscuit.
11. The Company agrees to start the giving of separation pay by the second week of January 2001 but shall in no case beyond the third week of the said month.
12. The agreement of the parties in this proceeding shall be contained in the Memorandum of Agreement that will be immediately prepared by the parties.
13. In view of this Agreement, the notices of strike filed with this Office are deemed settled and withdrawn. The rights of the parties are, however, not waived should any of the terms of this agreement are violated by any of the parties.
On
On
9. The
Company agrees to submit the list of all its present employees to the new
corporation for purposes of rehiring if said employee applies and qualifies,
subject to such criteria as the new corporation may impose. In the rehiring, the covered employees shall
be given hiring preference, if qualified.
The corresponding Notice as to whom of the covered employees have been
hired by the new corporation shall be issued immediately after
10. All employees hired by MONDE M.Y. SAN
CORPORATION and/or the new owner of the COMPANY, shall upon hiring, subject to
the terms and conditions of their probationary employment, become members of
the
On
On
On
Subsequently, petitioners were terminated on
various dates.
Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint
for illegal dismissal and underpayment, damages and attorney’s fees and
litigation cost with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional
Arbitration Branch No. IV.
Petitioners alleged that respondent
My San stopped its operations on 31 January 2001, but three days after, resumed
its operation with the same top management running the business; the union
officers, in exchange for being re-hired, acceded to bust the union; and the
sale of respondent M.Y. San to respondent Monde was merely a ploy to circumvent
the provisions of the Labor Code.
Respondent M.Y. San insisted that its
employer-employee relationship with petitioners had ceased to exist, thus, the
complaint for illegal dismissal against it could no longer prosper. It further contended that the power to hire
and fire employees is now lodged in the new business owner, respondent Monde.
On the other hand, respondent Monde alleged
that petitioners had no cause of action against it, stating thus:
A
few days before
On
For
those who did not qualify for regular employment on
Notwithstanding the opportunity given to herein complainants [petitioners] to improve their performance to qualify for regular employment with Monde, complainants [petitioners] either: (a) resigned from their employment with Monde; (b) refused to report for work on 02 May 2001 and on the days following; or (c) failed to qualify for regular employment at the expiration of the period of their probationary employment.
More specifically, the following complainants [petitioners] resigned from their employment with Monde and for which they signed their respective release, waiver and quitclaims:
1. Lorene C. Barnuevo;
2. Lina P. Asugao;
3. Noel T. de Borja;
4. Claudio delos Reyes;
5. Eddie Ollorsa; and
6. Joey Cerbito
Complainants Barnuevo and Ollorsa refused to be transferred from the mixing department to the packing department and consequently tendered their resignation letters and likewise signed their respective release, waiver and quitclaims. x x x.
Seven (7) complainants opted not to report for work either on 02 May 2001 and the succeeding days thereafter or even before the expiration of their probationary employment. After notice to explain was duly served upon them, they deliberately failed/refused to explain their absences. Accordingly, individual notices informing them of their dismissal due to AWOL/gross and habitual neglect of duties were personally delivered to their respective addresses or by registered mail.
1. Pilar Espina;
2. Eleanor G. Aquino;
3. Maricris S.J. Bandino;
4. Julio M. Petalio, Jr.;
5. Emiliano A. Ebreo;
6. Benjamin Paz; and
7. Leonora Paz
Copies
of the notices to explain and the notice of dismissal of the foregoing employees
are hereto attached x x x. In view of complainants Espino, Aquino and Bandino’s
refusal to receive copies of the notice of dismissal personally delivered to
them, Monde likewise submitted copies of the same to he Rizal Province Labor
and Employment Office, DOLE Region 4 on
The
following complainants failed to qualify as regular employees in accordance
with the terms and conditions of their probationary employment with Monde and
were duly informed of their failure to qualify as regular employees by letter
dated
1. Leandro F. Celis;
2. Paterno Fernandez;
3. Aniceto M. Rodriguez;
4. Donato M. Punzalan;
5. George Quinquilleria;
6.
7. Allan Palilio;
8. Daisy V. Arceo;
9. Mario Ramos;
10. Alejandro Pascual;
11. Ma. Corazon Bajo;
12.
13. Cristito Abela;
14. Dioscoro Fajanilag; and
15. Agustin
Wong.
Representative copies of the letter dated 23 June 2001 terminating the probationary employment of the foregoing employees effective at the close of business hours on 02 July 2001 are hereto attached x x x.
Anent
complainant Remegio Basco, on
With
respect to complainant Mateo Deocareza, he has been absent without official leave
(AWOL) since
Complainant
Arlene Laguerta last reported for work on
After evaluation of their respective
pleadings, Labor Arbiter Vicente R. Layawen rendered a Decision[8]
dismissing the case for lack of merit. It
ruled that respondent M.Y. San’s Decision to shut down its operations by selling
its assets is its sole prerogative which must be respected, and that it had
faithfully complied with the requirements of the law, i.e., the notice and payment of separation pay. As to respondent Monde, the Labor Arbiter
ruled that the former satisfactorily discharged the burden of establishing a
just and authorized cause for terminating the services of petitioners.
On appeal, NLRC affirmed the Decision
of the Labor Arbiter in a Resolution[9]
dated
Aggrieved, petitioners went to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari[10]
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, the appellate court dismissed[11]
the petition on the ground that the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by
petitioners did not bear the signatures of their three other co-petitioners
therein. A perusal of the said SPA would
reveal the apparent absence therein of the signatures of Eddie Ollorsa, Joey Cerbito
and George Quinquillera.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a
motion[12]
to drop the names of their three co-petitioners who failed to sign the SPA and
prayed for the reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition. The Motion was denied[13] by
the Court of Appeals on
Petitioners again filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14]
of the
Petitioners are now before us
imputing to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit[17]:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS (FORMER FIFTEENTH DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR FAILURE OF ALL THE PETITIONERS TO SIGN THE
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIFTEENTH DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO DROP EDDIE OLLORSA, JOEY CERBITO AND GEORGE QUINQUILLERA AS PETITIONERS.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIFTEENTH DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIFTEENTH DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE ALLEGED SALE OF M.Y. SAN TO MONDE AS MERE PLOY TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE AND THUS, VIOLATED THE TENURIAL SECURITY OF THE PETITIONERS.
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIFTEENTH DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PIERCING THE VEIL OF THE CORPORATE PERSONALITIES OF M.Y. SAN AND/OR MONDE.
VI.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIFTEENTH DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE PETITIONERS WERE ILLEGALY DISMISSED.[18]
Before resolving the substantive
issues raised by petitioners, the Court will first address the procedural
infirmities. Petitioners assail the
correctness and propriety of the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of their Petition on the
ground that the SPA executed by petitioners does not bear the signatures of their
three other co-petitioners therein.
While the general rule is that the
certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient,
this Court has stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed
to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective.[19]
Strict compliance with the provision regarding the certificate of non-forum
shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.[20]
It does not, however, thereby interdict substantial compliance with its
provisions under justifiable circumstances.[21]
In the case of San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa,[22] the
dismissed employees filed with the NLRC a complaint for declaration as regular
employees of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and for an illegal dismissal case,
following SMC’s closure of its Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant. After an unfavorable ruling from the NLRC, the
dismissed employees filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. Only
three out of the 97 named petitioners signed the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping. This Court ruled that given the collective nature of the
petition filed before the appellate court, which raised only one common cause
of action against SMC, the execution by the three petitioners, in behalf of all
the other petitioners, of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes
substantial compliance with the Rules.
In the case at bar, the signatures of
25 out of the 28 employees who filed the Petition for Certiorari in the appellate court, likewise, constitute substantial
compliance with the Rules. Petitioners raised one common cause of action
against respondents M.Y. San and Monde, i.e.,
the illegal closure of respondent M.Y. San and its subsequent sale to
respondent Monde, which resulted in the termination of their services. They share a common interest and common
defense in the Complaint for illegal dismissal, which they filed with the NLRC.
Thus, when they appealed their case to
the appellate court, they pursued the same as a collective body, raising only
one argument in support of their rights against the illegal dismissal allegedly
committed by respondents M.Y. San and Monde. There is sufficient basis, therefore, for the 25
petitioners, to speak for and in behalf of their co-petitioners, to file the Petition
in the appellate court.
Ordinarily, we would have remanded
this case to the Court of Appeals for disposition on the merits. However, so as not to needlessly prolong the
resolution of a comparatively simple controversy, we deem it just and equitable
to decide the same on the merits.[23]
Based on the merits, the petition must,
just the same, fail.
The substantive issue being presented
by petitioners for resolution is whether they were illegally terminated from
work by respondents M.Y. San and Monde. Corollary
to the above issue is whether the closure of business by respondent M.Y. San was
valid.
We
shall first discuss the validity of the closure of business by respondent M.Y.
San before tackling the alleged illegal dismissal of petitioners by respondent
M.Y. San.
Work is a necessity that has economic
significance deserving legal protection. The provisions on social justice and
protection to labor in the Constitution[24]
dictate so.
However, employers are also accorded
rights and privileges to assure their self-determination and independence and
reasonable return of capital. This mass
of privileges comprises the so-called management prerogatives. Although they may be broad and unlimited in
scope, the State has the right to determine whether an employer’s privilege is
exercised in a manner that complies with the legal requirements and does not
offend the protected rights of labor. One
of the rights accorded an employer is the right to close an establishment or
undertaking.[25] Just as no law forces anyone to go into
business, no law can compel anybody to continue the same.[26]
The right to close the operations of
an establishment or undertaking is explicitly recognized under the Labor Code
as one of the authorized causes in terminating employment of workers, the only
limitation being that the closure must
not be for the purpose of circumventing the provisions on terminations of
employment embodied in the Labor Code. Article
283 of the Labor Code reads:
ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.—The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. x x x. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year. (Emphasis supplied.)
The phrase “closure or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking” includes a partial or total closure
or cessation.
x x x Ordinarily, the closing of a warehouse facility and the termination of the services of employees there assigned is a matter that is left to the determination of the employer in the good faith exercise of its management prerogatives. The applicable law in such a case is Article 283 of the Labor Code which permits “closure or cessation of operation of an establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses,” which, in our reading includes both the complete cessation of operations and the cessation of only part of a company’s business.[27]
And the phrase “closure or cessation
not due to serious business losses or financial reverses” recognizes the right
of the employer to close or cease its business operations or undertaking even
in the absence of serious business
losses or financial reverses, as long as he pays his employees their
termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length of service.
It would indeed be stretching the
intent and spirit of the law if a court were to unjustly interfere in
management’s prerogative to close or cease its business operations just because
said business operation or undertaking is not suffering from any loss.[28] The determination to cease operations is a
prerogative of management which the State does not usually interfere with, as
no business or undertaking must be required to continue operating simply
because it has to maintain its workers in employment, and such act would be
tantamount to a taking of property without due process of law.[29] As long as the company’s exercise of the same
is in good faith to advance its interest
and not for the purpose of circumventing the rights of employees under the law
or a valid agreement, such exercise will be upheld.[30]
Clearly then, the right to close an
establishment or undertaking may be justified on grounds other than business
losses but it cannot be an unbridled prerogative to suit the whims of the
employer.[31]
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code,
three requirements are necessary for a valid cessation of business operations,
namely:
(1)
service of a written notice to the employees and to the
DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof;
(2)
the cessation must be bona fide in character; and
(3) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to at least one half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, or one (1) month pay, whichever is higher.
The records reveal that private
respondent M.Y. San complied with the aforecited requirements. M.Y. San
employees were adequately informed of the intended business closure and a
written notice to the Regional Director of DOLE was filed by respondent M.Y.
San, informing the DOLE that M.Y. San will be closed effective 31 January 2001.
The ultimate test of the validity of
closure or cessation of establishment or undertaking is that it must be bona fide in character.[32] And the burden of proving such falls upon the
employer.[33]
Respondent M.Y. San in good faith
complied with the requirements for closure; sold and conveyed all its assets to
respondent Monde for valuable consideration; and there were no previous labor
problems. It has been ruled that an
employer may adopt policies or changes or adjustments in the operations to
insure profit to itself or protect the investments of its stockholders, and in
the exercise of such management prerogative, the employer may merge or consolidate
its business with another, or sell or
dispose all or substantially all of its assets and properties which may bring
about the dismissal or termination of its employees in the process.[34]
Lastly, the petitioners received their termination pay which was even
beyond the amount required by law. The
computation of their separation pay was 15 days for every year of service plus
an additional nine days for every year of service, and cash equivalent of their
vacation and sick leaves.[35] Petitioners received their separation pay and
accordingly signed their quitclaims.
The closure, therefore, of the business
operation of respondent M.Y. San was not tainted with bad faith or other
circumstance that would give rise to suspicions of malicious intent. Other than
their mere allegations, petitioners failed to present independent evidence that
would otherwise show that the closure of M.Y. San was without factual basis and
done in utter bad faith. Mere allegation is not evidence. It is a basic rule in
evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.[36]
Thus, since private respondent M.Y.
San’s closure and cessation of business was lawful, there was no illegal
dismissal of petitioners to speak of.
We shall now proceed to discuss the
validity of the termination of the employment of petitioners by respondent
Monde.
There is no dispute that petitioners
were probationary employees as stated in their individual contracts of
employment with respondent Monde.
Article 281 of the Labor Code governs
probationary employment:
Art. 281. Probationary
employment. – Probationary employment shall not
exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is
covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period.
The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary
basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period
shall be considered a regular employee.
While petitioners were only
probationary employees who do not enjoy permanent status, nonetheless, they were
still entitled to the constitutional protection of security of tenure. As may be gleaned in the abovequoted
provision, their employment may only be terminated for a valid and just cause
or for failing to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the
reasonable standards made known to him by the employer at the time of
engagement and after being accorded due process.[37]
Procedural due process requires that the employee be given two
written notices before he is terminated, consisting of a notice which apprises
the employee of the particular acts/omissions for which the dismissal is sought
and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the
employer’s decision to dismiss him.[38]
In the case at bar, petitioners were
notified of the standards they have to meet to qualify as regular employees of
respondent Monde when the latter apprised them, at the start of their
employment, that:
1. You shall be under probation for
a maximum period of six (6) months or until
x x x x
5. To determine your fitness to assume your position on a permanent status, when considered due, your supervisor shall rate your performance during your probationary period.[39]
Significantly, petitioners Lorene C.
Barnuevo, Claudio delos Reyes, Eddie Ollorsa, and Joey Cerbito voluntarily resigned
from respondent Monde and signed their respective release, waiver and
quitclaims.
Respondent Monde
exercised its management prerogative in good faith when it dismissed petitioners
Pilar Espina, Eleanor G. Aquino, Maricris S.J. Bandino, Julio M. Petalio, Jr.,
Emiliano A. Ebreo, Benjamin Paz, and Leonora Paz, due to absence without leave
(AWOL), gross and habitual neglect of duties, and only after the personal
delivery of the notices to their respective addresses or by registered mail. With respect to petitioner Mateo Deocareza, he
has been AWOL since
In the case of petitioners Leandro R. Celis, Paterno Fernandez,
Aniceto M. Rodriguez, Donato M. Punzalan,
Lourdes Alfonso Q., Allan Panlilio, Daisy V. Arceo, Alejandro Pascual, Ma. Corazon Bajo, Arnold
M. Blanco, Cristito Abela, Dioscoro Fajanilag, and Agustin Wong, they failed to
qualify as regular employees in accordance with the terms and conditions of
their probationary employment with respondent Monde and were duly informed of
their failure to qualify as regular employees by letter dated 23 June 2001
terminating their probationary employment effective at the close of the
business on 2 July 2001. Again, there
were two notices sent to petitioners individually – a notice apprising them of
the particular acts or omissions for which their dismissal was sought and a memorandum
informing them that they were terminated from work.
It must be noted that petitioners
were terminated prior to the expiration of their probationary contracts on
Terminating employment is one of
respondent Monde’s prerogatives. As an
employer, respondent Monde has the right to regulate, according to its
discretion and best judgment, including work assignment, working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline,
dismissal and recall of workers. Management has the prerogative to discipline
its employees and to impose appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to
company rules and regulations.[41]
This Court has upheld a company’s
management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws and valid
agreements.[42]
The law imposes many obligations on
the employer such as providing just compensation to workers, observance of the
procedural requirements of notice and hearing in the termination of employment.
On the other hand, the law recognizes the right of the employer to expect from
its workers not only good performance, adequate work and diligence, but also
good conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to continue to
employ such persons whose continuance in the service will patently be inimical
to his interest. [43]
Thus, respondent Monde exercised in
good faith its management prerogative as there is no dispute that petitioners
had been habitually absent, neglectful of their work, and rendered unsatisfactory service, to the damage
and prejudice of the company.
Anent the validity of quitclaims
signed by petitioners.
To be sure, the law looks with
disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees who are inveigled or
pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their
legal responsibilities. But quitclaims and releases are not per se invalid.
We have clarified the standards for
determining the validity of quitclaim or waiver in the case of Periquet v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[44]
to wit:
If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. x x x.
In the case at bar, there is no
showing that petitioners were coerced into signing the quitclaims. In their sworn quitclaims, they freely
declared that they received to their satisfaction all that are due them by
reason of their employment and that they were voluntarily releasing respondents
M.Y. San and Monde, for any liability in relation to their employment. Nothing on the face of their quitclaims would
show that they were unconscionable. Further,
petitioners did not present evidence that they had been forced or intimidated
in signing the same.
Finally, it is significant to note
that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were unanimous in their findings that
the closure of respondent M.Y. San is valid and that the employees of
respondents M.Y. San and Monde were not illegally dismissed. The issue as to whether there was a valid
ground for petitioners’ dismissal is factual in nature.[45] We have always held that factual findings of
the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter, who are deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, when sufficiently supported by
evidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are considered
binding on this Court. As long as their
Decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the process of their
deduction from the evidence proffered by the parties before them, all that is
left is the Court’s stamp of finality by affirming the factual findings made by
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.[46] We find no reason to depart from this Rule.
WHEREFORE, this
Court grants
the instant Petition insofar as it REVERSES
the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Rosalinda
Asuncion-Vicente, concurring. Rollo, p. 13.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Records, pp. 44-48.
[8] CA rollo, p. 382.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Rule 52. Sec. 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration.- No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
[17] Rollo, pp. 27-68.
[18]
[19] Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, 448 Phil. 302, 311 (2003).
[20] HLC
Construction and Development Corporation v.
[21] Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, supra note 19.
[22] G.R. No. 149011,
[23] Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156413, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 658, 669; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 598, 605 (2001); Chua v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 262, 273 (1997); Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771, 778 (1997).
[24] 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 18. The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. x x x.
[25] Capitol
Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098,
[26] Mac
[27]
[28] Industrial Timber Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 27.
[29]
[30] J.A.T. General Services v. National Labor Relations Commission, 465 Phil. 785, 797 (2004).
[31] Capitol Medical Center Inc. v. Meris, supra note 25.
[32] Mac
Adams Metal Engineering Workers Union-Independent v. Mac
[33] J.A.T. General Services v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 31 at 87.
[34] Corporal, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 395 Phil. 890, 901 (2000).
[35] Rollo, p. 91.
[36]
[37]
[38] Secon Philippines, Ltd. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 377 Phil. 711, 718 (1999).
[39] Records, pp. 236-237.
[40] De La Cruz, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 463 Phil. 606, 618 (2003).
[41] Deles, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 384 Phil. 271, 281-282 (2000).
[42] Manila Electric Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, 331 Phil. 838, 847 (1996).
[43] Agabon
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158693,
[44] G.R. No. 91298,
[45] Anvil
Ensembles Garment v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155037,
[46] Bolinao
Security and Investigation Service, Inc. v. Toston, G.R. No. 139135,