THIRD
DIVISION
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CGP TRANSPORTATION AND
SERVICES CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus - PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INCORPORATED,
Respondent. |
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G. R. No. 164547 Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA,
JJ. Promulgated: March
28, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the 26 March 2004 Decision[1] and 13
July 2004 Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 68528 entitled “PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Hon. Alberto L. Lerma
in His Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City and CGP Transportation and Services Corporation.”
In the assailed decision, the Court of
Appeals set aside the 27 March 2001[3] and 30
August 2001[4]
Orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 256, of the City of Muntinlupa in LRC Case No. 99-020 entitled “In re: Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession for Real Properties Covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 172319 and 180241 of the Register of
Deeds for Makati City (CGP Transportation & Services Corporation
Properties).” Herein respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Incorporated (PCI)
was originally the petitioner in the aforequoted case, while herein petitioner CGP
Transportation and Services Corporation (CGP) was the oppositor therein.
This case stemmed from the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
instituted by herein respondent PCI against the Real Estate Mortgage[5] and
the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage[6]
executed by herein petitioner CGP.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner CGP obtained two loans from
respondent PCI, the collective principal sum of which amounted to Sixteen
Million (P16,000,000.00) pesos. Both
loans were secured by real estate mortgages over two parcels of land[7]
located in Bo. Cupang,
Petitioner CGP failed to pay its
indebtedness to respondent PCI pursuant to the terms and conditions extant on
the face of the Promissory Notes covering the two loans aforementioned.
Accordingly, the latter filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the
real properties subject of the Real Estate Mortgage and the Amendment of Real
Estate Mortgage, pursuant to Act No. 3135,[8] as
amended.
During the public auction held thereafter,
respondent PCI was the highest bidder of the subject real properties.
Consequently, the corresponding Certificates of Sale were issued in the name of
respondent PCI.
On
Petitioner CGP, however, failed to
redeem the real properties during the redemption period; thus, respondent PCI insisted
that actual possession thereof be turned over to it. Expectedly, petitioner CGP balked at the idea
and refused the demand. On
On
The petitioner is correct, the law expressly authorized the
purchaser to petition for a writ of possession during the redemption period by
filing an Ex-parte Motion under oath
for that purpose and that the pendency of any separate civil action can be no
obstacle to the issuance of the writ of possession which is a ministerial act
of the trial court after a title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgage.
Accordingly, Ex-parte
reception of evidence is scheduled on
In
its Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner CGP averred that the scheduled hearing was violative of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in its favor by the same trial court, albeit in a
different case involving the same parties – particularly Civil Case No. 99-234,
respecting a complaint for the annulment of the foreclosure proceedings earlier
mentioned. It argued that notwithstanding
the fact that the complaint for annulment of foreclosure proceedings had
already been dismissed by the trial court, such order had not yet become final
and executory inasmuch as it was appealed to the
Court of Appeals. That being the case,
the writ should still be considered in effect and subsisting.
On
[F]inding the grounds relied upon by the oppositor to be
meritorious and considering further that there are several motions to be
resolved yet by the court, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, the order
of this court dated October 20, 2000 is set aside and the ex-parte proceedings
is hereby nullified and set aside. The Preliminary Injunction previously issued
is reinstated.[11]
Consequently,
it was respondent PCI’s turn to file a Motion for Reconsideration.
In
an Order dated
This
resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner on the order of
this court dated
There
is basis to the pending motion of petitioner insofar as the reinstatement of
preliminary injunction earlier issued by this court and submission for
resolution of motions are concerned, as they all refer to Civil Case No. 99-234. This Court recognizes the snafu brought about
by the several pleadings and pending incidents both in the instant case and
Civil Case No. 99-234 which involved the same parties and the same subject
matter.
Be
that as it may, this court, after a careful review of the verified opposition
of the oppositor, including it annexes, is not inclined to grant the ex-parte
proceedings as asserted by the petitioner.
This court reviewed the grounds of oppositor in its motion for
reconsideration of the order dated
It
is the considered view of this court that the verified opposition on record
joined issues that need to be heard in the presence of both parties, a basic
requirement of due process. The general
rule frowns [on] ex-parte proceedings. When this court issued a writ of injunction
in Civil Case No. 99-234, taking into consideration the allegations in the
complaint it was convinced that there was a need for a status quo between the
parties until all the issues joined therein are heard and disposed. On technical ground, the complaint in Civil
Case No. 99-234 was dismissed by this court.
Although it may be too late for this court to say, there were indeed
pending incidents that needed to be resolved in Civil Case No. 99-234. Precisely, when this court mentioned of
pending motions, it was actually referring to the pending incidents in Civil
Case No. 99-234, as correctly pointed out by the Oppositor, petitioner at the
time of the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 99-234, it has not
filed yet its answer to the complaint in intervention of the
plaintiff-intervenor. Petitioner, apparently, took advantage of the
inadvertence in the issuance of the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 99-234
when it kept silent of the fact that it has not filed yet an answer to the
complaint in intervention.
This court is cognizant of the rule that the dismissal of the complaint on the merits automatically dissolves the injunction issued therein even if the decision or order of dismissal is on appeal. The dismissal of this court however, of the complaint in Civil Case No. 99-234 was not the result of trial on the merits but rather on mere technicality. It is in this light that this court believes that considering that the dissolution of the injunction was the consequence of the order of dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 99-234, which was not the result of a trial on the merits, and the said order of dismissal is now the subject of appeal, there is a need to suspend the proceedings in this case until the said appeal is disposed.[12]
Aggrieved, respondent PCI filed before
this Court, a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, premised on the following grounds:
1. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE THE EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE A QUO.
2. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT REINSTATED IN THE CASE A QUO THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHICH WAS ISSUED IN ANOTHER CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 99-234).
3.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT SET ASIDE IN THE CASE A
QUO THE ORDER DATED
4. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT SUSPENDED THE PROCEEDINGS A QUO UNTIL THE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 99-234 IS RESOLVED.[13]
The petition (G.R. No. 150483) was,
however, referred to the Court of Appeals by this Court for appropriate action
in a Resolution,[14]
dated
In response to the referral, the Court
of Appeals docketed the petition as CA G.R. SP No. 68528.
In its Decision promulgated on
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
orders dated
The appellate court found public
respondent RTC Judge to have gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in suspending the proceedings in LRC Case No. 99-020
relating to the writ of possession asked for by herein respondent PCI. The Court of Appeals did not favor the RTC
Judge who, “in effect took cognizance of the proceedings in Civil Case No.
99-234, an action for annulment of foreclosure proceedings filed by”[16]
herein petitioner CGP – one that is entirely separate from the case earlier
filed. Moreover, “[w]ith the dismissal of the main case, (an) injunction
(issued therein) is automatically lifted and the dissolution thereof is not
appealable.” The Court of Appeals then
clarified that though the preceding principle is the general rule, the
circumstances surrounding the reinstatement of the subject writ of preliminary
injunction do not necessarily entitle the application of the exception stated
in Section 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states:
SEC. 4. Judgments not
stayed by appeal. – Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership,
accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be
declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their
rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless
otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court
in its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or
granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond
or otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or protection of the
rights of the adverse party.
It likewise noted that the fact that
there was no dispute vis-à-vis herein
petitioner CGP’s failure to redeem the foreclosed real properties within the
period, herein respondent PCI’s right to possession
thereof is quite patent and absolute; and that “any question regarding the
validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for
refusing the issuance of a writ of possession xxx.”[17]
On
Hence, this Petition
for Review on Certiorari filed under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner CGP does not question at all the
substantive aspect of the decision of the Court of Appeals. It’s petition
is predicated solely on the issue
of “whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in giving due
course to the petition for certiorari
of respondent, there being already a final finding by this Honorable Court in
its Resolution dated December 3, 2001, in G.R. No. 150483, that the said
petition raised questions of facts and therefore not proper for petition for certiorari.”[18]
In its one page argument,
Petitioner CGP contends, in whole, that:
It is undisputed that this Honorable Court in
its resolution dated
Respondent PCI, in contrast, maintains that in
rendering its assailed Decision, the
“… Honorable Court of Appeals simply discharged the duty assigned to it by this
Honorable Court,” apropos the latter’s
We sustain respondent PCI’s
importunings and dismiss petitioner CGP’s petition.
Although the form or mode of the original petition
filed by herein respondent PCI from the Order of the RTC was a special civil
action for certiorari, an incorrect
mode of appeal there being questions of fact as assigned errors, i.e., the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstance, their relation to each other and to the
whole situation,[20]
this Court, in order to serve the demands of substantial justice, considers and
disposes of the case as an appeal by certiorari
instead.
In an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised.[21]
In petitions such as the one filed in
G.R. No. 150483, questions of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal
under Rule 45 as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law.[22] Well entrenched is the rule that this Court
is not a trier of facts.[23]
The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose
findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding on
us subject to certain exceptions.[24]
Cases where an appeal involved questions of fact, of law, or
both fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.[25]
This is attested to by Section 15, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The section reads:
SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. –
x x x he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact
that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed
by the parties.
It
was on this score that we referred the subject petition to the appellate court.
Under Section 5(f) of Rule 56 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal may be dismissed on the ground of erroneous
choice or mode of appeal. Said section
reads:
SEC. 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.
– The appeal MAY be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following
grounds:
x x x x
(f) Error in the choice or
mode of appeal.
This notwithstanding, the Court may refer the case
to the Court of Appeals under par. 2, Section 6 of the same rule. Said section states:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. – x x x
An appeal by certiorari taken
to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of
Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme
Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final. [Emphasis supplied.]
This Court’s discretion to refer the case to the
Court of Appeals is by reason of the term “may” in both sections.
Such term denotes discretion on our part
in dismissing an appeal or referring one to the Court of Appeals.
Besides, it must be borne in mind that
procedural rules are intended to ensure proper administration of law and
justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice.[26]
A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime
objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for
the existence of the courts.
In the case at bar, substantial ends of justice
warranted the referral of the case to the appellate court for further
appropriate proceedings.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice |
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ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with Associate Justices Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis and Jose L. Sabio, Jr. concurring;
Annex “A” of the Petition; rollo, pp. 19-26.
[2] Annex “B” of the Petition; id. at
27-28.
[3] Penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma; CA rollo, p. 35.
[4]
[5] CA Decision, p. 2; rollo, p. 20.
[6]
[7] Together with all the buildings and improvements existing thereon.
[8] An Act To
Regulate The
[9] Annex “M” of the Petition for Certiorari was originally filed before this Court; CA rollo, pp. 85-88.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[14] The Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals, for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, quoted as follows:
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.
[15] Rollo, p. 26.
[16] CA Decision, p. 6; id. at 24.
[17]
[18]
[19] Rollo, p. 15.
[20] Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. II. (2000 ed.), p. 650.
[21] Ybañez v. Court of Appeals, 323
Phil. 643, 651 (1996).
[22] De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 534, 544 (2002).
[23] Universal Motors Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 47432,
[24]
[25] Crisologo v. Globe Telecom, Inc., G.R. No. 167631,
[26] Morales v. The Board of Regents of the University of the