SECOND DIVISION
JULIUS
KAWACHI and G.R.
No. 163768
GAYLE
KAWACHI,
Petitioners, Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., J.
DOMINIE
DEL QUERO and
HON.
JUDGE MANUEL R. TARO,
Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 43,
Respondents.
March
27, 2007
x
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing two resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 226,
The
following factual antecedents are matters of record.
In
an Affidavit-Complaint dated
The complaint essentially alleged
that Virgilio Kawachi hired
private respondent as a clerk of the pawnshop and that on certain occasions,
she worked beyond the regular working hours but was not paid the corresponding
overtime pay.
The complaint also narrated an
incident on
On
2.
That the Plaintiff was employed as a clerk in the pawnshop business office of
the Defendants otherwise known as the A/J RAYMUNDO PAWNSHOP, INC. located (sic)
and with principal office address at Unit A Virka Bldg.
Edsa Corner Roosevelt[,] Quezon
City, from May 27, 2002 to August 10, 2002;
3.
That on August 10, 2002 at or about 11:30 AM, the Plaintiff was admonished by
the Defendants Julius Kawachi and Gayle Kawachi who are acting as manager and assistant manager
respectively of the pawnshop business and alternately accused her of having
committed an act which she had not done and was scolded in a loud voice in front
of many employees and customers in their offices;
4. That
further for no apparent reason the Plaintiff was ordered to get out and leave
the pawnshop office and was told to wait for her salary outside the office when
she tried to explain that she had no fault in the complaint of the customer, (sic)
[H]owever[,] her explanation fell on deaf ears;
5. That she was instantly dismissed from her job
without due process;
6. That the incident happened in front of many people
which caused the Plaintiff to suffer serious embarrassment and shame so that
she could not do anything but cry because of the shameless way by which she was
terminated from the service; x x x[3]
The complaint for damages specifically
sought the recovery of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal
of the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and forum-shopping or
splitting causes of action. At first, the MeTC
granted petitioners’ motion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction in an Order dated
Thus, petitioners elevated the MeTC’s aforesaid two orders to the RTC, Branch 226 of Quezon City, via a Petition for Certiorari (With
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction). After
due hearing, the RTC declined petitioners’ prayer for a temporary restraining
order. For her part, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition.
On
The RTC held that private
respondent’s action for damages was based on the alleged tortious
acts committed by her employers and did not seek any relief under the Labor
Code. The RTC cited the pronouncement in
On
Petitioners argue that the NLRC has
jurisdiction over the action for damages because the alleged injury is work-related.
They also contend that private respondent should not be allowed to split her
causes of action by filing the action for damages separately from the labor
case.
Private respondent maintains that
there is no causal connection between her cause of action and the
employer-employee relations of the parties.
The petition is meritorious.
The jurisdictional controversy of the
sort presented in this case has long been settled by this Court.
Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as
amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive
jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations —in
other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed
by the Civil Code.[10]
In the 1999 case of San Miguel
Corporation v. Etcuban,[11]
the Court noted what was then the
current trend, and still is, to refer worker-employer controversies to labor
courts, unless unmistakably provided by the law to be otherwise. Because of the
trend, the Court noted further, jurisprudence has developed the “reasonable
causal connection rule.” Under this rule, if there is a reasonable causal
connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then
the case is within the jurisdiction of our labor courts. In the absence
of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.[12]
In San Miguel Corporation,[13]
the Court upheld the labor arbiter’s jurisdiction over the employees’ separate
action for damages, which also sought the nullification of the so-called
“contract of termination” and noted that the allegations in the complaint were
so carefully formulated as to avoid a semblance of employer-employee relations.
In said case, the employees of San
Miguel Corporation (SMC) availed of the “Retrenchment to Prevent Loss Program.”
After their inclusion in the retrenchment program, the employees were given
their termination letters and separation pay. In return, the employees executed
“receipt and release” documents in favor of the company. Subsequently, the
employees learned that the company was never in financial distress and was engaged
in hiring new employees. Thus, they filed a complaint
before the NLRC for the declaration
of nullity of the retrenchment program and prayed for reinstatement, backwages and damages. After the labor arbiter dismissed
the complaint, the employees filed an action for damages before the RTC,
alleging the deception employed upon them by SMC which led to their separation
from the company. They sought the declaration of nullity of their so-called
collective “contract of termination” and the recovery of actual and
compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
The Court held that the employees’ claim
for damages was intertwined with their having been separated from their
employment without just cause and, consequently, had a reasonable causal
connection with their employer-employee relations with petitioner. The Court
explained in this manner:
x x x First, their claim for
damages is grounded on their having been deceived into serving their employment
due to SMC’s concocted financial distress and fraudulent retrenchment program—a
clear case of illegal dismissal. Second,
a comparison of respondents’ complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
retrenchment program before the labor arbiter and the complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their “contract of termination” before the RTC
reveals that the allegations and prayer of the former are almost identical with
those of the latter except that the prayer for reinstatement was no longer
included and the claim for backwages and other
benefits was replaced with a claim for actual damages. These are telltale signs that respondents’
claim for damages is intertwined with their having been separated from their
employment without just cause and, consequently, has a reasonable causal
connection with their employer-employee relations with SMC. Accordingly, it cannot be denied that
respondents’ claim falls under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter as
provided in paragraph 4 of Article 217.[14]
The “reasonable causal connection
rule” emerged in the 1987 case of Primero v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[15]
where the Court recognized the jurisdiction of the labor arbiters over claims
for damages in connection with termination of employment, thus:
It is clear that the question of the legality of the act
of dismissal is intimately related to the issue of the legality of the
manner by which that act of dismissal was performed. But while the Labor Code treats of the nature of, and the
remedy available as
regards the first – the employee’s separation from
employment – it does not at all deal with the second – the manner of that
separation – which is governed exclusively by the Civil Code. In
addressing the first issue, the Labor Arbiter applies the Labor Code; in
addressing the second, the Civil Code. And this appears to be the plain
and patent intendment of the law. For apart from the reliefs
expressly set out in the Labor Code flowing from illegal dismissal from
employment, no other damages may be awarded to an illegally dismissed
employee other than those specified by the Civil Code. Hence, the fact
that the issue—of whether or not moral or other damages were suffered by an
employee and in the affirmative, the amount that should properly be awarded to
him in the circumstances—is determined under the provisions of the Civil Code
and not the Labor Code, obviously was not meant to create a cause of action
independent of that for illegal dismissal and thus place the matter beyond the
Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction.[16]
In the instant case, the allegations
in private respondent’s complaint for damages show that her injury was the
offshoot of petitioners’ immediate harsh reaction as her administrative
superiors to the supposedly sloppy manner
by which she had discharged her duties.
Petitioners’ reaction culminated in
private respondent’s dismissal from work in the very same incident. The incident
on
Where the employer-employee
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a
different source of obligation, the Court has not
hesitated to uphold
the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Where the damages claimed for
were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the
claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated
damages in the enforcement of a prior employment contract,[17]
the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld. The scenario that obtains in
this case is obviously different. The allegations in private respondent’s
complaint unmistakably relate to the manner of her alleged illegal dismissal.
For a single cause of action, the
dismissed employee cannot be allowed to sue in two forums: one, before
the labor arbiter for reinstatement and recovery of back wages or for
separation pay, upon the theory that the dismissal was illegal; and two, before
a court of justice for recovery of moral and other damages, upon the theory
that the
manner of dismissal was unduly injurious
or tortious. Suing in the manner described is
known as “splitting a cause of action,” a practice engendering multiplicity of
actions. It is considered procedurally unsound and obnoxious to the
orderly administration of justice.[18]
In the instant case, the NLRC has
jurisdiction over private respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal and
damages arising therefrom. She cannot be allowed to file
a separate or independent civil action for damages where the alleged injury has
a reasonable connection to her termination from employment. Consequently, the
action for damages filed before the MeTC must be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
certiorari is GRANTED. The two Resolutions dated 20 October 2003 and 29 March
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon
City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice