SECOND DIVISION
|
Petitioners, - versus - |
G.R. No. 163706 Present: Quisumbing,
J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio
Morales, Tinga,
and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
|
HERMINIA
G. AURELIO, Respondent. |
Promulgated: March 29, 2007 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an
appeal to reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
dated
Respondent Herminia G. Aurelio was hired as accounting clerk by
petitioner Divine Word College (DWC) of
In July 1989,
DWC changed the basis for the across-the-board increase in the wages of its
employees resulting in the lowering of the wages. Two years after, a labor inspection team
examined DWC’s records for compliance of labor laws and found violations of
several labor standard laws such as nonpayment of holiday pay, rest day, and
holiday premium pay. On
According to Aurelio,
it was around this time when Fr. Holzgartner started to ignore and admonish
her. Despite her credible explanations,
she was terminated. She then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries, 13th month
pay, as well as actual, moral, and exemplary damages, against DWC and
petitioner Fr. Eleuterio Lacaron,
SVD, President of DWC.
Petitioners,
on the other hand, averred that Aurelio was appointed senior bookkeeper in lieu
of a designation as accountant since she was not a certified public accountant;
and in 1991, Fr. Holzgartner recommended Aurelio as the Acting Finance Officer. According to petitioners, the position had
gone to Aurelio’s head, so much so that Aurelio made decisions and
administrative/finance plans for DWC without authority from the school
administration; reported for work at her discretion; chose her work
assignments; divulged plans of the school administration even before these were
finalized; and sowed intrigue which caused conflicts to the point where her
co-workers filed several complaints about her attitude and treatment of
co-employees. At the end of school year
1991-1992, Aurelio was in the list for reshuffling of assignments. Petitioners added that when she was retained
as senior bookkeeper, her attitude and performance continued to
deteriorate. Despite several reminders
from Fr. Holzgartner and admonitions from her superiors, she did not improve. They even called her attention to all her
shortcomings and reminded her of the highly confidential nature of her position
as bookkeeper.[5] In response, she submitted a written explanation
dated
According
to petitioners, on
In
the meantime, CJV & Co. split into two auditing firms: CJV & Co. and Alba Ledesma & Co.
(Alba). The preliminary report of CJV
& Co. was endorsed to Alba for verification. It was discovered that various amounts spent
by DWC for salaries and other employee benefits had been inadvertently omitted
in the said report. Thus, Alba prepared
a final report which belied all the accusations of the teachers against DWC,
Fr. Lacaron and Fr. Holzgartner.
On
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondent is adjudged guilty of illegal dismissal and is hereby ordered to pay
complainant’s full backwages from
SO
ORDERED.[9]
On
On P78,523.20, since the appeal bond covered only the award of P110,110.13
backwages.
On April 19, 1999, DWC filed a manifestation with motion
for clarification[12]
that its appeal bond actually covered only the backwages award since they were
not appealing the award of separation pay, based on a manifestation and motion
wherein Aurelio manifested that due to error in computing her years of service,
the monetary award given to her was erroneous and therefore the appeal bond was
insufficient to cover the monetary award.
On
Said motion
was resolved by the Labor Arbiter on
In
view of the foregoing, the award of separation pay is One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Five Hundred Two Pesos and Eighty Centavos (P150,502.80) and the
record of the instant case is hereby forwarded to the Second Division of the
NLRC for appropriate action.
SO
ORDERED.[13]
On
The dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and the instant case DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.[15]
The motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari[16]
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals which reversed
and set aside the decision of the NLRC. The
Court of Appeals held that loss of trust and confidence has been
indiscriminately used by employers to justify almost every instance of
termination as a defense against claims of arbitrary dismissal, and that
assuming there was such, there was failure on the part of petitioners to observe
the procedural requirements of the law for an effective dismissal. There was no observance of due process as
Aurelio was not given notice nor given an opportunity to defend herself. According to
the Court of Appeals, petitioners did not furnish a notice which apprised the respondent
of the particular acts or omissions for which her dismissal was sought.
The dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed order dated April 2, 2003,
and a resolution dated May 29, 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission,
Second Division, in NLRC NCR CA No. 018324-99, NLRC RAB IV-7-9184-97-M are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondent DWC is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Herminia G. Aurelio
backwages to be computed from the time her salary was withheld up to the
finality of this decision, plus separation pay since reinstatement is no longer
viable.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, the instant petition, which raises the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN ITS FINDING OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, DESPITE AFFIRMING THE CONFIDENTIAL
NATURE OF THE POSITION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND FURTHER DESPITE ADMISSION
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT COMMITTED SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, ALLEGEDLY FOR THE REASON
THAT THE MISCONDUCT DOES NOT SUFFICE TO JUSTIFY PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
TERMINATION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HONORABLE NLRC WHICH WERE
ADMITTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS TO HER LAPSES:
· DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT’S POSITION; AND,
· DESPITE THE
FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S ADMISSIONS CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
SHOW BREACH OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN
IT MODIFIED PORTIONS OF THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER AND THE NLRC WHICH HAD
ATTAINED FINALITY BECAUSE THESE WERE NOT QUESTIONED AND/OR RAISED ON EITHER
PETITIONER DWC’S APPEAL TO THE NLRC OR PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS.
THESE ISSUES ARE:
· THE AWARD OF
BACK WAGES FOR A SPECIFIC PERIOD FROM P110,110.13.
· THE ISSUE OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
· IN FACT,
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S PETITION BEFORE THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISTINCTLY
QUESTIONED AND/OR “ZEROED ON” THE DELETION OF THE AWARD OF SEPARATION
PAY AND NOT THE AWARD OF BACK WAGES OR ITS COMPUTATION.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE NLRC ON PETITION FOR REVIEW.
V.
THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE ALLOW “PARTIAL APPEALS” AND PARTIAL DECISIONS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THEREFORE, ERRED IN
REVERSING THE DECISION DATED
Simply
stated, petitioners raise the following issues:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals err
in finding that petitioners illegally dismissed respondent despite admission
that respondent was a confidential employee and had admitted serious misconduct
and evidence to show breach of trust and confidence? (2)
Did the Court of Appeals err in deleting the award of separation pay and
not backwages? (3) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the respondent
was denied procedural due process?
Respondent contends that the
petitioners did not have just cause as the basis for terminating her
employment. She reiterated the Court of
Appeals’ finding that all the petitioners offered were
bare allegations of the acts imputed against respondent, and not a single
concrete piece of evidence was presented.[19]
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim
that the termination was validly based on the ground of serious misconduct
because respondent’s disclosure of information was intentional and malicious,
coupled with fraud.[20]
There is no denying the fact that
Aurelio as Acting Finance Officer occupied a confidential position vis-à-vis
her employer. Even if the Court of
Appeals upheld the respondent’s claims, it admitted the confidential nature of
the latter’s position.[21]
Article 282[22]
of the Labor Code allows an employer to terminate an employee for fraud or
willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly authorized representative. While
the right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employee is subject
to regulation by the State, basically in its exercise of its paramount police
power, nonetheless, an employer cannot be compelled to continue employing an
employee guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the employer and justifying
its loss of confidence in him.[23]
Thus, loss of trust and confidence is a valid ground
for dismissing an employee, provided that the loss of confidence arises from
particular proven facts. Termination of
employment on this ground does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
employee’s misconduct. It is sufficient
that there is some basis for the loss of trust, or that the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct which renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by
his position.[24]
As the nature
of his position is grounded on the trust and confidence reposed on him by his
employer, the latter is given wide latitude of discretion in terminating him
for lack or absence thereof.[25]
In order to constitute a just
cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be related to the performance
of the duties of the employee such as would show him to be thereby unfit to
continue working for the employer.[26]
Moreover, for loss of trust and
confidence to be a valid ground for an employee’s dismissal, it must be
substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts
sufficient to warrant the employee’s separation from work.[27]
Was there just cause in terminating the
services of Aurelio? A perusal of the records
and the evidence indicates that there was. The dissemination of confidential information
by the respondent and the pointless labor dispute following its
misinterpretation have been sufficiently proven. Procuring a report without authority, then covertly furnishing copies of
the incomplete report to parties in an attempt to unfairly discredit one’s
superiors, to our mind, constituted serious breach of trust and confidence. It was grossly inappropriate for
respondent to misrepresent herself in order to procure the external auditor’s
report. It was even worse to use the
report against the college authorities who reposed on her their confidence. Passing off the report as complete when it was
not, then falsely accusing one’s superiors as cheating their employees based on
the report, is morally reprehensible of the highest order. These highly condemnable acts made by Aurelio
as the Acting Finance Officer shows her unfitness to continue working with DWC
management. The law, in protecting the rights of workers, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.[28]
The employer may dismiss an employee if
the former has reasonable grounds to believe, or to entertain the moral
conviction, that the latter is responsible for the misconduct, and the nature
of her participation therein renders her absolutely unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by her position.[29] DWC, in this case, was acting within its
rights under the law to terminate the services of Aurelio as the Acting Finance
Officer of the college.
With
regard to the issue on backwages, we rule that since there was no illegal
dismissal, the award of backwages would be inappropriate.
Anent
the issue on partial appeals, the Court of Appeals correctly brushed aside
technicalities when it found that there was substantial compliance by petitioners.
It held:
Private respondents’ assertion
that the appeal was limited to the award of backwages, hence it properly
perfected the appeal upon the execution of the bond in the amount equivalent to
the backwages, is not well-taken. Article
223 of the Labor Code is explicit in that, in case of a judgment involving a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond, in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from. The law does not make any distinction whether
or not the appeal was total, or limited only to a portion of the monetary
award, hence, the filing of a smaller amount of bond than the monetary award in
the judgment is not justified.
In
any event, this Court has brushed aside the technicality issue and considered
private respondent[’s] compliance “substantial”,
hence, the matter of whether or not the appeal was perfected, has been rendered
moot and academic.[30]
Lastly,
on the issue on procedural due process, petitioners claim that Aurelio was
apprised of the actual basis for the loss of trust and confidence caused by
dissemination of false information.[31]
Aurelio in turn states that petitioners
failed to issue the necessary notices to her prior to her dismissal.[32]
There is
procedural due process in termination of employment for just cause if the employer gives the employee two
written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the
employee before terminating the employment. Specifically, there should be a notice
specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought, a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard, and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice
of the decision to dismiss.[33]
The
records show that procedural due process had been fully complied with as Aurelio
was apprised of the actual basis for the loss of trust and confidence. Letters had been sent to Aurelio asking her to
explain her side to which she replied on
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
|
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 61-78.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] ART. 282. Termination of employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
[23] Tabacalera Insurance Co. v. NLRC, No.
L-72555,
[24] Alcazaren v. Univet Agricultural
Products, Inc., G.R. No. 149628, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 636, 653.
[25] See Equitable PCIBank v. Caguioa, G.R.
No. 159170,
[26] See Equitable Banking Corporation v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 102467,
[27] Labor v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 110388,
[28] Bondoc v. NLRC, 342 Phil. 250, 262
(1997).
[29] Filipro, Incorporated v. National Labor
Relations Commission, No. L-70546,
[30] Rollo, pp. 351-352.
[31]
[32]
[33] See Agabon v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158693,
[34] Rollo, p. 101.
[35]