SPS. PEBLIA ALFARO and G.R.
No. 162864
PROSPEROUS ALFARO,
Petitioners,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
-
versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA,
VELASCO, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPS. OLEGARIO P. BAGANO
and CECILIA C. BAGANO
Respondents. Promulgated:
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga, J.:
There lies an inherent oxymoron to the term “duplicate
originals” as applied to documents. Yet,
even as two “duplicate originals” of the same document are not exactly identical,
they may be considered as identical for all legal intents and purposes. Indeed, each “duplicate original” may be
considered as the best evidence of the transaction embodied therein.
Assailed in this Petition for Review
on Certiorari is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated
First,
the facts on record.
On
P180,000.00; that upon payment of the
mortgage debt, a Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage[2]
dated 20 June 1995 was executed; that when respondents demanded the return of
their title, petitioners refused, prompting the former to check with the
Register of Deeds; that upon verification, respondents learned that their title
had already been cancelled
and in lieu thereof TCT No. 92783[3]
was
issued in the name of petitioners by
virtue of a spurious Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 June 1995 (Deed of Absolute
Sale) purportedly executed by respondents.
Thus, respondents sought the nullification of the deed of sale on the
ground that their signatures thereon were forged.
In
their answer, petitioners as defendants denied the alleged forgery. They insisted that respondents sold Lot No. 1710
to them in consideration of the amount of P534,000.00 sometime in June
1995.
Respondents’
evidence tend to establish that they sent a letter-request to Romeo Varona
(Varona), a handwriting expert from the Cebu City PNP Crime Laboratory, for the
examination of the questioned signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale. The request was accompanied by a set of
documents consisting of the Deed of Conditional Sale dated
(Exh. “B”).[9] After examining Exh. “B” and comparing the
signatures thereon purporting to be those of respondents with the specimen
signatures on the documents provided by respondents, Varona issued Report No.
006-96[10]
dated
On
On the same trial date, petitioners
manifested their intention to have Varona examine another set of documents
which according to them contain the genuine signatures of respondents. Hence, on P216,000.00 dated P52,000.00 (Exh. “10”),[14] and Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 19886842
dated
According to petitioners’ evidence,
respondents had initially mortgaged Lot No. 1710 in their favor for P180,000.00
on P138,000.00
as downpayment. Thereafter, petitioners
discovered that the lots subject of the conditional sale were also sold on
installment basis to other parties. To
placate petitioners, respondents sold to them the lot in question, Lot No. 1710,
in consideration of P534,000.00, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute
Sale. Petitioners paid an additional P216,000.00
after being credited the amounts of P180,000.00 representing the debt
secured by the Real Estate Mortgage and P138,000.00 representing the
aggregate downpayments for the six (6) conditional deeds of sale.[18]
On
P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P10,000.00 as litigation
expenses, plus costs of suit.
On
appeal, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision,[20] reversing
and setting aside the Decision of the RTC. It declared the Deed of Absolute Sale
null and void ab initio, reinstated
TCT No. 78445 in the name of respondents, and ordered petitioners to pay the
amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages and attorney’s fee to
respondents.
In
the present petition, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals committed an
error in reversing the judgment of the trial court. Issues were raised, concerning the following
points, to wit: first, the selective
reversal by the appellate court of the RTC’s factual findings; second, the
selective discussion of the elements of a contract of sale as basis for the
invalidation of the Deed of Absolute Sale; third, the ruling that failure to
offer in evidence the second questioned report proved fatal to petitioners’
cause; fourth, the blanket denial of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration;
and fifth, the citing
of
respondent Olegario Bagano’s
testimony in the Decision despite its having been stricken off the records for
his failure to be cross-examined.[21]
The first three (3) points raised
obviously relate to the determinative issue—whether or not the questioned signatures
of respondents on the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged, thereby rendering the
document spurious. Such determination is
evidently factual in nature, and the well-entrenched rule is that in the
exercise of this Court’s power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on this Court.[22] However, there are recognized exceptions,[23]
among which is when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate
court are conflicting.[24] This case falls under the exception. The disagreement between the trial court and
the Court of Appeals in the factual conclusion, especially with regard to the
alleged forgery of respondents’ signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale, has
constrained us to minutely examine the evidence submitted by the parties.
On its face, the Deed of Absolute
Sale was notarized; as such, it enjoys
the presumption of regularity and carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon
it with respect to its due execution.[25] Absent evidence that is clear, convincing,
and more than merely preponderant, the presumption must be upheld.[26]
In their bid to establish “clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence,” respondents presented
an expert witness, Varona, who attested that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
indeed forged. Was the witness
successful in that regard?
Respondents rely on Varona’s
testimony on direct examination, as well as his findings in the examination of
the copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale as Exh. “B.” On that basis, they claim forgery. In their effort to refute respondents’
allegation, petitioners hinge on the testimony on cross-examination of the same
expert and his findings in the examination of another original of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, marked as Exh. “13.” The two varying findings led the trial court to
conclude that Varona had retracted his earlier finding of forgery, thus:
When
Mr. Romeo Varona was presented by the defendants to identify and give his
expert opinion about the signatures appearing in the documents marked as
annexes 1 to 13, he categorically told the Honorable Court that the signatures
of Olegario Bagano and Cecilia Bagano appearing in the said documents are
genuine, thus belying the claim of the plaintiff that said signatures are
forged.
It
should be noted[,] however, that in an earlier testimony, Mr. Romeo Varona
testified that the deed of sale in question is a forgery, but he later on
retracted his earlier testimony after he conducted an examination of the
documents sent to him by the defendants.[27]
The trial court further sustained the
validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale by
citing the rule that instruments are evidence, even against third persons, of
the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.[28] The trial court also emphasized the character
of the questioned deed as a notarial document, which cannot be disproved by
mere denial of the alleged signatory, and bears the presumption of regularity.[29] Moreover, the RTC noted that respondents
filed the case in bad faith to appease their buyers and cover up their
wrongdoings in subdividing the lot and selling the resulting lots to different
parties.[30]
The Court of Appeals rejected the
trial court’s conclusion and proceeded from a different premise, i.e., that in the second examination which
involves the standard and specimen signatures submitted by petitioners, Varona
did not actually receive and examine the original of the Deed of Sale, Exh.
“13.” It explained, thus:
Records show that the
signatures of Spouses Bagano appearing in the Deed of Sale dated
x x x x
Likewise, he confirmed
on the witness stand on
Such a testimony cannot be taken as a retraction of his previous testimony. What the lower court failed to realize was that Romeo Varona did not actually receive and examine the original copy of the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale, as testified to by him. x x x
x x x x
Such a statement categorically
means that Romeo Varona did not actually receive any copy of the questioned
deed of absolute sale during his first examination upon the request of Atty.
Montesclaros. This Court observed that
during Mr. Varona’s cross-examination on June 16, 1999, defendants-appellees’
counsel, Atty. Juanita Montesclaros, tried to make it appear that Mr. Varona
examined the Deed of Absolute Sale, when in truth and in fact, he did not. x x
x
x x x x
It is very clear that Atty.
Montesclaros tried to make it appear that the questioned document which was the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated
The disparate conclusions reached by
the courts below are such because they originated
from different but similarly erroneous basic premises.
When a document in two or more copies
is executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies
are equally regarded as originals.[32] Original does not mean the first paper
written, in contrast to a copy or transcript made later. The original depends upon the issue to be
proved.[33] It is immaterial whether that document was
written before or after another, was copied from another, or was itself used to
copy from,[34] as long
as its contents are the subject of inquiry.[35] Hence,
one or some of these copies are still considered as originals, and they have
equal claims to authenticity.
As a matter of practice, deeds of
conveyance are prepared in several copies for notarization and record
purposes. After notarization, the notary
public retains copies pursuant to the Rules on Notarial Practice, one for his
record and the other for transmittal to the court, through Clerk of Court concerned, where
he secured his notarial commission.[36] When he gives all the other copies to the
parties, the latter agree between themselves how many copies should be kept by
each. The parties also agree which
copies shall be presented to the Register of Deeds for registration, the city
or municipal assessor in connection with the payment of transfer tax and other
fees, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue in connection with the payment of the
capital gains tax. All the notarized copies are originals. They are sometimes loosely referred to as
“original copies” or “duplicate originals.”
In the case at bar, presented in evidence
were two copies of one and the same Deed of Absolute Sale dated
Respondents had engaged Varona to
determine the genuineness of the signatures purporting to be theirs on Exh. “B”
by comparing them with the specimen signatures on the documents[41]
which they also provided Varona. On the
witness stand, Varona affirmed his finding in his Report[42]
that the questioned signatures on Exh. “B” were not affixed by the same persons
who affixed the specimen signatures and thus the questioned signatures were
forged.[43]
However, after Varona testified on
direct examination, petitioners manifested that they would engage him to
examine a different set of documents which contain the signatures of
respondents.[44] On cross-examination, Varona stated that he
examined the signatures on Exh. “13” and the specimen signatures on the other
documents furnished him and that after
making the examination he arrived at the conclusion that the signatures on the
documents, including Exh. “13,” were affixed by the same persons.[45]
On the basis of the two findings of
Varona, the first involving Exh. “B” and the second relating to Exh. “13,” the
trial court concluded that the questioned deed is genuine as the signatures
thereon which purport to be those of respondents are really theirs. It ratiocinated that Varona had retracted his
first opinion when he came out with his second opinion.
The trial court erred in using the
supposed retraction as basis for its ruling.
It cannot properly speak of retraction of one finding by the other
because the examinations conducted by Varona covered two different standard
signatures and two different sets of specimen signatures. It would have been a retraction or
repudiation of the first conclusion if the standard signatures analyzed and
compared with the specimen signatures were one and the same in the two
examinations, even if the specimen signatures were contained in two different
sets of documents which is not even the case here.
Yet clearly, Varona came out with
inconsistent findings. On one hand, he concluded that Exh. “B” is spurious
because the questioned signatures thereon were forged. On the other, he issued a different
determination as regards Exh. “13,” finding that the signatures thereon which
purport to be those of respondents and the counterpart specimen signatures were
affixed by the same persons. Since Exhs. “B” and “13” are copies of two
originals of one and the same deed, his conclusions with respect to the two
exhibits should be common, i.e.,
either the questioned signatures thereon were both affixed by the same persons or
they were affixed by different persons.
The disharmonious findings render Varona’s
testimony unconvincing. Thus, the
presumption of validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale as a notarized document is
left unscathed.
Respondents seek to downplay the
determinations made by Varona concerning Exh. “13” by impugning the
authenticity of the specimen signatures, specifically the signature of Olegario
Bagano on the CTC, Exh. “11.” They claim in particular that the issuance date
of the CTC was altered. Respondents,
however, did not present any tangible proof to support their allegation. On the other hand, petitioners procured a
certification from Cebu City Treasurer Eustaquio B. Cesa to the effect that the
subject CTC belonged to Olegario Bagano.[46] As regards the other documents which contain
the specimen signatures, namely: the Real Estate Mortgage (Exh. “2”), the
Acknowledgment Receipt (Exh. “3”), the six deeds of conditional sale (Exhs. “4”
to “9”) and the China Bank check (Exh. “10”), respondent failed to adduce
countervailing evidence of spuriousness. It is noteworthy that the parties to
the deeds of sale were also petitioners and respondents themselves. Also, the amount covered by the
Acknowledgment Receipt was the additional cash payment of petitioners to
respondents.
On the part of the Court of Appeals, it
chose to disregard Varona’s conclusions on Exh. “13” on the premise that the
written report which contained the conclusions was not presented in evidence.
However, as borne out by the record,
Varona repeated his findings in open court in the course of his testimony on
cross-examination and even was asked on re-direct examination by respondents’
counsel thereon.[47]
Generally,
it has been held that handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not
indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting.[48]
Yet without Varona’s testimony, the Court is hard-pressed to find any other
basis on the record to establish the forgery. One who alleges forgery has the
burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which
is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition
to it.[49]
Aside from the opinion of the handwriting expert which this Court finds
inconsequential, the bare assertions on the part of respondent Cecilia Bagano
that the signature appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale is not that of her
husband is not enough. No additional witnesses were presented.
We
reassert that forgery is not presumed; it must be proven by clear, positive and
convincing evidence. Those who make the allegation of forgery have the burden
of proving it.[50] Respondents failed to substantiate with
sufficient evidence their claim that their signatures appearing on the deed of
sale were forged.
We are moreover influenced in our
ultimate finding by the fact that there is also sufficient evidence on record
to bolster the presumption that the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was
genuine. Ultimately worthy of consideration is petitioner Plebia Alfaro’s
positive testimony that she actually saw respondent Olegario Bagano affix his
signature on the questioned document.[51] However self-serving that allegation may
seem, it corroborates the other evidence that respondents did affix their
signatures on the deed. Equally relevant in this supposition is the comparison
of the standard signatures on Exh. “13” with the signatures of respondents found in the Real
Estate Mortgage, Exh. “2,” a document which was duly notarized and thus bears prima facie proof as to its due
execution and the validity of the contents therein. Even respondent Cecilia
Bagano admitted the genuineness of said document in her testimony.[52]
No specific objection was raised by respondents as to the validity of the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage, their blanket objection thereto being confined to an
overarching allegation against its materiality and relevancy, which is not
sufficient to rebut the presumption of authenticity of the notarized deed.
And it must be said that our own comparison
of the signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale to the specimen signatures submitted
by the parties reveals no substantial
variance to warrant the conclusion
that there was forgery. Mere variance of the signatures cannot be
considered as conclusive proof that the same were forged.[53]
What could respondents have done in
order to fortify their claim of forgery following the manifest indecisiveness of
the expert witness they had relied on? Considering that the burden was upon respondents
to establish the alleged forgery, they should have presented evidence on
rebuttal, which they did not do, or even another expert witness to attest to
their claim of forgery, which again they failed to do. Disingenuous as
petitioners’ tactic may have seemed, in using their opponent’s expert witness
to advocate the contrary cause, respondents were not without remedy to mitigate
the damage wrought by said witness. That they failed to introduce rebuttal
evidence finally led to the collapse of their cause of action.
With the foregoing disquisition, discussion of the other
issues raised by petitioners is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 12, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Eubolo G. Verzola and Edgardo F. Sundiam. Rollo, pp. 46-63.
[22]Apex Mining Co. Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp., G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628,
[23](1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
[25]De Jesus v. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 57092,
[26]Cirelos v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 146523,
[33]Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law (1999 ed.), p. 179, citing 5 Moran 84 (1980 ed.), citing Fiscal of Pampanga v. Reyes and Guevara, 55 Phil. 905, 908.
[40]The copy of the original Deed of Absolute Sale marked as Exh. “B” was procured by respondents from the Register of Deeds of Cebu City, which copy bears a certification by Deputy Register of Deeds III, Ma. Vilma B. Sato.
[50]Herbon v. Palad, G.R. No. 149542, 20
July 2006; Pan Pacific Industrial Sales
Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 125283, 10 February 2006, 482 SCRA
164; R.F. Navarro & Co., Inc. v. Hon.
Vailoces, 413 Phil. 432 (2001).