FIRST DIVISION
|
ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL
CENTER EMPLOYEE’S ASSOCIATION-AFW (SLMCEA-AFW) AND MARIBEL S. SANTOS, Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 162053 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. |
|
-versus- |
|
|
NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) AND ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Respondents. |
Promulgated: March 7, 2007 |
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DECISION
AZCUNA,
J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
The antecedent facts are
as follows:
Petitioner Maribel S. Santos was hired as X-Ray
Technician in the Radiology department of private respondent St. Luke’s Medical
Center, Inc. (SLMC) on
On
On September 12, 1995, the Assistant Executive
Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director of private respondent SLMC issued a
final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply with the
requirement of Republic Act No. 7431 by December 31, 1995; otherwise, the
unlicensed employee will be transferred to an area which does not require a
license to practice if a slot is available.
On
On
On March 13, 1998, the Director of the Institute of
Radiology issued another memorandum to petitioner Maribel S. Santos advising
her that only a license can assure her of her continued employment at the
Institute of Radiology of the private respondent SLMC and that the latter is
giving her the last chance to take and pass the forthcoming board examination
scheduled in June 1998; otherwise, private respondent SLMC shall be constrained
to take action which may include her separation from employment.
On
On
In a letter dated December 18, 1998, a certain Jack C.
Lappay, President of the Philippine Association of Radiologic Technologists, Inc.,
wrote Ms. Judith Betita, Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC,
requesting the latter to give “due consideration” to the organization’s three
(3) regular members of his organization (petitioner Maribel S. Santos included)
“for not passing yet the Board of Examination for X-ray Technology,” “by giving
them an assignment in any department of your hospital awaiting their chance to
pass the future Board Exam.”
On
On
In the meantime, petitioner Alliance of Filipino
Workers (AFW), through its President and Legal Counsel, in a letter dated
September 22, 1999 addressed to Ms. Rita Marasigan, Human Resources Director of
private respondent SLMC, requested the latter to accommodate petitioner Maribel
S. Santos and assign her to the vacant position of CSS Aide in the hospital
arising from the death of an employee more than two (2) months earlier.
In a letter dated
Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letter of
The position is indeed vacant. Please refer to our
Recruitment Policy for particulars especially on minimum requirements of the
job and the need to meet said requirements, as well as other pre-employment
requirements, in order to be considered for the vacant position. As a matter of
fact, Ms. Santos is welcome to apply for any vacant position on the condition
that she possesses the necessary qualifications.
As to the consensus referred to in your letter, may I
correct you that the agreement is, regardless of the vacant position Ms. Santos
decides to apply, she must go through the usual application procedures. The
formal letter, I am afraid, will not suffice for purposes of recruitment
processing. As you know, the managers requesting to fill any vacancy has a say
on the matter and correctly so. The manager’s inputs are necessarily factored
into the standard recruitment procedures. Hence, the need to undergo the
prescribed steps.
Indeed we have gone through the mechanics to
accommodate Ms. Santos’ transfer while she was employed with SLMC given the
prescribed period. She was given 30 days from issuance of the notice of
termination to look for appropriate openings which incidentally she wittingly
declined to utilize. She did this knowing fully well that the consequences
would be that her application beyond the 30-day period or after the effective
date of her termination from SLMC would be considered a re-application with
loss of seniority and shall be subjected to the pertinent application
procedures.
Needless to mention, one of the 3 X-ray Technologists
in similar circumstances as Ms. Santos at the time successfully managed to get
herself transferred to E.R. because she opted to apply for the appropriate
vacant position and qualified for it within the prescribed 30-day period. The
other X-ray Technologist, on the other hand, as you may recall, was eventually
terminated not just for his failure to comply with the licensure requirement of
the law but for cause (refusal to serve a customer).
Why Ms. Santos opted to file a complaint before the
Labor Courts and not to avail of the opportunity given her, or assuming she was
not qualified for any vacant position even if she tried to look for one within
the prescribed period, I simply cannot understand why she also refused the
separation pay offered by Management in an amount beyond the minimum required
by law only to re-apply at SLMC, which option would be available to her anyway
even (if she) chose to accept the separation pay!
Well, here’s hoping that our
(Signed)
RITA MARASIGAN
Subsequently, in a letter dated
Dear Mr. Calderon:
This is with regard to the case of Ms. Maribel Santos.
Please recall that last Oct. 8, 1999, Ms. Rita Marasigan, HR Director,
discussed with you and Mr. Greg Del Prado the terms regarding the re-hiring of
Ms. Maribel Santos. Ms. Marasigan offered Ms. Santos the position of Secretary
at the Dietary Department. In that meeting, Ms. Santos replied that she would
think about the offer. To date, we still have no definite reply from her.
Again, during the conference held on
Please be informed that said position is in need of
immediate staffing. The Dietary Department has already been experiencing
serious backlog of work due to the said vacancy. Please note that more than 2
months has passed since Ms. Marasigan offered this compromise. Management
cannot afford to wait for her decision while the operation of the said
department suffers from vacancy.
Therefore, Management is giving Ms. Santos until the
end of this month to give her decision. If we fail to hear from her or from you
as her representatives by that time, we will consider it as a waiver and we
will be forced to offer the position to other applicants so as not to
jeopardize the Dietary Department’s operation.
For your immediate action.
(Signed)
JUDITH BETITA
Personnel Manager
On
September 5, 2000, the Labor Arbiter came out with a Decision ordering private
respondent SLMC to pay petitioner Maribel S. Santos the amount of One Hundred
Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P115,500.00) representing her
separation pay. All other claims of petitioner were dismissed for lack of
merit.
Dissatisfied,
petitioner Maribel S. Santos perfected an appeal with the public respondent
NLRC.
On
Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which,
as previously mentioned, affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
Hence, this petition raising
the following issues:
I.
Whether the CA overlooked certain material facts and
circumstances on petitioners’ legal claim in relation to the complaint for
illegal dismissal.
II.
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion and erred
in not resolving with clarity the issues on the merit of petitioner’s
constitutional right of security of tenure.[3]
For its part, private respondent St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC)
argues in its comment[4] that:
1) the petition should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to file a motion
for reconsideration; 2) the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that petitioner was legally
dismissed; 3) petitioner was legally and validly terminated in accordance with
Republic Act Nos. 4226 and 7431; 4) private respondent’s decision to terminate
petitioner Santos was made in good faith and was not the result of unfair
discrimination; and 5) petitioner Santos’ non-transfer to another position in
the SLMC was a valid exercise of management prerogative.
The petition lacks merit.
Generally, the Court has always accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact of the CA particularly if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and are supported by substantial evidence.[5] True this rule admits of certain exceptions as, for example, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, or the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence on record[6] or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.[7] None of these exceptions, however, has been convincingly shown by petitioners to apply in the present case. Hence, the Court sees no reason to disturb such findings of fact of the CA.
Ultimately, the issue raised
by the parties boils down to whether petitioner
The requirement for a certificate of registration is set forth under R.A. No. 7431[8] thus:
Sec. 15. Requirement for the Practice of Radiologic
Technology and X-ray Technology. — Unless exempt from the examinations
under Sections 16 and 17 hereof, no person shall practice or offer to practice
as a radiologic and/or x-ray technologist in the
It
is significant to note that petitioners expressly concede that the sole cause
for petitioner
While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.[9] The most concrete example of this would be in the field of medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has been closely regulated by the State. It has long been recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.[10] The same rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic and x-ray technology. The clear and unmistakable intention of the legislature in prescribing guidelines for persons seeking to practice in this field is embodied in Section 2 of the law:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy.
— It is the policy of the State to upgrade the practice of radiologic
technology in the
In
this regard, the Court quotes with approval the disquisition of public
respondent NLRC in its decision dated
The enactment of R.A. (Nos.) 7431 and 4226 are
recognized as an exercise of the State’s inherent police power. It should be
noted that the police power embraces the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, educations, good order, safety or general welfare
of the people. The state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements
for x-ray technicians and/or any other professions connected with the health
and safety of its citizens. Respondent-appellee being engaged in the hospital
and health care business, is a proper subject of the cited law; thus, having in
mind the legal requirements of these laws, the latter cannot close its eyes and
[let] complainant-appellant’s private interest override public interest.
Indeed, complainant-appellant cannot insist on her “sterling work
performance without any derogatory record” to make her qualify as an x-ray
technician in the absence of a proper certificate of Registration from the
Board of Radiologic Technology which can only be obtained by passing the
required examination. The law is clear that the Certificate of Registration
cannot be substituted by any other requirement to allow a person to practice as
a Radiologic Technologist and/or X-ray Technologist (Technician).[12]
No
malice or ill-will can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation of petitioner
It
would be unreasonable to compel private respondent to wait until its license is
cancelled and it is materially injured before removing the cause of the impending
evil. Neither can the courts step in to force private respondent to reassign or
transfer petitioner
While
our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice
and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be
decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has
rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of
fair play.[16] Labor
laws, to be sure, do not authorize interference with the employer's judgment in
the conduct of the latter’s business. Private respondent is free to determine,
using its own discretion and business judgment, all elements of employment,
"from hiring to firing" except in cases of unlawful discrimination or
those which may be provided by law. None
of these exceptions is present in the instant case.
The fact that another employee, who likewise failed to pass the required exam, was allowed by private respondent to apply for and transfer to another position with the hospital does not constitute unlawful discrimination. This was a valid exercise of management prerogative, petitioners not having alleged nor proven that the reassigned employee did not qualify for the position where she was transferred. In the past, the Court has ruled that an objection founded on the ground that one has better credentials over the appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications for the position.[17] Furthermore, the records show that Ms. Santos did not even seriously apply for another position in the company.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chairperson
Chief Justice
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO
C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 37-50.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Lopez v. National Steel
Corporation, G.R. No. 149674,
[6] JAT General Services v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 148340,
[7] Suan v. NLRC, G.R. No.
141441,
[8]
Otherwise known as the "Radiologic Technology
Act of 1992."
[9] PRC v. De Guzman, G.R.
No. 144681,
[10] DECS
v.
[11] Supra note 8.
[12] Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[13] Superstar Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81493 April 3, 1990, 184 SCRA 74; M.F Violago Oiler Tank Trucks v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 56950-51, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 544.
[14] Benguet Electric Cooperative v.
Fianza, G.R. No. 158606,
[15] Almodiel
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100641,
[16]
[17] Supra note 15.