HERMINIA
CANDO, G.R. No. 160741
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
-
versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
SPS.
AURORA OLAZO and CLAUDIO
OLAZO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
The
instant petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 November 2003 in CA
G.R. CV No. 61151 captioned “Herminia
Cando v. Spouses Aurora Olazo and Claudio Olazo.”[1]
The
facts of the case are not disputed.
On
P240,000.00 loan. The real estate mortgage was embodied in a
written instrument titled “Mortgage of Realty.” In the said instrument, the parties agreed
that should the mortgagors fail to pay the loan within one (1) year from the
date of the execution of the document, the mortgage shall be foreclosed.
Alleging
that respondents failed to pay their obligation within the prescribed period
despite demands, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage before the
On
Acting on the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Action to Foreclose Mortgage of Realty dated April 27, 1987 has prescribed in accordance with Article 1142 of the Civil Code “that the action for foreclosure of mortgage prescribes after ten (10) years” and it appearing that this Complaint was filed on February
16, 1998 after the expiration of the said period, this case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO
ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner
sought reconsideration of the Order but her motion was denied by the trial
court,[4]
prompting her to appeal the case before the Court of Appeals.
In
her brief as appellant,[5]
petitioner interposed a lone assignment of error, to wit:
THE
The appellate court dismissed the
appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
It found that the issue raised in the appeal is a pure question of law, that
is, what is the proper computation of the ten (10) year prescriptive period for
filing an action for foreclosure of mortgage.
According to the Court of Appeals, the dismissal was based on Sec. 2,
Rule 50 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that an appeal under
Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising
only questions of law shall be dismissed.[7]
In the present petition for review
under Rule 45, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that her action to enforce the mortgage obligation had already prescribed. She posits that the ten (10) year period for
foreclosure of the mortgaged property must be counted from the time the
stipulated one (1) year period within which to pay the loan elapsed. Thus, it should be reckoned from
On
the other hand, respondents point out that the petition is a mere rehash of the issues
and arguments raised and resolved by the lower court and the Court of
Appeals. They insist that the ten (10)
year period for foreclosure is counted from the date of the execution of the
mortgage deed.[9]
The
trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage is
a final order which terminated the litigation of the case and left nothing more
to be done by the lower court.
Petitioner had no more remedy but to appeal the order of dismissal.
There
are two modes of appeal from a final order of the trial court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction–(1) by writ of error under Section 2(a), Rule 41
of the Rules of Court if questions of fact or questions of fact and law are
raised or involved; or (2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in
relation to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised or involved.[10] If the aggrieved party appeals via a writ of
error under Rule 41, but it turns out that only questions of law are raised,
the appeal shall be dismissed.[11]
There
is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.[12]
The
test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation
given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating
the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question
of fact.[13]
Admittedly, petitioner’s appeal entailed
a lone assignment of error, which turned out be a pure question of law. The appellate court can easily determine the plausibility
of the trial court’s conclusion that the ten (10) year prescriptive period for
an action for foreclosure of mortgage should be computed from the date of the
deed of mortgage without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, but of course
with due regard to the governing case law on the matter. A strict adherence to the rules leads us to
the conclusion that the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing the appeal on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. However, equity considerations behoove a
different course of action.
Even
from a cursory reading of the appeal, it is indelibly clear that the
trial court committed an appalling blunder when it ruled that an action for
foreclosure of mortgage prescribes after
ten (10) years from the date of the mortgage contract. Under Article 1142 of
the Civil Code, a mortgage action prescribes after ten (10) years. Jurisprudence, however, has clarified this
rule by holding that a mortgage action prescribes after ten (10) years from the
time the right of action accrued,[14]
which is obviously not the same as the date of the mortgage contract. Stated
differently, an action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should be
enforced within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues;
otherwise, it will be barred by prescription and the mortgage creditor will
lose his rights under the mortgage.[15] The right of action accrues when the
mortgagor defaults in the payment of his obligation to the mortgagee.[16]
The foregoing basic principles must
have been unknown to the trial court when it
reached its erroneous conclusion that the action to foreclose the mortgage
covered by the “Mortgage of Realty dated April 27, 1987 has prescribed in
accordance with Article 1142 of the Civil Code which provides that ‘the action
for foreclosure of mortgage prescribes after ten (10) years’ and it appearing
that this Complaint was filed on February 16, 1998 after the expiration of the
said period x x x. ”[17]
The dismissal of the appeal by the
appellate court would have put the instant case to rest. Yet if
the Court will affirm the appellate
court’s dismissal of the case and disregard the error of the trial court, great injustice and undue prejudice will be caused petitioner.
We have ruled time and again that
litigants should have the
amplest opportunity for a proper and just disposition of their cause–free, as
much as possible, from the constraints of procedural technicalities. In the
interest of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may disregard procedural lapses
so that a case may be resolved on its merits.
Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules
liberally to resolve substantial issues raised by the parties.[18]
Rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override,
substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other
matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
justice must be avoided.[19]
In the instant case, the strict
adherence to the rules will definitely cause injustice to petitioner since the
erroneous conclusion of the trial court will bar her from pursuing her right of
action against respondents, assuming that the latter really failed to pay their
obligation within the prescribed period.
If procedural lapses on the part of
the litigants are sometimes overlooked by the Court in the interest of justice,
with all the more reason will the Court overlook these rules when the injustice will be compounded
by the error of the courts below. Ultimately,
the interest of substantial justice must
transcend rigid observance of the rules of procedure. We cannot allow the trial court’s egregious
error to perpetuate simply because petitioner had pursued the wrong recourse or
erred in drafting her appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
and the assailed Decision dated
REVERSED. Let the case be REMANDED to
the
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Penned
by Associate Justice
[11]Rules of Court, Rule 50, Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.—An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.
An appeal
erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
[13]Crisologo v. Globe Telecom, Inc., G.R.
No. 167631, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 433, 441, citing China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
137898, 15 December 2000, 348 SCRA 401, 411.
[18]Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan,
et al., G.R. No. 167136,