VICIA
D. PASCUAL, G.R. No. 160540
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
GARCIA,
JJ.
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March
22, 2007
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D E C I
S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision[1] and
resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25992 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Vicia D. Pascual.
The facts follow.
Petitioner was elected vice-president
of the Assumption College Parents Council for the school year 1996-1997. When
the council’s president suffered a stroke, she took over as acting president
from October 1996-June 1997. The council’s funds, at that time deposited in the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and Asianbank, were entrusted to her.
In 1998, when Joyce M. O’ Hara became
president, petitioner was requested to turn over the council’s money to the new
set of officers but despite several demands, petitioner failed to do so. Later,
O’ Hara discovered that petitioner had already withdrawn the money from UCPB
and Asianbank. Although petitioner opened a new account in the council’s name
at Philippine National Bank, she, however, failed to deposit about P578,208.96
of the council’s money.
Two criminal cases for estafa were
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, against
petitioner, Criminal Case No. 98-1014 and Criminal Case No. 98-1015.
In Criminal Case No. 98-1014,
Asianbank accused petitioner of falsely representing to it that she had been
authorized by the council to withdraw the latter’s deposits from the bank. On
the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 98-1015, the council charged petitioner with
misappropriating the money entrusted to her as acting president.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded
not guilty to the twin charges. A joint
trial ensued.
At the trial, Ms. O’ Hara presented
the following as evidence: (1) statements of account issued by UCPB and
Asianbank showing the amounts withdrawn by petitioner; (2) the council’s checks
issued by petitioner, payable to herself and (3) demand letters asking
petitioner to return the money.[3]
Petitioner, who was also the
defense’s sole witness, denied the charges against her. She claimed that the
council authorized her to withdraw the money from UCPB and Asianbank to finance
the construction of a covered walk in Assumption College. To support this
claim, she presented a Secretary’s Certificate signed by a certain Marietta
Veneracion.
On the other hand, Asianbank failed
to continue participating in the trial of Criminal Case No. 98-1014; hence,
this case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. On manifestation of
petitioner’s former counsel, the evidence in Criminal Case No. 98-1014 was
adopted and offered as the defense’s evidence in Criminal Case No. 98-1015.
After trial, the court a quo
found petitioner liable for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)[4] of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Accordingly, the trial court declared:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it having been proven beyond reasonable [doubt] the guilt
of [petitioner] VICIA DAVID PASCUAL in Criminal Case No. 98-1015, for the crime
of estafa under [Article 315,] paragraph 1 [b], as principal, with no
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, she is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term penalty of four [4] years two [2] months of prision
correcional in its medium period, as minimum to twenty [20] years of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum; to indemnify complainant
Assumption College Parents Council the amount of P578,208.96 with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the information until fully
paid; and to pay the costs.
For
failure to prosecute, Criminal Case No. 98-1014 is hereby dismissed.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner
moved for new trial and offered to submit to the trial court her affidavit that
she gave the council’s money to a contractor hired to build a covered walk for
Assumption College and that this contractor supposedly ran away with the money. Attached to this affidavit were documents
which she claimed were newly-discovered evidence, namely: (1) the approved
resolution of the council and a sketch of the proposed construction of the
covered walk; (2) approval of the project by the president of Assumption
College; and (3) approval by the San Lorenzo Village Association of the covered
walk project.[6]
When the
trial court denied petitioner’s motion for new trial, she appealed to the CA.
There, she argued that, due to her former lawyer’s negligence, she failed to
submit her affidavit during the trial proper. Although petitioner averred that she
gave the money to the contractor, she claimed she could no longer locate the
receipt issued to her.
Except
for the penalty imposed by the trial court, the CA affirmed petitioner’s
conviction for estafa. The CA held:
The
alleged loss of receipt is unbelievable as it is not duly proven. And the
construction for which payment was allegedly made turned out to be
non-existent. There is no other logical conclusion save that she merely
misappropriated the money. Otherwise stated, [petitioner] abused the confidence
the Council reposed on her by misusing and/or detaining its money from the use
it was intended to be applied.
…[A]fter
a thorough review, [w]e find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusion of the trial Court, save as to the penalty imposed upon
[petitioner].
The
penalty for estafa is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over [P]12,000
but does not exceed [P] 22,000; and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional [P]10,000; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
Considering
the amount of P 578,208.96 misappropriated by [petitioner], the
corresponding penalty obviously reached the twenty-year limit. Absent any
modifying circumstance, the maximum should be within the maximum twenty years
of reclusion temporal while the minimum term should be anywhere within prision
mayor, the penalty next lower in degree from reclusion temporal.
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WHEREFORE,
the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
[petitioner] VICIA D. PASCUAL is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of EIGHT
(8) Years and ONE (1) Day of prision mayor, as minimum, to TWENTY (20)
Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. All other aspects of the
decision are maintained.[7]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
of the above decision but the same was denied,[8] thus
this petition.
Petitioner essentially argues that
the CA erred in affirming her conviction. She reiterates her arguments in the
lower courts that: (1) she was denied her constitutional right to due process
because of her former counsel’s failure to present the necessary evidence on
her behalf and (2) the CA erred in not giving credence to her affidavit attesting
that she did not misappropriate the money.[9] She added that the notice of preliminary
investigation was defective and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over her person.
The petition must fail.
Petitioner Was Accorded Her Constitutional Right To
Due Process
Petitioner was not denied due process
on the mere premise that she was not able to submit her affidavit regarding
where she allegedly spent the council’s money. Due process means that a party
has been given the opportunity to be heard.[10] When a
party has been afforded a chance to present his or her own side, he cannot
feign denial of due process.[11] In this
case, the records are evident that petitioner herself participated as the only
witness for the defense during the trial. She cannot now claim very belatedly that
her constitutional right to due process was violated and that she was denied her
day in court. What is repugnant to due
process is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard through
pleadings or otherwise,[12] which
is not the case here.
Petitioner likewise contends that it
was due to her former counsel’s incompetence and negligence that she failed to
offer her affidavit as evidence during the trial. This contention does not hold
ground considering that she neither objected nor called the attention of her
former lawyer when the latter manifested in open court that petitioner (as then
accused) was adopting in Criminal Case No. 98-1015 the evidence in Criminal
Case No. 98-1014,[13] which
evidence did not include petitioner’s affidavit. Had petitioner truly believed
that her counsel then was inept and careless, she could have easily terminated
his services at that very instance. In failing to do so, we can only conclude
that she acquiesced to the manner her former lawyer handled her case.
The doctrinal rule is that litigants
should suffer the consequences of the negligence or incompetence of their
counsel whom they themselves hired and had full authority to fire at anytime
and replace even without any justifiable cause.[14]
Petitioner avers that her affidavit
was crucial in determining whether or not she indeed committed estafa. She
insists that, had the trial court allowed its submission, she would have been acquitted
of the charges.
We disagree.
Lest petitioner forget, the affidavit
she insisted on submitting as evidence in the trial court was her own
affidavit. Her statements in that affidavit were self-serving. At any rate,
even if offered and accepted as evidence, the affidavit was also
unsubstantiated considering that petitioner adduced no other convincing
evidence to prove that, indeed, the money was paid to the contractor of the
covered walk. The affidavit alone was not enough to overthrow the prosecution’s
evidence pointing to petitioner as the author of the crime.
The Defective Notice of Preliminary
Investigation Was An Issue Belatedly Raised
We likewise hold that petitioner is now
barred from attacking the validity of the notice of preliminary investigation.
Petitioner should have raised this issue in the lower courts, particularly
during the arraignment. A question never raised in the courts below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal without offending the basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process.[15]
Moreover, an inquiry into this issue
necessitates a review of factual and evidentiary matters which is proscribed in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules.[16]
Notwithstanding
the above disquisitions, petitioner ought to know that the absence or defect in
the conduct of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s
jurisdiction over a case.[17] Nor
does it impair the validity of the information or render it defective.[18]
Petitioner Committed
estafa Under Article 315, Paragraph 1(b) Of The RPC
In estafa through misappropriation
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, the following essential elements
must be present: (1) that money, goods, or other personal property is received
by the accused in trust or on commission or for administration or under any
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2)
that there is misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
accused or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation
or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another and (4) that there is a
demand made by the offended party on the accused.[19]
All the elements concur in this case.
First, petitioner received the money in trust or for administration as
the council’s acting president; second, she failed to substantiate her
claim that she did not misappropriate the money; third, the council was
prejudiced by such misappropriation and fourth, she failed to return the
money to the council despite repeated demands to do so.
Finally, we find no conflict in the
findings of fact of the lower courts. Well-settled is the rule that factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive
on us.[20] Without
any cogent or compelling proof that the lower courts committed reversible error
in their decisions, we shall not deviate from the rule. We therefore affirm the
findings of both the trial court and the CA that petitioner committed estafa
punishable under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25992 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals), and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 72-88.
[2] Id., p. 100.
[3] Id., pp. 33-34.
[4] ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). − Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow…
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1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. xxx
[5] Decided by Judge Francisco B. Ibay, RTC, Makati City, Branch 135. Rollo, pp. 31-37.
[6] Id., p. 82.
[7] Id., pp. 83-88.
[8] Supra note 2.
[9] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[10] Roxas v. Vasquez, 432 Phil. 148 (2002).
[11] Dayrit v. Philippine Bank of Communications, 435 Phil. 120 (2002); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 1 (1999).
[12] Sps. Friend, et al. v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165767, 29 November 2005, 476 SCRA 453; Salonga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111478, 13 March 1997, 269 SCRA 534; Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals, 445 Phil. 300 (2003).
[13] Rollo, p. 80.
[14] Salva v. CA, 364 Phil. 281 (1997); Alabanzas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 29 November 1991, 204 SCRA 304; Sps. Friend, et al. v. Union Bank of the Philippines, supra.
[15] Villanueva v. Sps. Alejo and Virginia Salvador, G.R. No. 139436, 25 January 2006; People v. Chua, G.R. No. 128280, 4 April 2001, 356 SCRA 225; Ayson v. Enriquez Vda. De Carpio, G.R. No. 152438, 17 June 2004, 432 SCRA 449; Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 294 (1999).
[16] Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138480, 25 March 2004, 426 SCRA 309; L.T. Datu & Co., Inc. v. Sy, G.R. No. 143701, 23 March 2004, 426 SCRA 189.
[17] San Agustin v. People, G.R. No. 158211, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 392.
[18] Id.;
Villaflor v. Vivar, 402 Phil. 222 (2001).
[19] Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132422, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 460.
[20] Velasco v. People, G.R. No. 166479, 28 February 2006.