FIRST DIVISION
SPS. ALBERTO and JOCELYN G.R. No. 157593
AZANA,
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA
and
GARCIA, JJ.
CRISTOPHER LUMBO and
ELIZABETH LUMBO-JIMENEZ,
Respondents. Promulgated:
March
22, 2007
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D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari, spouses Alberto and Jocelyn
Azana assail the decision[1] dated
September 17, 2002 and resolution[2] dated
March 12, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60973. After a
re-evaluation of the evidence on record, the appellate court held that the
trial court’s factual findings were contrary to the evidence presented and, on
that basis, reversed the latter’s ruling.
Originally,
respondents filed an action for quieting of title[3] in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan. The subject matter of the action was
a piece of real property located in the island of Boracay, a prime tourist
destination. It was designated as Lot 64 during the national reservation survey
of Boracay on April 14, 1976.
Respondents alleged that they were
the owners of Lot 64. They claimed that,
in a deed of absolute sale dated December 1, 1996, the spouses Emilio and
Estela Gregorio sold Lot 64 to petitioners.
This cast a cloud over their title.
To support their claim of ownership,
respondents stated that Lot 64 was originally part of the 8.0488-hectare land
bought in a public auction by their parents, which they inherited entirely;
that such sale in the public auction was evidenced by a final bill of sale
dated September 18, 1939; that Lot 64 was separately designated during the
national reservation survey only because it was also being claimed by the
spouses Gregorio; and that, if Lots 63 and 64 were combined, the boundaries of
the resulting lot coincided with the boundaries of the lot purchased under the
final bill of sale.
For
their part, petitioners claim that they purchased Lot 64 from the spouses
Gregorio in good faith; that the spouses Gregorio became the lawful owners of
Lot 64 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale dated March 25, 1976 executed by
Ignacio Bandiola in favor of Estela Gregorio whereby Bandiola transferred to Gregorio
a parcel of land with an area of 3.4768 hectares; and that Lot 64 was part of
this 3.4768-hectare land.
According
to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, respondents failed to establish the identity of
the lot sold under the final bill of sale. Consequently, their claim of title
over Lot 64 also had to fail. In the words of the court a quo:
Assaying
the evidence presented by the parties in relation to their respective
submissions, the Court noted that the land acquired by [respondents’] parents
at the public auction is not solely bounded on the North and East by [the]
Visayan Sea, but also by Anunciacion Gelito and Guillermo Sualog, respectively.
Indeed, [respondents] own survey plan discloses that Lots 63 and 64 [are]
bounded by Lot 62 and seashore.
Hence, it is not clear that the land
acquired by [respondents’] parents at an auction sale includes Lot 64. The
Court could probably sustain [respondents’] theory if the said land is solely
bounded on the North and East by [the] Visayan Sea or seashore. There would be
no space for any intervening lot.[4]
(citations omitted)
Finding equiponderance of evidence[5], the
trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and upheld the validity of the sale
of Lot 64 to them.
On
review, the CA arrived at a different conclusion. It declared respondents as
owners of Lot 64 and nullified the sale by the spouses Gregorio to petitioners.
The appellate court agreed with respondents that Lot 64 was part of the
8.0488-hectare property described in the final bill of sale. As opposed to the
findings of the trial court, the appellate court was satisfied that the
boundaries of the lot resulting from the merger of Lots 63 and 64 coincided
with the boundaries of the 8.0488 hectare property. Moreover, the CA noted that
the areas of Lots 63 and 64 were 7.0300 hectares and 1.2012 hectares
respectively, meaning that the area resulting from the combination of the two
lots was equivalent to “8.0000 hectares, more or less, which [was] the total
area being claimed by the [respondents]”.[6]
Aggrieved,
the spouses Gregorio and the spouses Azana filed in this Court separate
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
petitions were separately docketed as G.R. No. 157617[7] and G.R.
No. 157593, respectively. The Court instantly denied both petitions for
essentially raising questions of fact which are generally beyond our review.
Thereafter,
both the Gregorios and petitioners filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. The Court denied the MR[8] of the
spouses Gregorio, in effect denying G.R. No. 157617 with finality.
Meanwhile,
the MR of the spouses Azana was granted. As a general rule, it is not the
Supreme Court’s function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative
value of the evidence presented.[9] The
factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are binding on this Court
and are given great weight and respect.[10]
However, the rule is not absolute. In instances where there is divergence in
the findings and conclusions of the trial court, on one hand, and the appellate
court, on the other, the Court may give the petition due course and re-examine
the evidence on record.[11]
Satisfied that the foregoing exception applies to this case, the Court ordered
the reinstatement of G.R. No. 157593 (this petition).
Respondents
oppose the petition on the ground that it is already barred by prior judgment.
They argue that the dismissal of the Gregorios’ petition (G.R. No. 157617) was
a final judgment constituting a bar to the institution of a similar petition.
Respondents’
position is incorrect. Res judicata calls for the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) there is final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
judgment or order is on the merits and (4) there is, between the two cases,
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.[12] Here,
the first requisite is absent. The Court’s resolution denying the spouses
Gregorio’s petition is not the final judgment contemplated by the first
requisite. Rather, “final judgment” entails a decision which perpetually
settles the controversy and lays to rest all questions raised. At that point, there
was no final judgment because the spouses Azana’s appeal of the CA decision was
still pending before us. Stated differently, there was yet no final judgment
which could be entered and executed.
We
now proceed to consider the documents relied upon by the parties.
To
prove their claim, petitioners submitted a deed of absolute sale of real property[13] dated
March 25, 1976 to show that Ignacio Bandiola sold to Estela Gregorio 3.4768
hectares of land located in Manoc-Manoc, Malay, Aklan. The property was
particularly described as follows:
THE
PORTION SOLD CONSISTS of 3.4768 hectares, more or less, located at the southern
side of the whole parcel and with the following pertinent boundaries: on the
North by Visayan Sea and Ernesto Bandiola; on the East by Visayan Sea; on the
South by Felicitas Lumbo, D. Pelayo, and D. Magapi; and on the West by Teodorica
Bandiola.[14]
They also presented the corresponding
tax declaration[15]
which reiterated the same property boundaries.
Petitioners point out that a portion
of this property was separately declared for realty tax purposes under ARP/TD
No. 93-011-1020/1021 as Lot 64 with an area of 1.48 hectares.[16] The tax
declaration indicated that the boundaries of Lot 64 were:
North: Visayan
Sea South: Lot 63
West: lot 99-pt East: Visayan Sea
In the hope of strengthening their
case, petitioners narrated the supposed origin of the disputed property. They claimed
that the 3.4768-hectare property was taken from the consolidated lots owned by
Ignacio Bandiola, i.e., three
contiguous parcels of land with individual areas of 8.7766 hectares, 6550
square-meters and 4994 square-meters.[17]
From this land mass, Ignacio Bandiola carved out 3.4768 hectares and sold the
same to Estela Gregorio. Allegedly, this portion included Lot 64 which Estela
Gregorio, in turn, sold to petitioners.
Granting
for the sake of argument that petitioners’ preceding allegations are true, it
follows that Ignacio Bandiola’s lots, if taken as one, must have extended to
the Visayan Sea in the east to have roped in Lot 64. It also follows that at
least one of the lots should have the Visayan Sea as its eastern boundary.
However, this conclusion is belied by the tax declarations petitioners
themselves presented. Not one of the tax declarations stated that any of
Bandiola’s lots was bound in the east by the Visayan Sea. On the contrary, all
the tax declarations stated that each of the lots was bound in the east by a
particular land mass:
Tax
Declaration No. 3066
Land Area: 8.7766 hectares
Boundaries: North – Visayan Sea
East – Lorenzo Lumbo,
Vanancio
Maming
West – Conchita Tirol,
Visayan Sea
South
– Moises Pelayo, Paula Gelito[18]
Tax
Declaration No. 3087
Land Area: 0.6550 hectare
Boundaries: North – Visayan Sea
East – Felicitas Alag
de Lumbo
West – Felicitas Alag de
Lumbo
South – Quirica Lumbo[19]
Tax
Declaration No. 3068
Land Area: 0.4994 hectare
Boundaries: North – Ignacio Bandiola
East – Anunciacion Gelito and
F.A.
Lumbo
West
– Ignacio Bandiola
South
– Gertrudes Casimero &
Salvador
Magapi[20]
Petitioners strained to explain the discrepancy by pointing
out that “Lot 64 was but a mere portion of the three parcels of land covered by
the [three] tax declarations. xxx. It [was] therefore, quite unlikely that Lot
64 would have the exact same boundaries as any or all of these [three]
parcels.”[21]
We
find their explanation wanting. If, indeed, Lot 64 was part of Ignacio
Bandiola’s mass of properties it would have been in its south-east corner,
occupying part of its southern and eastern perimeter. [22]
Therefore, the parcels of land covered by the three tax declarations must
reflect southern and/or eastern boundaries similar to those of Lot 64. But, as explained
earlier, none of the lots was enclosed or partly enclosed in the east by the
sea. It is highly unlikely that the
corner portion of the mother property would not have similar boundaries as those
of the latter on at least two sides.
The Court is not inclined to
pronounce which of the documents presented by petitioners is true and correct.
It is enough to say that the evidence they presented cast doubt on the validity
of their claim. Petitioners failed to
establish, by preponderance of evidence, the exact perimeters of the land which
they claim as their own.
On
the other hand, respondents anchor their claim over Lot 64 on a final bill of sale[23] dated
September 18, 1939. Apparently, the document was executed in favor of Lorenzo
and Felicitas Lumbo who bought an 8.0488-hectare property in a public auction. It stated:
That
on September 30, 1937, the real property under Tax Declaration No. 6523 was
forfeited to the Government in the manner and form prescribed by Act 3995 known
as the Assessment Law, for non-payment of land taxes corresponding to the years
1931 to 1937, inclusive, the description of which follows:
A parcel of cocal land situated in
the barrio of Manocmanoc, municipality of Buruanga, province of Capiz,
Philippines, having an area of 80, 488 square meters more or less. Bounded on
the North by Visayan Sea; on the East by the property of Guillermo Sualog and
Visayan Sea; on the South by the property of Moises Pelayo; and on the West by
the properties of Venancio Maming and Lucino Gelito, and assessed at P1040.00.
x x x.[24]
The
trial court discredited the final bill of sale by highlighting the fact that
the property bought at the public auction was not solely bound on the north and
east by the Visayan Sea but also by the properties of Anuncion Gelito and
Guillermo Sualog, respectively. With this, the trial court deduced that there was
an intervening space which should not have been there if the lot referred to in
the document included Lot 64. Thus, the final bill of sale must pertain to a
different parcel of land.
We
find the trial court’s conclusion inaccurate. The Gelito and Sualog properties were
not located between the Visayan Sea and the disputed property. Otherwise, the
tax declarations and final bill of sale would have indicated that the Lumbo
property was solely bound in the north by the Gelito property and in the east
by the Sualog property. A cursory look at the survey map[25] reveals
that the perimeter of the Lumbo property ran along the Visayan Sea and Gelito’s
property in the north, and the Visayan Sea and Sualog’s property in the east.
Naturally, the tax declarations and final bill of sale included the two
properties mentioned as part of the boundaries of the Lumbo property.
Petitioners
underscore the seeming irregularities in the description of the property under
the final bill of sale, a deed of sale dated May 20, 1939 and the tax
declarations for the years 1991 and 1993 in the names of respondents. They
posit that these irregularities negate respondents’ claim of legal or equitable
title and ultimately justify the resolution of the case in their favor.
A
deed of absolute sale[26] was
executed on May 20, 1939 between Pantaleon Maming and the respondents’ parents,
stipulating the sale to the Lumbos of “an approximate area of [five hectares],
being a part of the land under Tax No. 6523 in the name of Pantaleon Maming…”.[27]
Petitioners emphasize the fact that the property sold under the final bill of sale
was the same lot under Tax Declaration No. 6523. This discrepancy supposedly
blurred the identification of the property claimed by respondents.
We
disagree.
The CA sufficiently reconciled the
difference in the land areas in the two deeds:
xxx. It
may be asked why there were two deeds of sale covering the same property. We
find credence in [respondents’] explanation. The public auction was held on 13
September 1938 and therefore Pantaleon Maming had up to 13 September 1939 to
redeem the property. Before the expiration of the period of redemption, Lorenzo
Lumbo bought [five] hectares of the [eight]-hectare property in an attempt, as
[respondents] put it, to persuade Maming not to redeem the property. This can
be inferred from the price of P500.00 he paid for the [five] hectares
while in the auction sale held, he bought the entire 8.0488 hectares for only P56.78.
xxx.[28]
Next,
petitioners highlight the tax declarations filed by respondents for the years
1991[29] and
1993[30] covering
Lot 63 only. In the absence of contrary evidence, tax declarations, being
official documents, enjoy a presumption of truth as to their contents. Petitioners
contend that, unlike them, respondents never actually declared Lot 64 as theirs
and cannot therefore claim ownership of the property.
Jurisprudence
is consistent that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership of
the properties stated therein.[31] A
disclaimer is even printed on their face that they are “issued only in
connection with real property taxation [and] should not be considered as title
to the property.” At best, tax declarations are an indicia of possession
in the concept of an owner.[32]
However, non-declaration of a property for tax purposes does not necessarily
negate ownership.[33]
From
the foregoing, the fact that both tax declarations in the names of respondents covered
Lot 63 only did not necessarily mean they did not own Lot 64 as they were in
fact able to present a document evidencing ownership of both properties ―
the final bill of sale.
Clearly,
respondents have been able to establish by preponderance of evidence that they
are the rightful owners of Lot 64.
When
an owner of real property is disturbed in any way in his rights over the
property by the unfounded claim of others, he may bring an action for quieting
of title. The purpose of the action is to remove the cloud on his title created
by any instrument, record, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid
or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid and prejudicial to his title.[34]
Here,
the deeds of sale executed in favor of petitioners and the spouses Gregorio were
prima facie valid and enforceable. However, further scrutiny and
investigation established that petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, Ignacio
Bandiola, could not have owned the disputed lot. Consequently, the subsequent
conveyances of Lot 64 to the spouses Gregorio and thereafter, to petitioners, were
null and void. Therefore, respondents, as the adjudged owners of Lot 64, are
entitled to have the aforementioned deeds of sale nullified to remove any doubt
regarding their ownership of the lot.
While
the appellate court adequately explained its decision, it failed to
categorically declare the deeds of sale as null and void in its dispositive
portion. Since it is the dispositive portion of the decision which shall be
carried out, it is important that the status of the deeds of sale be clearly stated
therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The decision dated September 17, 2002 and resolution dated March 12, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
deed of absolute sale dated March 25, 1976, in so far as it covers Lot 64, and
the deed of absolute sale dated December 1, 1996 are hereby declared null and
void.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz (retired) and Edgardo F. Sundiam of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 48-60.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo F. Sundiam of the Former Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals; id., p. 61.
[3] Docketed as Civil Case No. 5253.
[4] RTC Decision dated June 26, 1998; rollo, p. 69.
[5] Equiponderance of evidence is defined as:
When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action. (Sapu-an, et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91869, 19 October 1992, 214 SCRA 701, 705-706, cited in the CA Decision, supra note 1, at 58.)
[6] CA
Decision, supra note 1, at 56.
[7] Comment, rollo, pp. 183, 187.
[8] Motion for reconsideration.
[9] Asia Trust Development Bank v. Concepts Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 130759, 20 June 2003, 404 SCRA 449, 461-462.
[10] Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118749, 25 April 2003, 401 SCRA 594, 606.
[11] See Gutierrez v. Singer Sewing Machine Company, G.R. No. 140982, 23 September 2003, 411 SCRA 512, 518.
[12] Romero
v. Tan, G.R. No. 147570, 27 February 2004, 424 SCRA 108, 122.
[13] Annex “P” of Petition, rollo, p. 158.
[14] Id.
[15] Annex “F” of Reply, rollo, p. 245.
[16] Petition, id., p. 16
[17] Annexes “C,” “D,” “E” and "F” of Reply, id., pp. 242-245.
[18] Annexes “C” and “D” of Reply, id., pp. 242-243.
[19] Annex “E” of Reply, id., p. 244.
[20] Annex “F” of Reply, id., p. 245.
[21] Reply, id., pp. 216, 218.
[22] Annex “1” of Reply, id., p. 240.
[23] Respondent’s Memorandum, id., pp. 311, 356-357.
[24] Id., p. 356.
[25] Annex “L” of Respondent’s Memorandum, id., p. 370.
[26] Annex “A” of Respondents’ Memorandum, id., pp. 354-355.
[27] Id., p. 354.
[28] CA Decision, supra note 1, at 54-55.
[29] Petition, rollo, p. 97.
[30] Id., p. 96.
[31] Cuenco v. Cuenco Vda. de Manguena, G.R. No. 149844, 13 October 2004, 440 SCRA 252, 264-265; Abejeron v. Nabasa, 411 Phil. 552, 572 (2001); Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil. 838, 856 (2001).
[32] Id.
[33] Cf. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116372, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA 451, 462.
[34] Civil Code, Article 476.