SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), G.R. No. 156052
VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO,
and
BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON,
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s
u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA* and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON.
JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.,
in
his capacity as Mayor of the
City
of Manila,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 7, 2007
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CORONA, J.:
In this original petition for mandamus,[1]
petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and
Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr.,
mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
The antecedents are as follows.
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.[2]
Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001.[3] It became effective on December 28, 2001,
after its publication.[4]
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted
pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle described
as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional
limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the
society.[5] This is
evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:
SECTION
1. For the purpose of promoting sound
urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the
residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use
of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR
Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the
southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest
area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and
Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The
area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo
28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to
Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other
businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1
hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of
effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in
consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the
area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners
and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of
the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil
companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City
of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU)[6]
with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to
perform the following:
Section 1. -
Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall,
upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan
Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate
removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the
LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and
green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals.
xxx
Section 2. – Consistent with the scale-down program
mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and
management, including the operation of common, integrated and/or shared
facilities, consistent with international and domestic technical, safety,
environmental and economic considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL
COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and
integrated areas/facilities. A separate
agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and conditions of the
joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3.
- The development and maintenance of the
safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the
properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall
be the sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.
The City
of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:
Section 1.
- The City Mayor shall endorse to the
City Council this MOU for its appropriate action with the view of implementing
the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2.
- The City Mayor and the DOE shall,
consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to
continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited
area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program.
Section 3.
- The DOE and the City Mayor shall
monitor the OIL COMPANIES’ compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4.
- The CITY OF MANILA and the national
government shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all
efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by
illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang
Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.[7] In the
same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only
for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.[8] Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian
adopted Resolution No. 13[9]
extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor
Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No.
13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.[10]
Meanwhile,
petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002
praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.[11]
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1.
whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals,
and
2.
whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the
resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.[12]
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal
duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160),[13] to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies. Instead, he has allowed them
to stay.
Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been
superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.[14] However, he also confusingly argues that the
ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has
not amended the former. He insists that
the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did
not in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be
considered as a mere guideline for its full implementation.[15]
Under Rule 65, Section 3[16] of the
Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station. Mandamus is an
extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of
a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner
should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of
the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the
act required to be done.[17]
Mandamus will not issue to
enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or
over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus
is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is
neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to
implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief
sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.[18]
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal
right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a
political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices
in Manila. It claims to have many members
who are residents of Manila. The other
petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous
cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its
object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they
need not show any specific interest.[19]
Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the
enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent
never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon
respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city.”[20] One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has
the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by
the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.[21] He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[22] we
stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot
refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the
statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the
government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are
bound to obey it.[23]
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by
respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian
have made the respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear
or uncertain. This is also connected to
the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and Resolution
Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of
the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which
ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full
force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally
hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.[24]
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right
after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror
of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center
in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of
Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a
terrorist attack[25]
on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason
exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as
mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No.
8027.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(On official leave)
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
|
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
* On official leave.
[1] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Entitled “Ordinance Reclassifying the Land Use of [Those] Portions of Land Bounded by the Pasig River In The North[,] PNR Railroad Track in the East, Beata St. in the South, Palumpong St. in the Southwest and Estero De Pandacan in the West, PNR Railroad in the Northwest Area, Estero of Pandacan in the Northeast, Pasig River in the Southeast and Dr. M. L. Carreon in the Southwest; the Area of Punta, Sta. Ana Bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St.[,] Mayo 28 St. and the F. Manalo Street from Industrial II to Commercial I.”
[3] Rollo, p. 12.
[4] Id., p. 6.
[5] Philtread Workers Union (PTWU) v. Confesor, 336 Phil. 375 (1997), citing Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestlé Philippines, Inc., G.R. Nos. 88710-13, 19 December 1990, 192 SCRA 396.
[6] Rollo, pp. 16-18. This MOU modified the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed on October 12, 2001 by the oil companies and the DOE. This MOA called for close coordination among the parties with a view of formulating appropriate measures to arrive at the best possible option to ensure, maintain and at the same time harmonize the interests of both government and the oil companies; id., p. 36.
[7] Entitled “Resolution Ratifying the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Entered into by and Among the Department of Energy, the City of Manila, Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation on 26 June 2002, and Known as Document No. 60, Page No. 12, Book No. 1, Series of 2002 in the Notarial Registry of Atty. Neil Lanson Salcedo, Notary Public for and in the City of Manila;” id., p. 36.
[8] Id.
[9] Entitled “Resolution Extending the Validity of Resolution 97, Series of 2002, to April 30, 2003, Thereby Authorizing his Honor Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., to Issue Special Business Permits to Caltex Phil., Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation Situated within the Pandacan Oil Terminal Covering the said Period;” id., p. 38.
[10] Id.
[11] Id., p. 9.
[12] Id., p. 15.
[13] It states:
Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Compensation. – xxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city xxxx
[14] Rollo, pp. 28 and 144.
[15] Id., pp. 31 and 146-147.
[16] The full text reads:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. xxxx
[17] University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100588, 7 March 1994, 230 SCRA 761, 771, citations omitted.
[18] BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Manikan, G.R. No. 148789, 16 January 2003, 395 SCRA 373, 375, citing Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 200 (2000).
[19] Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 1075 (2001); Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. L-72119, 29 May 1987, 150 SCRA 530, 536; Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36.
[20] Supra note 13.
[21] Tuzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90107, 21 August 1992, 212 SCRA 739, 747. According to respondent, the oil companies separately filed actions for annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 which are now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branches 39 and 42; Rollo, p. 143.
[22] G.R. No. 96859, 15 October 1991, 202 SCRA 779.
[23] Id., p. 795, citing Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, 42 Phil. 818 (1922) and Burton v. U.S., 202 U.S. 344.
[24] According to respondent, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued in the action filed by the oil companies to annul Ordinance No. 8027 (see note 21, supra); rollo, p. 143. This presumably has already lapsed.
[25] This was alleged by petitioners and not refuted by respondent; id., pp. 7 and 118.