Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
NACHURA,
JJ.
FELICIDAD
TATING MARCELLA,
represented
by SALVADOR MARCELLA,
CARLOS
TATING, and the COURT OF
APPEALS,
Promulgated:
Respondents. March 27, 2007
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Assailed in the Special Civil Action
for Certiorari before the Court are the Decision[1]
dated
The present case arose from a
controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of Subdivision
plan Psd-31182, located at
On
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed
a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the
property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title
over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan
by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her
business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor
mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and
the subject property reconveyed to her.[7]
Daniela
died on
In a letter dated
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos
and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the RTC
of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the nullification of
the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the
TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration
in favor of the heirs of Daniela.[10]
The complaint also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages as well
as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. On
In her Answer, Nena denied that any
fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the subject Deed of
Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos.
She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and in her counterclaim, she
asked the trial court for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages as
well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.[12]
Trial
ensued. On
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, and
hereby declaring the document of sale dated
1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu thereof to issue a new title in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion of the property; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion and Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion, all of lot 56 after payment of the prescribed fees;
2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-00672 and in lieu thereof issue a new Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; Felicidad Tating Marcella, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; Julio Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; and Nena Lazalita Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion, all of lot 56 as well as the house standing thereon be likewise declared in the names of the persons mentioned in the same proportions as above-stated after payment of the prescribed fees;
3.
The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs
the sum of P20,000.00 by way of moral damages, P10,000.00 by way
of exemplary damages, P5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees and P3,000.00
by way of litigation expenses; and to
4. Pay the costs of suit.
SO
ORDERED.[13]
Nena’s Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA “has decided the instant case without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported by and is even against the evidence on record.”[16]
At the outset, it must be stated that
the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is inappropriate.
Considering that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA finally
disposed of the case, the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
The Court
notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the petition actually
avers errors of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction, which are the proper
subjects of a petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in accordance
with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
justice, the Court decided to treat the present petition for certiorari
as having been filed under Rule 45, especially considering that it was filed
within the reglementary period for filing the same.[17]
As to the
merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private respondents
rests on the proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
Petitioner also contends that while
the subject deed was executed on
Petitioner further asserts that the
RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine held time and again by the
Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance is required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial
document. Petitioner also argues that the RTC and the CA erred in its
pronouncement that the transaction between Daniela and petitioner created a
trust relationship between them because of the settled rule that where the
terms of a contract are clear, it should be given full effect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private
respondents contend that petitioner failed to show that the CA or the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed judgments; that
Daniela’s Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of
sale by and between her and petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in
effect, the agreement between petitioner and Daniela created a trust
relationship between them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and
the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela
is simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound
at all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement
(relatively simulated).[19]
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the
intention of the parties.[20] Such
intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement as well as
from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[21]
In the
present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving
their allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true
intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela dated
There is no
issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.[22]
The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade.[23]
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the
rules of evidence.[24]
It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are
not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language
in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.[25]
Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the
affiant.[26]
For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.[27]
The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving
the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to
take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not
have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving
that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as
a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.
Private respondents
should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation
that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she
executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil
cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the defendant.[28]
Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to present any
other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their
witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she
entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
In Suntay
v. Court of Appeals,[29]
the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the
complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to
assert his rights of ownership over the disputed property.[30] In the
present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared the
property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name. Petitioner has
shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes due on
the said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the
taxes thereon. While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves,
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property.[31]
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government.[32]
Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[33]
On the other hand, private respondents failed to present even a single tax receipt or
declaration showing that Daniela paid taxes due on the disputed lot as proof
that she claims ownership thereof. The only Tax Declaration in the name of
Daniela, which private respondents presented in evidence, refers only to the
house standing on the lot in controversy.[34]
Even the said Tax Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner owns
the lot (
Moreover,
the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did
not really reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained
silent until her death; she never told any of her relatives regarding her
actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make known her true
intentions through the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the
existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her
declaration therein that she is appealing for help in order to get back the
subject lot, she never took any concrete step to recover the subject property
from petitioner until her death more than ten years later.
It is true
that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she
executed the subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property
was transferred in petitioner’s favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the
property in dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the meantime, petitioner
continued to reside in
As to
Daniela’s affidavit dated
However,
even if Daniela’s affidavit of
Considering
that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and
Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity
to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created
between them.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case
No. 278-C, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents
is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Also spelled as Lasalita in other parts of the rollo.
[1] Penned by Justice Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Conchita Carpio Morales (now a
member of this Court) and Sergio L. Pestaño; rollo,
p. 53.
[2] Original Records, pp. 318-342.
[3] Exhibit “A”, id. at 138.
[4] Exhibit “Q”/“1”, id. at 177.
[5] Exhibit “3”, id. at 179.
[6] Exhibits “8-A” to “8-AA”, id. at 183-212.
[7] Exhibit “D”, id. at 142.
[8] Exhibit “I”, id. at 149.
[9] Exhibit “E”, id. at 143.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] CA rollo, p. 86.
[15]
[16] Rollo, p. 5.
[17] Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066, 1075 (1997).
[18] Based on the certification issued by
the Civil Registry of Cadiz City, Daniela S. Tating died on
[19] People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 850, 869-870 (1998).
[20] Ramos v. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr., 431 Phil. 337, 345 (2002).
[21]
[22] Ayala Land, Inc. v. Tagle, G.R. No. 153667,
[23]
[24] Heirs of
[25] Lim v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 60, 78 (2000) citing People’s Bank and Trust Company v. Leonidas, G.R. No. 47815, March 11, 1992, 207 SCRA 164; D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249, 260-261.
[26] D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. at 260-261.
[27]
[28] Dungaran
v. Koshnicke, G.R. No. 161048,
[29] 321 Phil. 809, 831-832 (1995).
[30] Ramos v. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr., supra note 20, at 348-349.
[31] Heirs of Miguel Franco v. Court of Appeals, 463 Phil. 417, 433 (2003).
[32] Calicdan v. Cendaña, G.R. No.
155080,
[33]
[34] Exhibit “B”; OR, 139.
[35] Spouses Sabio v. The International Corporate Bank, Inc., 416 Phil. 785, 820 (2001).
[36] Id. at 820; Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 113472-73, December 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341, 347.
[37] Mendezona v. Ozamiz, 426 Phil. 888, 904 (2002).
[38] People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19, at 870; Ramos v. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr., supra note 20, at 346.