CAROLYN
M. GARCIA, G.R. No. 154878
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s -
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
RICA MARIE S. THIO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 16, 2007
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Assailed
in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the
Sometime in February 1995, respondent
Rica Marie S. Thio received from petitioner Carolyn M. Garcia a crossed check[4] dated P76,500[7] on July
26,[8] August
26, September 26 and
In June 1995, respondent received
from petitioner another crossed check[9] dated P500,000, also payable to the order of Marilou Santiago.[10] Consequently, petitioner received from
respondent the amount of P20,000 every month on August 5, September 5,
October 5 and
According to petitioner, respondent
failed to pay the principal amounts of the loans (US$100,000 and P500,000)
when they fell due. Thus, on February
22, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages in the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 58 against respondent, seeking to collect the sums of
US$100,000, with interest thereon at 3% a month from October 26, 1995 and P500,000,
with interest thereon at 4% a month from November 5, 1995, plus attorney’s fees
and actual damages.[12]
Petitioner alleged that on P500,000 at an agreed monthly interest of 4%, the maturity
date of which was on
Respondent denied that she contracted
the two loans with petitioner and countered that it was Marilou Santiago to
whom petitioner lent the money. She claimed she was merely asked by petitioner
to give the crossed checks to P76,000 and
P20,000 not as payment of interest but to accommodate petitioner’s
request that respondent use her own checks instead of Santiago’s.[18]
In a decision dated P500,000
at a monthly interest of 4%:[20]
WHEREFORE, finding
preponderance of evidence to sustain the instant complaint, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of [petitioner], sentencing [respondent] to pay the former
the amount of:
1.
[US$100,000.00]
or its peso equivalent with interest thereon at 3% per month from
2.
P500,000.00
with interest thereon at 4% per month from
3.
P100,000.00
as and for attorney’s fees; and
4.
P50,000.00
as and for actual damages.
For lack of merit,
[respondent’s] counterclaim is perforce dismissed.
With costs against
[respondent].
IT IS SO ORDERED.[21]
On
appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled that there was no
contract of loan between the parties:
A perusal of the record
of the case shows that [petitioner] failed to substantiate her claim that
[respondent] indeed borrowed money from her.
There is nothing in the record that shows that [respondent] received
money from [petitioner]. What is
evident is the fact that [respondent] received a MetroBank [crossed] check
dated February 24, 1995 in the sum of US$100,000.00, payable to the order of
Marilou Santiago and a CityTrust [crossed] check dated June 29, 1995 in the
amount of P500,000.00, again payable to the order of Marilou Santiago,
both of which were issued by [petitioner].
The checks received by [respondent], being crossed, may not be
encashed but only deposited in the bank by the payee thereof, that is, by
Marilou Santiago herself.
It must be noted that
crossing a check has the following effects: (a) the check may not be encashed
but only deposited in the bank; (b) the check may be negotiated only once—to one
who has an account with the bank; (c) and the act of crossing the check serves
as warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose
so that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose,
otherwise, he is not a holder in due course.
Consequently, the
receipt of the [crossed] check by [respondent] is not the issuance and delivery
to the payee in contemplation of law since the latter is not the person who
could take the checks as a holder, i.e., as a payee or indorsee thereof, with
intent to transfer title thereto.
Neither could she be deemed as an agent of Marilou Santiago with respect
to the checks because she was merely facilitating the transactions between the
former and [petitioner].
With the foregoing
circumstances, it may be fairly inferred that there were really no contracts of
loan that existed between the parties. x x x (emphasis supplied)[22]
Hence this petition.[23]
As a
rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, this case falls under one of the exceptions, i.e., when
the factual findings of the CA (which held that there were no contracts
of loan between petitioner and respondent) and the RTC (which held that there
were contracts of loan) are contradictory.[24]
The
petition is impressed with merit.
A loan
is a real contract, not consensual, and as such is perfected only upon the
delivery of the object of the contract.[25] This is evident in Art. 1934 of the Civil
Code which provides:
An accepted
promise to deliver something by way of commodatum or simple loan is binding
upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be
perfected until the delivery of the object of the contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Upon delivery of the object of the contract of loan (in this
case the money received by the debtor when the checks were encashed) the debtor
acquires ownership of such money or loan proceeds and is bound to pay the
creditor an equal amount.[26]
It is
undisputed that the checks were delivered to respondent. However, these checks were crossed and
payable not to the order of respondent but to the order of a certain Marilou
Santiago. Thus the main question to be
answered is: who borrowed money from petitioner — respondent or
Petitioner insists that it was upon
respondent’s instruction that both checks were made payable to
We
agree with petitioner. Delivery is the
act by which the res or substance thereof is placed within the actual or
constructive possession or control of another.[30]
Although respondent did not physically receive the proceeds of the checks,
these instruments were placed in her control and possession under an
arrangement whereby she actually re-lent the amounts to
Several
factors support this conclusion.
First,
respondent admitted that petitioner did not personally know
Second,
Leticia Ruiz, a friend of both petitioner and respondent (and whose name appeared
in both parties’ list of witnesses) testified that respondent’s plan was for
petitioner to lend her money at a monthly interest rate of 3%, after which
respondent would lend the same amount to
Third,
for the US$100,000 loan, respondent admitted issuing her own checks in the
amount of P76,000 each (peso equivalent of US$3,000) for eight months to
cover the monthly interest. For the P500,000 loan, she also issued her
own checks in the amount of P20,000 each for four months.[34] According to respondent, she merely accommodated
petitioner’s request for her to issue her own checks to cover the interest
payments since petitioner was not personally acquainted with Santiago.[35] She
claimed, however, that Santiago would replace the checks with cash.[36] Her
explanation is simply incredible. It is
difficult to believe that respondent would put herself in a position where she
would be compelled to pay interest, from her own funds, for loans she allegedly
did not contract. We declared in one
case that:
In the assessment of the
testimonies of witnesses, this Court is guided by the rule that for evidence to
be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itself such as the common experience of mankind can approve
as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human
testimony except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of
juridical cognizance.[37]
Fourth,
in the petition for insolvency sworn to and filed by Santiago, it was
respondent, not petitioner, who was listed as one of her (Santiago’s)
creditors.[38]
Last,
respondent inexplicably never presented Santiago as a witness to corroborate
her story.[39]
The presumption is that “evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced.”[40]
Respondent was not able to overturn this presumption.
We hold
that the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that respondent did not
borrow the amounts of US$100,000 and P500,000 from petitioner. We
instead agree with the ruling of the RTC making respondent liable for the
principal amounts of the loans.
We do
not, however, agree that respondent is liable for the 3% and 4% monthly
interest for the US$100,000 and P500,000 loans respectively. There was no written proof of the interest
payable except for the verbal agreement that the loans would earn 3% and
4% interest per month. Article 1956 of the Civil Code provides that “[n]o
interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.”
Be that as it may, while there can be
no stipulated interest, there can be legal interest pursuant to Article 2209 of
the Civil Code. It is well-settled that:
When the
obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e.,
a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil Code.[41]
Hence, respondent is liable for the
payment of legal interest per annum to be computed from November
21, 1995, the date when she received petitioner’s demand letter.[42] From
the finality of the decision until it is fully paid, the amount due shall earn
interest at 12% per annum, the interim period being deemed
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[43]
The
award of actual damages in the amount of P50,000 and P100,000
attorney’s fees is deleted since the RTC decision did not explain the factual
bases for these damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED
and the June 19, 2002 decision and August 20, 2002 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56577 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
February 28, 1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 96-266
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent is directed to
pay petitioner the amounts of US$100,000 and P500,000 at 12% per annum
interest from November 21, 1995 until the finality of the decision. The
total amount due as of the date of finality will earn interest of 12% per
annum until fully paid. The award
of actual damages and attorney’s fees is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
|
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by former Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola (deceased) and concurred in by Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and Josefina Guevara-Salonga of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 98-102.
[3] Id., pp. 104-105.
[4] This was Metrobank check no. 26910; id., pp. 70, 224 and 368.
[5] Id., pp. 60, 100-101, 224.
[6] Id., pp. 60-61. According to respondent, she originally
issued four postdated checks each in the amount of P76,000 on the same
dates mentioned but these were not encashed and instead each check was replaced
by Santiago with US$3,000 in cash given by respondent to petitioner; id., p.
224.
[7] This was the peso equivalent of
US$3,000 computed at the exchange rate of P25.50 to $1.00; id., pp. 17
and 88. These postdated checks were
deposited on their respective due dates and honored by the drawee bank; id., p.
225.
[8] According to respondent, this check was replaced by Santiago with cash in the amount of US$3,000.
[9] This was City Trust check no. 467257; rollo, pp. 90 and 327.
[10] Id., pp. 60, 101 and 225.
[11] Id., p. 109.
[12] Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-266; rollo, pp. 15, 60 and 364.
[13] Id., p. 109.
[14] Id., p. 110.
[15] Id., p. 16.
[16] Id., p. 110.
[17] Id., p. 224.
[18] Id.
[19] Id., pp. 60-95.
[20] Id., pp. 79 and 89.
[21] Id., pp. 94-95.
[22] Id., pp. 100-101, citation omitted.
[23] The issues submitted for resolution are the following:
(A)
Is actual and physical delivery of the money loaned
directly from the lender to the borrower the only way to perfect a contract of
loan?
(B)
Does the
respondent’s admission that she paid interests to the petitioner on the amounts
represented by the two checks given to her by said petitioner render said
respondent in estoppel to question that there was no loan transaction between
her and the petitioner?
(C)
Is respondent’s
written manifestation in the trial court, through counsel, that she interposes
no objection to the admission of petitioner’s documentary exhibits for the
multiple purposes specified in the latter’s Formal Offer of Documentary
Exhibits a judicial admission governed by Rule 129, Section 4, Rules of Court?
(D)
Is this Honorable
Court bound by the conclusions of fact relied upon by the [CA] in issuing its
disputed Decision?
(E)
Have the [RTC’s]
findings of fact on the lone issue on which respondent litigated in the [RTC], viz.
existence of privity of contract between petitioner and respondent, been
overturned or set aside by the [CA]?
(F)
May the
respondent validly change the theory of her case from one of privity of
contract between her and the petitioner in the [RTC], to one of not being a
holder in due course of the crossed checks payable to a third party in the [CA]
and before this Honorable Court?
(G)
Is the
petitioner’s entitlement to interest, despite absence of a written stipulation
on the payment thereof, justified?
(H) Is the deletion by the [CA] of the [RTC’s] award of attorney’s fees and actual damages in favor pf the petitioner justified? Id., pp. 401-402.
[24] Philippine National Bank v. Andrada Electric & Engineering Co., G.R. No. 142936, 17 April 2002, 381 SCRA 244, 253, citing Fuentes v. CA, 335 Phil. 1163, 1167-1169 (1997).
[25] Naguiat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118375, 3 October 2003, 412 SCRA 591, 597.
[26] Article 1953 of the Civil Code states:
A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
[27] Rollo, p. 39.
[28] Id.
[29] Id., pp. 39-40.
[30] Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142021, 29 November 2000, 346 SCRA 563, 569, citing Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.
[31] Rollo, p. 64.
[32] Id., p. 70.
[33] Id., pp. 76 and 85.
[34] Id., pp. 16-17, 224-225, 411.
[35] Id., p. 224.
[36] Id., p. 70.
[37] People v. Mala, G.R. No. 152351, 18 September 2003, 411 SCRA 327, 337, citing People v. Dayag, 155 Phil. 421, 431 (1974).
[38] Rollo, pp. 88 and 94.
[39] Id., p. 93.
[40] Sec. 3 (e), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
[41] Eusebio-Calderon v. People, G.R. No. 158495, 21 October 2004, 441 SCRA 137, 148-149, citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 12 July 1994, 234 SCRA 78, 95; Cabrera v. People, G.R. No. 150618, 24 July 2003, 407 SCRA 247, 261.
[42] Rollo,
p. 65.
[43] Cabrera
v. People, supra.