THIRD
DIVISION
|
MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and
its members,
Petitioners, - versus
- MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 154591 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR.,* CHICO-NAZARIO,
and NACHURA,
JJ. Promulgated: March 5, 2007 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision,[1]dated
31 October 2001, promulgated by the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated 5 April 2000, declaring
that the strike held by the petitioner Manila Hotel Employees Association
(MHEA), herein represented by Ferdinand Barles, is
illegal. The Court of Appeals, in its
assailed Decision, modified the Decision rendered by the NLRC and ruled that
both incumbent officers and members of MHEA involved in the illegal strike lost
their employment status.
On
The case was set for mandatory
conference on 8 February 2000 before Presiding Commissioner Rogelio I. Rayala. During the
conference, the parties were advised of the certification order, which prohibited
them from taking any action that would exacerbate the situation. At the instance of the MHEA officers, the
hearing of the case was reset to 29 February 2000 due to the absence of the
counsel for MHEA.[5]
On
After the strike was conducted, both
parties filed various motions and pleadings before the NLRC. Manila Hotel filed a complaint with Prayer
for Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order on 11 February 2000, alleging
that MHEA conducted an illegal strike, blocked all ingress and egress of the
hotel premises, harassed and intimidated company officers, non-striking
employees, customers and suppliers. In
addition, it sought a declaration that the strike was illegal and that, consequently, the striking employees lost their
employment.[9]
The NLRC issued an Order dated
The NLRC received a copy of the
Compliance filed by Manila Hotel on
In response to the NLRC’s
return-to-work order, dated 11 February 2000, the MHEA filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside Order on 14 February 2000. It alleged
that the Motion for Reconsideration, dated 29 November 1999, questioning the
validity of the Order of the SOLE, dated 24 November 1999, which certified the
case to the NLCR, was still pending with the SOLE. The said motion had prevented the said Order
of the SOLE from becoming final and executory. Thus, it alleged that the NLRC had not
acquired jurisdiction over the labor dispute pending the resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration filed before the SOLE.[13] On
The NLRC also issued another Order on
17 February 2000, ordering MHEA to refrain from putting up a blockade or
barricade or any mode of preventing the free ingress to and egress from the
hotel. Parenthetically, it also ordered
Manila Hotel to respect the right of the striking workers to peacefully picket
in a designated area outside the hotel. [15] Manila Hotel moved for the Reconsideration of
the said Order on the ground that the picket, which they were ordered to
respect, was an unlawful activity.[16]
Pending the resolution of its motion,
MHEA filed a Motion to Inhibit, dated
In the Decision promulgated on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the strike is declared illegal. Accordingly, the incumbent officers of the
union are declared to have forfeited their employment status. Further, no relief may be granted the union
with respect to their demands, in view of the absence of a decision thereon by
a Voluntary Arbitrator.
In lieu of an order for the Hotel and members of the union to maintain their respective status previous to the strike, Manila Hotel, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay the returning union members, as an alternative relief to continued employment, severance compensation in an amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service, a fraction thereof, being considered as one whole year. No entitlement to backwages is however decreed, pursuant to the no-work-no-pay principle in strike cases.
Both parties filed their respective
Motions for Reconsideration. Manila Hotel filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration which sought the deletion of the award of severance
compensation to the union members who participated in the illegal strike.[23] MHEA, on the other hand, sought the reversal
of the Decision on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case
and that they were deprived of due process.[24] The NLRC denied both motions in a Resolution
dated
On 6 July 2000, Manila Hotel filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals to assail the Decision
dated 5 April 2000, and the Resolution dated 17 May 2000, both issued by the
NLRC.[26] In a Decision[27]
dated
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the same is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is MODIFIED in that both the incumbent officers and members of the Union involved in the illegal strike are declared to have lost their employment status. The award of severance compensation to the striking members of the union is consequently DELETED.
On
MHEA filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court questioning
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
In
the present petition, MHEA raises the following issues[34]:
I
WITH DUE RESPECT,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION HAD ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND THEY HAD COMMITED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN THEIR
QUESTIONED DECISIONS AND RESOLUTIONS WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE,
THE INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS, WHO ARE MERE ORDINARY MEMBERS OF THE UNION, ARE
ENTITLED TO BE REINSTATED BACK (sic) TO WORK WITHOUT LOSS OF SENIORITY OR OTHER
EMPLOYEES’ RIGHTS AND BENEFITS AND WITH FULL BACKWAGES FROM DATE OF DISMISSAL
UNTIL ACTUAL REINSTATEMENT.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT,
THE COURT BELOW AND THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION HAD COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF STRAINED RELATIONSHIP IN THE CASE AT BAR.
This petition is devoid of merit.
Before
discussing the substantial issues of this case, this Court takes notice of a
serious procedural flaw. Ferdinand Barles is not authorized to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping in the present case. The General Membership Resolution, dated
The
provisions of Supreme Court Circular Nos. 28-91 and 04-94 require a
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in any initiatory pleading filed before the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. In
the case of Teoville Homeowner’s Association v. Ferreira,[36]
the Court emphatically underscored the need to show to the satisfaction of the
Court that the person signing the verification and certification against
non-forum shopping had been specifically authorized to do so. In other similar cases,[37]
it has been ruled that it is the party-pleader, and not the counsel, who must
execute the certificate against forum shopping.
The rationale for the rule is that the counsel may be unaware of any
similar actions pending with other courts on the same matter. In this case, Ferdinand Barles
was no longer an officer of the union at the time this petition was filed, and
therefore was no longer privy to the cases that may have been filed by
MHEA. Absent the specific authorization
from the MHEA members that he sought to represent, any statement he may make
cannot bind the MHEA herein named. For
the foregoing reasons alone, this petition should be dismissed.
Aside from
its procedural defects, the petition is also substantially infirm. MHEA members seek their reinstatement after
participating in an illegal strike, that is, a strike that was conducted after
receiving an Order of assumption[38]
by the SOLE certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Worse still, the strikers failed to comply
with the
ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS
x x x x
(g) When, in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of the assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES
(a) x x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
More to the point, the Court has
consistently ruled in a long line of cases spanning several decades that once the
SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, such jurisdiction should not be
interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or
lockout. Defiance of the assumption
order or a return-to work order by a striking employee, whether a union officer
or a member, is an illegal act and, therefore, a valid ground for loss of
employment status.[39]
The
assumption of jurisdiction by the SOLE over labor disputes causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest
is in the nature of a police power measure.[40] In this case, the SOLE sufficiently justified
the assumption order, thus:
The
Hotel is engaged in the hotel and restaurant business and one of the de luxe hotels operating in Metro Manila catering mostly to
foreign tourist groups and businessmen.
It serves as venue for local and international conventions and
conferences. The Hotel provides
employment to more than 700 employees as well as conducts business with
entities dependent on its continued operation.
It also provides substantial contribution to the government coffers in the
form of foreign exchange earnings and tax payments. Undoubtedly, a work stoppage thereat will
adversely affect the Hotel, its employees, the industry, and the economy as a
whole.
At this critical time when efforts of the present administration are seriously focused on preserving the economic gains achieved and ensuring that existing jobs are maintained, it is the utmost concern of this Office to avoid work disruption that might result to the firm’s closure particularly so when an alternative mechanism obtains to resolve the parties’ differences.[41]
The allegation[42]
that the strikers relied on their honest
belief that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, issued by
the SOLE on
The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other construction. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter, affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national interest. The order is issued in the exercise of the court’s compulsory power of arbitration, and therefore must be obeyed until set aside. To say that its [return-to-work order] effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element it concerned.
Returning to work in this situation is
not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together
with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can
continue serving the public and promoting its interest.[45]
This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at
arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without
jeopardizing national interests. Regardless therefore of their motives, or the
validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from
any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of
Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore
return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the
company, to justify their action.[46]
MHEA
claims that the Court should consider as a mitigating circumstance the fact
that they held the strike three months after filing their notice of
strike. Such detail is irrelevant. What is crucial is that they were apprised of
the assumption order of the SOLE wherein they were enjoined from carrying out a
strike. They were again reminded to
refrain from conducting a strike during the mandatory conference on 8 February
2000. Pending the proceedings for
compulsory arbitration and for no apparent reason, they staged the strike two
days later and refused to obey the return-to-work order issued on 11 February
2000. In the case of Grand Boulevard Hotel v. Genuine Labor Organization of
Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (GLOWHRAIN),[47]
the Court cautioned against the unreasonable and indiscriminate exercise of the
right to strike:
[T]he decision to wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. In every strike staged by a union, the general peace and progress of society and public welfare are involved. x x x.
MHEA alleges that the union members
were not served a copy of the assumption order issued by SOLE.[48] Such allegation is absurd considering that MHEA
repeatedly alluded in its Motion for Reconsideration dated
They, likewise, imply that they were
not served a copy of the return-to-work order.[49] Such allegation loses credence because MHEA,
in its Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside Order dated
MHEA cannot lean on the doctrine in
the case of PNOC Dockyard and Engineering
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission.[52]
The Court, in the aforecited case, ruled that there
was no valid service of the certification order which prohibited any strike or
lockout since the said order was served on the guard on duty instead of the
president of the union who was authorized to receive the same. As a result, the strike undertaken after the
issuance of the said order was considered legal, hence
cannot effectively terminate the employment of workers who joined the
strike. In the present case, not only
were the union officers apprised of the order, a copy of the same was served on
the picket lines.
MHEA,
likewise, assails the Decision of the NLRC for having been determined without
conducting any preliminary hearings nor requiring the
submission of position papers.[53] Again, the records belie these statements. During the mandatory conference held on
MHEA propounds the theory[56]
that both parties had acted in pari delicto and, therefore, the dismissal of its members
who participated in the illegal strike, was
unwarranted, citing as its precedents Philippine
Airlines Inc. v. Brillantes[57]
and Philippines Interfashion
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.[58] In both cases, the undisputed finding that
the employer was guilty of an illegal lockout while the union conducted an
illegal strike, caused the Court to order the
reinstatement of the employees who participated in the illegal strike. In Philippine
Airlines Inc. v. Brillantes,[59]
the Court emphasized the unequivocal rule that participating in a strike
undertaken in defiance of the order of the SOLE results in the loss of
employment status. It only made an
exception of the said case because the records clearly established that the
employer, Philippine Airlines, Inc., terminated the employment of 183 union
officers and members, in violation of the order issued by the SOLE.[60] In Philippines
Interfashion Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the return-to-work order was not issued pursuant to an
assumption or certification order.[61] More importantly, the employees complied with
the return-to-work order and reported back for work within one day after receiving
the same. Despite such compliance, the
employer refused to reinstate 114 employees, and, thus, such refusal on the
part of the employer amounted to an illegal lockout.[62]
In the present case, nothing in the
records shows that Manila Hotel was guilty of an illegal lockout. It readmitted
the six (6) employees who complied with the return-to-work order. MHEA made a vague reference to striking employees
who complied with the return-to-work order, but were nevertheless refused
re-admittance by Manila Hotel.[63]
However, they failed to even identify
these employees. There is no allegation
that MHEA filed any case for illegal lock-out against Manila Hotel. What is clearly shown by the records is that
the strike or picketing was still being conducted on
It
would not be amiss to reiterate the Court’s pronouncement in the case Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission[67]:
As a general rule, the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. The Court must take care, however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules. x x x.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alino-Hormachuelos
with Associate Justices Eriberto U. Rosario and Amelita G. Tolentino concurring. Rollo, pp.112-119.
[2] CA rollo, p.
79.
[3] Rollo, pp.
157-158.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Records, Volume I.
[8] Records,
Volume IV, Transcript of Stenographic Notes,
[9] CA
rollo,
pp. 87-91.
[10] Rollo, p. 157.
[11]
[12] CA rollo,
pp. 105-106.
[13] Rollo, pp.194-199.
[14] Records, Volume I.
[15] CA rollo, pp.
114-116
[16] Rollo, pp. 201-207.
[17] Id.
at 216-218.
[18]
[19] Id.
at 221-222.
[20]
[21] Id.
at 133-144.
[22] Id.
at 144-145.
[23] Rollo, pp.
284-288.
[24] Id.
at 225-283.
[25] CA rollo,
pp. 45-49.
[26] Id.
at 2-18.
[27] Rollo, pp.
112-120.
[28] CA rollo, pp. 376-377.
[29] Rollo, p. 476
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] Rollo,
pp. 51-52.
[35]
[36] G.R.
No. 140086,
[37] Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Solidbank
Corporation, G.R. No. 134049, 8 June 2005, 432 SCRA 360, 387; Digital Microwave Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128550, 16 March 2000, 328 SCRA 286, 290.
[38] The
Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what
industries are indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination
of the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national
interest, it will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry.
The assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. This
is done for the promotion of the common good considering that a prolonged
strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy. The Secretary of
Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory
arbitration is not intended to impede the workers' right to strike but to
obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. (PHILTREAD WORKERS
UNION [PTWU] v. CONFESOR, G.R. No. 117169, 12 March 1997, 269 SCRA 293.)
[39] Grand Boulevard Hotel v. Genuine Labor
Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (GLOWHRAIN),
G.R. No. 153664, 18 July 2003, 406 SCRA 688, 710; Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
143013-14, 18 December 2000, 348 SCRA 565, 582; Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong,
G.R. No. 49983, 20 April 1982, 208 SCRA 157, 165.
[40]
[41] Records,
Vol. 2, Annex F.
[42] Rollo, p. 698.
[43] G.R.
No. 100158,
[44] G.R. No. L-32740,
[45] Sarmiento v. Tuico,
G.R. Nos. L-75271-73, L-77567,
[46]
[47] G.R.
No. 153664,
[48] Rollo, p. 684.
[49]
[50] Records, Volume I, Transcript of Stenographic Notes,
[51]
[52] G.R.
No. 118223,
[53] Rollo, p. 655, 698.
[54] Records,
Volume IV, Transcript of Stenographic Notes,
[55]
[56] Rollo, p. 693.
[57] G.
R. No. 119360,
[58] G.R. No. L-59847,
[59] G.
R. No. 119360,
[60]
[61] G.R. No. L-59847,
[62]
[63] Rollo, p. 698.
[64] Records,
Volume IV, Transcript of Stenographic Records,
[65] G.R.
No. 119360,
[66] G.R. No. L-59847,
[67] G.R.
Nos. 86917-18,