Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL G.R. NO.
154243
ROBERTO
LASTIMOSO, ACTING
CHIEF
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL Present:
POLICE
(PNP), DIRECTORATE
FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
MANAGEMENT
(DPRM), Chairperson,
INSPECTOR
GENERAL, P/CHIEF AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and CALLEJO, SR.,*
P/SUPT.
ELMER REJANO, CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
Petitioners, NACHURA, JJ.
- versus -
P/SENIOR
INSPECTOR JOSE
J.
ASAYO, Promulgated:
Respondent. March 6,
2007
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the Resolutions dated
The
antecedent facts, as gathered from the records, are as follows.
Sometime
in 1997, a certain Delia Buño (Buño)
filed with the Office of the Inspector General of the PNP an administrative
complaint for abuse of authority/harassment against P/Senior Inspector Jose J. Asayo (respondent).
The latter allegedly obstructed police officers from arresting his
brother Lamberto Asayo, one
of the suspects in the shooting of Buño's son.
The
complaint was referred to the Inspector General for pre-charge investigation. When summoned, respondent did not appear but filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that it was the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) which had
jurisdiction over the case.
On
On
On
WHEREFORE,
the subject petition of petitioner Asayo is
GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
public respondents dated
Pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 65, a
certified true copy of this decision should be served by personal service on
the public and private respondents, on the Office of the Solicitor General and
on the counsel for the petitioner.[3]
Herein
petitioners then appealed the case to the CA.
On
On
Hence, herein
petition to set aside the aforementioned CA Resolutions on the following
grounds:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ALL THE AVAILABLE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PRIOR TO THE FILING OF HIS PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE HAS THE AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6975 TO HEAR AND TRY THE CITIZEN'S COMPLAINT AGAINST
RESPONDENT.[5]
With
regard to the first issue, the respondent rightfully invoked the jurisdiction
of the courts without first going through all the administrative remedies
because the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of
exceptions, such as when the issue involved is a purely legal question.[6]
The only issue presented by respondent in his petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the RTC was whether or not the PNP Chief had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by a private citizen
against him. Said issue being a purely
legal one, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply
to the case.
However, as
to the question of whether the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to act on a private
citizen's complaint against respondent, the Court finds merit in petitioners'
position.
The Court
has previously ruled on this issue in Quiambao
v. Court of Appeals,[7]
to wit:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the
Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which took effect
on
Section 41. (a) Citizen’s Complaints. – Any complaint by
an individual person against any member of the PNP shall be brought before the
following:
(1) Chiefs
of police, where the offense is punishable by withholding of privileges,
restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any
combination thereof, for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days;
(2) Mayors
of cities or municipalities, where the offense is punishable by withholding of
privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of
salary, or any combination thereof, for a period of not less than sixteen (16)
days but not exceeding thirty (30) days;
(3) People’s Law Enforcement Board, as
created under Section 43 hereof, where the offense is punishable by withholding
of privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of
salary, or any combination thereof, for a period exceeding thirty (30) days; or
by
dismissal. . . . (Emphasis added)
It
is readily apparent that a complaint against a PNP member which would warrant
dismissal from service is within the jurisdiction of the
PLEB. However, Section 41 should be read in conjunction with Section 42 of
the same statute which reads, thus:
Sec. 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors.
- The Chief of the PNP and regional directors, after due notice and
summary hearings, may immediately remove or dismiss any respondent PNP member
in any
of the following cases:
(a) When the charge is serious and the
evidence of guilt is strong;
(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or
has been repeatedly charged and there are reasonable grounds to believe that he
is guilty of the charges; and
(c ) When the
respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer. (Emphasis ours)
Evidently, the PNP Chief and regional
directors are vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring PNP members if
any of the causes for summary dismissal enumerated in Section 42 is attendant.
Thus, the power to dismiss PNP members is not only the prerogative of PLEB but
concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and regional directors. This shared power is likewise evident in Section 45.
SEC. 45. Finality
of Disciplinary Action. – The disciplinary action imposed upon a
member of the PNP shall be final and executory:
Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the regional director or by the
PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed
to the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy
of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary action
imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed
to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof:
Provided, furthermore, That the regional or National Appellate Board, as the
case may be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the regional
appellate board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the
decision final and executory without prejudice,
however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.
(Emphasis ours)
Once
a complaint is filed with any of the disciplining authorities under R.A. No.
6975, the latter shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case
although other disciplining authority has concurrent jurisdiction over the
case. Paragraph (c) of Section 41 explicitly declares this point.
(c) Exclusive
Jurisdiction– A complaint or a charge filed against a PNP member shall be heard and
decided exclusively by the disciplining authority who has acquired original
jurisdiction over the case and notwithstanding the existence of concurrent
jurisdiction as regards the offense; Provided, That offenses which carry higher penalties referred to a
disciplinary authority shall be referred to the appropriate authority which has jurisdiction over the offense. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly,
the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional directors have concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases filed against members of the PNP which
may warrant dismissal from service.
x
x x The Court further
declared that R.A. No. 6975 defines the summary dismissal powers of the PNP
Chief and regional directors, among others in cases, “where the respondent is
guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer.”
Memorandum
Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the rules and regulations in the conduct of
summary dismissal proceedings against erring PNP members and defines conduct
unbecoming of a police officer under Section 3(c), Rule II, as follows:
Conduct unbecoming of a police officer
refers to any behavior or action of a PNP member, irrespective of rank, done in
his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing himself as
a PNP member, seriously compromise his character and standing as a gentleman in
such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral character;
it may also refer to acts or behavior of any PNP member in an unofficial or
private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a
gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and exhibits
himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization.[8] (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners
maintain that the charge against respondent, which is grave misconduct for
preventing responding policemen from apprehending suspects and threatening one of the
witnesses, constitutes conduct
unbecoming a police officer, one of the cases under Section 42 of R.A. No.
6975, hence, the case falls within the summary dismissal powers of the PNP
Chief. The Court agrees with
petitioner on this point.
The
allegations in the complaint-affidavit,[9] i.e.,
that respondent gave refuge to the suspects in the shooting of complainant's
son, and intimidated and harassed complainant's witness, are “acts or behavior
of any PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or
disgracing himself personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his
position as a PNP member and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as
a member of the organization,” which constitute conduct unbecoming a police
officer as defined under Section 3(c), Rule II, of Memorandum Circular No.
92-006.
In Zacarias v. National Police Commission,[10]
the Court discussed the meaning of “conduct unbecoming,” in this wise:
Webster defines “unbecoming” conduct as “improper” performance. Such term “applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.” Obviously, the charges of neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties fall within the scope of conduct unbecoming a police officer. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:
Even assuming that the charge against
petitioner is not serious within the contemplation of paragraph (a) of Section
42 above quoted, or that he is not a recidivist within the context of paragraph
(b), he could nonetheless fall within
the ambit of paragraph (c) thereof, in that, because of his laxity and
inefficiency in the performance of his duties, he is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a police officer.[11]
Clearly, the
charges against respondent in this case are also covered by paragraph (c),
Section 42 of R.A. No. 6975, vesting the PNP Chief with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the complaint against respondent.
Respondent
then insists that petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion by not
giving him the opportunity to cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses
despite the fact that Memorandum Circular No. 94-0422, providing for rules on
how the summary hearing is to be conducted, grants him such right to
cross-examine. This claim is belied by
the testimony of the summary hearing officer, S/Insp.
Ermilando O. Villafuerte,
to wit:
Q Now, after submission of these pleadings what are the other steps, if any, that you have taken, Mr. Witness?
A When he submitted his last pleading – that is the rejoinder, I asked him [herein respondent] whether he still – he is still submitting any evidence or going to cross examine the witnesses, but he moved that the case be submitted for resolution based on the last pleading he submitted, sir.[12]
x x x
CROSS-EXAMINATION:
x x x
Q When you apprized (sic) the respondent about his right to cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses, is that in writing?
A No, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, you did that, if ever you did, without the presence of the counsel of the respondent. Is it not?
A Yes, sir.
x x x[13] (Emphasis supplied)
The
foregoing testimony reveals that respondent was indeed given the opportunity to
cross-examine his accusers but he chose to waive the same. The fact that the hearing officer merely
orally informed respondent that he may cross-examine the complainant and her
witnesses and that respondent was not assisted by counsel when he waived the
right to cross-examine, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the summary hearing officer.
In the
first place, Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 94-0422 only provides thus:
Being summary in nature, direct examination of witnesses shall be dispensed with and the sworn statements of witnesses or their affidavits shall take the place of their oral testimony. Either party shall limit cross-examination to the sworn statements on hand. Cross-examination must be confined only to material and relevant matters. Prolonged arguments and other dilatory proceedings shall not be entertained. Insofar as may be compatible with the ends of justice, cross-examination shall be limited to not more than fifteen (15) minutes for each witness.
The
foregoing rules on summary hearings do not require the summary hearing officer
to even inform a party, either orally or in writing, of such right to
cross-examine.
Moreover,
as held in Emin v. De Leon,[14]
to wit:
x x x in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
Nothing on record shows he asked for cross-examination as most of the submissions were written. In our view, petitioner cannot argue that he has been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place. The rule is well-established that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. x x x[15] (Emphasis supplied)
With
regard to the right to be assisted by counsel, it has been held in Sebastian
v. Garchitorena[16]
that:
While an investigation conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. It has been held in the case of Lumiqued v. Exevea that the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, the assistance of counsel
was not required for respondent to validly waive his right to cross-examine the
witnesses in the administrative case against him.
In
sum, the charges against respondent fall well within the scope of paragraph (c), Section 42 of R.A. No. 6975,
thus, the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint
against respondent; and the summary hearing officer accorded respondent due
process and never deprived respondent any of his rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
(On Leave)
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Alicia L. Santos, with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
and Josefina G. Salonga concurring; rollo,
pp. 41-46.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices Josefina G. Salonga and Jose L. Sabio, Jr. concurring; id. at 47-48.
[3] Rollo, p. 117
[4] See Decision penned by Associate Justice Alicia L. Santos, with Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole concurring, id. at 167-178.
[5] Rollo, p. 12.
[6] Estrada v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137862,
[7] G.R. No. 128305,
[8] Quiambao v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7, at 32-36.
[9] Rollo, p. 50.
[10] 460 Phil. 555 (2003).
[11]
[12] Rollo, p. 16.
[13] Folder of TSNs,
TSN of the
Hearing of
[14] 428 Phil. 172 (2002).
[15]
[16] 397 Phil. 519 (2000).
[17] Sebastian v. Garchitorena case, supra note 16, at 527.