FIRST DIVISION
|
ROSARIO M.
REYES, Petitioner, - versus
- ALSONS
DEVELOPMENT and INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, REGISTRY of DEEDS of Respondents. |
|
G.R. No.
153936 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, *AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I
O N
GARCIA, J.:
Judicial
proceedings must end some time. As Justice Malcolm remarked, public policy and
sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final at some definite date fixed by law.[1] And
once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party should not be
denied the fruits of victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.[2] So
it must be in this long-drawn case which started as a simple suit for ejectment.
In
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Rosario M. Reyes seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision[3]
dated
From
the petition and the comment thereto, with their respective annexes, and other
pleadings, the Court gathers the following facts:
The legal
dispute between the private parties started when, on June 30, 1980, in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, herein private respondent
Alsons Development and Investment Corporation (Alsons, for short) filed a complaint[5] for
unlawful detainer against herein petitioner Rosario M. Reyes. Docketed as Civil Case No. 3781-G, the case was
raffled to Branch VII of the court. On
On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The
RTC’s decision soon become final and executory for petitioner’s failure to interpose
a timely appeal therefrom. Private respondent Alsons then
moved for the execution of the MTCC decision which the RTC-Davao-8 granted per
its order[8] of
The following events and proceedings
then transpired:
1)
On
2)
Before the lapse of the period of redemption, petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC-Davao (Br. 15) to
cancel the provisional certificate of sale issued considering that the alleged combined
value of the two (2) lots thus levied and sold exceeded the aggregate amount of
the judgment award. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 18980, was
dismissed by the RTC on
Petitioner’s
appeal from the November 2, 1988 RTC order would, on October 17, 1991, be
dismissed by the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 20189 [10]
and finally by this Court per its
Resolution dated
3)
Meanwhile, or on
4) On
5) On
March 12, 1993, the petitioner
filed in Civil Case No. 17,505 an omnibus
motion to (1) vacate the order dated February 22, 1993; (2) set aside all
execution proceedings conducted by the sheriff; and (3) remand the case to the
court of origin for execution of its judgment.
Alsons
opposed the omnibus motion since the petitioner never questioned the RTC’s lack
of jurisdiction to order the execution of the judgment of the trial court.
On September 17, 1993, RTC-Davao - 8 issued an order
denying the motion to set aside its order dated
February 22, 1993 but granting the desired remand of the case to MTCC
VII. However, on
6. On
(1)
Order of
(2)
Sheriff’s
provisional certificate of sale dated
(3)
Order dated
(4)
Order of
On
However, xxx the case has dragged on
more than a decade xxx. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that a
pleading filed under Rule 65 [of the Rules of Court] should be within a
reasonable period of time xxx.Thus, petitioner should have raised this question
[of whether or not the RTC, acting as court of appellate jurisdiction, is
empowered to execute the judgment of the MTCC] within a reasonable time from
the date of the issuance of the execution order dated September 20, 1985, the
writ of execution dated January 5, 1987 and the sheriff’s provisional
certificate of sale dated March 30, 1987. Suffice it to say that eight (8)
years does not and cannot fall within the category of “reasonable time.” xxx.
To allow the petitioner to
successfully question the order issued by the [RTC] would be rewarding her lack
of vigilance in pursuing the case. xxx, this Court will not place a premium on
apathy and sloth. As the maxim goes xxx The laws aid those who are vigilant not
those who sleep on their rights. The
petitioner is, thus guilty of laches xxx.
Besides, xxx [T]he properties of the
petitioner have already been levied and sold at a public auction; and the
corresponding certificates of sale have already been issued xxx.
Furthermore, the Rules of Court xxx are
designed to facilitate xxx the expeditious settlement of controversies and,
with it, the prompt dispensation of justice xxx. Thus the questioned orders
should not be tampered anymore as Rule 39, Section 8 is a procedural rule which
should not be interpreted to overturn an order which has long become final and
executory and has not been shown to have been made with patent error, and which
had it been remanded, would have the same effect anyway, that is, the [MTCC]
would also have issued an order of execution, the Sheriff would also have
levied on the execution and would have held a public auction to sell the
properties. What the petitioner is actually seeking is a delay of the
inevitable …. (Words in bracket and emphasis added.)
7) Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied on July 1995.
8) Petitioner then challenged the CA’s ruling in CA-G.R. SP-32449 via a petition for review
before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
121081.[16]
This petition, however, was denied per our Resolution of
The series of setbacks the petitioner experienced from the
RTC, the CA and this Court did not appear to dampen her spirit. For, six (6) years after the Court issued its
November 20, 1995 Resolution adverted to, petitioner, in December 2001, went again to the CA, this time in the guise
of a petition for annulment of judgment or final orders and resolutions
mentioned in his omnibus motion filed on March 12, 1993 in Civil Case No. 17,505 of RTC-Davao-8. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 68007.
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant case is OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED with a stern
warning to petitioner’s counsel that a similar
infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied in the appellate court’s equally assailed
resolution of
Hence, this recourse by the petitioner on the lone
submission that the CA erred in dismissing her petition for annulment of
judgment on the ground of forum shopping
and res judicata.
Petitioner maintains that the anti-forum-shopping rule cannot
be set up against her, absent the elements of litis pendentia. As she puts it:
Based
on [my] personal knowledge…there is no other action or proceeding that is
pending before the [Court], the [CA] or any tribunal or administrative bodies
involving the same issues or subject matter as in this case. This is the only
pending case which challenges the assailed Resolutions and Orders of the
respondent RTC. Thus, petitioner believes that there is no forum shopping
because the elements of litis pendentia are not present. (Words in bracket
added)
The contention is not well-taken. It is, to be sure, a
strained attempt by the petitioner to resuscitate a lost cause by foisting on
the Court a cock-eyed application of the forum shopping rule. Contrary to the
petitioner’s appreciation, the prescription against forum shopping contextually
operates regardless of whether or not one of the two (2) or more identical
suits commenced or claims filed are pending.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing by a party
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of another suit
other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari;[21]
the act of filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment.[22] Forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. [23]
In CA-G.R. SP No.
68007, the decision in which is the subject of the present
recourse, the petitioner presented the core issue of lack of jurisdiction of
the RTC to enforce the judgment of the MTCC in its Civil Case No. 3781-G. It is
the same issue she earlier raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 32449 and which the
appellate court dismissed via its decision[24] of
Upon the foregoing perspective, private respondent Alsons is correct in saying that the petition for annulment
of judgment is barred by res judicata
as all the elements of this preclusive doctrine are present, to wit: 1) there is
a final judgment or order on the merits; 2) the court rendering it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and 3) there is between
the two cases identity or parties, subject matter and causes of action.[26]
It is petitioner’s submission that the element of identity of
causes of action does not, under the premises, obtain because the petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 32449 is for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, whereas CA-G.R. SP No. 68007 is a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of
the Rules based on lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner’s posture is untenable. As
earlier explained, the identicality of the issues raised in both cases is
unmistakable. The same relief is in fact sought in both cases, i.e., to annul the orders, writs and
processes issued by RTC-Davao-8 to enforce the decision of the MTCC in Civil Case
No. 3781-G. The differing designations of
the petitions thus filed, i.e., certiorari
for the first, and for annulment of judgment for the second, are really of no
moment. For, it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein
made that determine the nature of the
action and the court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations.[27]
Accordingly,
we accord concurrence to the following observations of the CA:
The
Court, through its former Fourteenth Division, denied [in CA G.R. SP No. 32449] the petition finding
laches on the part of the petitioner having filed the petition more than eight
(8) years from the accrual of her cause of action. The Court also reasoned out
that to order the remand of the case to the court of origin would not serve the
best interest of justice considering that execution was already effected at the
level of public respondent and that the MTCC would, just the same, order the
execution of the same judgment.
After
almost seven (7) years from the time the Court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
32449 was promulgated, the same petitioner is again … assailing the same
Orders, writs and processes but this time through a petition for annulment of
judgment, final orders and resolution under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This
is clearly forum-shopping and a devious disregard of the principle of res
judicata.
xxx xxx xxx
The
xxx propriety of the issuance of the questioned orders, resolutions and writs
was already judiciously put to rest by the decision of this Court in CA-G.R. SP
No. 32449. As such, it cannot again be passed upon in any proceeding before any
court without transgressing the principle of res judicata and the declared
policy on forum shopping. And it matters not that the subsequent proceeding is
disguised as a different action governed by separate rules. xxx.
Petitioner’s other unmeritorious contention that her
petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction is imprescriptible need not detain us long. Section 3, Rule 47
of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment based
on lack of jurisdiction may be filed any time, unless laches has, in the
meantime, set in.[28]
To reiterate, the RTC-Davao-8 issued on
At bottom, the petitioner had trifled with the
inter-related rules and jurisprudence on forum shopping and res judicata all for the purpose of
frustrating the satisfaction of a final judgment. In the process, she unduly
taxed the manpower and financial resources not only of the judiciary, but those
of the prevailing party as well. This loathsome practice cannot be
countenanced. Accordingly, the petitioner and her counsel are
thus forewarned that any attempt to revive this case in whatever form shall be appropriately
dealt with.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition for review is hereby DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.
With
treble costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C.
GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
[1] Dy Cay v. Crossfield & O’Brien, 38 Phil. 527 (1918).
[2] Rubenito v. Lagata, G.R. No. 140959, December 21, 2004, 447 SCRA 417, citing Nasser v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115829, June 5, 1995, 245 SCRA 20.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, concurred in by Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Eliezer R. De Los Santos (now both deceased); Rollo, pp. 36-40.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 32449, p.
9; id. at 90.
[14] Supra note 8.
[15] Rollo, pp. 82 et seq.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Supra note 3.
[20] Supra note 4.
[21] Heirs of
[22] Executive Secretary v. Gordon, G.R. No.
134171,
[23] Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Solidbank
Corporation, G.R. No. 134049,
[24] Supra note 15.
[25] Supra note 17 & note 18.
[26] Romero v. Tan, G.R. No. 147570,
[27] Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 108451, April 11, 1997, 271 SCRA 157, citing Ras v. Sua,
G.R. No. L-23302,
[28] Sec. 3 Period for filing action. - If based on extrinsic fraud, the action [for annulment of judgment] must be filed within four (4) years from its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
[29] Supra note 8.
[30] Supra note 17.