THIRD DIVISION
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REPUBLIC
OF THE Petitioner, - versus - DEMOCRITO T. MENDOZA, SR., GWENDOLYN MENDOZA, VILMA MENDOZA,
DEMOCRITO MENDOZA, JR., MENCA DEVELOPMENT CORP., CARMEN VELEZ TING and JACINTO
VELEZ, JR., Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - x SILOT
BAY FISHERMAN’S ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, - versus - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, Respondent. |
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G.R.
No. 153726 G.R. No. 154014 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57069, dated 30 March 2001, which reversed and set aside the
Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch 14,
and dismissed for lack of merit Civil Case No. CEB-9563.
The present controversy involves a considerable spread of Silot Bay situated in Liloan, Cebu, and originally classified as part of Block
B-Timberland, Project No. 29 of LC Map 1391-Liloan of the Land Classification
Project of the Province of Cebu, with an area of
87.134 hectares, more or less.
On
Meanwhile, on 16 January 1967, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued a Memorandum addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Development
Bank of the Philippines, the Undersecretary of Natural Resources, and the
Directors of the Bureaus of Fishery, Forestry, and Lands, respectively, thereby
constituting a continuing committee to accomplish the following:
1.
Identify the
exact locations and area of these 700,000 hectares of fishpond areas on or
before
2.
Within the month
of March 1967, all these fishpond areas shall be released by the Bureau of
Forestry to the Bureau of Lands as alienable and disposable, but subject to the
disposal of the Bureau of Fisheries for fishpond purposes.[3]
Thereafter, on
On
Please be informed that the
tract of land situated in Silot-Poblacion, Liloan,
x x x x
2. That the
area herein certified as Alienable or Disposable be solely developed and used
for fishpond purposes in consonance with the approved scientific practices and
assistance of the personnel of the Philippine Fisheries Commission
(Presidential Directive of January 16, 1967).[6]
[Emphasis ours]
In compliance with the process for sales patent application, Democrito Mendoza, Sr. secured and submitted separate
certifications from concerned government agencies such as the Provincial
Engineer of Cebu, the District Engineer of Cebu, the Municipal Council of Liloan,
Cebu, the Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of
Public Works and Highways, among other offices, to determine if there were
objections to his application. Based on
these certifications issued upon Democrito Mendoza,
Sr.’s request, it was ascertained that there was no objection to said
application and that the same did not interfere with any function or proposed
project of the government.
Subsequently, notices of sale were published in the Nueva Era and the Mindanao Mail, in addition to the
publication in the Official Gazette. The
same were posted in conspicuous places within the vicinity of the property
subject of the sale and on the bulletin boards of the Municipal Hall of Liloan,
In the interim, Presidential Decree No. 43, Providing for the
Accelerated Development of the Fishery Industry of the
On
Thereafter, then Acting Director of the Bureau of Lands Ramon
N. Casanova recommended the approval of Democrito
Mendoza, Sr.’s request for the issuance of a patent to the land covered by
Sales (Fishpond) Application No. (VI-I) 41-A on grounds of justice and equity.
In the First Indorsement of then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Arturo Tanco, Jr., dated
On
Prior to the formal award of the subject property, Democrito Mendoza, Sr., however, had caused the property to
be subdivided into Lots 1 and 2.
On 26 June 1974, Acting Director of the Bureau of Lands Ramon
N. Casanova issued an Order awarding the sales patents over the disputed
property to Democrito Mendoza, Sr. and his three
children Gwendolyn, Vilma, and Democrito,
Jr., respectively, to wit:
It appearing that the
proceedings had in connection with the above-noted applications were in
accordance with law and existing regulations, the portions of the land applied
for which correspond to Lot No. 1-A & Lot No. 2, Si(F)
(VI-I) 42-D are hereby awarded to Democrito T.
Mendoza at P200.00 per hectare or P4,800.00 for the whole tract
of 24.0000 hectares; Lot No. 1-B, Si(F) (VI-I) 42-D,
to Gwendolyn C. Mendoza at P200.00 per hectare or P4,600.00 for
the whole tract of 23.0000 hectares; Lot No. 1-C Si(F)
(VI-I) 42-D, to Vilma C. Mendoza at P200.00
per hectare or P4,600.00 for the whole tract of 23.0000 hectares and Lot
No. 1-D Si(F) (VI-I) 42-D, to Democrito
C. Mendoza, Jr. at P200.00 per hectare or P4,477.62 for the whole
tract of 23.3881 hectares.[13]
Following the registration of the sales patents with the Register of
Deeds of Cebu, Original Certificates of Title were
each issued to Democrito, Sr.,[14]
Gwendolyn,[15] Vilma,[16]
and Democrito, Jr.[17]
On 8 January 1982, in consideration of shares of stock in MENCA
Development Corporation (MENCA) worth P77,283.00, Democrito
Mendoza, Sr. executed a “Contract of Exchange of Real Properties for Shares of
Stock” on 8 January 1982, whereby he ceded to MENCA Lot No. 2 and a portion of
Lot No. 1-A. The portion tendered to
MENCA was later on known as Lot No. 1-A-1, while the lot retained by Democrito Mendoza, Sr. was denominated as Lot No.
1-A-2.
On
Finally, on
Sometime in 1988, a protest was filed by the fisherman-residents of Liloan against the issuance of the sales patents to the
According to the complaint, there was irregularity in the issuance of the
sales patents covering the subject properties since the area in question forms
part of
On
After trial on the merits, the trial court, on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Declaring Sales Patents Nos. 187, 188, 189
and 190 together with its corresponding Original Certificates of Titles Nos.
0-9983, 0-9980, 0-9981 and 0-9982 issued to defendants Democrito
T. Mendoza, Sr., Democrito Mendoza, Jr., Gwendolyn
Mendoza and Vilma Mendoza, absolutely null and void ab initio;
(2) Ordering the said defendants to surrender to
the defendant Register of Deeds for the Province of Cebu
their respective owner’s duplicate copies of Original Certificates of Titles
Nos. 0-9983, 0-9980, 0-9981 and 0-9982, and directing the said defendant
Register of Deeds for the Province of Cebu to cancel
the same and all the patent titles emanating or springing therefrom;
and,
(3) Declaring
Aggrieved by the aforequoted
Decision, the Mendozas and MENCA Corporation lodged
an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On
The separate appeals
interposed by the defendants are impressed with merit.
As We see it, the primordial
issue is whether or not appellants are qualified to own the property subject
matter of this controversy. Implied in
this issue is a more basic one, that is whether or not said property is
alienable and disposable and, therefore, subject to private appropriation
through modes recognized under the Public Land Act.
The lower court resolved the
issue in the negative on the main reasoning that
The Court cannot bring itself
to agree to the rationale for the trial court’s posture. Our reasons are, as
follows:
One, the property involved in this case is not a communal
fishing ground, as erroneously concluded by the court a quo. While
We have carefully perused the
records before Us and found nothing therein evidencing such a declaration by
the DANR respecting
x x x x
This Court, for argument, may
allow that
Second, the Mendozas, or Democrito, Sr. in his behalf and in behalf of his children
appear to have complied with all the documentary, developmental, publication,
bidding and other legal requirements necessary for securing sales patents. Otherwise, the Director of Lands, during the
evaluation process, would have simply denied due course to his
application. The actuality of the
Director of Lands recommending and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources favorably endorsing the request of Democrito,
Sr. for the issuance of what turned out to be the underlying sales (fishpond) patent is indicative of Democrito’s compliance.
Last but not least, the President’s act of approving the issuance of the
requested sales (fishpond) patent cannot but be viewed as final confirmation
that Democrito, Sr. has indeed met all the
requirements to justify a public land award through sales.
It may be worth mentioning
that the Director of Lands had dismissed the protests filed by then Liloan Municipal Mayor Bugtai, et
al., against the Sales (Fishpond) Patent application of Democrito,
Sr. on the consistent ground that the applicant had complied with all the
requirements of the law for a sales patent grant. In this regard, jurisprudence reminds that
decisions of the Director of Lands on disputes involving patents to public
lands, if supported by substantial evidence and approved by the DENR Secretary
of Agriculture, are generally conclusive. xxx.
Third, as a necessary consequence of Democrito,
Sr.’s compliance with the legal requirements referred to above, the sales
patents and the original certificates of titles issued in favor of the
Much was made by the trial
court of the splitting up of the sales patent issued to Democrito,
Sr., into four (4) parts, with each part containing an area not exceeding
twenty-four (24) hectares in the names of Democrito,
Sr., Democrito, Jr., Gwendolyn Mendoza and Vilma Mendoza. It
may well be noted, however, that the split – obviously effected in view of
Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, supra, limiting the acquisition of alienable land by individuals to
twenty-four (24) hectares – came with the approval of the Director of Lands and
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In a very real sense, therefore, the flaw, if
any there be, in the manner the Mendoza children acquired their sales patents
was remedied by the positive actions of the very officials charged by law with
the administration and disposition of alienable public lands.
The unyielding posture of the appellee, as adopted by the trial court, that the area in
question cannot be legally titled because it is underwater may be accorded some
cogency but for the hard fact that it is being titled “for fishpond purposes only”, as what precisely appears in the sales
patents. Fish do not thrive on dry
land. Fish are born and grow in water.
x x x x
Fourth, the sales patents and certificates of titles issued
in the name of the
As may be noted, the one-year
prescriptive period in the underscored portion of Section 32, P.D. No. 1529
applies even to the government.
Accordingly, the government if deprived of property through fraud, as
the trial court seems to imply, and as intervenor-appellee
have at every turn postulated, must institute the proper petition in court for
the reopening and review of the decree of registration – including of course
the patent issued – within one (1) year from and after the date of entry of
such decree of registration. Failing in
this, the decree becomes inconvertible even as against the government
itself. Hence, since the sales patents
in question were registered a little less than a month after they were issued
on September 25, 1974, the filing of the instant action for cancellation on
October 23, 1990, which in net legal effect partakes of a petition for a
reopening or review of the validity of the issuance of the sales patents, has,
with the view We take of the case, definitely prescribed.
Fifth, the government is estopped
to ask for the cancellation of the sales patents and titles issued in the names
of the
“This Court is mindful of the
well entrenched principle that the government is never estopped
from the collecting of taxes because of the mistakes or errors on the part of
its agents, but this rule admits of exceptions in the interest of justice and
fair play x x x.
x x x x
Then, too, it has been the
long standing policy and practice of this Court to respect the conclusions
arrived at by quasi-judicial agencies x x x which by the nature of its functions, is dedicated
exclusively to the study and consideration of x x x problems, and which has thus developed an expertise on
the subject, unless an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority is shown.
x x x”
The Bureau of Land Management
and the intervenor-appellee, at this late hour, can
no longer assail the issuance of the patents and titles to the
Moreover, by reason of the
lapse of more that sixteen (16) years from the issuance of the patents and the
titles in question up to the filing on October 23, 1990 of the complaint
contesting their validity on the ground of fraud, the government agency
concerned and the intervenor are guilty of laches and are now precluded from questioning the validity
of such grants. x x x.
It is indeed illogical and a
cruel breach of the sporting idea of fair play, if the very same government
agency which vigorously recommended, through indubitable public documents and
authentic writings, the issuance of Sales Patents to Democrito
Sr., would now be permitted to deny and successfully impugn in this action its
official acts. What compounds matters is
that the same agency led Democrito Sr. to believe
that he has truly complied with the law and who, acting on such belief,
participated in the bidding held on January 19, 1973 and paid the price for the
area sold.
x x x x
Finally, We note that the primary basis of the lower court in
declaring the nullity of the sales patent and titles of the appellants is its
finding that the area covered thereby is “beyond
the commerce of man”, and, therefore, could not have been declared as
alienable and disposable. x x x.
It bears stressing herein that
LC map 1391-Liloan of the Land Classification Project of the
The trial court deduced that
the 1940 map wherein
The conclusion reached by the lower
court is assumed, not demonstrated; it is absolutely wanting in factual
support, what with the reality that no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the
Republic to sustain such a finding. It
cannot be taken to overturn the legal presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed.
x x x x
As between the aforesaid
official findings of experts and the bare unsupported conclusions of the lower
court, the choice is not hard to make.
As it were, only the executive and possibly the legislative departments
have the power to transfer, any time, lands of the public domain from one class
to another, and, in like manner, to classify, for purposes of administration
and disposition, such land as disposable and alienable by sale or other modes
of ownership transfer. x x x.
Unquestionably, then, the
lower court committed a serious error in ruling that
Foregoing premises considered,
We rule and so hold that (1) Sales Patents Nos. 187, 188, 189 and 190 issued in
favor of the Mendozas; (2) the corresponding Original
Certificates of Titles Nos. 0-9980, 0-9981, 0-9982 and 0-9983 issued in favor
of the Mendozas; and (3) all the derivative titles
emanating therefrom in the names of MENCA Development
Corporation and Carmen Velez-Teng and Jacinto Velez,
Jr., are all valid, legal and binding as against the whole world.[21]
The trial court’s Decision having been reversed and the Sales
Patents, as well as the Original Certificates of Title issued to the
Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring that the area covered by the sales patents are not communal fishing
grounds due to the absence of any declaration to that effect by the appropriate
government agency. According to
petitioners, the appellate court failed to consider that
(a) The areas covered by the sales patents are part of Silot Bay and used as communal fishing grounds by Liloan residents and, therefore, is not alienable and
disposable;
(b) The sales patents were issued in violation of Section
23 0f Presidential Decree No. 704, which provides that no public land suitable
for fishpond purposes shall be disposed by sale except sales patent already
processed and approved on or before
(c) The issuance of the sales patents was attended by
fraud and misrepresentation committed by the applicants in that it was made to
appear that the areas applied for are alienable and disposable tracts of land,
when in truth and in fact, they form part of Silot
Bay being used as communal fishing grounds by the residents of Liloan, Cebu.
Moreover, the government stresses the fact that the
sales patent application of Democrito Mendoza, Sr.
was for an area of 92.3881 hectares, clearly in violation of the constitutional
limitation of 24 hectares; and that his act of circumventing the constitutional
prohibition by distributing the area applied for to his three children cannot
be legally authorized since his children were not qualified to apply for sales
patents because not one of them had an existing lease over the property, which
is a condition that must first be complied with before the grant of a sales
patent.
On the Court of Appeals’ ruling that
the government is now precluded from bringing an action for annulment of title
after the lapse of one year from the issuance of the certificate of title,
petitioners contend that said ruling is diametrically opposed to the
pronouncement of this Court that the Republic of the Philippines is not
precluded from bringing an action for annulment of title and reversion of land
to the public domain even after the lapse of the one-year period.
Lastly, petitioners call attention to
the previous rulings of this Court that estoppel does
not operate against the government. In
the case at bar, petitioner explains that the court a quo found that the sales patents were issued on the basis of
false and misleading information supplied by the Mendozas
to the government agencies which processed and granted their application;
hence, it is erroneous for the appellate court to say that the government is
already estopped from seeking the cancellation of
these sales patents since the Republic of the Philippines is never estopped by the mistakes or error committed by its
officials or agent.
In resolving the instant controversy,
we shall foremost settle the issue of whether or not the government is now
precluded from bringing an action for the annulment of title and reversion of
the disputed property to the public domain after the lapse of the one-year
period from registration thereof. We
answer in the negative. It is true that, as the Court of Appeals upheld, the
sales patents and certificates of title issued in the name of the Mendozas cannot, after the lapse of one year from their
issuance, be successfully challenged on the ground of fraud or
misrepresentation for the reason that after the due registration of a patent
and the issuance of the corresponding title, the covered area is deemed to have
been brought under the aegis of the Torrens system entitled to all guarantees
implied in such system of registration. It is equally true however, that this
Court, on the other hand, has declared too in numerous cases that the lapse of
the one-year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud
would not prevent the cancellation thereof by the government, for to hold that
a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been
secured through fraud or in violation of the law would be the height of
absurdity.[22] As held in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals[23]:
[T]he
indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not bar to an
investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired,
if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud has
been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for
reversion may be filed by the Government.[24]
Nevertheless, whilst we agree with petitioners that the government is not
precluded from conducting an investigation as to how titles to property
formerly belonging to the public domain has been acquired notwithstanding the
lapse of the one-year period for bringing an action for the annulment of title
and reversion of property to the public domain, in the absence of any showing
that there was fraud or a violation of any law, we are constrained to uphold
the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the authority of administrative
agencies to classify Silot Bay as timberland and its
subsequent release as alienable and disposable, and the findings of the
appellate court that the Mendozas have complied with
all the necessary requirements under the law for the issuance of the sales
patents.
Despite petitioners’ assertion that Silot Bay
is a navigable body of water and by its very nature and inherent character is
of public dominion, thus, there is no need for a declaration by any appropriate
government agency that it is a communal fishing ground before Silot Bay may be recognized as such, it cannot be gainsaid
that the prerogative of classifying public lands pertains to administrative
agencies which have been specially tasked by statutes to do so and that the
courts will not interfere on matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government and/or quasi-judicial agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under their special technical knowledge and training.[25] It should be stressed that the
function of administering and disposing of lands of the public domain in the
manner prescribed by law is not entrusted to the courts but to executive
officials.[26] And as such, courts should refrain from looking into the
underlying reasons or grounds which impelled the classification and declaration
of
After a careful perusal of the records of the case, We rule that the
sales patents handed out to Democrito T. Mendoza,
Sr., Gwendolyn Mendoza, Vilma Mendoza and Democrito Mendoza, Jr., were properly issued.
Although it may seem that upon the advent of the 1973 Constitution, a
conflict had arisen with respect to the then pending sales patent application
of Democrito Mendoza, Sr., yet from the letter of
then Acting Director of the Bureau of Lands Ramon N. Casanova, the approval of
the sales patent application of Democrito T. Mendoza,
Sr. was still favorably recommended on grounds of equity and justice, to wit:
Under Opinion No. 64, series of 1973 which was
promulgated in the meantime by the Secretary of Justice and given clearance for
implementation by the President per Memorandum dated February 6, 1974 of
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, it
has been held that “even sales application already awarded are not to be
exempted from constitutional injunction regarding the acquisition of public
lands for the reason that other requirements have still to be satisfied before
a patent may be issued”. In the case of
the abovementioned application, while the land covered thereby was sold at
public auction in which the applicant is the successful bidder and has been
considerably improved and developed, no formal award has up to now been issued
by this Office. In other words, the
applicant may be considered not having acquired vested rights over the land
applied for prior to the advent of the New Constitution which will entitle him
to exemption from the constitutional limitation, following the above-noted
ruling of the Secretary of Justice.
It may also be mentioned that this case does not fall
under any of the categories of sales applications which may be given due course
and issued patent pursuant to the policy guidelines prescribed by the Honorable
Secretary in his memorandum dated February 18, 1974.
As the
applicant, however, has in good faith made considerable investment in the
development and improvement of the fishpond area and could have already
obtained a title thereto were it not for circumstances beyond his control, it
is believed that he is entitled, on considerations of equity and justice, to
exemption from constitutional injunction.[27]
(Emphasis ours.)
From the abovequoted letter,
it can be deduced that had it not been for circumstance beyond the applicant’s
control, i.e., the adoption of the
1973 Constitution during the pendency of the sales
patent application of Democrito T. Mendoza, Sr.,
there would not have been any obstacle for its approval by the Office of the
President. Hence, taking into account
the fact that Democrito T. Mendoza, Sr. had complied
with all the necessary requirements for the issuance of sales patent covering
the disputed area, then Acting Director of the Bureau of Lands Ramon N.
Casanova recommended the approval of said application in the spirit of justice
and equity. As stated by the Court of
Appeals, Democrito Mendoza, Sr., appears to have complied
with all the legal requirements for securing the sales patents; otherwise, the
Acting Director of Lands would not have recommended the approval of said
application despite the seeming constitutional impediment.
Moreover,
it is worth noting that in order to conform to the prohibitions imposed by the
1973 Constitution which limits the purchase of lands of the public dominion to
24 hectares per individual, Democrito Mendoza, Sr.,
subdivided the property in question into four, each comprising an area not more
than 24 hectares, and assigned his rights over three parts to his three
children. Accordingly, Democrito Mendoza, Sr. amended his sales patent application
while his three children filed their own applications for their respective
parts. The area applied for in each of
the
In the absence of any evidence of fraud or violation of law,
the title of the
While the general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions. We recognized such exceptions in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[30] to wit –
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel
by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. However, like all general rules, this is also
subject to exceptions, viz:
"Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not
be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked
where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted
to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be
applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly
require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x
x the doctrine of equitable estoppel
may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private
individuals."
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the
government, in its effort to recover ill-goten
wealth, tried to skirt the application of estoppel
against it by invoking a specific constitutional provision. The Court
countered:
"We agree with the statement that the State is immune from estoppel, but this concept is understood to refer to acts
and mistakes of its officials especially those which are irregular (Sharp
International Marketing vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 299; 306 [1991]; Republic
v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 [1983]), which peculiar
circumstances are absent in the case at bar. Although the State's right of
action to recover ill-gotten wealth is
not vulnerable to estoppel[;] it is non sequitur
to suggest that a contract, freely and in good faith executed between the
parties thereto is susceptible to disturbance ad infinitum. A different
interpretation will lead to the absurd scenario of permitting a party to
unilaterally jettison a compromise agreement which is supposed to have the
authority of res judicata
(Article 2037, New Civil Code), and like
any other contract, has the force of law between parties thereto (Article 1159,
New Civil Code; Hernaez vs. Kao, 17 SCRA 296 [1966];
6 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 7th ed., 198, p. 711; 3 Aquino,
Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 46.
Finally, it
should be borne in mind that that the contested areas and titles thereto had
already passed on to third parties who acquired the same from the
According
to Section 103 of the Land Registration Decree, whenever public lands is by the
Government alienated, granted, or conveyed to any person, the same shall be
brought under the operation of the said Decree and shall be deemed to
registered lands to all intents and purposes under the Decree. And a well-settled doctrine in Our
jurisdiction provides that one who deals with property registered under the
In Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., et al.,[32] We refused to revert the land in question to the public domain despite the fact that the free patent thereto was secured by fraud since the same land already passed on to purchasers in good faith and for value –
There
can be no debate at all on petitioner’s submission that no amount
of legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation
for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. It is thus
understandable why petitioner chants the dogma of fraus
et jus nunquam cohabitant.
Significantly, however, in the cases cited by petitioner
Republic, as well as in those other cases where the doctrine of fraus et jus nunquam
cohabitant was applied against a patent and title procured thru fraud or
misrepresentation, we note that the land covered thereby is either a part of the
forest zone which is definitely non-disposable, as in Animas, or that
said patent and title are still in the name of the person who committed the
fraud or misrepresentation, as in Acot,
Animas, Republic vs. CA and Del Mundo and Director
of Lands vs. Abanilla, et al. and, in either
instance, there were yet no innocent third parties standing in the way.
If the titles of innocent buyers were recognized and protected in the afore-mentioned circumstances, even when the original title to the property was obtained through fraud, then the titles of the purchasers in good faith and for value of the fishpond areas in the present case better deserve our recognition and protection considering that the sales patents and original certificates of title of their predecessors-in-interest were found to be legally and validly issued.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 57069 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now a member of this Court) with Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Elvi John S. Asuncion, concurring; rollo of G.R. No. 153726, pp. 34-60.
[2] Penned by Judge Renato C. Dacudao (now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals), dated
[3] Records Vol. I, pp. 121-122.
[4] Sales (Fishpond) Application No. S (F) A-VI-1-42, later renumbered as Sales (Fishpond) Application No. (VI-I) 41-A.
[5] Democrito
Mendoza, Sr. also applied for another sales patent [Sales Application No. VI-1
(43)] covering an area of 20 hectares within
[6] Records Vol. I, pp. 43-44.
[7] Fishery Industry Development Decree of 1972.
[8] Section 6. Implementing
Agencies. The agencies represented in the Council shall, in accordance with
the Fishery Industry Development Program adopted by the Council, have the
following functions, powers and duties under this Decree:
A. The Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall:
1. Direct and coordinate the activities of its component agencies in accelerating the development of the industry;
2. Direct and facilitate the orderly, systematic and expeditious transfer of the jurisdiction of public lands available for fishpond development to the Bureau of Fisheries upon the effectivity of this Decree. For this purpose, all public lands, such as tidal swamps, mangrove and other swamps, marshes, ponds and streams within public lands, including public lands left dry during the lowest low tide and covered by water during the highest tide; and which are not needed for forestry purposes are hereby declared available for fishpond purposes and automatically transferred to the Bureau of Fisheries for its administration and disposition; Provided, That the Bureau of Fisheries shall set aside portions of such public lands for fish propagation, fish sanctuary, conservation and ecological purposes: And provided, That certain tidal swamps, mangrove and other swamps, marshes, ponds, streams within public lands, used or utilized by fishery schools and colleges be set aside for their use; and
3. Undertake such other measures as may be necessary to efficiently carry out the fishery industry development program.
[9] Lot 1-B; Psd
[10] Lot 1-C; Psd
[11] Lot 1-D; Psd
[12] Psd
[13] Records Vol. I, p. 128.
[14] OCT No. 0-9983.
[15] OCT No. 0-9981.
[16] OCT No. 0-9982.
[17] OCT No. 0-9980.
[18] Revising and Consolidating All Laws and Decrees Affecting Fishing and Fisheries.
[19] Section 23. Disposition of
Public Lands for Fishponds. Upon the effectivity
of the Decree, no public lands suitable for fishpond purposes shall be disposed
by sale. Provided, That only fishpond
sales patent already processed and approved on or before November 9, 1972,
shall be given due course subject to the condition that such application covers
a fully developed fishpond not exceeding twenty-four (24) hectares.
[20] RTC Decision, pp. 37-42; rollo of G.R. No. 153726, pp. 123-128.
[21] CA Decision, pp. 15-26, id. at 48-59.
[22] Republic
v. Court of Appeals,
[23]
[24]
[25] Villaflor
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95694,
[26] Heirs of Proceso Bautista vs. Barza, G.R. No. 79167, 7 May 1992.
[27] Records Vol. I, pp. 123-124.
[28] Filinvest Credit Corp. v. Hon. Relova, G.R. No. L-50378,
[29] Mariano et al. v. CA & Sps. Ines and Cleto Rebosa, G.R. No. 126875,
[30] G.R. No. 116111,
[31] Sandoval v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 106657,
[32] G.R. No. 155394,