Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
INC.,
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
NACHURA,
JJ.
LOLITA
VELASCO, Promulgated:
Respondent. March 6, 2007
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
dated July 23, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56571 which affirmed the Decision dated
The
facts of the case, as stated by the CA, are as follows:
Lolita M. Velasco (respondent)
started working with Del Monte
On
On
In view of the said alleged
absences without permission, on
Respondent having failed to appear
on
On
Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed
a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner asserting that her dismissal
was illegal because she was on the family way suffering from urinary tract
infection, a pregnancy-borne, at the time she committed the alleged
absences. She explained that for her
absence from work on August 15, 16, 17 & 18, 1994 she had sent an
application for leave to her supervisor, Prima Ybañez. Thereafter, she went to the company hospital
for check-up and was advised accordingly to rest in quarters for four (4) days
or on
On
Respondent appealed to the NLRC.
On
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the
instant decision is hereby VACATED
and a new one entered declaring the dismissal of complainant as ILLEGAL. In consonance with Art. 279 of the Labor
[Code], her reinstatement with full backwages from the date of her termination
from employment to her actual reinstatement is necessarily decreed.[4]
The NLRC held that, under the company
rules, the employee may make a subsequent justification of her absenteeism,
which she was able to do in the instant case; that while it is not disputed
that the respondent incurred absences exceeding six (6) days within one
employment year – a ground for dismissal under the company rules – the
petitioner actually admitted the fact that the respondent had been pregnant,
hence, negating petitioner’s assertion that the respondent failed to give any
explanation of her absences; that the records bear the admission of
petitioner’s officer of the receipt of the hospital record showing the cause of
her absences (“RIQ advice” or “rest-in-quarters”) for August 19-20, 1994 which,
in turn, could already serve as reference in resolving the absences on August
15 to 18; that the petitioner further admitted that the respondent was under
“RIQ advice” on September 2-3, 1994 and yet insisted in including these dates
among respondent’s 16 purported unexplained absences; that it is sufficient
notice for the petitioner, “a plain laborer” with “unsophisticated judgment,”
to send word to her employer through a co-worker on August 15 to 16, 1994 that
she was frequently vomiting; that the sheer distance between respondent’s home
and her workplace made it difficult to send formal notice; that respondent even
sent her child of tender age to inform her supervisor about her absence on
September 5, 1994 due to stomach ache, but her child failed to approach the
officer because her child felt ashamed, if not mortified; that respondent’s
narration that she had to bear pains during her absences on September 21 to 27,
1994 is credible; that she dared not venture through the roads for fear of forest
creatures or predators; that the petitioner is guilty of unlawfully discharging
respondent on account of her pregnancy under Article 137(2) of the Labor Code;
and, that petitioner’s reference to the previous absenteeism of respondent is
misplaced because the latter had already been penalized therefor.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
was denied on
The petitioner then appealed to the
CA. On
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
the instant petition is DISMISSED,
the Resolutions, dated May 27, 1999 and September 30, 1999 of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. M-003926-98, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[5]
In
affirming the NLRC, the CA held that absences due to a justified cause cannot
be a ground for dismissal; that it is undisputed that the respondent was
pregnant at the time she incurred the absences in question; that the
certification issued by a private doctor duly established this fact; that it
was no less than petitioner’s company doctor who advised the respondent to have
rest-in-quarters for four days on account of a pregnancy- related sickness;
that it had been duly established that respondent filed leaves of absence
though the last had been refused by the company supervisor; that the dismissal
of an employee due to prolonged absence with leave by reason of illness duly
established by the presentation of a medical certificate is not justified; that
it is undisputed that respondent’s sickness was pregnancy-related; that under
Article 137(2) of the Labor Code, the petitioner committed a prohibited act in
discharging a woman on account of her pregnancy.
On
Hence, the instant Petition raising
the following issues:
I.
The court
of appeals seriously erred In considering respondent’s Excessive aWOPs as
justified Simply on account of her pregnancy.
II.
THE COURT
OF APPEaLS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT’S LATEST STRING
OF ABSENCES INCURRED WITHOUT ANY PRIOR PERMISSION, AND AS ABOVE SHOWN, WITHOUT
ANY VALID JUSTIFICATION, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH HER DAMAGING awop history,
established her gross and habitual neGlect of duties, a just and valid ground
for dismissal.
iii.
the court
or appeals seriously erred in holding that respondent’s dismissal was in
violation of article 137 (prohibiting an employer to discharge an employee on
account of her pregnancy).
iv.
the court
of appeals seriously erred in awarding full backwages in favor of respondent
notwithstanding petitioner’s evident good faith.[6]
The
essential question is whether the employment of respondent had been validly
terminated on the ground of excessive absences without permission. Corollary to
this is the question of whether the petitioner discharged the respondent on
account of pregnancy, a prohibited act.
The
petitioner posits the following arguments: (a) The evidence proffered by the
respondent, to wit: (1) the Discharge Summary indicating that
she had been admitted to the Phillips Memorial Hospital on August 23, 1994 and
discharged on August 26, 1994, and that she had been advised to “rest in
quarters” for four days from August 27, 1994 to August 30, 1994, and (2) the
Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Marilyn M. Casino stating that respondent had
sought consultation on September 4, 2002 because of spasm in the left iliac
region, and was advised to rest for five days (from September 4, 1994 up to
September 8, 1994), due to urinary tract infection, all in all establish
respondent’s sickness
only from August 23, 1994 up to August 30, 1994 and from September 4, 1994 up
to September 8, 1994. In other words, respondent was absent without permission
on several other days which were not supported by any other proof of illness,
specifically, on August 15, 16, 17, 18, 31, 1994 and September 1, 2, 3, 9, and
10, 1994, and, hence, she is guilty of ten unjustified absences; (b) Per Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Co. v.
National Labor Relations Commission (Filflex),[7]
if the medical certificate fails to refer to the specific period of the
employee’s absence, then such absences, attributable to chronic asthmatic
bronchitis, are not supported by competent proof and, hence, they are
unjustified. By parity of reasoning, in the absence of evidence indicating any
pregnancy-borne illness outside the period stated in respondent’s medical
certificate, such illness ought not to be considered as an acceptable excuse
for respondent’s excessive absences without leave; (c) Respondent’s latest
string of absences, taken together with her long history of absenteeism without
permission, established her gross and habitual neglect of duties, as established
by jurisprudence; (d) The respondent was dismissed not by reason of her
pregnancy but on account of her gross and habitual neglect of duties. In other
words, her pregnancy had no bearing on the decision to terminate her
employment; and, (e) Her state of pregnancy per se could not excuse her
from filing prior notice for her absence.
Petitioner’s
arguments are without merit.
First. The Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Co. case
is not applicable, principally because the nature and gravity of the illness
involved in that case – chronic asthmatic bronchitis – are different from the
conditions that are present in the instant case, which is pregnancy and its related
illnesses.
The Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that the condition of asthmatic bronchitis may be intermittent, in contrast to pregnancy
which is a continuing condition
accompanied by various symptoms and related illnesses. Hence, as to the former, if the medical
certificate or other proof proffered by the worker fails to correspond with the
dates of absence, then it can be reasonably concluded that, absent any other
proof, such absences are unjustified. This is the ruling in Filflex which cannot be
applied in a straight-hand fashion in cases of pregnancy which is a long-term condition accompanied by an assortment of related illnesses.
In
this case, by the measure of substantial evidence, what is controlling is the
finding of the NLRC and the CA that respondent was pregnant and suffered from
related ailments. It would be unreasonable to isolate such condition strictly to
the dates stated in the Medical Certificate or the Discharge Summary. It can be
safely assumed that the absences that are not covered by, but which nonetheless
approximate, the dates stated in the Discharge Summary and Medical Certificate,
are due to the continuing condition of pregnancy and related illnesses, and,
hence, are justified absences.
As
the CA and the NLRC correctly noted, it is not disputed that respondent was
pregnant and that she was suffering from urinary tract infection, and that her
absences were due to such facts. The petitioner admits these facts in its Petition
for Review.[8] And, as the CA aptly held, it was no less
than the company doctor who advised the respondent to have “rest-in-quarters”
for four days on account of a pregnancy-related sickness.[9]
On
this note, this Court upholds and adopts the finding of the NLRC, thus:
In
this jurisdiction tardiness and absenteeism, like abandonment, are recognized
forms of neglect of duties, the existence of which justify the dismissal of the
erring employee. Respondent’s rule
penalizing with discharge any employee who has incurred six (6) or more
absences without permission or subsequent justification is admittedly
within the purview of the foregoing standard.
However,
while it is not disputed that complainant incurred absences exceeding six (6)
days as she actually failed to report for work from August 15-18, 23-26, 29-31,
September 1-3, 5-10, 12-17, 21-24, 26-30, and October 1-3, 1994, her being pregnant at the time these
absences were incurred is not questioned and is even admitted by respondent.
It thus puzzles us why respondent asserts complainant failed to explain
satisfactorily her absences on August 15-18, 29-31, September 1-3 and 5-10,
1994, yet reconsidered the rest of her absences for being covered with
“rest-in-quarters” (RIQ) advice from its hospital personnel when this advice
was unquestionably issued in consideration of the physiological and emotional
changes complainant, a conceiving mother, naturally developed. Medical
and health reports abundantly disclose that during the first trimester of
pregnancy, expectant mothers are plagued with morning sickness, frequent
urination, vomiting and fatigue all of which complainant was similarly plagued
with. Union official IBB Lesna’s
observation on complainant being [sic] apparently not feeling well during the
investigation conducted by respondent on October 5, 1994 even remains in the
records of said proceedings. For
respondent to isolate the absences of complainant in August and mid-September,
1994 from the absences she incurred later in said month without submitting any
evidence that these were due to causes not in manner associated with her [ ] condition renders its justification of
complainant’s dismissal clearly not convincing under the circumstances.
Despite contrary declaration, the
records bear the admission of respondent’s P/A North Supervisor, PB Ybanez, of
her receipt of the hospital record showing complainant’s RIQ advice for August
19-20, 1994 which could already serve as respondent’s reference in resolving
the latter’s absences on August 15 to 18, 1994.
Respondent further admitted complainant was under RIQ advice on
Petitioner’s
contention that the cause for the dismissal was gross and habitual neglect
unrelated to her state of pregnancy is unpersuasive.
The Court agrees with the CA in
concluding that respondent’s sickness was pregnancy-related and, therefore, the
petitioner cannot terminate respondent’s services because in doing so, petitioner
will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to
discharge an employee on account of the latter’s pregnancy.[11]
Article
137 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 137. Prohibited acts. – It
shall be unlawful for any employer:
(1) To
deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter or to
discharge any woman employed by him for the purpose of preventing her from
enjoying any of the benefits provided under this Code;
(2) To discharge such woman on account of
her pregnancy, while on leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy; or
(3) To
discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to her work for
fear that she may again be pregnant. (Emphasis supplied)
Second. The petitioner stresses that
many women go through pregnancy and yet manage to submit prior notices to their
employer, especially if “there is no evidence on record indicating a condition
of such gravity as to preclude efforts at notifying petitioner of her absence
from work in series.”[12] But it must be emphasized that under petitioner’s
company rules, absences may be subsequently justified.[13]
The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
NLRC and the CA that the respondent was able to subsequently justify her
absences in accordance with company rules and policy; that the respondent was
pregnant at the time she incurred the absences; that this fact of pregnancy and
its related illnesses had been duly proven through substantial evidence; that
the respondent attempted to file leaves of absence but the petitioner’s
supervisor refused to receive them; that she could not have filed prior leaves
due to her continuing condition; and that the petitioner, in the last analysis,
dismissed the respondent on account of her pregnancy, a prohibited act.
Third. Petitioner’s reliance on
the jurisprudential rule that the totality of the infractions of an employee
may be taken into account to justify the dismissal, is tenuous considering the
particular circumstances obtaining in the present case. Petitioner puts much emphasis on respondent’s
“long history” of unauthorized absences committed several years beforehand. However,
petitioner cannot use these previous infractions to lay down a pattern of
absenteeism or habitual disregard of company rules to justify the dismissal of
respondent. The undeniable fact is that during
her complained absences in 1994, respondent was pregnant and suffered related
illnesses. Again, it must be stressed that respondent’s discharge by reason of
absences caused by her pregnancy is covered by the prohibition under the Labor
Code. Since her last string of absences is justifiable and had been
subsequently explained, the petitioner had no legal basis in considering these
absences together with her prior infractions as gross and habitual neglect.
The Court is convinced that the petitioner terminated the
services of respondent on account of her pregnancy which justified her absences
and, thus, committed a prohibited act rendering the dismissal illegal.
In fine, the Court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the CA and the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. The Decision dated
No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
(On Leave)
ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Leave.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Candido V. Rivera (retired) with
Associate Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales
(now a Member of this Court) and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador,
concurring; rollo,
p. 49.
[2]
[3] Rollo,
pp. 49-51.
[4]
[5] Rollo, p. 54.
[6]
[7] 349 Phil. 913 (1998).
[8] Rollo, p. 32.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo, p. 31; Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 18.
[13]